The Church and the Conflict in Northern Ireland: A Case for Corrymeela?

An assessment of an ecumenical organisation working toward peace and reconciliation.

by

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Declaration

This dissertation does not contain any material which has been accepted for the award of any other higher degree or graduate diploma in any tertiary institution.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the dissertation represents my own work and does not contain any material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the dissertation.

Ted Cichon

September 1, 2000



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Abbreviations

AIA	Anglo-Irish Agreement
AIP	Association of Irish Priests
AOH	Ancient Order of Hibernians
AP	Alliance Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIRA	Continuity Irish Republican Army
CRA	Civil Rights Association
CRM	Civil Rights Movement
DCAC	Derry Citizen's Action Committee
DRC	Dutch Reformed Church
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
ECONI	Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland
FAIT	Families Against Intimidation of Terror
IMC	International Missionary Council
INL	Irish National League
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
IPLO	Irish People's Liberation Organisation
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ITUC	Irish Trades Union Congress
LVF	Loyalist Volunteer Fighters
MI5	Military Intelligence (Section) 5
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NI	Northern Ireland
NICRA	Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
NIO	Northern Ireland Office
OIRA	Official Irish Republican Army
OUP	Official Unionist Party
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PSF	Provisional Sinn Féin
PUP	Progressive Unionist Party
RHC	Red Hand Commandos
RIRA	Real Irish Republican Army/ Real IRA
RSF	Republican Sinn Féin
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SDLP	Social Democratic Labour Party
SF	Sinn Féin

UDA	Ulster Defence Association
UFF	Ulster Freedom Fighters
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party
UVF	Ulster Volunteer Force
UWC	Ulster Workers' Council
YMCA	Young Christian Men's Association
YCWA	Young Christian Women's Association
WCC	World Council of Churches

To the twenty-nine people who lost their lives in Omagh, County Tyrone, on Saturday August 15, 1998

A Note on Terminology

The use of the term *Republican Movement* means Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin. The term *Movement* is used by the Republicans to mean IRA. In fact, to the Provisionals, the Republican Movement means the IRA -- not the IRA and Sinn Féin. In this dissertation, the use of non-denominational terms *Nationalists/nationalists* (for Catholics) and *Unionists/unionists* (for Protestants) are used interchangeably. *Loyalist* is the term generally given for more extreme Unionists. Also it is noted here that there is no distinction intended by using lower or upper case in the above terms, as most literature on this subject uses the two cases interchangeably. The fact that these identities coincide with the religion of those who wish to maintain union with Great Britain (unionists/loyalists) and those who aspire to a united Ireland (nationalists/republicans) is a legacy of history. This exchangeability of terms extends to ' the six counties', (upper or lower case), Ulster, 'the province' (upper or lower case) --- all meaning Northern Ireland. Some writers, (as well as usage in the spoken language) refer to the same province, that is Ulster, as the north of Ireland. Similarly, 'the Republic' generally means the Republic of Ireland, as well as the twenty-six counties. Most literature uses upper and/or lower cases, for North/South to mean Ulster and Ireland. Finally, the above interchangeability is often used for the term 'the troubles', which means the conflict in Northern Ireland since 1968. In this thesis, to avoid confusion, references to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) will also mean that the dominant republican paramilitary organisation is the same organisation as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). It is acknowledged that a split took place in 1970, and the former group was known as the Official IRA. Similarly, Provisional Sinn Féin (PSF), is the political counterpart of PIRA, but is also referred to as Sinn Féin.

Abstract

The conflict in Northern Ireland is one of the longest conflicts in post-war Europe. It is often described as a sectarian conflict between Catholics and Protestants. Certainly, there is no other religious division in the English-speaking world such as that which is witnessed in this British province. Although there is a formidable amount of literature on this subject, there is limited discourse on the relationship between the major confessions and the relationship between the Churches and the conflict. In order to gain an understanding of this relationship, and for the purposes of clarity this study attempts to define the terms 'religion' and 'politics'. Moreover, this study examines the relationship between religion and politics and between Church and State in a variety of experiences. Such an inquiry identifies patterns of ecclesiastical and political behaviour. In order to demonstrate this, a historical-comparative method is employed, accompanied with an investigation of the Irish experience from early times to the contemporary period. Thus, in this instance, it is a case study.

However, in the latter part of the twentieth-century, we witnessed efforts at attempting greater church unity. The meeting of the Second Vatican Council, held between 1962 and 1965, was a concerted effort by the Roman Catholic Church to achieve this end. Interestingly, this Council was held before the eruption of the current conflict. Thus, this study also examines the ramifications of Vatican II, particularly in the context of Northern Ireland. Also, in 1965, the Corrymeela Community was founded in Belfast as an ecumenical organisation. Its latter objectives focus on peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, which also means religious and social healing between the Protestant and Catholic communities. Peace movements and organisations seeking social justice are not altogether new phenomena in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the variants, which exist in a changed Irish society, since the beginning of the conflict. These variants include phenomena such as demographical changes, European Union membership, secularisation, constitutional amendments, paramilitary criminality and denominational intransigence. Thus, some of these variants can be viewed as 'adversities' that confront the Corrymeela Community. This examination also enables this study to assess the viability and potential of the Corrymeela Community, not only as an ecclesiastical actor, but also its position in the political sphere. In other words, this inquiry also considers the Community's efficacy in a political environment, which has experienced several significant popular developments, such as the Peace Process, and the referendums held in the Republic of Ireland and in the province of Ulster in 1998. At the same time however, the above do not necessarily detract from the Corrymeela Community's efforts of achieving peace and reconciliation.

Disclaimer

Although every effort has been taken to ensure that all Hyperlinks to the Internet Web sites cited in this dissertation are correct at the time of writing, no responsibility can be taken for any changes to these URL addresses. This may change the format as being either underlined, or without underlining. Due to the fickle nature of the Internet at times, some addresses may not be found after the initial publication of an article. For instance, some confusion may arise when an article's address changes from "front page", such as in newspaper sites, to an archive listing. This dissertation has employed the Australian English version of spelling, but where other works have been cited, the original spelling has been maintained. It was not possible to insert all the accents found in other languages.

Table of Contents

Part II

Introduction

There is no single definitive interpretation of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Arthur Aughey estimated that in 1990 there were some seven thousand published works on the Irish problem, and that by 1997 this figure would have risen to ten thousand.[1] Thus, one may be forgiven for harbouring scepticism about the usefulness of yet another interpretation, adding to the existing body of scholarship. This approach would imply however, that every facet of the conflict has been studied, and furthermore, the knowledge and analyses on this subject are finite.

According to M.L.R. Smith[2], who claims to the contrary that there are 'pervasive ideas about the Northern Ireland conflict', and further disputes that 'it has been rigorously studied'.[3] Smith maintains: 'For the past three decades Northern Ireland has been one of the most under-studied conflicts in the world'.[4] However, he is referring to the military dimension of the conflict. Smith's proposition is that the academic study of the conflict in Northern Ireland has been, 'to a great degree, insulated --- intellectually interned'... from influences and debates at work in the wider academic world'.[5] Among other scholars, Richard Breen and Bernadette Hayes[6] focus on specific concepts, such as religious mobility and political party preferences in

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[1] Aughey, A., " A State of Exception: The Concept of the Political in Northern Ireland" in *Irish Political Studies*, Vol. 12 1997, p. 1.
[2] Smith, M.L. R., "The intellectual internment of a conflict: the forgotten war in Northern Ireland", in *International Affairs*, Vol. 75, No.1, January 1999, p. 78. It is notable however, on this point Smith makes a *volte-face* at a seminar when he refers to the conflict in Northern Ireland as being an over-studied subject. See further discussion in Chapter four.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid. p. 78.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Breen, R., and Hayes, B.C., "Religious Mobility and Party Support in Northern Ireland, in *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3 1997, pp. 225-239.

Northern Ireland. Dominic Bryan, for instance, discusses the significance of 'the right to march', thus arguing it gives the Orange Order a Protestant identity.[7] But at the same time, the annual parades are a demonstration of the control of territory, and not just a celebration of the victory at the Boyne. John Whyte in his work titled *Interpreting Northern Ireland*, examines 'some religious aspects',[8] but he places more emphasis on the religious divisions rather than interdenominational cooperation. In Whyte's earlier study, *The Church and State in Modern Ireland: 1923-1979*, he provides a comprehensive analysis of Irish church-state relations.[9] There is no suggestion here that the above and other studies lack academic merit. Whilst many of the arguments that are presented by the respective writers are valid, social and political changes are palpable since the publication of their findings. Despite the obvious differences of opinion that exist, resolution of the debate is not crucial to this paper, given that there appears to be general acceptance among researchers that religious difference does have some influence on the conflict.

Nonetheless, in a sense we can concur with Smith's sentiments of 'negligible attention from scholars',[10] if we are to examine an aspect of the conflict which *unites* the two communities, Protestant and Catholic, rather than dissecting all the criteria for division. Although, one needs to make the distinction of how the interplay of these institutions, that is, the Church and State alter in times of war or conflict, as compared with their relationship in times of peace. In specific terms we mean the behaviour of the Church. The Catholic Church seems to be inconsistent in its position on nationalist or self-determination struggles. By way of comparison, the Protestant Church in Northern Ireland

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[7] Bryan, D., "The Right to March: Parading a Loyal Protestant Identity in Northern Ireland" in *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, No. 4, 1997, pp. 373-396.
[8] Whyte, J., *Interpreting Northern Ireland*,(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 26-51.
[9] Whyte, J., *Church and State in Modern Ireland 1923-1979*, second edition (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan Ltd, 1980).
[10] Smith, M.L.R., *International Affairs*, op. cit. p. 78.

experiences division within by the fact there are several different Protestant denominations. The three main Protestant denominations are Presbyterian, Church of Ireland (that is, Anglican) and Methodist. Moreover, the characteristics of this relationship are not necessarily unique in the Irish situation when compared with other societies, such as those in Eastern Europe, South Africa, South America or East Timor. A comparative approach in this study will be fruitful because we can identify certain patterns of political behaviour. Thus, we can suggest that there is a certain dualism that exists on the island of Ireland. In other words, in the north -eastern corner of the island, the six counties of Ulster, and its latter history of political violence in real terms, has also meant guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Or, put differently, a territorial and ideological struggle between unionism and republicanism. The Republic of Ireland, on the other hand, in part at least, presents us with a converse situation. This is not to say:

> [T]he Irish Republic has escaped from the spillover [sic] effects of the turmoil north of the border; it has experienced its own share of scandals, violence, trauma, internal instability, restrictive legislation and the wholly negative distortion of its relationship with the United Kingdom.[11]

However the point here is, the relationship between the Irish Catholic Church, the Protestant Churches and the State are different because the political environment is different. That is, there is no armed struggle in the Republic. Its entity as a nation-state impinges politically and ecclesiastically and on the six counties in the North. Although, it may seem ironically that the respective Churches' hierarchy embraces the entire island of Ireland. Armagh is the ecclesiastical centre for the Catholic Church, while the Church of Ireland has its administrative and Representative Church Body based in Dublin, where also the General Synod usually meets. The ecclesiastical centre for the Church of Ireland is based in Armagh. Moreover, three-quarters of the

[11] Ibid. p. 80.

Church of Ireland's members live in Northern Ireland.[12] The above highlights just one instance in a substantial list of ambiguities, paradoxes and contradictions associated with Irish history which will be examined in the course of this study.

At the same time however, given the longevity of Northern Ireland's turbulent past, certain political advances have been made in recent years. Progress has been considerable. For instance, the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998 was followed by an overwhelming endorsement of that settlement by the electorates of Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic in May 1998. Shortly afterwards, in June, elections were held for a new Ulster assembly in order to establish a power-sharing executive to govern the province. The two key words uttered and printed in daily discourse since the inception of the above, have been the term's 'peace process'. But there seems to be hardly a mention of the Peace People, or other similar organisations that had prominence in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Nor has there been much attention given to current initiatives aimed at peace and reconciliation. Certainly, power sharing was attempted in 1972, but like the concept of 'politics' itself; the past three decades in Northern Ireland have witnessed an evolutionary process. The conflict in Northern Ireland has taken on a life of its own and it has not reached its end point yet. Thus, in this study there is a need to trace back to the origins of this process. For instance, in the beginning of the conflict the civil rights movement (CRM) was a grouping devoted to political and social reform, led by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) which was founded in Belfast in 1967. It included

[12] Ford, A., and Milne, K., in *The Oxford Companion to Irish History*, Connolly, S.J., (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 92.

liberals, trade unionists, communists and republicans, but no active politicians.[13]

Thus, it can be said here, that the above organisation was not only secular, but with the absence of politicians it was made up of lay persons: individuals not active in partisan politics. Although its aims included the abolition of the Special Powers Act and the Ulster Special Constabulary, for present purposes, it is of note to mention a key aim was to achieve universal suffrage. NICRA's other aims included an end to religious discrimination in public employment and housing allocation; and an end to the manipulation of electoral boundaries ('gerrymandering'). In other words, these are social justice issues which needed to be addressed by the State, the United Kingdom or, perhaps in the first instance by the Stormont government. The Church on the other hand, as an institution of moral order, it should be required to be vigilant and outspoken when the State's authority and policies transgress the interests and democratic rights of its citizens. In brief, it is when the State becomes an instrument of social injustice. Indeed, analyses of the relationship between the Church and State and between religion and politics have been rehearsed elsewhere; across different cultures, nations and regimes. Yet, it seems rather curious in the Northern Irish context, how the term 'sectarian' is used readily, but little or no reference is made to the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant Churches. Nor is there much in the way of an explanation of Catholicism or Protestantism, except in selected or limited writings. In other words, there is little commentary on the positions taken by the respective denominations and their relationship with the Hibernian struggle. In this study, the 'struggle' or 'Troubles', refers to the

[13] Hepburn, A.C., in *The Oxford Companion to Irish History*, Connolly, S.J., (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 95.

period 1968 to 1999. It will also assume that the conflict in Northern Ireland is not yet resolved.

At the same time there is much debate about the cause and effects of regionalism, globalisation and secularisation. These are concepts that are often analysed at the macro level, but often escape closer examination in the context of a microcosm. For the purposes of this study, we need to investigate, for instance, the impact of Europeanisation on Ireland, north and south. One of the phenomena which can be identified as an effect of the above, is an increasing demographic heterogeneity. This in turn has ramifications for issues such as national identity, language and culture. In Northern Ireland, identity assumes religious and political dimensions. While some researchers may disagree on a definition of secularisation, it is sufficient here to understand its analysis 'as the process in which religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance' in the culture of capitalist societies.[14] Thus in the Irish context, we are required to reconcile the concept of secularisation in a society where religious fundamentalism is not far from the surface. An added complexity in such an analysis is found in further investigations concerning ecumenism and the impact of the Second Vatican Council. To be sure, we need to assess the changes incurred by the above events for Roman Catholics in Ireland and whether these developments have changed the perceptions of Protestants.

Again, a common theme which runs through the study of the relationship between Church and State, and between religion and politics is on the one hand a symbiotic relationship and on the other the ambiguous position of the Catholic Church. This is also evident in the discussion of ecumenism. In

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[14] See Abercrombie, N., Hill, S., and Turner, B.S., *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology*, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1993), pp. 372-373.

particular, the Roman Church still considers the Protestant confessions "to be in error",[15] but at the same time proclaiming 'the Anglican Communion occupies a special place'.[16] Moreover, the concept of ecumenism becomes more problematic by the Vatican II's commitment to Christian unity, but at the same time it creates division by its belief that the 'one true religion continues to exist in the Catholic and Apostolic Church'.[17] It should be borne in mind that the above have global implications. For this study however, it is perhaps best summarised by David Hempdon:

> Ecumenism, ironically, seems to have prospered amid the social, political and ecclesiastical divisions of modern Ireland. Organizations unlimited, from the Irish School of Ecumenics and the Corrymeela community [sic] to charismatic renewal movements and local community groups, meet to pray, study, discuss, reflect, and co-operate. Moreover, recent polling evidence suggests that while many churchgoers are prepared for social co-operation with members of other churches, fewer are prepared to contemplate joint religious services between Protestants and Catholics, and fewer still have any enthusiasm for church unity. Divisions over education, mixed marriages, and old Reformation doctrines have proved remarkably resistant to ecumenical enthusiasm.[18]

Furthermore, according to Hempton, 'there remains a formidable fundamentalist rump in most of the Protestant denominations, which regards closer relations with Roman Catholics as a betrayal of Reformation principle'.[19] Thus the above discourse leaves one serious omission: the central role of the Corrymeela Community, which is *peace and reconciliation* in Northern Ireland. Surely, the aspirations of this organisation must set it apart from the endeavours of the respective denominations noted thus far.

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[15] .See discussion on the Second Vatican Council and its Decree on Ecumenism in Chapter four.
[16] "Churches and Ecclesial Communities Seprarted from the Roman Apostolic See" in Decree on Ecumenism (*Unitatis Redintegratio*) p. 7.
[17] Declaration on Religious Liberty (*Dignitatis Humanae*), p. 1.
[18] Hempton, D.N. in *The Oxford Companion to Irish History* op. cit. p. 168.
[19] Ibid.

Methodology

In attempting to test the hypothesis that the Corrymeela Community has potentially an important role in achieving peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, a two-pronged approach has been adopted. The first involves a theoretical analysis in order to establish clarity in what is meant by the terms 'politics' and 'religion'. These studies are supplemented by an examination of 'the sociology of religion'. In order to achieve this, five brief studies of different situations were undertaken. In brief, each study involves and exacts a historical-comparative analysis[20] of the relationship between church and state in situations of crisis and conflict. Having established the importance of the relationship between church and state, and between religion and politics, this study involves an historical assessment of the Irish experience. This is in part, the case history of Ireland. In other words, the other part amounts to a case study of the evolution of the situation that exists in contemporary Northern Ireland.

The thesis is divided into five substantive chapters. Chapter one defines the terms 'politics' and 'religion'. It also provides a theoretical framework to identify the concept of politics as a process. Thus, it is a useful historical assessment, dating from ancient Greece, the Enlightenment and, to the modern period. Also, it provides an insight into the stratification of societies -- East and West. Moreover, chapter one attempts to introduce the different meanings of politics. A definition of politics is inadequate if it is restricted to just the concepts of power and government. This chapter explores the emergence of gender politics and other contemporary phenomena. In recent times, we have witnessed the emerging prominence of minority groups. The

[20] See Mackie, T., and Marsh, D., in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Marsh, D., and Stoker, G., (eds.) (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995), pp. 173-188.

latter may well belong to post modern thought, but it does not erode the notion of allocation of scarce resources which in turn creates some inequalities.

Moreover, this chapter provides a definition of 'religion'. Also, it canvasses the anthropological, psychological and sociological approaches which have contributed to its present understanding. In this study, Durkheim defines religion in terms of its social functions: religion is a system of beliefs and rituals with reference to the sacred which binds people together into social groups.[21] It is also of note, some sociologists have extended the notion of religion to include nationalism.[22] Thus, on the one hand it may be erroneous to adopt a narrow definition of religion, while the contemporary world is experiencing a diversity of religions on the other. Moreover, the definition of religion becomes problematic when we examine phenomena such as sects, cults and New Age beliefs.

Chapter two examines the sociology of religion and a variety of other experiences. It introduces the notion that Church and State are not just two separated poles. Thus, it investigates the concept of religion as a means of salvation, but at the same time its analysis considers the relationship between religion and the major processes of social, economic and political systems. By utilising an historical approach, this chapter illustrates rational-legal authority relationships and charismatic leadership. The latter phenomenon assists in the understanding and development of the role of the ruler. In this study, the theoretical work of Thomas Hobbes is useful. Thus, such an interpretation of religious bodies as social formations will lead from a typology of religious men to a typology of religious societies.

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[21] Durkheim, E., cited by Abercrombie, N., Hill., and Turner, B.S.,*The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology*, op. cit. p. 356.
[22] Ibid.

The relationship between religion and politics presents us with another set of issues. In brief, both religion and politics are instruments of maintaining a moral order. But citizens, as believers and non-believers, are also members of a secular polity. Thus the problem arises when certain legislation attempts to reconcile religion and politics as proponents of the common good.[23] Although it can be argued that religion ought to be a check on the morality of politics, this chapter illustrates how the two spheres are in principle separate but in practice often overlap.

Part two of this chapter marks the beginning of the main methodological approach in the thesis: an historical - comparative method. To fully appreciate the relationship between the Church and State, and between religion and politics, it is necessary to explore several case studies. Accordingly, it seeks to determine whether there are similarities in the relationship aforementioned between different countries or regimes, cultures and religious denominations. It is the analysis of empirical data to test the above hypothesis. An examination of this relationship in contemporary Germany for instance, has resonance with the Australian experience of having to define 'religion', when respective legal challenges were made by the Church of Scientology. (See also Appendix 2). Thus here we note further problems of defining religion, which in turn demonstrates an overlap between Chapters one and two.

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[23] It is noted in Chapter 2 that the issue of abortion is often cited as a conflictual phenomenon between religious bodies or churches, and a secular state's legislature which attempts to pass laws in the interest of the common good. We can however, in the Northern Irish context cite the issue of anti-terrorist legislation as being in the interests of the common good. See Appendix 4 . Religion, or rather in this case the Roman Catholic Church as an organised religion acted as a check on human rights abuses and on the conditions in the Maze Prison. However, it must be borne in mind that the issue of human rights abuses was raised at the European Court/ Commission of Human Rights beginning in 1978.

Chapter two however, builds on the discussion of the theme of "choseness" which exists in the Protestant, Judaic, Islamic and other traditions. This theme recurs not only among the major religious denominations, but also in other sects, cults and fundamentalist creeds.[24] Moreover, Chapter two examines the position of the Roman Catholic Church and its relationship with politics in situations of conflict and crises. It has often been said that the Catholic Church behaved as the "silent church" during the Nazi regime, when Jews were being persecuted.[25] By analysing the connection between the Catholic Church and conflict, it is possible to determine whether its position is consistent, inconsistent, or ambiguous. It also provides important background data and a theoretical basis for later discussion of the position of the Churches and the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Chapter three is devoted to the historical assessment of the relationship between the Church and State in the Irish experience. However, it should be borne in mind here, the usage of the term 'state' is a convenient shorthand to describe an embryonic political arrangement before the concept of the modern 'nation-state' emerged. (In this study, the term 'state' in the lower case generally denotes a theoretical context, whereas the upper case in 'State' generally implies a national realm, such as British, German, Irish and so forth). Nonetheless, it is necessary to trace the arrival of Christianity in Ireland and the establishment of Catholicism on the island of Ireland. This in turn is useful because of certain international relations, a dimension that held prominence until the latter period. Moreover, it is necessary to provide a

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[24] For instance, in the northern suburbs of Hobart, there is a small religious group known as the "Exclusive Brethren". It is argued in the above, the propensity for religious denominations to proclaim exclusiveness or uniqueness, and therefore increase the possibility of conflict. Although it is unlikely that this group will become a protagonist in a conflict, the point here is to illustrate the concept of exclusiveness that exists among small and major confessions.

[25] See also the case of Bishop Oscar Romero in El Salvador. Jones, D.,"El Salvador Revisited: A Look at Declassified State Department Documents-Some of What the U.S. Government Knew- And When it Knew It" in *National Catholic Reporter*, September 23, 1994 Vol. 30 No. 41, pp. 17- 33.

comprehensive historical account, given the different opinions as to when foreign domination (Anglo-Norman) began. For instance, it raises the question whether the above process began with Pope Adrian IV, an English pope, giving Ireland to Henry II in 1155. Or, whether the troubles began during the Reformation period and culminating when Henry VIII proclaimed himself as King of Ireland in 1542. Several important issues present themselves here. Firstly, historical accuracy becomes distorted, in order to fit into a mythology that assumes cultural importance. In other words, 'a golden age' or a *mythomoteur* , which becomes an ingredient for ethnic conflict. Language grief is just one manifestation of the above. Another issue which arises here is, a history of paradoxes and contradictions: both politically and ecclesiastically.

This pattern of paradoxes in Irish history continues to the present day. For instance, the Jacobite War in Ireland (1689-1691), included the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. The victory in the latter instance is a political symbol for Protestantism today. But, after William III's victory, penal laws were enacted against Catholics and dissenting Presbyterians. Moreover, *United Irishmen* leader Wolfe Tone was a Protestant who faced execution for rebellion in the following century, is now revered by republicans. To demonstrate this phenomenon, Chapter three relies on, among others, the scholarship of Jonathan Bardon,[26] Cecil Woodham-Smith[27] and Tom Garvin.[28] Bardon's study for instance, as the title suggests, focuses on Ulster rather the entire island of Ireland. For this reason, his work becomes useful in a later discussion in Chapter five, which considers the significance of peace organisations in the province. Again, there is an overlap between these chapters.

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[26] Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1992).
[27] Woodham- Smith, C., *The Great Hunger: Ireland 1845-1849*, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1962).
[28] Garvin,T., *The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics*, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1981).

Nonetheless, it is in the latter part of Chapter three which begins to examine the core social issues and the emerging conflict. During this time, the mobilisation of Catholics began, particularly in Belfast and Londonderry which became known as the civil rights movement. It is of note here, the relationship between the Churches and the civil rights movement. In brief, it identifies the early signs of interdenominational cooperation. At the same time however, the nationalists/republicans lacked political leadership. Thus, this void was filled by the IRA. Even though analyses of the various paramilitary groups have been rehearsed elsewhere, Bardon notes that Scotland Yard in a confidential document confirmed that the IRA 'is not organised or equipped to play a significant independent role'.[29] In May 1969 the IRA's total arsenal in Belfast was 'a machine gun, a pistol, and some ammunition'.[30] The point here is, the above gives a sense of proportion of not only an increase in weaponry, but also the escalation of violence which protracted over three decades.

By following a historical continuum, further contradictions are revealed. The year 1848 witnessed a contagion of revolution in Europe. Not only did the British government fear the spread of this contagion to Ireland, the latter was still in the grips of a famine. During this period, the position of the Catholic Church towards the benevolence of the Society of Friends (Quakers) and the starving population, was one of more concern with the fear of proselytism.[31] While it is not necessary to completely revise Irish history in this study, its hallmarks cannot be dismissed. In other words, historical processes such as the rise of Fenianism in the latter part of the nineteenth-century was

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[29] Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, op. cit. p. 675.
[30] Ibid.
[31] *Weekly Freeman's Journal*, W [sic] Dublin, September 25, 1847, in *The Famine Decade: Contemporary Accounts 1841-1851*, Killen, J., (ed.), (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1995), p. 152.

condemned by Pope Pius IX in 1870. On the surface at least, the position of the Catholic Church in this instance, is clear. In brief, there seems to be an unambiguous relationship between religion and politics. The converse, that is, the relationship between the Irish Free State (later Éire) and the Catholic Church in 1937, also appears to be unambiguous. But, these are only sporadic instances because the evidence seems to indicate an inconsistent position taken by the Catholic Church. Furthermore, a symbiotic relationship between the two spheres, adds to its complexity and ambiguity. As we can see, a puritanical Eamon de Valera, the architect of the 1937 Constitution, which accorded the 'special position' of the Catholic Church, had been an IRA member and Sinn Féin president. In any event, Garvin concludes, the churches were in a sense the first Irish political parties.[32]

Chapter four builds on the latter part of Chapter three where we begin to observe some notion of church unity. But at the same time the focus becomes sharper on the relationship between the churches and the conflict. Moreover, this chapter discusses the attitudes of the major denominations towards the conflict. In attempting to test the central hypothesis, a two pronged approach has again been adopted. That is, this chapter is divided into three parts which examines the attitudes of the Catholic, Church of Ireland, Presbyterian and Methodist Churches. The second strategy analyses the concept of ecumenism. A definition of ecumenism involves a discussion of its history. In other words, it too is a process that has evolved, and is often referred to as the 'ecumenical movement'. Nonetheless, ecumenism can be defined as church or Christian unity. A study of this nature demands an examination of the Second Vatican Council (or Vatican II). This study outlines the role of Vatican II and its impact on its Catholic brethren. However, the above event adds to the complexity of ecumenism, and this is palpable in a society such as Northern

[32] Garvin, T., *The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics*, op. cit. p.179.

Ireland. In brief, this chapter is compelled to discuss the issues of mixed marriages, education, contraception and liturgical practice. Not only do these issues have global ramifications for Roman Catholics and non-Roman denominations, in terms of this debate it is possible to demonstrate that these issues are exacerbated in the Northern Irish context. It (ecumenism) is a problematic concept in that it is difficult to assess.

A further comment is warranted here. In Whyte's study, *Church and State in Modern Ireland*, he argues that the developments and effects of Vatican II 'in Ireland have simply paralleled developments in world catholicism'.[33] Furthermore, the Second Vatican Council and Pope John XXIII's desire 'to encourage good will among Christians has had its echo in Ireland'.[34] Interestingly, according to Whyte, 'for the most part these events are irrelevant to a study of Church and State, but their influence has spilled over into the political field'.[35] This was evident in the report of the Dáil Committee on the Constitution, 'which referred to the ecumenical movement to justify its recommendations for amending Articles 41 and 44. (For a full text of Articles 41 and 44, see Appendix 3). However, this may be regarded as a modernising approach in the Republic of Ireland, but it can be argued that the same does not apply in the North. That is, the Protestant population of Northern Ireland does not perceive this amendment of the Republic's Constitution as a separate development from the dogma of the Roman Church. For instance, a closer inspection of the Vatican II's documents (see Appendix 4) reveals an almost intransigent position taken by Rome, on the issue of mixed marriages. In other words:

> Neither in doctrine or in law does the Church place on the same level a marriage between a Catholic and a baptised non-Catholic, and one

[33] Whyte, J., *Church and State in Modern Ireland*, op. cit. p. 354.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.

> between a Catholic and an unbaptised person; for, as the Second Vatican Council declared, men who, though they are not Catholics believe in Christ and have been properly baptised are brought into a certain, though imperfect communion with the Catholic Church.[36]

Surely, the terms "imperfect communion" would be interpreted by some Protestants as another form of "Rome rule." Thus in Whyte's other study, *Interpreting Northern Ireland*, he notes: 'Endogamy emerges from the literature as one of the more important mechanisms by which the communities are kept divided'.[37] At the same time however, caution must be exercised so as not to overstate the issue of mixed marriages. Nonetheless, the concept of ecumenism also embraces the issues of education, divorce and contraception. For instance, on the matter of education in the Republic, it has mostly remained in the control of the Churches. Another aspect of ecumenism includes inter-denominational cooperation. In 1974 the Catholic hierarchy sent representatives to the General Synod of the Church of Ireland. Certainly, such events cannot be dismissed. It can be argued that such meetings are constructive in the pursuit of Christian unity, especially if a 'top-down' effect is going to be influential. But, it can also be argued that an ecumenical spirit needs to be in the "hearts and minds" of the laity and congregations of all denominations. Thus, the Corrymeela Community holds a distinct advantage here. This community of Catholics and Protestants is united.

Returning to the central objectives of Chapter four, Gerard McElroy provides an analysis of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the conflict in the former period, from 1968 to 1986.[38] One of McElroy's main foci, is the involvement of the Catholic clergy and the civil rights movement. In brief, the

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[36] "The Constitution on the Church", Apostolic Letter on Mixed Marriages, (Matrimonia Mixta) cited in *Vatican Council II : The Conciliar and Post Concilliar Documents*, Flannery, A., (ed.), (Dublin: Dominican Publications, © 1975, 5th printing, 1980), p. 509.
[37] Whyte, J., *Interpreting Northern Ireland*, op. cit. p. 42.
[38] McElroy, G., *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Crisis 1968-1986*, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1991).

Catholic clergy supported the CRM, but did not lead the movement. Moreover, the Irish Catholic Church denounces the use of violence. Despite this unequivocal position of the Catholic Church, some Protestants maintain that the Catholic Church speaks for the republicans. However, the relationship between the Catholic Church and the conflict becomes ambiguous or inconsistent, if we examine its position on the hunger strikes in the Maze Prison; (often referred to as "the Maze"). The hunger strikes took place from October 27 1980 to December 18, 1980. Cardinal Tomas O'Fiaich attracted criticism from the Protestant community for his nationalistic and republican orientations. Moreover, the hunger strikes raised further theological antagonisms between the Catholic and Protestant denominations. In brief, the debate consisted of arguments whether a hunger strike can be considered as suicide or, a form of sacrifice with political implications. Interestingly, Padraig O'Malley's[39] analysis of the above returns us back to the issues of mixed marriages, education, and theological differences. For this reason, the above receives further comment in Appendix 4.

During the latter period of the conflict in Northern Ireland, the Catholic Church assumed a clandestine diplomatic role. Father Alec Reid of Clonard Monastery in West Belfast, was a protagonist in the negotiations which brought about the origins of what is now commonly termed as the 'peace process'. This process began in 1988 when Father Reid established a dialogue between Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams and the leader of the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), John Hume. Another mediator in this process is Father Gerry Reynolds, who is also located at Clonard Monastery. Again, we can draw upon historical events as a means for a comparative approach. For instance, abbots as early as the nine-century were involved in

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[39] See O'Malley, P., *Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair*, (Boston: Beacon Press,1990).

diplomacy to help resolve the conflicts between warring Irish chieftains. In the contemporary period, the Clonard 'abbots', Reid and Reynolds, negotiated with the 'chieftains' of the Irish Republican Movement (IRM). This movement had changed its strategy. The republicans now sought constitutional means as a way of seeking their political objectives.

As noted above, the approach in this chapter includes an examination of the main Protestant denominations' attitude towards the conflict. Several observations are made here, which can be summarised in the following. The literature highlights the fragmentary nature of Protestantism. This contrasts with the Catholic population, which is unified into one institutional body. Nonetheless, another point that needs to be made is all the main Protestant denominations condemn political violence perpetrated by the paramilitary organisations from both communities in the province. This theme is frequently cited in, *Violence in Ireland: A Report to the Churches.*[40] Interestingly, this report notes the Protestant Churches claim that 'reconciliation must be sought as the ultimate end'.[41] At the same, the Methodist Church addresses social issues, but it is important to note here, it advocates a strong ecumenical concept.[42] We noted above however, the Catholic Church's supposed commitment to ecumenism. This point is debatable. The evidence (see Appendix 4) seems to suggest reluctance by the Roman Church to embrace the other main Christian denominations as *equally* valid religions. Perhaps one significant point , which can be noted here, is the recurrence of the concept of uniqueness or exclusiveness is maintained by not only the Catholic Church, but also by other denominations. This phenomenon cannot be underestimated. For the purposes of this study, not only is it argued that this

[40] See *Violence in Ireland: A Report to the Churches*, (Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, Dublin: Veritas Publications, 1977). Author(s) not cited.
[41] Ibid. p. 61.
[42] Ibid. pp. 105-107.

is one source of antagonism, but it is also possible to identify the linkages between theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapters one and two and, the empirical discourse in the remaining chapters.

There are two remaining aspects of Chapter four that deserve mention here. Firstly, there is some acquiescence by the Presbyterian Church as taking 'partial responsibility for the terrible situation'.[43] The second point in a sense departs from the central theme of this chapter, but is often overlooked. We have noted above Smith's sentiment, where he argues the lack of scholarship on the military or strategic aspect of the conflict. Thus, the point here is the behavioural dimension of paramilitary violence. Certainly, there is little argument about the political component in this armed struggle. Be that as it may, we cannot overlook the concept of deviance in this analysis. We can rely upon the work done in this area by Durkheim. There is no need here to rehearse his theoretical findings.[44]

It may be useful to consider a differentiation between political motives and criminal motives for some of the violence that has been perpetrated during the course of this conflict. For instance, we cannot altogether dismiss the language that has been introduced into commentaries by the media. It is of note here, whilst media coverage of the conflict is useful, it is not always accurate. Interestingly, the term 'godfather' has assumed some semantic prominence.[45] Again it needs to be pointed out the possible misleading association with the Italian concept of *mafioso*. But at the same time, we need to be aware of Durkheim's treatise on deviance and, how it relates to a

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[43] Ibid. pp. 112-113.

[44] See Durkheim, E.,*The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* 2nd ed., first published 1915, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1975), p. 47.

[45] For instance, see Walters, S., a reporter for the *Daily Mail* . In Walters's article, "Shooting to the Top" Ken Maginnis, a Unionist MP called Martin McGuinness, Sinn Féin's chief negotiator and Minister for Education, the *capo di tutti capo*--- the godfather of godfathers. Cited in *The Mercury*, December 1, 1999, p. 19.

political struggle. For this reason, reference is made to Clive Walker's differentiation of terrorist activity and other criminal offences. By way of an illustration, it is common knowledge in Ireland how the IRA committed bank robberies in the Republic to raise funds for the purchase of arms. Nowadays, a small military convoy accompanies the delivery or collection of monetary funds. Putting criminological sensationalism aside, it is possible here to be embroiled in another debate. The point is however, we need to be aware of the fact that a sociological examination of the above activity is termed as deviance. An ecclesiastical interpretation would determine the above as a *sin*. A behavioural variant would consider it under the rubric of psychopathology, or, as anti-social behaviour.

Chapter five is an assessment of the Corrymeela Community. The name 'Corrymeela', and the term 'Community' are used interchangeably to mean the same thing. From the outset, this Chapter establishes the nature of this community as an ecumenical non-government organisation (NGO). It is the pivotal chapter of the thesis. Therefore, as cases study it is subject to rigorous intellectual interrogation. Again, an overlap between Chapters three and four recur.

To conduct such an examination, it requires analyses of several empirical and theoretical perspectives. In brief, we must consider all the possible variables. To begin with, the notion of ecumenism as a concept is introduced in a conflictual environment. For instance, the ecumenical movement will have different connotations in a society such as Australia, where there is an absence of warring parties. However, this is not to be confused with antagonistic race relations that are present. But before we embark on an analysis of the Corrymeela Community, there is a need to examine other and previous Northern Irish peace movements and their initiatives. Moreover,

they need to be differentiated from the popular mobilisation of the civil rights movement. Nonetheless, this popular mobilisation is a variable that not only serves as an assessment of Corrymeela in this study, but also, there is a linkage in this assessment and between partisan mobilisation and, that of Corrymeela.

Returning to the task at hand, our background information about the Corrymeela Community briefly discusses its origins, organisational structure, its aims and the role of reconciliation. The Community provides this data directly in electronic correspondence by its Leader and in various publications. There is limited discussion of the Corrymeela Community in the literary review conducted for the purposes of this study. Thus, this is an impetus for an investigation of an aspect of Northern Irish society that has a potential to bring about peace and reconciliation. In other words, in the main, the existing discourse on this subject often focuses on the criteria for *division* between the Catholic and Protestant communities.

However, to continue with this analysis we need to consider the variables of minor party mobilisation, the impact of the European Union (EU) on the island of Ireland; the EU's secular disposition; Vatican II and a theoretical examination of pluralism. Again, there are linkages between the nature of the EU and the Second Vatican Council's limited impact on European secularisation. In other words, on the one hand the EU as an entity is a secular concept, while on the other hand the Catholic Church is opposed to secularisation as it can be linked with a pluralistic society that can choose not to believe in religious doctrine. To demonstrate this, a demographical analysis of current trends in Ireland is useful. Changes in maternal choices and feminisation of the Irish workforce are just two examples that come to mind. That is, in Chapter five's examination of pluralism, there exist two prevailing

considerations. One is warranted by the context of the United Kingdom's (UK) liberal democratic arrangement, and two, is the assumption that in such context pluralism represents an ideal. Thus, not one but several definitions of pluralism are required in order to assess any gap which may exist between this ideal and, an existing political arrangement such that in Northern Ireland.

Moreover, this chapter utilises in two instances a qualitative method. One, to clarify ecumenism, its relation with pluralism and, an interpretation of Vatican II's salient points for the purposes of this study. The other instance seeks the opinions of a former Corrymeela participant and its present leader. At the same time, a comparative approach is useful to assess the Community's structure, efficacy and *modus operandi*, in relation to other non-government organisations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace. Each of these organisations has normative aspirations.

An overview of the variables stated above, could be summarised as adversities, which exist in contemporary Irish society. In other words, they are adversities that are faced by Corrymeela. Certainly, not all of these variables have sinister connotations. They do exist however, and it is in the face of these adversities that a proper assessment of Corrymeela can be made in the context of this thesis. It should be borne in mind however, in an ideal situation, a research method that could favour the above assessment would require a period of participant observation. In brief, the researcher would need to be a part of the Community and its programmes.

There is one remaining phenomenon that deserves mention: the concept of hatred, or anti-Catholicism. The significance of this variable (an ideology) is directly related to one of Corrymeela's central programmes, that is, peace and reconciliation. Corrymeela attempts to achieve this by ecumenical education.

Put another way, this programme is also one that attempts to 're-socialise' Northern Ireland's younger generation and others. For these reasons, this chapter discusses a phenomenon that is often described by the term 'sectarianism'. Again, we witness a linkage between our theoretical treatment in Chapters one and two in defining the term 'religion', and current socio-political manifestations in Northern Ireland.

Finally, a few comments on the use of appendices in this study. They serve two functions. One is to provide supplementary data: such as numerical, empirical, or, historical perspectives. For instance, contemporary electoral patterns in Northern Ireland, size and membership of Corrymeela, Vatican II documents and relevant extracts (Articles) from the Irish Constitution complement the main body of work. The other function is to augment the debate of this thesis. Thus, theoretical perspectives are employed to supplement a certain point or concept. In some instances, certain material may seem to belong to a particular chapter. In spite of attempting to maintain a historical continuum throughout this study, an overlap between chapters is inevitable and this is reflected in the appendices.

Chapter 1

Defining politics and religion

Politics is the science of who gets what, when and why.

Sidney Hillman 1887-1946[1]

Men will wrangle for it, fight for it, die for it; anything but live for it.

Charles Colton 1780-1832[2]

Part I : Politics

1.0 Introduction

The above definitions of politics and religion by Hillman and Colton are succinct, but certainly incomplete. They are merely levers for the introduction of two concepts under examination. This chapter attempts to define, firstly 'politics'; and secondly religion. So, what is 'politics'? For, if politics is a science, it is an ideal of science that theoretical explanation should remain within a system of definitions, axioms, theorems and postulates. Thus, there is no single definition of politics that can adequately explain the good, bad, evil, mediocre, contradictory, paradoxical or irrational aspects of human activity (ordered or chaotic) in time and place. Yet, the concept of *order* permeates from the time of Plato, through to the present day. The concept of order also permeates, both as an empirical and theoretical inquiry through the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, philosophy and recently psychology. Order, however, requires power and authority, whether it may be in

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[1] Cited in *Quotations for Speakers and Writers*, compiled by Allen Andrews, (London: Newnes Books, Hamlyn Publishing Group Ltd, 1969), p. 355.
[2] Ibid. p. 387.

organised societies or primitive loose arrangements. For this reason, I attempt to define 'politics' by tracing through the earliest notions of a polity, society, territoriality and kinship, to concepts of political organisation, political systems, political philosophy and political behaviour. Put another way, as politics is an evolutionary process, its study here may be best served by a historical approach. It is probably impossible to trace any particular approach to a single intellectual source. This chapter, therefore, though structured more or less chronologically, does not attempt a precise historical reconstruction. Similarly, some reference is given to an Oriental perspective as well as a more recent phenomenon, such as gender politics.

Similarly, 'religion' has been a part of humanity dating back to the early origins. In the Old Testament, Moses had the tablets bearing "The Ten Commandments". The task here, however, is to define religion. In a contemporary context, such a definition may be difficult in view of increasing secularisation in post-industrial societies, changing perceptions and interpretations of the sacred sphere or spirituality. For instance, on the one hand sacred spheres are set apart, they are alien and extraordinary. They are separated from everyday life and include the supernatural. Yet, on the other hand contemporary studies reveal that religion can be categorised under four headings: political religion, mystery-mongering religion, ritual religion and real religion. The first category is the subject and focus of later discussion, but for now, it is noted here in some New Age phenomena the term 'spiritual' has found rather loose if not inaccurate applications.

The *Shorter Oxford Dictionary* defines politics (plural) as:

> The science and art of government; the science dealing with the form, organisation, and administration of a state or a part of one, and with the regulation of its relations with other states (hence *imperial,*

> *national, domestic, municipal, parochial, foreign politics,* etc.).[3] Also, *the politics,* that branch of moral philosophy dealing with the state or social organism as a whole.[4] *The Politics,* is the name of Aristotle's treatise on political science.[5]

The Oxford Shorter Dictionary expands our understanding of politics by including:

> Political actions or practice; policy; political affairs or business; political life; political principles; opinions or sympathies of a person or party.[6] It also includes conduct of private affairs; political management, scheming and planning.[7]

At this point we have enough tools to launch a more detailed discussion.

1.1 The early concepts

The traditional starting point in discourse on defining politics is the basic unit of political organisation in the Graeco-Roman world, termed *'polis'* which translated into English means a 'city state'. The polis was a relatively small self-contained state focused on a city, though the agricultural hinterland was seen as equally a part.[8] This analysis conveniently utilises the city-state concept synonymously with the concept of 'society'. However, conceptualisation of what we mean by 'society' is necessary. It is sufficient to say that: The concept is a commonsense category in which 'society' is equivalent to the boundaries of nation-states.[9]

The philosopher and founder of political theory Plato was born in 427 BC and died in 347 BC. One of Plato's influential works is found in *Laws* , where

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[3] Onions, C.T.,(ed.) *The Oxford Shorter Dictionary,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 1537.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Robertson, D.,*The Penguin Dictionary of Politics,* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1984, 1993), p. 380.
[9] Abercrombie, N., Hill, S., and Turner, B.S., *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology,* (London: Penguin Books Ltd 1994), p. 395.

he pronounces: You are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you.[10] Another is *Apology of Socrates* . In the latter instance, Socrates the friend and teacher of Plato, is condemned to death and becomes possibly the first martyr for the right of free speech. Such were the events in Plato's time, they led him to pose his fundamental problem: Society, and the body politic, are sick. How can they be cured?[11]

Plato, faced with the problem of how to heal a sick social body leaves us with his version of the organic theory of society.[12] A theory which is an analogy between the city-state and the soul of man: the city-state is the soul writ large, and the soul is a state in miniature.[13] Moreover, Plato recognised the state as being class-divided. Its structure characterised by an unstable equilibrium between the ruling classes, the ruled classes, the money-earning classes and the slaves.[14] (This resonates with nineteenth-century Marxian political theory of "class struggle"). Plato's social examination goes deep. While on the one hand he sees democracy as the rule of many, of the mob, on the other hand democracy is a symptom rather than the malady itself.[15] As Popper puts it, 'For the malady is social revolution --- the revolutionary change has led to the dissolution of the old patriarchal society in which everybody knew his place and was happy'.[16] In brief, Plato alerts us to political degeneration and decay caused by the decline of hereditary kingship, which then becomes an organic *division of labour* in the rule of the state. The decay is then transmitted by an aristocracy, from the rule of the few to the rule of many, democracy. In a word, Plato introduces the notion of *disorder*.

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[10] Cited by Popper, K., in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* (The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), p. 160.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid. p.161.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid. p.162.
[16] Ibid.

Moreover, according to the *Republic,* one of Plato's main works, the main cause of political degeneration is the racial degeneration of the ruling class, or a culture clash.[17] More can be said about this thinker's immeasurable influence on Western thought, but this chapter only allows us to examine a cross section of Athenian political thought. The other political philosopher who deserves mention is Aristotle. Like Plato, Aristotle's aim was to find a way to develop an adequate theory of both human nature and nature in general.[18] For Aristotle, the state is a *natural entity.*[19] (Book I, *Politics*). Humans, naturally congregate: individuals join in households, households band into villages, villages coalesce into states.[20] Moreover, according to Aristotle, the emergence of the state is the culmination of a natural process, and the state is the perfect form of human community for we are by nature 'political animals'.[21] This polemical concept of the 'state' and loosely, society are in a sense central to further discussion and it is very much the backdrop for specific concepts in this study. In a sociological framework, it is the emergence in society of differential access to the means and products of production, and it is the rise of true coercive power, that signal the presence of a new level of societal integration --- the state.

However, like Plato, Aristotle is an elitist when he writes ethics for the aristocracy.[22] By ethics, we mean here to act correctly and be virtuous. What defines a virtue and virtuous activity, according to Aristotle is *reason.*[23] But, reasoning is not a way to learn or exercise these virtues, we must be brought

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[17] Ibid.
[18] Solomon, R.C., and Higgins, K.M., *A Short History of Philosophy,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 56.
[19] Barnes, J., in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought,* Miller,D., Coleman, J., Connolly, W., and Ryan, A., (eds.), (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1996), p. 21.
[20] loc. cit. p. 21.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Solomon and Higgins, *A Short History of Philosophy,* op. cit. p. 66.
[23]Ibid. p. 65.

up to be virtuous. Thus, certain preconditions are required for 'the good life' in the state. In order that humans flourish, they can only do this within the context of the state, and to do this they must be citizens of the state. It is then that according to Aristotle, as citizens they have the capacity to reason on matters of justice and injustice.[24] Further, Aristotle argues a state is a community of citizens, and a citizen is someone who is eligible to hold political office.[25] Indeed, there are different forms of the state and different forms of office.

These differences can be determined by the different types of 'constitution' (*politeia*) or ways of ordering and allocating offices. In brief, for Aristotle humans are political rather than social creatures. Therefore, in Aristotlean discourse social cooperation requires *political organisation*.[26] (Emphasis added). Moreover, Aristotle devises a simple system which Barnes demonstrates below where a state may be governed either (i) by a single ruler, or (ii) by a small group, or (iii) by a large group; and the rulers may rule either (a) in the interests of all or (b) in their own interests. In brief, there are six basic constitutions, three 'correct' and three 'deviant': (ia) kingship, (iia) aristocracy, (iiia) constitutional government, (ib) tyranny, (iib) oligarchy, and, (iiib) democracy.[27]

Although the above simplification is noted, it does introduce the concept of a *political system* that has a distinctive currency in the modern world. For now, in order to avoid confusion the concept of a political system is discussed here in the Aristotlean context. However, as the latter chapters focus on 'specialised' aspects of a political system (for instance pluralism), it may be

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[24] Barnes, J., *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, op. cit. p. 22.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.

useful here to briefly introduce the concepts of 'freedom' and 'rights', in relation to a system. Specifically, the focus is on a *democratic* system. In spite of Plato's and Aristotle's apprehensions about the latter arrangement, it emerges as the "least bad" because this "majority rules" system is a reflection of the will of the majority. However, according to Aristotle this majority is likely to be influenced by the selfish motives of the many bad people who live in any society.[28]

The above alludes towards an inherent tension in politics and in the study of politics. On the one hand, the state exists for the sake of the good life (or common good) --- its end is the well-being of its citizens. If the citizens make up the majority, that is, a democratic system, then it follows that they possess reason and ethics to determine their level of freedom and rights as part of that well being. (This avenue of discussion infers the concept of the social contract, but I will reserve its discussion below, see pages 34 -35). Yet, on the other hand there is no such thing as unlimited freedom, as freedom is normally defined by reference to some limitations, such as the self-imposed loyalty to an authority, or obedience to laws. Why the need for laws? Laws must be instituted in hopes of preventing the stronger citizens from taking advantage of the weaker ones. It seems from the above evidence, humanity, in essence at least has aspired to the notion of democracy or a democratic arrangement in governance.[29] In brief, Palmquist argues that political systems which start out as kingships degenerate into oligarchies, fall into the grip of tyranny or dictatorships, are liberated from oppression by democracy.[30] However, a

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[28] Palmquist, S., *Biblical Theocracy*, (Hong Kong: Philopsychy Press, 1993), p. 19.

[29] Indeed, nearly all political systems claim to be democracies of one sort or another, for example liberal democratic, social democratic and so on. The key distinction in a modern framework would be "democratic" and "totalitarian" systems. However, during the Cold War (and even in some instances today as seen in Northern Korea, China, Congo), there was an array of countries referring to themselves as the "Peoples' Republic", but in fact their system of government was hardly a democratic arrangement.

[30] Palmquist, S., *Biblical Theocracy*, op. cit. p. 17.

sobering thought for the contemporary world is found in Dunn: Today, in politics, 'democracy is the name for what we cannot have -- yet cannot cease to want'.[31]

1. 2 Despotism

Despotism is not a new phenomenon. The term despotism has been conflated with tyranny, absolutism and totalitarianism in western parlance. For this reason it warrants an historical overview. In addition, the Enlightenment period (see below) is in a sense a bridge between the old feudal and despotic political arrangement and the rise of the nation-state and the concept of citizenship. In order to grasp the meaning of despotism, its history must be studied in terms of its four most important phases.[32] Again, such a study highlights the evolution of politics. That is, it took centuries to progress from the rule of one person to say a modern day representative democracy, as we know it. Yet, at the same time, the idea of democracy dates back to the ancient Greco-Romans. For now a simplified definition of despotism is the total political domination by a single person. However, in the latter instance, totalitarianism can also mean governments with unlimited power.

Firstly, in a historical and a political theory framework, despotism has received attention in classical Greek theory by Aristotle. Secondly, in early modern political thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the term was a subject of study for Bodin, Grotius, Hobbes and Locke.[33] Thirdly, in the second half of eighteenth century, Montesquieu's treatment of despotism often replaced tyranny as the regime of evil monarchies.[34] Fourthly, in the

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[31] Dunn, J., *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 28.
[32] Richter, M., in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, Miller, D., Coleman, J., Connolly, W., and Ryan, A., (eds.), op. cit. p. 119.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid. p.120.

nineteenth and twentieth centuries, theorists such as de Tocqueville, J.S. Mill, Hegel and Marx found new uses for despotism for their respective discourses.[35]

A summary of the concept's development is necessary here in order to establish an understanding of this strand of politics. Richter notes that Aristotle developed the concept of despotism and contrasted it with tyranny.[36] The two forms of rule treated subjects as slaves. Despotism however, or barbaric monarchy, was characteristic of Asian barbarians because the subjects 'submitted willingly to an absolute ruler who alone was free'.[37] In spite of the Asian governments being placed in the pejorative category of despotism by Europeans, by the sixteenth century and within Europe, the meaning and prominence of despotism found new applications.[38] As Europe assumed superiority in conquered new lands, it was sometimes combined with belief in the civilising mission of Christianity.[39] Spanish conquerors justified their enslavement of Indians, as well as colonialism and sovereignty, by theories found among others in Hobbes, Bodin, Grotius and Locke.[40]

Montesquieu called into question this justification and concluded that despotism was dangerous, foreign and that a just and free order was most appropriate to modern commercial states.[41] We can add to this, with the rise of capitalism more persons became free. As an analogy, it has currency with the rise of the middle class in democratising nations as seen in the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs). By the early nineteenth-century, the concept

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[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid. p.121.

of despotism troubled the legitimacy of absolute monarchies, just as Aristotle had asserted that they [tyrannies] were unstable. Equally, one can argue that having more than one source of authority might cause instability. (The Glorious Revolution of 1688 may have resonance in the latter argument, but at the same time regicide was an outcome of Charles I's tyranny).

Moreover, as secularisation of thought became a consequence of the influence of the above theorists among others, the belief in the divine right of kings (the notion a monarch's authority came directly from God), lost its acceptance. (Note that this notion of divine right is akin to that of papal infallibility). As society changed in the nineteenth century, despotism was thought to be outmoded and referred to as the *ancien régime.* Tocqueville, in his treatment of despotism referred to the other end of the spectrum of rule, that is, 'the tyranny of the majority'. Another variation of this theme is found in Proudhon, whose 'fifty plus one' proposition means that the forty-nine have not been heard in matters of elections or representations.[42]

1. 3 The Enlightenment and beyond

The Enlightenment marked the movement of intellectual change that penetrated Europe and America during the eighteenth-century, which made possible for humanity's conviction that all things may be encompassed by *reason*. It was also a century of technology which fostered a materialistic viewpoint, belief in progress and utilitarianism. It developed bourgeois modes of life which, containing modern bureaucratic elements replaced the

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42There have been a number of significant results where the Proudonian concept has materialised. For instance, in the 1995 referendum (direct democracy) in Canada on the question whether Quebec should secede to become an independent state resulted in the separatists attracting 49.45% of the vote, with a 94% turnout. As this was not the first referendum on the matter of Quebec's separation, the whole issue of the province's separatist agenda within the Canadian framework has gained the colloquial phraseology "referendum never endum". The other example of close results in a democracy is the 1995 referendum on the issue of divorce in Ireland. The vote in favour of legalised divorce was 50.3 per cent, and the anti-divorce vote was 49.7 per cent.

feudal state with a democratic class society and the principle of popular sovereignty.

Although Enlightenment thinkers shared a belief in progress, their political ideas varied considerably. Thus, it is necessary to highlight some of the salient features of the age. It is safe to say the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the Industrial Revolution and political revolutions, which advanced the legal and social emancipation of the individual. Sudden increases in population also advanced capitalistic industrialisation and certain political thought found specific expression in socialism.

According to Montesquieu, personal liberty could be guaranteed only by a modern state, in which each branch of power placed checks and balances on the others. The branches of power consisted of the executive (the king in a constitutional monarchy); the legislative power, which was exercised by representatives, elected directly by the people (the representational system) and an independent judicature. This concept has currency although more refined in modern democracies as the separation of powers. Robertson, however, makes the point that some constitutional experts have the view that if 'the Crown in Parliament' is a single entity, then the United Kingdom (UK) has 'absolute' government.[43] Moreover, as the UK has neither a bill of rights nor separation of powers, its government could be described as unlimited and absolutist.[44] Again, this demonstrates a difficulty in reconciling political theory and practice.

Rousseau conceived an idealised democratic image of society in his *Contrat Social* (The Social Contract). This concept proposes, since it is the people who

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[43] See Robertson, D., *The Penguin Dictionary of Politics*, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1993), p. 2.
[44] Ibid.

join in the state to protect their liberty and equality, sovereignty rests with them. Moreover, those who govern are the people's functionaries; laws need universal consent, popular sovereignty is also absolute, indivisible, inalienable and manifesting itself in the 'general will'. The general will aims at the best interest of all but at the same time it is (idealistically) identical with the will of the individual. Liberty exists only in this equality, that is, in the acceptance of the general will. The significance of Rousseau's work can be measured in terms of a utopian concept which influenced the French Revolution as well as the democratic and nationalistic movements of the nineteenth century. [45] The question of its influence on the twentieth century's totalitarian systems remains controversial.[46]

Moreover, it should be noted that the transfer of Enlightenment ideas into economic and social life led to economic liberalism. In brief, the motto of *laissez faire* emerged which called for the freedom of property and an order, which would be free from the influence of the state. The main rationale for the concept of laissez faire meant free competition and trade would guarantee economic progress and wealth. However, it was the overlapping of conservative, liberal, democratic and socialistic ideas, which were the hallmarks of the nineteenth-century, concurrent with the idea of an intermediate form of government --- the constitutional monarchy. Yet, it is liberalism, which places its confidence in the progress of reason and is aimed at the realisation of individual freedom. The significance of this ideology can be best summarised in the following points:

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[45] For a detailed account of the transition from revolution to 'the nation as a novelty', see E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Realty* , (Cambridge : Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1990), in particular, pp. 14- 45.

[46] See also Muschamp, D., " Rousseau: The General Will" in *Political Thinkers*, Muschamp. D., (ed.) (Melbourne : Macmillan, 1986), p. 135.

1.Freedom of the individual, protected by a basic constitution or human rights which include freedom of conscience, freedom of thought, freedom of the press and equality before the law.
2. A constitutional state whose powers are limited by the mechanism termed the separation of powers, and laws, which protect the citizen from the state's abuse of power.
3. Participation of the citizens through the election of representatives to a parliament that devises and passes legislation which is a part of governance.
4. A free economy with freedom of trade, movement and association.

By now having outlined a basic nature of politics, we have the materials to further refine our definition of politics. Politics is the method of allocating scarce resources in such a way that people feel reasonably satisfied. The reality however, is that not all people feel satisfied because the allocation of resources to some groups and/or individuals cause deprivations for others which leads to inequality. At the same time, if resources are scarce, and their distribution can cause inequality, then it follows that some kind of *order* is necessary so as to prevent conflict, chaos or even anarchy. Therefore, governments act as mechanisms to allocate the scarce resources which can be under constant pressure during times of war, economic depressions, natural disasters or rebellion. Moreover, a consequence of inequality also results in "the haves" and the "have nots". "The haves" will have a vested interest in the *status quo.* For this reason, rulers of society or the conservatives will seek to legitimise the status quo and the allocation of resources in the minds of the people so that there is a just sense of order.

Politics is also the process of determining policy which can affect society at three levels: the micro, meso and macro levels. In brief, the vehicles implemented to determine policy, or the allocation of resources can include

institutions, élites, the masses, and linkages between executive structures, the total political system and violence. In the latter instance, violence may be a resort for the government to exercise coercion because it has a legitimate monopoly on the use of force. However, this legitimacy is questionable in situations where there is state-sponsored violence or terror. The latter concept of violence has become topical in some discourse on the conflict in Northern Ireland.

1. 4 Chinese political thought

Our definition of politics is deficient however, without some discussion of Asian political thought. A general but brief treatment shows that the various schools of political thought can be distilled to four major schools: Confucian, Mohist, Taoist and Legalist schools. For purposes of periodization, Chinese political thought may be divided in the following manner. The Shang dynasty circa 1766 to 1122 BC, the Chou dynasty from 1122 BC to 770 BC, and the Ch'in dynasty from 221 BC. From 206 BC, China was ruled by a succession of dynasties until the extinction of the last dynasty in 1911. After the short lived Ch'in dynasty, there was more or less a commitment to Confucianism with interludes of Taoism and Buddhism.[47]

Among the early texts in Chinese political thought, two significant traditions are identified. The first concerns 'the mandate from heaven', being the notion that the ruling house is entrusted with the governance of the empire provided its rule is virtuous and benevolent.[48] The second is the exemplary moral behaviour of the early rulers. [49] Confucius (K'ung Fu-tzu, 551-479 BC) whose views can be sought in the *Analects* , was the first political thinker (apart from the legalist Kuan Tzu who died in 645 BC). The Confucian ideal is rule by

[47] Cotton, J., *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, op. cit. pp. 61-62.
[48] Ibid. p. 62.
[49] Ibid.

moral example rather than by military supremacy. [50] The most significant development of the ancient period of Chinese thought was the triumph of humanism.[51]

Moreover, during the Western Chou period man gradually replaced the spirits as master of his destiny. Previously, dynasties which could be established or destroyed no longer were dependent on the Lord's (Ti of Shang Ti) pleasure but on man's virtue. The period was also characterised by a "hundred schools of thought" which enabled a great variety of opinion, criticism and freedom of expression.[52] A similarity is drawn here with the political arrangement in ancient Greece.[53]

1. 4.1 Confucianism

Humanism reached it greatest height during Confucius's time. He taught the universal virtues of wisdom, humanity, filial piety, righteousness, generosity, sincerity, humility, respect, and all other possible virtues. In brief, the keynote of Confucian teaching is that "man can make the way (Tao) great" and individual goodness is incomplete unless it serves society.[54] At the same time Confucius believed those who are scholarly talented, should set the standard of conduct for the common people whose labour is the only source of real wealth.[55] (The emphasis on education here is not too dissimilar from the Aristotlean notion found in *Politics,* Book VIII).

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[50] Ibid.
[51] See *Encyclopaedia Britannica Volume 5* , in 23 Vols. (Chicago: William Benton, 1970), p. 650.
[52] Cotton makes the point of how in contemporary China, Mao Zedong is known for saying "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend". The latter day leader however, used this as a way of identifying his opponents, rather than for scholastic or constructive purposes. See Cotton, J., *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought,* op.cit. p. 62.
[53] *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* op. cit. p. 650.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Cotton. J., *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought,* op.cit. p. 62.
[56] Ibid.

Moreover, according to Cotton:

> Confucius makes no distinction between familial and political authority, regarding the society as an extension of the ruler's household and the well ordered family as the foundation of the state.[56]

Confucius is a proponent of social hierarchy and the division of labour between the peasantry and literati, together with emphasis on men of learning to serve the state. In government, Confucius taught rule by virtue and moral example and righteousness as the keynote in both self-discipline and social organisation.[57]

However, for the greater part China was a purely feudal state. Initially, the king's land was located in the centre but surrounded by smaller feudal states. Central power had no chance to expand as the king's power waned and the independence of the feudal lords increased. Accordingly, the schools of Chinese political thought waxed and waned throughout a two thousand-year period. In brief, the above can be reduced to a feudal age and an authoritarian age. The feudal world legally recognised regional divisions and controls, whereas the authoritarian world was one of absolute unification. Unification also meant there was no restraining authority from the legitimate king above and no controlling influence by the aristocracy below.[58]

During the transition when the feudal world transformed into the authoritarian empire, there were only three attitudes possible in political thought: (i) expression of nostalgia for the disappearing old system, coupled with the effort to maintain or restore it; (ii) recognition of current realities as

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[57] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 5, op.cit p. 650.
[58] Kung-chuan Hsiao, *A History of Chinese Political Thought, Volume 1: From the Beginnings to the Sixth Century A.D.*, Translated by F.W. Mote, (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1979) p. 32.

well as a willingness to the future system and its justification; (iii) 'repugnance for all systems, old and new, and inclination toward individual self-sufficiency and *individual freedom*'.[59] (Emphasis added). According to Hsiao, Confucianists and Mohists belong to the first of these categories, the Legalist philosophers belong to the second; and the Taoists belonged to the third.[60]

1. 4.2 Mohism

The Mohists, like the Confucianists focused on human society, but the former subordinated the individual to the group. Led by Mo Ti, he taught 'promoting benefits and removing evil'.[61] Mo Ti condemned war and proposed the idea of universal love by 'obeying the will of Heaven', thus making him an active promoter of religion in ancient China. Interestingly, Mo Ti approved the belief of spirits because he thought they helped people in proper conduct. Moreover, he believed social benefits in a political sense are achieved when the people are in agreement with their superiors.

1. 4.3 Legalism

Like the Mohists, the Legalists valued society above the individual, but they considered that human nature was basically evil and needs to be controlled through political means.[62] The Legalists represented the notion of 'government by laws'. Han Fei Tzu synthesised the ideas of law, statecraft and power to make punishments and laws as the essential element in the government, thus making the Legalists directly opposed to the government of men advocated by Confucians and Mohists.[63]

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[59]Ibid. pp. 32-33.
[60] Ibid. p. 33.
[61] *Encyclopaedia Britannica ,Vol. 5* op.cit. p. 650A.
[62] Ibid.
[63]Kung-chuan Hsiao, *A History of Chinese Political Thought*, op. cit. p. 40.

1. 4.4 Taoism

Hsiao makes the suggestion that the Taoists are representative of anarchism.[64]For this school, the Way (Tao) is not the way of man but of Nature. By following Nature - that is, by "taking no action", one can gain contentment, enlightenment and peace.[65] Moreover, wars, conventions and ceremonies are considered as not being natural and therefore destructive. Therefore, the ideal man or the "pure man" is a companion of Nature in Taoist thinking, the goal is freedom to be achieved in the realm of Nature.[66] While Confucianism emphasises being, human relations and social adjustment, Taoism emphasises non-being, taking no action, the individual and self-transformation.[67] However, both schools teach the basic virtues of true humanity, they oppose the use of force and punishment, denounce profit as motivation, and exhort scholastic pursuit.

1. 4.5 Buddhism

A number of schools in Buddhist philosophy were introduced into China from India in the fourth century. Buddhist philosophy flourished from the 6th century through the eighth century. For instance, the Middle Doctrine school, evolved from the doctrine of "two levels of truths", namely, "common truth" and "absolute truth".[68] In brief, the main doctrine deals with the mind and consciousness and this is found in the Idealistic school which believes that previous deeds and thoughts affect future deeds and thoughts until perfect wisdom is reached. For our purposes here, however, it is sufficient to say that Buddhism impacted upon the Chinese intellect reaching the height of its philosophical, religious and political influence during the T'ang dynasty (AD

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[64] Ibid. p.41.
[65] *Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 5,* op.cit. p. 650A.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid. p. 650 B.

618-906), contributing in no small measure to the emergence of neo-Confucianism. [69]

To summarise the above, Confucianism changed from a position of supporting feudalism to one of supporting the authoritarian political system, becoming the orthodox school of learning.[70] While Confucianism's influence thrived, Mohism and Legalism failed to survive. It should be noted that the strength of Confucius's theory is secular rather than spiritual, although some have accorded it a religious dimension. In addition, due to the thought of the authoritarian world, the Chinese had no concept of internationalism for two reasons. Firstly, a tendency toward the "doctrine of the great community"; and secondly, an advocacy of the theory of the "adoption of Chinese ways to transform the barbarians".[71] The above points can be summed up by concluding that the concept of the modern nation-state was lacking.

1. 5 Contemporary period

Modern Chinese thought has been concerned with the introduction of Western political theory and reconstruction of traditional systems. The earlier part of the twentieth-century began with the "intellectual revolution", which then led to the critical selection of Western philosophies. Although thinkers like Chang Tung-sun formulated his pluralism on the basis of neo-Kantianism, the strongest influence was Marxism.[72]

At the same time, Confucianism was revived and reconstructed in two different directions. One direction was represented by Fung Yu-lan, who formulated his "new nationalism" notably on the basis of the Great Whole, in

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[69] Cotton, J., *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, op. cit. p. 65.
[70] Kung-chuan Hsiao, K., *A History of Chinese Political Thought*, op. cit . pp. 22-23.
[71] Ibid. pp. 24-25.
[72] *Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 5*, op. cit. p. 650D.

which one is all and all is one.[73] The other direction led by Hsiung Shih-li, was an attempt to reconstruct the idealistic neo-Confucian philosophy in terms of change; the perpetual expansion and contraction as an expression of the Cosmic Mind.[74]

In any event, Confucian thought reached Japan, Korea and Vietnam. According to Cotton, 'even Chinese Marxism continued to incorporate many Confucian preoccupations'.[75] In reality, however, it can be said that Mao Zedong's era was one of totalitarianism, and it has only been in recent times that democratisation has found its way, although it is still at grass roots level. In the corporate climate of today, Marxism has seen a revision which is coined in the phrase of "socialism with Chinese characteristics". Nevertheless, the notion of 'Asian values' (society before the individual) has strong currency in other areas of the Orient, including Singapore and Malaysia.

To sum here, we find parallels between the Orient and the Occident in their evolution of political thought and practice, although under different circumstances and chronologies. For instance, the similarities are observed in the Western notion of the 'divine right of kings', and the Chinese concept of a 'mandate from heaven' in order to rule, to name but one. Moreover, the two traditions contain elements of the idea of freedom of speech and the concept of humanity moving towards freedom. However, it should be borne in mind these are generalisations which facilitate our preliminary understanding of the relationship between religion and politics. In the contemporary sense, democratisation is a feature of some Oriental societies. Yet, in another sense, Northern Ireland, a province within a liberal democratic kingdom is still in the process of developing a democratic arrangement.

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[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Cotton, J., op. cit . p. 66.

1. 6 Gender politics

John Stuart Mill's, *The Subjection of Women* is avowedly devoted to condemning the legal inferiority of women in Victorian England.[76] It is safe to say that until recent times the discourse on women's rights and issues has been dormant. An exception may be found in the suffragette movement earlier this century. The modern feminist movement stems from the 1960s, which spread, to Europe and rest of the Western world. Robertson notes that there is no political doctrine of feminism as such, and there is disagreement among the strands of feminist thought.[77] Basically the movement is to achieve equal political and social rights as those shared by men.

However, feminism resists an easy definition. In the broad sense, it concerns with the social role of women in relation to men in society, past and present and the injustices suffered because of their sex. Modern feminism draws its political aims from the French Revolution and Enlightenment. One of the significant works is more often traced to Mary Wollstonecraft's publication, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, in 1792. More recently writers like Gatens

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[76] For instance, Mill frequently discusses marriage law and its role in creating and perpetuating the conditions of domination and subordination of women. He uses the analogy of women as chattel slaves because the economic and social system gave women little alternative except to marry. Once married, 'the legal personality of the woman was subsumed in that of her husband'. Moreover, Mill challenged the traditional distinction in liberal political theory by arguing that domestic and political life were connected. Marriage law reform would require the end of the subjection of women and institute changes in women's participation in public and political life. In addition, Mill advocated women entering the professions, remunerative work, higher education and be admitted "to all the functions and occupations hitherto retained as the monopoly of the stronger sex". See *The Cambridge Companion to Mill*, John Skorupski, (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), particularly pp. 396-397 and 401.
See also Millett, K., *Sexual Politics*, (New York: Avon Books, 1969), pp. 115-122 for further detail on the history of political organisation and mobilisation of the feminist movement in England and the United States.

[77] Robertson, D., op. cit. p. 186.

take up Wollstonecraft's challenge of Rousseau's notion of inequalities as a part of a natural order necessary for the survival of society.[78]

Moreover, to be 'free' and 'equal' (to men) is not only the language of rights derived from liberalism, but it also demanded inclusion: women as well as men, are rational beings.[79] Furthermore, the different schools of feminist thought are derived from socialist, Marxist, utopian and romantic ideas. While there is a focus on redefining the role of womanhood, some feminists embrace the notion of difference, and others are indebted to redefining sexuality and sexual identity. In some societies, there is an active campaign to encourage women to participate in the political process. For instance, the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition aims at not only addressing gender inequalities, but also, it attempts to highlight the impact on women resulting from the province's conflict.

1. 7 Another approach to politics: A post-modern phenomenon?

This chapter began with an examination of the political philosophers Plato and Aristotle. This part of our definition of politics also ends with an overview of politics at a point when a new millennium is about to begin. It is not a millenarian influence in order to make a unique assessment, or put forward a theory (or theories), but merely a convenient historical or chronological coincidence. In other words, if politics is claimed to be a civilising activity, then there could be no better point in time than to reflect on

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[78] Gatens, M., *Feminism and Philosophy Perspectives on Difference and Equality*, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991), p. 19. Gatens is critical of Rousseau's idea of the natural basis of social life which is found in the patriarchal family. Rousseau writes in *The Social Contract*:

> The oldest of all societies, and the only natural one is that of the family; [which can be viewed as] the first model of political societies: the head of the state bears the image of the father, the people, the image of his children and all, being born free and equal, surrender their freedom only when they see advantage in doing so.

[79] Elshtain, J.B., in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, op. cit. p. 152.

'human progress', more (or less) than two thousand years after Aristotle, Plato and Jesus Christ.

For the above reasons, it is inevitable that the following discussion has an overlap of international and national (or domestic) themes and connotations. Also, there is an overlap between politics and religion, which again is inevitable because individuals can have a secular sense of morality and at the same time claim to be atheistic, agnostic or simply be rational beings in the absence of religious dogma. In one sense, this treatise here is influenced by a post-modernist's views of politics and religion. Given the radical changes in society, even in our own times compels me to comment in the following.

The theories on politics that Aristotle proposed have currency today. That of course may be a simplified view because for good or ill politics is an evolutionary process. Nonetheless the twentieth-century alone, witnessed a mixture of events such as the equal voting rights for women, political correctness, oppression and liberation of nations, self-determination of former colonised nations, two major world wars, a series of international conflicts, genocide, and countless crimes against humanity. Regimes have transformed from being monarchic to a representative democracy, totalitarian, and then to a liberal democracy. The formerly oppressed have taken refuge in the land of their former oppressor. (For instance, Eastern Bloc citizens resettling in West Germany, and occurring within a matter of less than a couple of decades). The list is hardly exhaustive. At the same time, in order to be fair one must consider the human progress that supposedly has been made to make the world a better place. Since Hugo Grotius the world has loosely attempted to realise a concept of international organisation and cooperation. At the end of World War II, the Nuremburg Trials attempted to bring the Nazi war criminals to justice. The international community through sections of the

United Nations (UN)[80] is attempting to address the problems of famine, refugees and human rights abuse. In brief, there seems to be a growing argument for the notion of a global ethic. At the same time, the UN has by no means overcome the problems, which have bedevilled efforts to establish collective security. These are the kind of issues whereby some individuals such as Booth, who expresses a degree of scepticism concerning the ability of the international community to resolve ongoing conflicts and human rights abuse.[81]

There is little argument that the world oil crisis of 1973 affected domestic economies and policies worldwide. For one, it brought about changes in the Australian tariff policy, or the end of the 'Fortress Australia' attitude, which in part was traditionally dependent on commodities earnings in the world market. Countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore to name but few underwent economic miracles against a backdrop of authoritarianism in those respective nations. However, the main driving force which affected state policies, especially in the Western world, is, the concept of *economic rationalism,* whereby the social structure is greatly influenced by economics. This in turn brings us back to Hillman's assertion of politics as the science of 'who gets what and why'. Moreover, what is important here under

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[80] For an assessment of the United Nations as a form of a 'proto-government' see Roberts A., and Kingsbury, B., *United Nations , Divided World,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 1-62.

[81] See Booth, K., "Human Wrongs and International Relations", in *International Affairs,* 71, 1 (1995), pp. 103-126. Booth's study argues that the historical record of international relations and intervention in the globe's conflicts are like 'family snapshots', that is, a focus on its achievements, rather than its failures and shortcomings. However, Booth does acknowledge the progress made towards the settling of intractable conflicts, such as those in Israel, South Africa and Northern Ireland. It should be noted here, that the conflict in Northern Ireland has raised the issue of human rights abuses. For instance, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when republican prisoners in the 'H-Block' of Maze Prison demanded special status as political prisoners. Moreover, the conditions in the prison cells were described as 'inhuman' by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Armagh, Dr Tomas O'Fiaich. See also, Flackes, W.D., *Northern Ireland: A Political Directory,* (London: Ariel Books, British Broadcasting Corporation, 1983), pp. 105- 109.

the rubric of 'who gets what and why', is the *modus operandi* of political organisation to ensure distributive justice.

Certainly, resources are scarce and therefore their allocation requires very careful policies. In any event, we have witnessed the entry of themes which go under the key words in everyday life such as "efficiency", "market forces", "productivity", "economic growth", "privatisation", "ecologically sustained development" and the like. In a sense these are manifestations of the 'minimal state'. Or, the ideology of libertarianism. At the same time however, while there is the claim of scarcity of resources, it can be argued that phenomena such as acid rain, greenhouse effect, environmental, pollution, "tragedy of the commons", hole in the ozone layer, are the destruction of the natural human environment which will result in large-scale social destabilisation. In other words, there is a crisis for the ideology of progress in the West which developed in modern times on the basis of a new kind of confidence in reason and a consciousness of freedom, and which beyond question could point to enormous success.[82]

'Progress, that great god of the modern ideologies' as Küng puts it, 'with its strict commandments, "Thou shalt do more and more, better and better, faster and faster", has disclosed that it is fatally two-faced, and belief in progress has lost its credibility'.[83] Küng's assertion is evidenced by what I argue here as politics' evolutionary process: a shift from paternalism to consumerism. By this I mean, not only has there been a change from primarily property owning males or a 'tyranny of the majority', but citizens are lobbying for their own agendas. To be sure, while major political parties still exist there is the

[82] Küng, H., *Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic*, translation by John Bowden 1990, (London: SCM Press, 1992), p. 12.
[83] Ibid. p. 13.

emergence of single issue parties[84] (such as the No Noise Party in New South Wales) and a number of pressure groups lobbying for such issues as animal rights, law reform, anti-uranium mining, Gay and Lesbian Rights among others. However, it should be noted, similar structures and groups exist in the conflictual environment of Northern Ireland. A similarity is observed for instance, in the notion of minority groups seeking certain rights, social justice, or as diverse as a anti-nuclear lobby. In brief, individualism rather than paternalism, has become a prominent characteristic in several democracies.

This selection of issues leads to the question of whether they are in the interests of the common good or, just those who are marginalised? Or, are they citizens who have a sense of justice or an environmental concern, but also wish to expose the interests of governments or multinationals? Is the common good undermined when it comes to issues like uranium mining or deforestation? In brief, two opposing arguments arise. One could argue such policies are part of the national interest, which theoretically affects all its citizens. The other argument is, that it may follow the line of claiming the above policies result in the destruction of the natural habitat or adding to nuclear arms proliferation. Does politics allocate resources in such a way that all people feel satisfied? Clearly not, as noted above. The reality is that allocation of resources to some groups and/or individuals causes deprivations for others, which leads to inequality. The 'good life' can be seen to be in the hands of the élites (including multinationals). Yet, it can be argued here, the élites of Northern Ireland's society (including church hierarchy) have mobilised the people to partake in the peace process and in the referenda of 1998. Moreover, the electorate can sense and recognise a deficit in democracy between elections of governments (every three or four years)

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[84] Jaensch, D., *The Politics of Australia*, (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1992), p. 318. For instance, Jaensch lists here some forty-five minor political parties which contested federal elections in the years 1945-1988.

and the opportunity to be more participatory in democracy can only be made by the mobilisation of those who feel affected or marginalised.[85] This can be viewed as a form of "compensatory democracy", but at the same time democracy does allow the freedom of speech, association and assembly. The problem is free speech and association cannot always guarantee a fairer distribution of resources or rights. In the latter instance, the absence of a democratic arrangement, limited popular representation and social justice, are some key issues, which have long been associated with popular grievances in the politics of Northern Ireland.

In terms of defining 'politics', that is the 'traditional' understandings of politics remain valid. However, it should be noted that politics is not static. Therefore, if politics is an ongoing process, one should ask: is it cyclical? For instance, if we consider the contemporary situation, nationally or elsewhere, it appears that the Marxian strand of politics has almost exhausted itself. Just over a hundred years after Marx's death, the exploitative character of the owners of the means of production, again occupy centre stage in our society. Certainly, the 'state has not withered away', nor did the Revolution eventuate

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[85] Interestingly and perhaps a cynical critique of representative democracy is found in Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf.*, translated by Ralph Manheim HoughtonMifflin & Co 1943, (London: Pimlico, 1969), p. 341. In order to grasp the context of his derision, I have quoted the following:

> After four years, or otherwise during critical weeks when the dissolution of parliamentary bodies begins to loom closer and closer, an unconquerable urge suddenly comes over the gentlemen. Just as a caterpillar cannot help turning into a butterfly, these parliamentary larvae leave their parliamentary cocoons and, endowed with wings, fly out among the beloved people. [T]hus, the man of the people and the candidate of the working classes turns himself back into the parliamentary caterpillar and again fattens on the foliage of state life, and again after four years turns back into a gleaming butterfly.

There is no intention here to compare the above excerpt to modern liberal democracies. However, I make two points. First, it adds to the notion of totalitarianism that controversially surrounds Rousseau's earlier theory on the 'general will'. Secondly, the above has some resonance with the electorate's perception of politicians as having their "snouts in the trough", that is, spending tax payers' money. For example, the recent travel rorts uncovered in the present federal government in Australia exacerbated the public's perception of politicians as being driven by self-interest.

or a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' as Marx envisaged. However, I argue here that Marx's 'theft principle' still has currency. Neo-colonialism in its subtle and sometimes not so subtle forms, exploits several Third World countries. Domestically, that is, in the Australian experience we have seen the erosion of workers' conditions and entitlements under the euphemism of industrial relations reform. Moreover, the welfare state has declined as such, that the notion of reaching one's fullest potential may be only within reach of the bourgeoisie.

Finally, I argue that politics, like human behaviour is not always predictable. Certainly, by comparative methodology we can identify patterned (political) behaviour that can be useful for analyses. It is suggested here, too often commentators, observers and writers look for reasons for certain political behaviour which they perceive to be outside the parameters of human behaviour. Governments, regimes, political parties and leaders are groups of individuals. It should not come as a surprise that the psycho-dynamics of self-preservation, rationalisation, projection, deviance, denial, distortion, self-interest and deception, are a part of political life and behaviour. This is where controversy, contradiction and paradox also enter the political realm. Yet, according to Crick, 'politics is a great and civilising human activity.' [86]

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[86] Crick, B., *In Defence of Politics*, (London: Penguin Books, 1962), p.15.

Part II: Religion

1.8 An introductory definition

The Shorter Oxford Dictionary lists several definitions of religion, for instance, a state of life bound by monastic vows; the condition of one who is a member of a religious order.[87] For the purposes of this study, it is suggested the following have particular relevance. Religion is thus defined as: 1.Action or conduct indicating a belief in, reverence for, and desire to please, a divine ruling power; the exercise or practice of rites or observances implying this.[88] 2. A particular system of faith and worship; for example, the Reformed Religion or Protestantism.[89] 3. Recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence, and worship; the general mental and moral attitude resulting from this belief, with reference to its effect upon the individual or the community; personal or general acceptance of this feeling as a standard of spiritual and practical life.[90]

Durkheim defines religion as a shared set of beliefs and practices which links a supernatural reality to the everyday world and thus offers meaning to it.[91] To provide an explanation and a definition of religion, it requires an examination of psychological and sociological theories which have been derived from anthropological studies or approaches. At the same time, such a study provides an insight into the origins of religion. Moreover, this inquiry needs consideration of the work by theorists such as Müller, Evans-Pritchard, Spencer, Tylor, and Freud.

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[87] Onions, C.T., *The Shorter Oxford Dictionary*, op. cit. p.1697.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Cited by Crook, R., and Waters, M., *Sociology One*, (Melbourne: Longman, 1993), p. 361.

1.9 Primitive religion and psychological considerations

All human knowledge comes through the senses giving an impression of reality. All reasoning is based on them, and this is true of religion.[92] According to Müller, things which are intangible, like the sun, and the sky, gave men the idea of the infinite and also provided the materials for deities.[93] His point is that religion did not begin by humans deifying grand natural objects, but rather the feeling of the infinite served as symbols for religion.[94] These heavenly bodies in the known world seemed majestic and their attributes achieved autonomy by becoming personified as deities in their own right.[95] Müller further attempts to explain religion by restoring the names of gods and the stories told about them. Evans-Pritchard illustrates Müller's thesis by the use of myth. For instance, Apollo was originally a solar deity and Daphne, the Greek name for the laurel was the name for the dawn. So, Apollo loved Daphne, but Daphne fled before him and was changed into a laurel tree. This tells us the original meaning of the myth: the sun chasing away the dawn.[96]

Moreover, Evans-Pritchard expands on Müller's thesis on primitive religion, where the latter deals with the belief in the human soul and its ghostly form. Evans-Pritchard does this in the following way:

> When men wished to express a distinction between the body and something they felt in them other than the body, the name that suggested itself was breath, something immaterial and obviously connected with life.[97]

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[92] Evans-Pritchard, E.E.,*The Theories of Primitive Religion*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 21.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid. p. 22.
[97] Ibid. The use of the term 'men' is not intended to be used as sexist language. Rather, it is the language of the literature cited here, and elsewhere.

From this the word 'psyche' came to express the principle of life, and then the soul, the mind, the self.[98] After death the psyche went to an invisible place.[99] Müller argues further, that the opposition of body to soul had thus been established in language and thought and when the discipline of philosophy arose, all this was put together again what language had severed.[100] The important point here is, 'language exercises a tyranny over thought' and thought is always in a vain struggle against it.[101] Furthermore, the word for ghost originally meant breath, and the word for shades (of the departed), according to Evans-Pritchard, meant shadows.[102] In brief, these concepts were at first figurative expressions which eventually achieved concreteness.[103]

For Spencer, the origin of religion is to be looked for in the belief in ghosts rather than in souls.[104] This notion however, is flawed because as Evans-Pritchard points out that the idea of ghosts is found everywhere and not characteristic of very primitive peoples.[105] In any event, Spencer claims that the idea of ghosts develops into that of gods, the ghosts of remote ancestors or of superior persons becoming divinities.[106] Thus, the food and drink placed at their graves to please the dead are sacrifices to the gods. He concludes that 'ancestor-worship is the root of every religion'.[107]

In Tylor's view, a minimal and an elementary definition of religion was "a belief in spiritual beings", or *animism.* [108] The notion of a separable soul was

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[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid. p. 24.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Geertz, C., in *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 13, in 16 Vols., Sills, D.L., (ed.), (The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968), p. 399.

used to explain more remote and hitherto inexplicable natural occurrences, 'until every tree and rock was haunted by some sort of gossamer presence'.[109] However, Tylor argues that the higher and more developed forms of "belief in spiritual beings", first polytheism , ultimately monotheism, were founded upon an animistic basis, and were refined by more critical thinkers.[110] In brief, as Geertz notes, an intellectualistic strain has run through most evolutionist thought about religion.[111]

1.10 Freud's interpretation of religion

A psycho-analytic approach is found in Freud's essay titled *Totem and Taboo* . In his analysis of religion, Freud's general account of neurosis reappears to establish the central principle of his theory: that the beginnings of religion can be explained in terms of the Oedipus complex.[112] A shorthand explanation of this theory is what Freud postulates is a sexual feeling towards one's parents, involving attraction to the parent of the opposite sex (especially the mother) and jealousy of the other parent. (The name stems from the Greek legend, where Oedipus who killed his father and married his mother). In terms of our analysis, the above translates into the sons in a primitive horde band together out of a sense of guilt and created a totem which served as a substitute father. In brief, Palmer's interpretation of Freud's theory is to say that 'religion is based on the sense of guilt and the remorse attaching to it'.[113] Put another way, there is a connection between conscience and guilt.

Another Freudian concept that deserves consideration is found in his analysis of religion is *The Future of an Illusion.* For the purposes of this study, Freud in calling religion an illusion does not mean to say that religious beliefs

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[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Palmer, M., *Freud and Jung on Religion,* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 17.
[113] Ibid. p.25.

are necessarily false but rather they must satisfy the believer's wishes; they might be true, although this is unlikely.[114] The question remains, however, is how does such a theory translate in a collective consciousness?

The argument here is two folds. On the one hand, Freud asserts that it is like the obsessional neurosis of children, which arose out of the Oedipus complex. This is because Freud has a male concept of God, a father figure. Religion would thus be the universal neurosis of humanity.[115] On the other hand, because men and women are born into a hostile world where the forces of nature threaten to destroy them, the principal task of civilisation is a potent defence against these superior powers.[116] According to Freud, this is done through the creation of religious ideas. People humanise nature, personalise its forces and turn them into gods in the hope to have some control over them.[117] Put another way, in order to come to terms with the external forces of nature, religion provides a unique set of satisfaction's to certain demands inherent within the human experience.[118] Palmer concludes in his treatment of Freud's theory, religion is a primary *cultural* method by which men and women attempt to deal with the suffering and helplessness they experience in relation to the external world.[119] (Emphasis added). To sum up, what Freud attempts here is an evolutionary history of how man views the universe. He does this by specifying three stages: the animistic, the religious and the scientific.[120]

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[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid. p. 49.
[116] Ibid. p. 35.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid.
[120] Ibid. p. 31.

1.11 Sociological approaches

1.11.1 Durkheim's analysis

One of the early assertions which Durkheim makes in his work *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, is that there was no given moment when religion began to exist.[121] According to Durkheim, whether we examine primitive and simple as well as the more recent and refined religious systems, we need to examine religion as a concrete reality; 'for religion cannot be defined except by the characteristics which are found wherever religion itself is found'.[122] Thus, we can begin to define religion as saying that one characteristic of all that is religious , is that of the supernatural.[123] By this Durkheim means, 'all sorts of things which surpass the limits of our knowledge; the supernatural is the world of the mysterious, of the unknowable, of the un-understandable'.[124] Moreover, he states that religion is a form of 'speculation upon all that which evades science or distinct thought in general'.[125]

Neither the idea of the supernatural, nor the idea of *mystery* is of primitive origin. In the former instance, Durkheim asserts 'the idea of the supernatural dates only from today'.[126] Therefore, in order to say that certain things are supernatural, there needs to exist a natural order of things, or alternatively, the phenomena of the universe are bound together 'by necessary relations, called laws'.[127] It is when humans attribute extraordinary virtues to insignificant objects or to other people that there is an element of mystery attached to these concepts. As Durkheim puts it,' It [mystery] was not given to

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[121] Durkheim, E., *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, 2nd ed., first published 1915, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1975), p. 8.
[122] Ibid. p. 24.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid. p. 26.
[127] Ibid.

man; it is man who has forged it'.[128] Moreover, as Durkheim maintains, 'this is why it has a place only in a very small number of religions'.[129]

Another aspect of defining religion is the concept of divinity. In simple terms it means being divine, a god, or the study of divinity as it exists in Christianity, Judaism and Islam, among other faiths. In this context, being divine can also mean a spiritual being(s). Durkheim makes the qualification that 'spiritual beings must be understood as conscious subjects gifted with powers superior to those possessed by common men'.[130] As they are conscious beings, 'we can act upon them by psychological processes, attempting to influence them, either with the aid of prayers, or by offerings and sacrifices'.[131] Thus, we can infer that a rite or ritual, or ritualistic behaviour and associated symbols are a part of the relations we have with spiritual beings, and therefore the above is a criterion for religion. At the same time, however, even within deistic religions there are rites, which are completely independent of all idea of gods or spiritual beings. By way of illustrating the latter, Durkheim cites the example, the Bible orders that a woman lives isolated during a determined period each month.[132] In the modern day, Saint Patrick is secularly celebrated as a figurehead of 'Irishness' and of Irish identity, rather than his divine acts. Nevertheless, an important qualification is that 'since the object of religion is to regulate our relations with these special beings, there

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[128] Ibid. p. 29. Triune religions have the doctrine of God a s the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. I suggest here, Durkheim's above assertion is clear in this instance. Certain rituals as well as doctrine perhaps compound the idea of mystery. For instance, the sacrament of communion in the Catholic tradition claims the mystery of transubstantiation. In other words, the bread and wine is transubstantiated into the body and blood of Jesus Christ.

[129] Ibid. p. 29.

[130] Ibid.

[131] Ibid. p. 30.

[132] Ibid. p. 34. For a complete quotation see, "First Book of Kings " (Sometimes called "The First Book of Samuel"), 21: 6, *The Holy Bible* , Knox Version 2nd ed. (London: Burns, Oates and Macmillan, 1965), p.248.

can be no religion except where there are prayers, sacrifices, propitiatory rites'.[133]

However, it should be noted there are religions where gods and spirits are absent or at least have a minor significance. For instance, Burnouf observes with Buddhism, 'sets itself in opposition to Brahmanism as a moral system without god and an atheism without Nature.'[134] Nevertheless, Durkheim's study of Australian totemism, that is, the collective rituals involving the emblems of totemic beings displayed 'emotional mass behaviour and evoked a deep sense of *moral identification among the participants*'.[135] (Emphases added). These rituals set apart a quality of sacred acts and objects as contrasted with the profane. For Durkheim they were symbolic of a hidden reality. He concluded this reality was not a psychological one, but a social one. As Geertz puts it, 'the moral force of the community', and 'the integrity of the social order was the primary requisite for human survival'.[136]

Moreover, the phenomenon noted above meant more than collective worship. It created social solidarity. Although these objects had no intrinsic value, they are regarded as 'perceptible representations of the *social identity* of the individuals'.[137](Emphasis added). Collective worship in turn created a moral community, a "church", thus forming major social units. A system of rights and obligations implicit in the social order, together with beliefs and acts were ' outward expressions of inward social necessities, and God was the symbol of society'.[138] In a word, such a definition of religion is firmly set in a social context.

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[133] Durkheim, E., *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, op. cit. p. 30.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Geertz, C.,*International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, op. cit. p. 402.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid.

Religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, presuppose a classification of the things, real and ideal, into two classes or opposed spheres: the *profane* and *sacred*. The profane sphere is that which is encountered in everyday life and belongs to the natural world. In Durkheim's view, anything can be sacred (not just gods or spirits).[139] A rite can be sacred. The inference here is that of a human construct. Nevertheless, rites are the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of sacred objects.[140] However, it is a distinctive trait of religious thought which contains the beliefs, myths, dogmas and legends which are either representations or systems of representations which express the nature of sacred things and the relations which they sustain, either with each other or with profane things.[141] Finally, we arrive at a definition of religion, which Durkheim has devised. It warrants quoting in its entirety:

> A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden -- beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.[142]

1.12 Philosophy of Religion

Philosophy of religion is the study of the concepts and arguments surrounding the idea of a Supreme Being or beings, a God or gods. The idea that God is a necessary being is a fundamental theme of theism. (The belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent and active deity is called

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[139] Durkheim, E., *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, op. cit. p. 37.
[140] Ibid.
However, consider the rite of passage as witnessed in a marriage ceremony. In a religious ceremony it can be a sacrament with prayers stating "what God has put together, let no man put asunder". In a secularised ceremony, a wedding can make no religious reference whatsoever. Moreover, in several countries, it is a requirement for those seeking matrimony to be 'married' by the State. If a couple choose to be married in a church, they may do so, *after* fulfilling the ceremonial requirements of marriage as prescribed by the State, that is, within the statist framework.
[141] Ibid. p. 37.
[142] Ibid. p. 47.

"theism", from the Greek word *theos* for God). Immediately, a number of questions arise. For instance, what is meant by the expression "necessary being"? Why is God necessary? The question " Does God exist"? is perhaps the most profound that human beings can ask. It is the ultimate metaphysical issue. If there is no God, we want to know this too. Whether or not we believe in God makes a difference in the way we view the universe and in the way we live. The purpose here is not to specifically prove or disprove God's existence, but rather to present some of the arguments for the existence of God.

Firstly, there is a need to define some terms. The belief that there is no god is called atheism. The belief that an ingenious being created the world but then left it is termed deism. Polytheism is the belief in many gods. Pantheism, the belief that everything is God and limited theism is the view that God is very powerful but not omnipotent and omniscient. The Western tradition, influenced by Judaism, Christianity and Islam, has been monotheistic. Secondly, the main arguments for the existence of God are identified as teleological, cosmological, and ontological.

1.12.1 The teleological argument

One of the earliest references to arguments for the existence of God is found in Plato's *Laws*, where in a dialogue Clinias claims 'it looks easy enough to speak the truth in saying that gods exist'.[14] [3]Briefly, Clinias goes on to comment on the earth, sun, planets and the order of the seasons and claims that 'there is the fact that all mankind, Greek and non-Greek alike, believe in the existence of gods'.[144] As Pojman asserts, two arguments can be identified here: the teleological (purposefulness) argument, which states 'the design in the world shows the hand of a grand designer'; and the *consensus gentium*,

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[143] Cited by Pojman, L.P., in *Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings*, (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 1991), p. 163.
[144] Ibid. p. 164.

that is 'the consensus of humanity, that virtually all cultures exhibit belief in gods'.[145]

In the New Testament St. Paul writes:

> The knowledge of God is clear to their minds; God himself has made it clear to them; from the foundations of the world men have caught sight of his invisible nature, his eternal power and his divineness, as they are known through his creatures. Thus there is no excuse for them; although they had knowledge of God. (Romans 1:20)[146]

The teleological argument for God's existence begins with the premise that the world shows intelligent order or purpose, and concludes that there must be a divine intelligence, a supreme designer to account for the observed or perceived intelligent purpose or order.[147]

Another teleological argument is found in the work of the 13th century Dominican monk St. Thomas Aquinas, in his *Summa Theologica*. In brief, Aquinas presents five arguments (The Five Ways) for the existence of God, but it is "The Fifth Way: The Argument from Harmony" which is a teleological one. Again, we have here the concept of intelligence and purpose. Aquinas argues that even certain things without knowledge, such as natural bodies work for an End. They do not arrive at their goal by chance but by purpose. But as those things, which have no knowledge, do not move towards a goal unless they are guided by someone or something, which does possess knowledge and intelligence. Aquinas concludes, 'Therefore, there does exist something which possesses intelligence by which all natural things are directed to their goal; and this we call God'.[148]

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[145] Ibid.
[146] "The Epistle Of St. Paul to the Romans", in *The Holy Bible*, Knox Version, op. cit. p.148.
[147] Pojman, L.P., *Introduction to Philosophy*, op. cit. p. 165.
[148] Ibid. p.174.

In William Paley's *Natural Theology* (1802), he offers his famous "watch" argument. The inference here is that of an intelligent designer to account for the purpose-revealing watch. What Paley says, is we must analogously infer an intelligent grand designer to account for the purpose-revealing world.[149] In Paley's words he says:

> Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which exists in the work of nature, with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation.[150]

However, David Hume's work, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* is the classic critique of the teleological argument. In brief, Hume is saying that we cannot argue from the parts of something to the whole.[151] Moreover, Hume makes the point that the world might well be the result of mere chance, as the world exhibits not merely order, but much disorder.

1.12.2 The cosmological argument

All versions of the cosmological argument are based on *a posteriori* arguments.[152] In other words, an *a posteriori* argument is based on the premises that can be known only by means of experience of the world, whereas an *a priori* argument rests on premises that can be known to be true independently of experience of the world. Therefore the cosmological argument begins with the *a posteriori* assumption. First, the universe exists and secondly, something outside the universe is required to explain the existence of the universe. That is, the universe is contingent. In other words, depending on something outside of itself for its existence. That "something else" is logically prior to the universe. It constitutes the reason for the existence of the universe. God is such a being.

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[149] Ibid. p. 165.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid. p.166.
[152] Ibid. p.164.

We rely upon the cosmological arguments given by Aquinas which may be summarised in the following points:

1. Everything in the universe has a cause.

2. An infinite repression is impossible. The series of causes and effects cannot go on indefinitely but must have a beginning.

3. There must be a first cause (outside the universe) capable of producing everything besides itself (which is not produced, but a necessary being).

4. Such a being must be an infinite, necessary being, that is , God.[153]

1.12.3 The ontological argument

The third main argument for the existence of God was first set forth by St. Anselm. Briefly, his argument goes like this: Just as Nature exists through itself, and other beings through it, so it derives existence from itself, and other beings from it.[154] It is an *a priori* argument but raises such philosophical problems as (1) whether existence is a property and (2) whether the notion of necessary existence is intelligible. Furthermore, Pojman asserts it has special religious significance because it is the only traditional argument that clearly defines the necessary properties of God; that is, omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence.[155]

1.12.4 Religious experiences

Finally, our fourth argument for the existence of God is the argument from religious experiences, which appeals to mystical experiences and claims of extraordinary revelations as evidence for God's existence. The problem with religious experiences is that they are experienced in private, and therefore are often dismissed as sensory distortions or delusions. Nevertheless, they

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[153] Ibid. p.165.

[154] Rowe, W.L., and Wainwright, W.J., *Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings,* 2nd ed., (Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1989), p. 6.

[155] Pojman, L.P., *Introduction to Philosophy,* op. cit. p. 167.

deserve some analysis in view of for instance, beatifications and then canonisations are based on evidence of religious experiences.

Two questions arise here. First, to what degree, is the subject of a religious experience justified in inferring from the psychological experience (the subjective aspect) to the ontological reality of the object of the experience (the objective experience)? Secondly, to what degree does the cumulative witness of people who have religious experiences justify the claim that there is a God? In other words, religious experiences are self-authenticating for the subject. In a sense, we have returned to the work of Evans-Pritchard noted above where he argues,'All human knowledge comes through the senses, that of touch giving the sharpest impression of reality'.[157] The brain processes spatiotemporal experiences communicated through the senses. All learning is produced in this way. The brain modifies and coordinates the experience, but there is no good reason to believe that the brain has access to extraphysical reality.

1.13 Another approach to religion

Hitherto now, several theories of religion have been put forth. From the view of sovereignty of the individual, the choice of whether to believe in God (or gods) or not, is a personal matter. It follows that adherence to one faith (religious denomination) or another should also be an individual choice. Similarly, attendance at a church (organised religion) for worship or other

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[157] Evans-Pritchard, E.E., op. cit. p. 21. It can be suggested here that religious experiences are synonymous with miracles. In attempting to prove miracles the Catholic Church turns to scientists to scrutinise the growing number of claims. This raises the question: does a rationalist approach to acts of God undermine basic principles of faith? For this reason the "Miracle Police" explores the increasing phenomenon of Catholic claims to miraculous interventions and as support for the beatification of saints. As Professor Arthur Frank argues, ' science and miracles are not in conflict because they are written by the same author' (God). Source: "The Miracle Police", on *Compass*, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC- TV), transmitted August 15, 1999. In any event, whether we refer to religious experiences or miracles, these phenomena lead us to the issue of "truth". That is, establishing truth, and who has ownership of truth. See Appendix 1 for further analyses.

religious purposes, should also be one of free choice. What is important here, is that no body (or bodies, that is organisations, institutions) has ownership of another's conscience or consciousness. Ideally, if one chooses to believe in a god, then one should freely choose to be Christian one day, Muslim another or Jewish another. In my opinion, there is a danger in one creed proclaiming to be " the only true faith" or the "only true church". Put simply, this has led to the issue of conflicting ideology(ies), manifested as 'holy wars', genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism or messianic missions. Surely, human history bears testimony to the above. Similarly, there is a danger in proclaiming to have a monopoly on salvation.

At the same time however, religion is a part of daily life because it is a human construct. The point is though, whether one is a believer or not, as human beings we all have a relationship with the reality of the universe. In a word, creation; seen and unseen. Hence, it is certainly complex and difficult for humans to come to terms with, or, accept mystery. This is in spite of scientific discoveries, empirical data and reason. Nevertheless, religion does create a moral community. It keeps people aware of their significance and a series of behavioural norms. In other words, it is a societal order. However, it can be argued here, that although there may be little argument about the existence of a moral community, the term 'community', is elusive and vague. Communities can be regarded as collections of people with a particular social structure. Thus, the notion of community, is a significant part in the central argument of this thesis. That is, whether an organisation such as the Corrymeela Community in Northern Ireland, as a moral community or a normative force, can influence the province's socio-political structure so as to achieve a sense of harmony and peaceful co-existence.

By the same token, whilst religion can be a form of social control, and keeping in mind it is a social construct, certain forms of religion are manipulative and patently fallible. That is, even at a micro-level it can cease to have philanthropic qualities, but rather create disharmony, political divisions, excessive fear and affective torment through feelings of guilt.

1.14 Conclusion

We have examined only a broad cross section of concepts to understand what we mean by the terms 'politics' and 'religion'. There are in fact some parallels between the two concepts in terms of their origins, development, evolution and history. In brief, neither has a single fixed definition. For instance, does a post-modernist definition of politics mirror that of the *polis* in ancient Greece? Or, does Christ's instruction to St. Peter to establish a church[158] have the same definitional connotations of religion today?

Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, we can accept the definition of 'politics' as a the method of allocating scarce resources in such a way that people feel reasonably satisfied. In reality, however, not all people feel satisfied because the allocation of resources to some groups and/or individuals causes deprivations for others which leads to inequality. In addition, politics is also the process of determining policy (that is, a general plan of action) which can affect society at the micro, meso and macro levels. The vehicles implemented to determine policy, or allocation of resources can include institutions, élites, the masses, linkages between the masses and the

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[158] In the Gospel according to St Matthew 16: 13-19, Christ states:

> Thou art Peter, and it is upon this rock that I will build my Church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it; and I will give you the keys to the kingdom of heaven; and whatever thou shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatever thou shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.

See *The Holy Bible*, Knox Version, op. cit. p. 17.

élites and executive structures; the total political system and the use of force. In order to implement policy, this usually requires legitimate authority and power.

Moreover, it is of note that in modern societies, the concept of 'politics' is not just restricted to the realm of governance, particular political systems or partisan activity. For instance, we speak of politics in a general sense; that is, in the workplace, trade unions, charities, in sporting bodies, clubs, universities, non-government organisations--- and in religious institutions. The usage of the term 'politics' in the above situations, often refers to the competitive or adversarial nature of allocating scarce positions.

Religion in this study is defined in Durkheim's terms:

> A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden -- beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.[159]

There are however, in the context of this study certain qualifications that need to be specified. For instance, since the time of Peter the Apostle, there has been a fragmentation of religious organisations. Some are for instance referred to as religions, but are more accurately described as sects or cults. Also, even though the subject of this dissertation is focused on Northern Ireland, a Western entity, Eastern/Oriental considerations are taken into account. In addition, the distinction is made here that although the terms 'religion' and 'church' are used interchangeably, by the term 'church', I mean organised religion. To sum up, politics is a process; religion is a value.

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[159] Durkheim, E., *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, op. cit. p. 47.

Chapter Two

The relationship between religion and politic and, a variety of experiences.

Part I

Sociology of Religion

2.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I identified some of the earliest links between concepts of the sacred, that is, the belief in spiritual beings, spiritual forces and their perceived control of human destiny. The Chinese experience showed how 'the mandate from heaven' is the notion of governance being entrusted as long as it is moral and benevolent. For Plato the purpose of the state is 'to enforce decent living, actively to encourage a morality and a religion, rather to satisfy the demands of the population or even just to keep law and order to allow freedom'.[1] Indeed, we cannot enumerate every facet of religion and its relation with society in the course of human history. However, what has happened in recent centuries is not that religion has decayed and replaced by 'all-enveloping positivism and rationalism'[2]; it is merely that new forms of belief have arisen and taken their place alongside the older ones.[3] This chapter examines the relationship between religion and

[1] Robertson, D., *The Penguin Dictionary of Politics*, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1993), p. 374.
[2] Stark, W., *The Sociology of Religion : A Study of Christendom, Volume 1 , Established Religion*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1966), p.1.
[3] loc. cit.

politics, the relationship between the church and the state, beginning with an analysis of the sociology of religion.

In the course of this chapter, our examination includes a definition of sociology of religion, some of problems in defining it, and an analysis of the concept of the ruler in the sacred and profane contexts. Indeed, there are variations on a theme here, but a common thread is identified which is present from primitive to present times. Moreover, under the rubric of the relationship in question, political, economic and cultural systems are investigated. In Part II, the attempt is to link the theoretical discourse with a variety of experiences in the Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions. In a broad sense, it can be viewed as a comparison between the Occident's and the Orient's interpretations of the relationship between religion and politics, and between organised religion and the state.

2.1 The sociology of religion

2.1.1 A definition, problems of a definition and further questions

At one time the sociology of religion was treated under the heading 'relation of church and state'. However as Werner Stark points out, 'from the vantage point of modern knowledge these terms appear far too narrow'.[4] Church and State are not just two separated poles, and the relationship itself is not predominantly legal and political as once thought.[5] Moreover nearly a century ago, there was tendency for anthropologists and sociologists 'to write of religion principally in terms of its alleged inappropriateness to industrial societies'.[6] In other words, religion was regarded as a phenomenon whose significance diminished as societies evolved to a more advanced condition.

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[4] Ibid. p. 2.
[5] loc.cit.
[6] Robertson, R., (ed.)*Sociology of Religion: Selected Readings,* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1969), p. 11.

The two major sociologists who rejected this evolutionary kind of thinking were Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Although not denying the decline of traditional forms of religion, both had the desire to expose the dominant social and cultural characteristics of industrial societies. On the one hand, Weber's emphasis is on the importance of bureaucratic organisations and rational-legal authority relationships, charismatic leadership as well as the notion of salvation and, the disenchantment of the modern world. Durkheim's concerns, on the other hand, are with major processes of social, economic, and political specialisation relating to the division of labour.

There are several approaches in studying the relation between religion and other areas of social life, such as economics, politics and social action and social class. To be sure, for this study we can employ Stark's definition of sociology of religion:

> It studies the religious factor in society at large, and more especially to custom, law, the family, the political, economic and cultural life, and indeed to all the features of social reality with which it coexists, and with which it is meaningfully correlated and connected.[7]

At the same time, because sociologists have chosen to study many different types of religious groups, it would be hard to reproduce a balanced selection of representative denominations or groups in this analysis. Accordingly, the emphasis in this part is upon theoretical and methodological issues. Moreover, Brothers reminds us of some of the basic issues in the sociology of religion such as the question of the status and definition of religion itself.[8] Surely, there is no need to reiterate definitional concepts examined in Chapter one. Nevertheless, one should remain aware of the basic issues in such a

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[7] Stark, W., *The Sociology of Religion*, op. cit. p. 3.
[8] Brothers, J., (ed.), *Readings in the Sociology of Religion*, (Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd, 1967), p.6.

study. For instance, is religion essentially a personal, individual matter and should sociology therefore be concerned with its secondary characteristics, its social consequences. Or, as Vrijhof is concerned with questions such as: Are religious beliefs themselves to be subjected to sociological analysis and are its personal manifestations in individual life merely epiphenomena? Have they any reality outside their social context? Can they be explained wholly in terms of the social functions they perform?[9] Finally, differences of opinion vary according to individual approaches. For instance, as Vrijhof points out, Roman Catholic writers in the sociology of religion have tended to be unwilling to submit the content of belief to examination; in their work certain ideas are taken as given.[10] In any event, the interpretation of religious bodies as social formations will lead from a typology of religious people or individuals to a typology of religious societies.

2.2 The ruler

The earliest notions of the philosopher king in, say, Plato's time have been alluded to in the above. Comparatively, the literature has mostly been descriptive rather than analytical. That is to say, we know what a divine king or ruler was and meant; but we do not know why he was what he was, or why he meant what he meant. In any event, we can begin to uncover some explanation found in the work of Vico, who pioneered exploration of the primitive psyche. Vico differentiates the archaic and modern mind. In the former instance, the archaic mind is described in terms of concrete and imaginative universals, whereas the modern mind thinks in terms of the abstract and rational.[11] It follows, 'the sacred king is a concrete and imaginative universal', and *is* society, in a sense.[12] According to Stark a simple

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[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Stark, W., *The Sociology of Religion*, op. cit. pp. 7-8.
[12] Ibid. p. 9.

illustration of this is found in the economy of the community, where the sacred king is judged as vital by his subjects. Expanding on Stark's example, in the matter of 'food production and hence in terms of collective survival: no king, no crops'.[13] C.K. Meek has written of the Jukun tribe of Nigeria, but throughout Africa most kingdoms were modelled on this principle. They sought to preserve their lives...'by strict devotion to their cults and king', whom they believed to be a 'divine being and guarantor of the fertility of the surrounding country'.[14] Meek sums up his analysis by arguing the Jukun system of government:

> ... might be described as a theocracy, based on the conception that the king is the representative of the gods and the divinely appointed intermediary between them and the people. [H]e is himself the food of the people, and his person is a magical charm which secures the invincibility of the country. He is, in fact, not merely the symbol, but the source of national existence.[15]

The modern rationalist might well argue that the above account is far removed from his or her own age and country and that it belongs to an esoteric field of social anthropology. However, we find in Jacques-Bénigne Boussuet (1627-1704), Bishop of Meaux, when he refers to Louis XIV,

> The man dies, it is true, but the king, as we say, never dies. The image of God is immortal. It is therefore easy to understand that of all living persons, none should be more conscious of God's majesty than kings, for how may they forget Him whose active, distinct and ever present image they always carry within themselves?[16]

Or, by way of a comparison, we can briefly consider a Caribbean example. In 1930 a tribal warlord from a remote corner of Ethiopia named Ras Tafari had

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[13] Ibid. p. 9.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid. pp. 9-10.
[16] Church, W.F., (ed.), *The Impact of Absolutism in France Under Richelieu, Mazarin and Louis XIV* (New York: Wiley, 1969), pp. 73-76.
Bossuet was a proponent of what is called the 'Divine Right of Kings'. For a similar example in the English context, the diarist Samuel Pepys noted, ...'Me thought it lessened my esteem of a king that he should not be able to command the rain'. Latham, R., and Williams, M., (eds.) (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd, 1970) *Samuel Pepys' Diary*, Vol. 3, July 19, 1662 p. 140.

himself crowned the 111th Emperor of Ethiopia in a line traced back to the Union of King Solomon and Queen Makeda of Sheba.[17] His new title was King of Kings, Lord of Lords, His Imperial Majesty the Conquering Lion of the tribe of Judah, Elect of God.[18] Tafari took a new name: Haile Selassie -- "Power of the Holy Trinity".[19] Therefore, the above demonstrates a recurring concept of the 'divine ruler' across cultures, and is also a central theme in the works of Thomas Hobbes (see below).

We can postpone our inquiry of the sociology of religion momentarily, but without detracting from the concept of the divine ruler and the ruled. In 1649 the English regicide of Charles I, literally pre-empted Boussuet's notion of the immortality of the 'Sun King' (Louis XIV). The former instance marked a *volte-face* , but not quite as we shall soon see. My point here is, 'majesty, justice and wisdom', no longer were the exclusive domain of the monarch. Instead,

> The gentlemen that were appointed his [Charles I's] judges... saw in him a disposition so bent on ruin of all that opposed him, and all of the righteous and just things they had contended for, that it was upon the consciences of many of them, that if they did not execute justice upon him God would require at their hands all the blood and desolation which should ensue by their suffering him to escape, *when God had brought him into their hands.*[20]
> (Emphasis added).

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[17] Davis, S., and Simon, P., *Reggae Bloodlines: In Search of the Music and Culture of Jamaica,* (New York: Anchor Books Doubleday:, 1977), p. 69. The text copyright belongs to Stephen Davis, while Peter Simon shares the graphics copyright. For a more detailed account of the Rastafarian worship of Haile Selassie, see pp. 69-79, ibid. The connection between the Ethiopian ruler can be attributed to Jamaican nationalist and preacher Marcus Garvey. In a Kingston church in 1927, Garvey prophesised, " Look to Africa, where a black king shall be crowned, for the day of deliverance is here". After this coronation Jamaican Garveyites consulted their Bibles for a sign. According to Davis, the textual evidence is found in Revelation 5: 2, 5. In 1977, Davis estimates some 75, 000 Rastafari brethren in Jamaica. Ibid. pp. 63-69.

[18] Ibid. p. 69.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Hutchinson, L., *Memiors of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson,* from J. Wroughton, *Seventeenth-Century Britain,* (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 59.

Certainly, the parliamentary structure of the time is another subject of discussion elsewhere. For present purposes, the point remains however, dissent and revolutionary consciousness had disseminated among those (the ruled) who now rejected concrete and imaginative universals. The ruled now had become active in the notion of justice.

Although it may be argued as a historical coincidence, the above account can be accompanied here by the political thought of Hobbes. In brief, we can separate his work into, (1)Hobbes and God, and (2) Hobbes and absolutism.

2.3 Hobbes and God

Warrender and Hood argue that God has a central role in Hobbes's moral and political theory.[21] Coady points out however, an opposing view which suggests Hobbes as an atheist and therefore countering the prominence of Warrender and Hood's above assertion. Nevertheless, it is not the prime objective here to prove Hobbes's faith one way or another, but rather to briefly examine Hobbes's treatise. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes makes the assertion that the religion of the Jews was forbidden by the Roman government (empire) because it was unlawful for the Jews " to acknowledge subjection to any mortall [sic] King or State whatsoever".[22] For Hobbes, "God is King of all the Earth", even though "he be King of a peculiar, and chosen Nation".[23] Moreover, God " by supernaturall [sic] Revelation, planted Religion", thereby making laws and policy which made religion a part of civil law.[24] Hobbes makes abundant references to the Bible throughout *Leviathan*, with a marked emphasis on the "power of God" , or "Divine Power" in his kingdom on earth.

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[21] Coady, C.A. J., in *Political Thinkers*, David Muschamp, (ed.), op. cit. p. 87.
[22] Hobbes, T., *Leviathan*, (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1975), p. 60. Note: The same spelling has been maintained here as used by Hobbes in the original text of *Leviathan* .
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.

Without sovereigns or subjects, there would be anarchy in Nature.[25] It is also evident in his writings how the notion of the 'Laws of God' are to guide individuals along with the 'State of Nature' and therefore a knowledge of the 'Laws of God', is knowledge of civil duty. As Hobbes puts it, ' That a Common-wealth, without Sovereign Power, is but a word, without substance, and cannot stand'.[26]

2.3.1 Hobbes and absolutism

The above provides a glimmer into the political philosophy of Hobbes, but at the same time the point is clear that, God is absolute. God is absolute in terms of laws, power, divinity and rule. Therefore the requisite for Hobbes is, to:

> ... believe there is a God that governeth the world, and hath given Praecepts, and propounded Rewards, and Punishments to Mankind, are Gods Subjects; all the rest, are to be understood as Enemies.[27] [sic]

According to Coady, Hobbes's theory of sovereignty is absolutist as there are no constitutional checks on the exercise of legitimate sovereign power and for no division of powers within the state.[28] Again, we can trace the above, back to the Hobbesean notion of God's almighty power, His omnipotence. In other words, "God reigneth [sic] over men", and for those who break his Laws are subject to his *Irresistible Power* because he has the "Right of afflicting men at his pleasure".[29] Again by using scriptural evidence, Hobbes makes the claim that God has spoken to men whereby " wise and learned interpretation... all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man,...may easily be deduced".[30] Therefore in Hobbes's mind those who are wise and have knowledge are " the Supream Governors on earth, of Christian

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[25] Ibid. p. 189.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid. p.190.
[28] Coady, C.A.J., *Political Thinkers*, op. cit. p. 89.
[29] Hobbes, T., *Leviathan*, op. cit. pp. 190-191.
[30] Ibid. p. 202.

Common-wealths; and of the duty of Christian Subjects towards their Soveraigns".[31][sic]

To sum up, the above gives an interpretation of Hobbes. That is, a demonstration of a prevailing connection between religion in a sociological perspective, that is, the notion of a 'sacred ruler', and political practice. Nevertheless, a more pragmatic interpretation may be found in an interpretative study where Hood argues that Hobbes's presentation of the sovereign is not the head of the body, but as the soul of the artificial body.[32] Therefore, the soul can be described only 'as the principle of life in the body as a whole... [and] until a sovereign has been chosen a multitude of men cannot become an artificial body'.[33] Finally, the act of instituting a commonwealth is interpreted by Hood, as the making of mutual covenants (just as "God is King by Covenant") by a multitude of men. Put another way, it is described as a gift by the major part of the multitude to one man (the ruler) or assembly of the right to present the person of them all.[34]

2.4 The Relationship of Religion and Politics

There is a sense of a recurrent theme in the course of this study. In other words, virtually the same concepts are rehearsed in modernity as they are in the ancient world. Perhaps it is best summarised here by Weber's assertion, 'Even the Christian God is still invoked as a god of war and as a god of our fathers, in much the same way that local gods were invoked in the ancient *polis* .'[35] Put another way, it appears that there is a need for a god 'for the protection of the political interests of his followers' association'.[36] For instance,

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[31] Ibid.
[32] Hood, F.C., *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of Leviathan,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p.160.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Weber, M., *The Sociology of Religion,* 4th ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964) p. 223.
[36] Ibid.

one is reminded of the words traditionally spoken at the launching of vessels, "... and may God protect all of those who sail in her". This example has a familiar contemporary resonance in the Christian tradition, but Weber points out variations on this theme have existed in the Chinese, Hindu, Brahmin and Jewish configurations where 'political victory and especially vengeance against the enemy constituted the real reward granted by god'.[37] A clear example of this idea can also be found in the Protestant notion of "For God and Ulster" in Northern Ireland, particularly among the Loyalist paramilitaries.

Moreover, while on the one hand the priesthood attempted to organise itself as a power independent of the political authorities, the more rationalised its ethic became. Yet, on the other hand a social factor was the assignment to the priests to control over the masses. Some contemporary examples are evidenced in the situations such as those witnessed in Bishop Belo and a predominantly Catholic East Timor; Desmond Tutu championing the anti-apartheid system in South Africa; priests in Londonderry; Pope John Paul II and Poland during Solidarity's rise to prominence. In addition, the contradiction arises within the priestly preaching, that is brotherly love toward fellow religionists and the glorification of war against outsiders.[38] According to Weber, as a general rule this did not markedly ' stigmatise martial virtues and heroic qualities', because a distinction could be drawn between just and unjust wars.[39]

However, it should be noted that not all relations between religion and politics centred on bellicose phenomena. The rise of congregational religions, especially among politically demilitarised or un-warlike peoples under the

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[37] Ibid. p. 224.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.

control of the priests, led to the following realisations. First, the priests' maintenance of power, and second, the characteristic virtues of these classes (patience, deference, forgiveness) were useful in establishing the ascendancy of an ethical god and of the priests themselves.[40] Out of these virtues, which can also include passivity in the face of injustice, an opposing influence became part of the historical process. In a word, it can be termed as pacification. A mystical and personal quest for salvation emerged which was characterised by a religious ethic of brotherly love and rejection of violence. The Quaker ethos is just one example of the latter instance.[41] As empires rose and fell, their respective political power(s) were limited or short lived in contrast to universalistic religions.[42] Again, there is a sense of resonance here with the Confucian ideal of rule by moral example rather than by military supremacy. (See p. 37). However, our concern here is not so much the moral example of the ruler, but rather religious interpretations of social organisation, which includes economic, political and cultural systems.

2.5 Religion and economic systems

Economic activity, as well as the class systems with which they are intertwined, call for moral interpretation. In our definition of 'politics' (see Chapter 1), we have already noted the allocation of scarce resources can lead to feelings of injustice and inequity. In the social system of ancient India for instance, the concrete world was strongly rejected by religion: it was regarded

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[40] Ibid.

[41] Weber also notes the rejection of violence by such groups as the 'genuine' Mennonites, most Baptist communities, and Luther himself who 'completely rejected religious revolutions and religious wars'. Moreover, Weber makes the point:

> This was of course the position of mystical apoliticism, with its absolute indifference to the world, as well as the position of those types of inner-worldly asceticism which were pacifistic in principle.

Ibid. p. 229. At the same time however, Luther's view was that only the secular authority, 'whose domain is untouched by the rational postulations of religion, has the responsibility of determining whether political wars are just or unjust'. Ibid. p. 230.

[42] Ibid. p. 225.

as *mãyã* , or illusion.[43] This radical rejection of the world not only devalued economic activity, but also the propertyless ascetic was both supported and revered, although with some exception.[44] In medieval Europe, the situation was rather different. The gaining of heaven was the Christian's major objective. Therefore as Nottingham puts it, 'His moral problem concerning economic activity was how to engage in it without falling into sin and so jeopardizing his chance of heaven'.[45]

Weber attempts to explain the relationship between religion and economic activity in his work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* Weber analyses religious commitments as the source of commitment to work.[46] In brief, a commitment to work is also a means of salvation. Moreover, worldly material success came to be viewed as a sign that God had chosen an individual (the elect) for salvation in the next world and the source of material success was work.[47] However, this Protestant Ethic has little currency in a secularised world where material success is linked to self-interest, rather than salvation. In addition, it is a limited interpretation because Weber's concern is with those features of the institutional system of modern Western society. Parsons views this as Weber attempting to establish a 'relation of congruence between the cognitive patterns of Calvinism and some of the principal institutionalised attitudes towards secular roles of our own society'.[48] It does not necessarily fit with the Orient's recent rise of capitalism (Asian 'tiger economies'), where in some instances, material success is more linked with concerns for democratisation rather than salvation.

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[43] Nottingham, E.K., *Religion: A Sociological View*, (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 133.
[44] Ibid. Nottingham points out however, at the same time economic exploitation of the masses and the extortion of usurers went unchecked.
[45] Ibid.
[46] See Waters, M., and Crook, R., *Sociology One*, op. cit. pp. 424-425 for a condensed summary of the main theme of Weber's explanation for the rise of capitalism. The authors also contrast Weber's theory with that of Karl Marx.
[47] Ibid. p. 425.
[48] Parsons, T., in *Sociology of Religion*, Roland Robertson, (ed.) op. cit. p. 58.

In a historical context, another problem with Weber's argument as Thompson points out, is that religion did not appeal to a forming proletariat where work experiences did not dispose the multitudes to any calling because their communities favoured collectivist rather than individualist values.[49] In the circumstances of capitalistic labour, 'frugality, discipline or acquisitive values brought profit' to the masters rather than the labourers.[50] Historical anomalies aside, another problem here is found in Weber's assertion of, ' a man does not " by nature" wish to earn more and more money, but simply to live as he is accustomed to live and earn as much as is necessary for that purpose'.[51] Certainly, even by today's standards there some who are satisfied with a humble existence, but I suggest here that again, self-interest is often accompanied by greed or a lack of a work or entrepreneurial ethic. The purpose here is not to find flaw in Weber's argument, rather by an examination of it, that highlights the secular nature of economic systems.

2.6 Religion and political systems

Medieval Christian thought regarded political institutions as means for the Christian to pursue both his sanctified earthly purposes and his heavenly goal, interpreted political authority in moral terms.[52] The notion of a sacred ruler has been noted above, but for present purposes it is sufficient to say all earthly authority was assumed to be ordained by God the universe's Supreme Ruler, and was believed to be delegated to its earthly rulers as a sacred trust. In a sense this reflects a simplistic nature of concrete thought. On the one hand, political authority, thus religiously sanctioned in this case, presupposes

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[49] Thompson, E.P., "The Transforming Power of the Cross", from *The Making of the English Working Class*, cited in *Religion and Ideology*, Bocock, R., and Thompson, K., (eds.), (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p. 159.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Nottingham, E.K., *Religion: A Sociological View*, op. cit. p. 134.

that political authority is moral. On the other hand, another extravagant assumption is:

> Religion as morality itself.
> Religion as the sanction of morality.
> Religion as the completion of morality.[53]

The above may have had resonance with positivists such as Comte in his consideration of ethical societies, but in the contemporary setting we have neither religious homogeneity nor political homogeneity in a pluralist civil society. In addition, we are reminded that 'politics' is a process, and part of that process is that we have moved from a paternalistic orientation to a 'consumerist' position in terms of the distribution of resources. It is argued here, this includes political phenomena. Thus, according to Alford, 'where opposing beliefs about ultimate values enter the political arena, they exacerbate struggles by preventing compromise'.[54] Alford cites three stages of change which have moderated conflicts over ultimate values: secularisation,[55] the weakening of religious belief in general; compartmentalisation, the separation of religion from other areas of life; and homogenisation, or the convergence of many religions upon a consensus on teaching and practice.[56]

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[53] Oakeshott, M., in *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life*, T. Fuller (ed.), (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 39.

[54] Alford, R.R., in *Sociology of Religion*, R. Robertson, (ed.), op. cit. p. 321.

[55] For a more detailed discussion of the process of secularisation, see Smith, D.E., (ed.) in *Religion and Political Modernization*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 8. Briefly, Smith cites five processes of secularization [sic]: 1. Polity separation secularization, which refers to the institutional separation of religion (church-state separation). 2.Polity expansion secularization involves the expansion of the political system into areas of society formerly regulated by religion. 3. Political-culture secularization refers to the transformation of values associated with the polity; that is secular notions of political community. 4. Political-process secularization is the decline in political saliency and influence of religious leaders, religious interest groups, religious political parties and religious issues. 5. Polity-dominance secularization refers to a radical program of secularization by revolutionary regimes that recognize no area of religious autonomy. Ibid p. 8. (Cited as spelt in the text using American English).

[56] Alford, R.R., *Sociology of Religion*, op. cit. p. 321. Alford also notes that all of these processes, or contradictory forms of them, may be going on simultaneously.

The concept which is derived from these processes is the separation of Church and State. This separation is most notable in Protestant societies, especially in Anglo-American countries. Alford points out how this contrasts with continental Europe, in such countries as Italy, France, Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands.[57]A historical survey reveals that during the Reformation period in England, the political authority undertook to break Catholic power without any single religious ethic or ideology guiding its efforts.[58] Perhaps more importantly, unlike the Reformations on the continent, the English experience may have contributed to the relatively high degree of separation of church and state and the legitimacy of religious *pluralism* in British political culture.[59] (Emphasis added). Moreover, religious pluralism and the separation of the state 'from a single coercive church', subsequently had a far reaching influence in the English colonies, except in certain regions such as Quebec.[60]

The rise of religious political parties in continental Europe and the lack of them in English-speaking countries requires some comment. According to Alford, the explanation is simple in that the former are predominantly Catholic and the latter, predominantly Protestant. What is of note however, where Catholics have made up a majority of the population, the evidence indicates that they have attempted to carry out Catholic social policies by political means.[61] Where Catholic parties have arisen, so too Protestant parties have formed in reaction.[62] It should be apparent here the salience of the above analysis in relation to our central thesis. Hence, Alford's study warrants some further discussion. For instance, Quebec's *Bloc Populaire* and *Union Nationale* were nationalist parties which gained support from Catholics

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[57] Ibid. p. 322.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid
[60] Ibid. pp. 322-323.
[61] Ibid. p.323.
[62] Ibid. pp. 323-324.

in the early 1940s. Similarly, Ireland's Sinn Féin, is also a nationalist party and Catholic in its composition, but for now it is sufficient to say that the issue is more nationalistic than religious. Interestingly, both the Canadian and Irish nationalist parties have failed to secure support from the Catholic hierarchy or clergy.

In any event, Alford's work also illustrates distinctive political behaviour of Catholics. Certainly, the above is limited to the United States,[63] Great Britain, Canada and Australia. To summarise his findings, Catholics are more likely to vote for the major Left party than are Protestants. In the US they are disproportionately Democratic; in Britain and Australia, Labor; in Canada, Liberal.[64] However, this distinctiveness does not mean fixed loyalty to their traditional parties. If we assume party identification along class and religious lines, Catholic voting behaviour is complicated by cross-pressures found in the contradictory nature of Catholicism itself.[65] In brief, while Catholicism is a profoundly conservative religion, at the same time it can be powerfully progressive socially.[66]

2.7 Religion and its cultural relationship

For present purposes, it may be useful to first define the concept of culture. A valuable analysis is found in Geertz's chapter cited in Banton's work titled *Anthropological Approaches to Religion*. Geertz defines culture as follows:

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[63] See also Gerhard Lenski's study of American class voting patterns. Lenski also includes in his study Negro Protestants and Jews, who consistently tend to lean towards the Democratic Party. A similar study was done by Lazersfeld, who came up with a similar conclusion. In Lenski's study of Detroit, he found among sons and daughters of Republican fathers who were interviewed, only 13 per cent of those who were white Protestants had become Democrats, compared with 44 per cent of those who were Catholics. See Lenski, G., in *Readings in the Sociology of Religion*, Brothers, J., (ed.), op. cit. pp. 220-223.

[64] Alford, R.R., *Sociology of Religion*, op. cit.p. 326.

[65] Ibid. p. 327.

[66] Ibid.

> It denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.[67]

It follows, those sacred objects and entities must be continually renewed and kept alive in the minds of the worshiping group. Moreover, religious belief not only assumes the existence of sacred objects and beings, but repetition of beliefs strengthens and reaffirms faith. The keywords here are ' meaning ', 'symbol' and 'conception'. As Geertz puts it:

> Sacred symbols function to synthesize [sic] a people's ethos - the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood- and their world view- the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order.[68]

The term 'symbol' has an array of meanings and is used to refer to a variety of things, often a number of them at the same time. For instance, the Cross- initially, is a symbol of Christ's crucifixion, but it has come to represent or *symbolise* Christianity. At the same time, the inverted Cross represents a satanic property, and a burning Cross is used ritually in a perverse sense by certain white supremacists --- usually to express anti-Semitic sentiment. Yet, the same symbol can be used as a piece of jewellery, but not necessarily signifying pious attributes. In any case, 'they are tangible formulations of notions, abstractions from experience fixed in perceptible forms, concrete embodiments of ideas, attitudes, judgements, longings, or beliefs'.[69]

Geertz locates systems or complexes of symbols as culture patterns which have a generic trait of being extrinsic sources of information.[70] To explain this,

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[67] Geertz, C., in *Religion and Ideology*, Bocock, R., and Thompson, K., (eds.) op. cit. p. 66.
[68] Ibid. p. 67.
[69] Ibid. p. 68.
[70] Ibid. pp. 68-69.

he employs Horowitz's analogy of genes as ' sources of information'--- they provide a blueprint in terms of which processes external to themselves can be given a definite form.[71] Thus in this context, humans gain a conception from some symbolic source. Moreover, we can argue that cultural patterns are 'models', in that 'they are sets of symbols whose relations to one another' model 'relations among entities or processes in physical, organic, social, or psychological systems' by 'paralleling', 'imitating', or ' simulating' them.[72] Furthermore, the potency of cultural patterns cannot escape mention here. According to Geertz, although a generality as he admits, 'man's innate response capacities means that without the assistance of cultural patterns he would functionally be incomplete'.[73] The significance of cultural patterns is further compounded by his assertion, 'Man *depends* upon symbols and symbol systems with a dependence so great as to be decisive for his cultural viability'.[74] Finally, we can include in a system of symbols - ritual or consecrated behaviour. It may take the form of a ceremonial recitation of a myth, the burning of incense, or the placing of a wreath at a grave. What is important about this behaviour is the conviction that religious conceptions are veridical. That is, in ritual the world as lived and the world as imagined, fused under the agency of a single set of symbolic forms, remain the same world, but there is a transformation in one's sense of reality.[75]

How does the above theoretical framework translate into religious beliefs and practices? We can answer this by way of a summary, consistent with Geertz's study. As he puts it:

> [R]eligion on one side anchors the power of our symbolic resources for formulating analytic ideas in an authoritative conception of the

[71] Ibid. p. 69.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid. p. 71.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid. p. 74.

> overall shape of reality,... on the other side it anchors the power of our, also symbolic, resources for expressing emotion - moods, sentiments, passions, affections, feelings - in a similar conception of its pervasive tenor, its inherent tone and temper.[76]

Finally, the religious perspective differs from the common-sensical in that, by our definition of religion, it moves beyond the realities of everyday life.

2.8 Church and State, or religion and politics ?

So far, we have only seen glimpses of the relation between religion and politics. In this part we distinguish the specificity of this relationship. To be sure, we have noted the role of the gods or spirits in the ancient world, or the notion of moral authority found in the ruler, but so far I have eschewed the notion of organised religion, that is, a church and its relation with politics. Churches here, mean all religious organisations. The problem of church and state has to do with institutions and the spheres of action that are appropriate for each. Therefore, the concept of separation is valid. The government does not appoint bishops and pastors for the churches. Churches, do not appoint presidents, cabinets and judges. No religion can be favoured over others or supported by taxes.[77] The state has no role or authority in defining beliefs

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[76] Ibid. p.73.

[77] The above argument may have varied currency in Australia. Take for instance, education. In the 1960s, 'independent' schools' or non-government were and probably still are schools and colleges administered by various religious denominations (Anglican, Catholic, Presbyterian, Quaker, Methodist and so forth). A number of schools could not exist solely from fees paid by the pupils' parents or guardians. Moreover, there existed a gap in the redistribution of government funds between high and low resource (Catholic) non-government schools. See Mortensen, K.G., *Politics and Sociology of Funding Australian Schools: 1962-84,* (Melbourne: Gerald Griffin Press, 1985), particularly pp. 184-225.
Similarly, a number of hospitals in Australia are run through the auspices of religious orders. For instance, the St. Vincent's hospitals are associated with the order, the Sisters of Charity, but at the same time these hospitals are administered as public hospitals, and therefore they are funded by a state and /or federal government. The overlap between the State and Church in administering certain social policies has been more accentuated in Australia in recent times. For instance, the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES), has been out-sourced to a number of church-based agencies, including the Salvation Army, Roman Catholic Church, Mission Australia and the Wesley Mission. An extensive discussion of the above is found in: "For God or Caesar", Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC- Television), *Compass,* transmitted on May 14, 2000.

relating to God and worship and the free exercise of religion is to be guaranteed. There is no religious prerequisite to hold office. However, this is not a universal reality as the situation in some Islamic countries is a theocratic arrangement.

Nevertheless, in a secularised society complications exist that confound any simple notion of religious neutrality or pure secularism in the national life.[78] While it is not possible here to enumerate all the instances of the above, a short list will illustrate the nature of this phenomenon. We noted above how Alford (see p. 83) argued the notion of separation of state from a ' single coercive church ' in Britain , but also in Anglo-American countries. Yet, the coronation of the English monarch seeks legitimation from the Archbishop of Canterbury; the Australian federal parliament commences each session of sitting with the recital of the Lord's Prayer; and, 'Thanksgiving defines a peculiar duty and destiny under the Providence of God'.[79] It is also of note, as Cauthen points out that in the American experience, it is incarnate in its history that a kind of " civil religion " finds expression in founding documents, coins, speeches of presidents, the pledge of allegiance and so forth.[80] Benjamin Franklin's " public theology" affirms the reality of God the Creator as the Author of certain human rights such as liberty and equality, 'gives a sacred dimension' to national holidays.[81] In spite of the above instances, which can loosely qualify a " Christian nation", they have no official status. Yet, the ambiguity exists when "God" is included in the Constitution and in the expression, "In God We Trust". Does this offend the atheists? At the same time however, problems arise in trying to negotiate between avoiding

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[78] Cauthen, K., "Religion and Politics versus Church and State", <http://www.frontiernet.com/~kenc/relandpo.htm>. Sighted June 2, 1999.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.

an establishment of religion and permitting its free exercise. Similarly, individuals should be free to believe in God, or not to believe. The judicial system makes a sweeping assumption when individuals are coerced to make an oath on the Bible when giving testimony. To sum up, all these conflicts occur between two spheres of authority and activity that are in principle separate but in practice often overlap.

2.9 Religion and politics

The problem of religion and politics defines another set of issues. Citizens who belong to religious groups are also members of the secular society. As Cauthen argues, ' Religious beliefs have moral and social implications, and it is appropriate for people of faith to express these through their activities as citizens in the political order'.[82] It follows, that as ethical convictions are rooted in religious faith, this does not disqualify them from the political realm. By the same token, they do not have secular validity merely because they are thought by their exponents to be religiously authorised. Rather, they need to be argued for in the appropriate social and political terms in harmony with national values. In brief, the social and political terms are intended to promote the common good.

An often cited example and is also used to illustrate the problem that arises when attempting to 'reconcile' religion and politics as proponents of the common good, is found in the issue of abortion. On the one hand there are some Christians, Jews and Muslims who will take the position of referring to abortion as killing or murder, which finds its religious authority in the Fifth Commandment. On the other hand, other groups of individuals argue for the *right* to have abortion on demand. The following attempts to clarify this issue in the context of religion and politics in general.

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[82] Ibid. p. 2

In the first instance, all attempts to get laws passed are efforts to impose the beliefs of some on everybody. At the same time, it is legitimate for a group of people to try to get a law passed if they believe it will promote the common good. As Cauthen points out, whether they are successful in getting the coercive power of the state behind any policy depends on whether they have sufficient political power, not on whether the legislation they seek is good or wise as judged by those who oppose it.[83] In that sense, it is appropriate for Christians, Jews or Muslims who are inclined to get laws passed that make abortion illegal, not because abortion is judged to be morally wrong by the specific religious doctrines held by them, but because it would be a wise and good law in terms of the *values* resident in the cultural traditions of the nation as a secular society.

It is also noteworthy however, those religiously based convictions about society and morality are as legitimate as those that originate from non-religious philosophies. Hence, in the former instance Christians, Jews or Muslims may seek to get laws passed that are mandated by their religious convictions as long as they have a secular purpose and do not constitute an establishment of religion. A recent development in Germany warrants a pause here in discussing the above theoretical blueprint, but without necessarily disturbing the sequence of our overall analysis. The case in point is the German policy toward the Church of Scientology.[84]

Although German state-church relations will receive a more detailed discussion in the following section, for present purposes a significant point

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[83] Ibid.

[84] Moseley, E.A., "Defining religious tolerance: German policy toward the Church of Scientology", in *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, November 1997, Vol. 30 No.5, pp.1129-1171.

initially is that the Federal Constitutional Court as the guardian of the Basic Law. Not only does the Basic Law institutionalise fundamental human rights, it encompasses communitarian values, and "subjects positive law to a higher moral code."[85] Moreover, individual liberty is derived from the state: The state does not protect liberty, it provides it.[86] In addition, Article IV guarantees freedom of religious thought and practice. More specifically, it states, "Freedom of faith, of conscience, and freedom of creed, religious or ideological shall be inviolable... The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed".[87] In the case of establishing a Church of Scientology, the state is constitutionally bound to protect religious minorities from domination by *majoritarian* religious groups. In this sense, the notion of 'promoting the common good' is subject to contention. On the one hand, the German state has demonstrated its willingness to uphold the guarantee that "there will be no state religion"[88] (for instance, its decision to have crosses and crucifixes removed from classrooms). But on the other hand, as Moseley points out, 'the traditional partnership between Christian churches and the state, continued by the Basic Law, may fail to protect minority groups from majoritarian pressure'.[89] Yet, surely the common good also *must* be interpreted as fundamental rights and freedom are to be enjoyed by *all* German citizens. Clearly, this includes minorities. It tempts the question of whether the common good is prescribed for the majoritarian religions at the exclusion of organisations such as the Church of Scientology. At the same time, as Moseley notes :

> The German theory of religious freedom does not imply... the state's total withdrawal from religion. Indeed, an absolute separation between church and state would constitute a radical break from the

[85] Ibid. p. 1137.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid. p.1139.
[88] Ibid. p.1141.
[89] Ibid.

> historical *cultural norm*, undermining the Basic Laws popular acceptance and political legitimacy.[90] (Emphasis added).

The above exercise demonstrates the thorny problem of the relationship between religion and politics in a diffuse sense, as well as the issues of church and state relationships. The merits of the German policy are not the subject of scrutiny here, nor the validity of Scientology as a church or religion. Rather, my point is the issue of secular humanism and its location in the continuum of order juxtaposed with religious faith as a proponent of moral order and satisfying the common good. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the 'common good' remains contested in some arenas, if not controversial or even contradictory. Hence, ideally and in principle, religious believers should not seek to get laws passed on religious grounds but because they express the values of secular society as *defined by its founding documents* and traditions as they have come to be embedded in the common life.[91] (Emphasis added). To sum up, the relationship between church and state and between religion and politics is not the same. In both cases, we need to be prepared to recognise and deal with the complexities, ambiguities and overlapping realms in which practical wisdom needs to seek compatibility with constitutional imperatives founded in human reason.

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[90] Ibid. p. 1140.
[91] Cauthen, K., "Religion and Politics versus Church and State",op. cit. p. 3.

Part II

Religion and politics, the Church and State: a variety of experiences

2.10 The German experience

2.10.1 Background information

As Moseley asserts, ' Any discussion of German church - state relations must begin with the impact of Martin Luther and the Reformation on the German nation and its people'.[92] Luther's influence brought revolutionary social, political and theological change. The Reformation established the Protestant Church, as well as a number of German denominations including Lutheranism and the Reformed Churches of Germany. Although the above was challenged by the Catholic Emperor Charles V, Protestantism took hold in Germany. Under the 1555 Treaty of Augsburg, Germany was divided between Protestant and Catholic Churches when each region's prince selected a religion for his reign. Otherwise referred to as the policy of *cuius regio, cuius religio* (whose rule, whose religion). The Reformation and the political events of the time... 'were responsible for some of the central features of modern German history: the deep religious division of the nation... and the intermingling of religion and politics'.[93] Protestantism, the faith of the majority of Germans and their leaders, grew to enjoy a large degree of state support until the time of the Weimar Constitution.[94]

Moreover, the Reformation transformed the relationship between a Catholic minority and the German state. Catholicism lost its political power and cultural dominance, as its high degree of clericalism deepened the divide

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[92] Moseley, E.A., *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, op. cit. p. 1134.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Ibid.

between the church and state.[95] In brief, discrimination against Catholics and their losing the bases of socio-political and economic power, they became politically and socially isolated from the Protestant majority.[96] Catholic separateness eventually mobilised itself into political action found in the Catholic Centre Party as a counter to the Protestant-driven *Kulturkamf.*[97] That is, in the latter instance it was a culture struggle to bring the Catholic Church under Prussian state control in 1870 and the 1880s. As Moseley argues, the Catholic Centre Party united Catholics and metamorphosed into one of the 'most powerful parties throughout the Wilhelmenarian era' and 'during the rise of the Third Reich'.[98] It is the latter era which is the focus of our study here in the relationship between Church and State.

2.10.2 The Third Reich, Religion and its Churches

The Protestant Church welcomed the advent of the Third Reich enthusiastically, describing Hitler's rise to power as a "divine miracle".[99] This sentiment finds it expression when Pastor Leutheuser declared:

> Christ has come to us through Hitler. Hitler struck you for us, and through his power, his honesty, his faith and his idealism, the Redeemer found us... We know today the Saviour has come... We have only one task, be German, not be Christian.[100]

The above also took the form of a state policy in the name of *Deutschgläbig* (literally translated it means " belief in Germany"), therefore reinforcing the notion of a pseudo-religion.

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[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid. The literal meaning of *Kulturkampf* is a "culture struggle".
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Conway, J.S., *The Nazi Persecution of the Churches,* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 45.

Interestingly, and by way of comparison, this echoed a similar sentiment expressed earlier in 1929 when not only Fascism was praised in sermons by certain clergy, Cardinal Enrico Gasparri (a nephew of the Secretary of State) said: " Only one man in the present world chaos has a clear view --- Mussolini".[101] Pope Pius XI himself referred to Mussolini as " the man sent by Providence".[102]

Thus, this peculiar position of the Catholic Church, specifically its centre the Vatican, is viewed here as collusion with the fascist regime in Italy as well as Germany. Pope Pius XI preferred Mussolini's Fascists in Italy to the Catholic Popular Party, because Mussolini had made a number of concessions to the Church.[103] However, the circumstances in the latter instance differed in several ways as we shall soon see. Nevertheless, the following demonstrates the prevailing clerical sentiment. In his acceptance speech when elected as Reich Bishop, Ludwig Müller declared:

> The whole German movement for freedom with its leader, our Chancellor, is for us a present from God... when enemies of Christ were doing their best to destroy our people...[T]he political struggle in the Church is now over. Now begins the struggle for the soul of the people.[104]

Moreover, in the Lateran Agreements of 1929, the Pope was to be regarded as a foreign ruler, thereby the above document meant the regulation of the relations between the sovereign States, Italy and the Vatican. This was the Lateran Treaty proper. The second agreement, the Concordat, defined the rights of the two States in the realm of education and spiritual matters. Catholicism was recognised as the State religion of Italy and the Vatican was granted autonomy.

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[101] Rhodes, A., *The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators 1922-1945*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), p. 46.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid. pp. 173-174.
[104] Conway, J.S., *The Nazi Persecution of the Churches*, op. cit. p. 48.

There were several reasons for Hitler wanting a Concordat. While it is true the Vatican had no Concordat with Germany since the Reformation, Hitler perhaps found more urgency than Mussolini to do same, offering concessions over religious education in return for the Pope's withdrawal of support from the Catholic Centre Party.[105] But the Centre Party had ninety-two deputies in the Reichstag, still a democratic body. Although Hitler's party had gained a constitutional majority, the Centre Party had a number of priests as deputies, who together with the Communists could block and vote against the *Ermächtigunggesetz*.[106] This legislation (Enabling Act) would give Hitler full dictatorial powers. At the same time, the Vatican thinking was that Hitler would prove to be another Mussolini in religious matters.[107] Another concern of the Vatican, was that if no agreement was reached, the Nazi government might favour a German National Church. Moreover, the conditions offered by Nazi Germany were more favourable than anything which could have been obtained under the Weimar governments.[108]In addition, the Vatican later showed indifference toward the dissolution of the Centre Party.[109]

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[105] Rhodes, A., *The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators*, op. cit. p. 174. As Rhodes points out, under Bismarck a Reichskonkordat had not been possible because Article 5 of the Constitution (1871) stated that the Reich government had no competence in matters relating to the Church, which was to be left to the individual States of the Federation. Prussia, Bavaria and Baden therefore dealt directly with the Vatican. Ibid. p. 174.

[106] Ibid. p. 173.

[107] Ibid. p. 174.

[108] Ibid. Rhodes also notes that Hitler needed to obtain a concordat with some urgency to help manoeuvre himself toward other changes in the Reich's legislation, especially when the Protestants and the Socialists were opposed to a concordat. In the former instance, the process of *Gleichschaltung* (the suspension of basic constitutional rights) was passed on 31 March 1933, a mere two months after Hitler came to power. Moreover, in May 1934 the Confessional Synod of the German Protestant Churches opposed the establishment of an evangelical 'National Church' by the Nazis; growing out of Martin Niemöller's Pastors' Emergency League the previous year, which constituted the 'Confessional Church'.

[109] Ibid. p. 175. In more detail, Rhodes quotes the Under-Secretary of State Pizzardo saying to the British Minister (April 22, 1933) to the Vatican, " The Holy See is not interested in the Centre Party. We are more concerned with the mass of Catholic voters in Germany than in the Catholic deputies who represent them in the Reichstag". Ibid. p. 175.

The Concordat between the Holy See and the German Reich was signed on July 20, 1933. Article 16 required the bishops' and clergy of dioceses...' loyalty to the German Reich ... to honour the legally constituted Government... [and] to avoid all detrimental acts which might endanger it'.[110] However, in the same month the National Socialists founded the "German Evangelical Church" as a pseudo-Protestant church. Nevertheless, in the first years of power the Nazis refrained from making open attacks on the Church until Göring in a public speech accused Catholic priests of being "black moles, as venemous as the red moles" (Communists).[111]

According to Rhodes, until 1936 it was still possible for a priest to speak in the pulpit on behalf on the persecuted Jews, although a year earlier the Nazis began the practice of discrediting the Vatican and brought clerics to trial for alleged currency offences.[112] Such charges were publicised as 'the systematic robbing of the nation",[113] which would for instance, contravene the requirements of Article 16 of the Concordat. That is, 'detrimental acts' against the Reich. Moreover, Pius XI was not silent about the breaches of the Concordat, nor did he confine himself to words.[114] The Pontiff's refusal of an audience to Frank, the Minister for Justice was based on public insults such as the representative of Christ on earth being allied with Bolshevism, the Anti-Christ against National Socialism and that the Pope was of Jewish origin, to name just few.[115] Thus, the above indicates a marked strain in church-state relations.

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[110] Source: New Advent Catholic Website,
<http://www.knight.org/advent>.
Sighted June 27, 1999.
[111] Rhodes, A., *The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators,* op. cit. p. 196. Indeed, these remarks are politically laden. It should also be noted here, that religious vilification can be a part of racial and, or ethnic vilification. For further discussion, see Appendix 2.
[112] Ibid. p. 198.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid. p. 200.
[115] Ibid.

Nazi rhetoric and inflammatory allegations, such as Moscow being "the daughter of Rome" prompted the Pope to speak out before the whole world by the release of the encyclical of 1937, *Mit brennender Sorge.*(With Burning Sorrow). Rhodes notes, however, it appears that its inspiration came from a group of German bishops (Cardinals Bertram, Schulte, Faulhaber, Bishops von Galen and von Preysing) who happened to be in Rome reporting on anti-clerical excesses in Germany.[116] Hitler's view was that the Church should not criticise the morals of the State,[117] even though the old Pope continued his unequivocal protest against the persecution of the Church.

Even though the Nazi regime claimed that religion was separate from the state, by the mere fact it persecuted the church, religion was never separated from the Nazi State. Indeed, by definition a totalitarian state controls all aspects of its society. The very behaviour of the regime intrinsically made religion and the church aspects of the policies for the regime's *raison d'être.* In other words, state policy included the persecution of Jews, and therefore Judaism. The Nazi state attempted to erase any religious ideology and replace it with its own. In a crude sense religion was politics, and politics meant religious issues, especially in the sense of the Jewish question. This view perhaps coincides with Daniel Goldhagen's thesis in *Hitler's Willing Executioners,*[118] which includes the citizenry and not only armed and security forces personnel (secret police), as being accountable for the Holocaust. The point here is not so much a concept of collusion, but the overlap between the

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[116] Ibid. p. 203. Cardinal Faulhaber drew up the encyclical without a stenographer for security reasons and there was some postponement in its publication in the hope that the situation in Germany might improve. Even so, Faulhaber considered the encyclical adequate for a pastoral letter rather than a Papal pronouncement. As Rhodes notes, 'the whole incident reveals the close relations existing between the Pope and the German episcopate'. Ibid. p. 203.
[117] Ibid. p. 205.
[118] Golhagen, D., *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust,* (London: Abacus, 1996).

two pairs of concepts: the relationship between religion and politics, and between the Church and State. Certainly, more could be said about the course taken in the state-church relationship by Pope Pius XI's successor , Pius XXII. In other words, the controversial stance taken by the latter Pontiff with regards to the Nazi policy concerning the Jews. Therefore, we return to the contemporary situation cited above concerning the Church of Scientology.

2.10.3 Germany's Constitution and the Church of Scientology

The Church of Scientology presents a constitutional difficulty for the German government. The constitution is bound to defend minority religions from majoritarian domination. Moreover the above study unravels a series of issues. Among these we can include 1. Freedom of religion; 2. Freedom from religion; 3. Religions approved to be within the cultural norms; 4. Traditional church-state relations and the associated in-built tensions; 5. Religious neutrality by the State; 6. Religious identity cannot affect an individual's rights as a citizen,[119] to name but few. Nevertheless, it is of note how Moseley's interpretation of an imposed constitution under the rubric of the Basic Law, in Article 138 where she argues,' [M]any constitutional rights *depend* on the government's categorisation of the group as an ideological organisation or religious body'.[120] My own interpretation of the above is that the State maintains a constitutional check on the establishment of 'outsiders' forming churches which are outside traditional cultural norms. To sum up, whilst on the one hand German history indicates intermittently a comfortable

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[119] It is of note that the religions in Germany are made up of the following: Protestant 38 per cent, Roman Catholic 34 per cent, Muslim 1.7 per cent and unaffiliated or other, 26.3 per cent. Moreover, ethnic minorities such as Turks, make up 2.4 per cent of the population (estimates as of July 1999). Note the significant 'unaffiliated' figure. Source:
<http://www. askjeeves.com>.
Sighted May 20, 2000
Recent changes in the legislation by the Schröder government have allowed more rights for the exogenous population, such as dual citizenship. The fact remains, however, Protestant and Catholic Germans do not assume a political identity from their religious identity in the same way Protestants and Catholics do in Northern Ireland.

[120] Moseley, E.A., *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, op. cit. p.1140.

partnership between church and state, it also indicates a degree of antagonism, or at least a palpable tension in their relationship.

2.11 South Africa

The context of the relationship between religion and politics, and between the church and state in South Africa needs to be examined in much the same historical- comparative method in the above treatise of the German experience. Robert G. Crawford's study of the Church in South Africa during apartheid supplements and augments our understanding of this relationship. Although the issue there centres on race rather than religion, Crawford maintains its institutionalised racism which included the separation of black and white, was authorised by the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), the Church of the Afrikaner.[121]

2.11.1 Historical Background

The Dutch East India Company established a settlement at Cape Town in 1652, and the first slaves were imported there six years later. By the 1760s, slaves and the Khoi were required to carry passes. The following years were marked by British conquest, colonial expansion and control of the Cape. In 1836, settlers leave the eastern Cape on the 'Great Trek' which acquired symbolic proportions for the Trekkers, together with the defeat of the Zulus at Blood River, signified Divine Providence which helped establish the Republic of Natalia (Natal) in 1838. It is at this point that we can unfold and examine the relationship between religion and politics, and between the church and state, not only in a historical context but also as a precursor of the above concept(s) in the contemporary period. Thus, for our purposes as Worden points out, a significance of the Trek is that:

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[121] Crawford, R.G., *Loyal to King Billy: A Portrait of the Ulster Protestants*, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987), p. 106.

> The Trekkers complained in particular against the failure of the colonial administration to grant them representative government and the social implications of placing freed slaves and Khoi servants on an equal footing with Christians, contrary to the laws of God and the natural distinction of race and colour.[122]

Moreover, the 1839 constitution of Natalia laid down political representation to only adult white males, with Transvaal's constitution following this pattern in 1858 which explicitly stated, 'the people desire to permit no equality between coloured people and the white inhabitants of the country, either in church or state'.[123]

2.11.2 Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid[124]

It is of interest that such organisations as the Society of True Afikaners produced a newspaper in 1875, *Die Afrikaanse Patriot*, written in Afrikaans rather than the Dutch currently in use stressing the distinctiveness of the Afrikaner experience and the 'God-given destiny they possessed as a chosen people'.[125] By 1915, a strong nationalist bourgeoisie emerged consisting of professionals, property owners and intellectuals of the DRC.[126] In brief, several divisions occurred within the Afrikaners such that some intellectuals advocated a distinctively Afrikaner ' Christian National' education.[127] In a conscious attempt to develop an Afrikaner ethnic identity in the face of industrialisation and class division, cleric and teachers mobilised to such an extent that in 1918 a secret society, the Afrikaner *Broederbond* (Brotherhood) was established to unify and disseminate a sense of separate Afrikaner

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[122] Worden, N., *The Making of Modern South Africa*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1995), p. 12. The 'trekker' republics, such as Transvaal and the Orange Free State, rejected the principles of the Cape liberal franchise as evidenced in their constitutions. Ibid. p. 70.
[123] Ibid. p.70.
[124] Although Worden uses this heading in his own work, its application here is not intentional but rather, coincidental. I argue here that the concept of Afrikaner nationalism and its relationship with apartheid is firmly established in the preceding text.
[125] Worden, N., *The Making of Modern South Africa*, op. cit. p. 88.
[126] Ibid. p. 89.
[127] Ibid.

identity.[128] Thus, this brief overview offers an insight into the following developments, historically, politically and in the religious context of South Africa.

In the later period, the DRC consistently supported the Group Areas, the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts. Earlier, in 1932 the Cape Synod said that the Mixed Marriages Act forbidding inter-racial unions should be placed on the statute book.[129] At a conference in 1947 the DRC actually worked out a detailed blueprint of the policy that would become known as *apartheid.* Furthermore, the DRC's publication of the *Kerkebode* had an editorial which 'thanked God that the Churches had been first to work out a policy'.[130] In brief, as Crawford points out, so great is the influence of the Church on the thinking of the state that if it had condemned apartheid, the policy would have collapsed years ago.[131] In any event, it is an example of Christians codifying (legislating) racial policy based on their interpretation of Scriptural sources. The reasons for this I argue, are focused around what I term, firstly, "the messianic rationalization", and secondly, socio-economic advantage for a white minority, achieved by exploitation - by the white minority. In the former instance, the idea of a Christianising mission was not just restricted to South Africa, but also a prevalent approach in the United States and in colonised countries, such as Australia. Certainly, these are not the sole reasons for the Church's influence on the state, but the above are concepts that are repeatedly found in the study of race politics.

How was the policy of apartheid was institutionalised as a way of life in South Africa? The method bears some similarity to the German experience in

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[128] Ibid.
[129] Crawford, R.G., *Loyal To King Billy,* op. cit. pp. 108-109.
[130] Ibid. p. 109.
[131] Ibid. p. 108.

that agents of the State such as the Afrikaner *Broederbond* infiltrated the public and private spheres. This infiltration translates into holding positions of office in crucial institutions, so that the control and enforcement of government policy is assured. Yet, both instances share some contradictions at the same time. Let us consider the African experience first. Dr. Piet Meyer's speech as Broederbond Chairman contains the following :

> 1. We must always distinguish sharply between the religious, the broad cultural and the political spheres as independent, autonomous spheres, each with its own nature, function and destiny.

(Note here a similarity found in the 1933 Concordat with the German government found in Article 32,...' the Holy See will prescribe regulations for the exclusion of clergy and members of religious Orders from membership of political parties, and from engaging in work on their behalf').

It should be noted however, where the Centre Party had members as priests, for quite different reasons as DRC clergy were members of the Broederbond. Meyer's second declaration is as follows:

> 2. The area of activity of our organisation is the cultural functions and issues of the Afrikaner nation with its distinctive identity, based on separate Christian-Protestant, linguistic and cultural community with its own God-given Christianising mission in Africa.[132]

The remainder of Meyer's speech maintains a contradictory theme, but it is of merit to note a crucial point, which elucidates a key point in our main thesis:

> Our members are and always should be active members of their Afrikaner churches and of their own national-political party and should always receive guidance from our organisation in this respect --- this is also valid for our church and party with regard to the cultural sphere. It is and always should be the case that our cultural leaders are simultaneously church and political leaders, that political

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[132] Cited by Serfontein, J.H.P., in *Brotherhood of Power: An Exposé of the Secret Afrikaner Broederbond,* (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 218.

> leaders are simultaneously cultural and church leaders and that church leaders are simultaneously cultural and political leaders.[133]

If we argue that in one sense religion defines morality, and in another sense politics implements morality, then how can the German and South African experiences be explained here? It can be suggested that one argument is (keeping in mind however, that religion is a value and politics is a process), the above political systems created and mobilised ideologies. That is, perverse variants of race relations which are known as Aryan and white supremacy respectively. By this I mean, it is the perceived notion of a righteous messianic role for both regimes, but at the same time institutionalising racial segregation and discrimination. Certainly, this is not a complete answer, as we need to take into account the contexts that gave rise to the above governments. In brief, the Germans felt betrayal by the terms of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and by the "November criminals" who were Jewish. The Third Reich also manipulated the Vatican, taking advantage of Catholicism's position of holding the Jewish people responsible for Christ's death. The Afrikaners, together with the DRC felt that their mission was to Christianise the savage and sinful blacks. In both instances, their behaviour amounts to systematic or institutionalised racism, stereotyping of the Jew and the Black (or Coloured), but rationalised by the use of religious Scriptures, which were manifested in government policies.

It took two centuries for an Afrikaner cultural and ethnic identity to evolve and an Afrikaner theology based on the conservative Calvinistic Biblical interpretation. The Afrikaners' interpretation is based on a fundamentalist approach where justification was found for the paternal role of the Afrikaner in South Africa.[134] As noted above, it was the DRC that was so influential

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[133] Ibid. p. 219.
[134] Du Toit, B.M., " The Far Right in Current South African Politics", in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 29. No. 4 1991, p. 658.

regarding government policy on apartheid. Since the 1980s however, younger theologians were speaking of 'reconciliation' and concluded that the church had been in error in basing apartheid on Biblical grounds.[135] As Du Toit points out, during these years there were subtle changes within DRC practices, such as ministers' prayers and sermons, representing a shift in church and government.[136] In brief, there developed a rupture in church unity as well as splits in the political arena. The Afrikaner identity defined in terms of ethnicity, language, and religion was starting to crumble.

Opposition and the threat of violence from the African National Congress (ANC) among other black groups marked the beginning of the fall of the apartheid regime. Moreover, the international community placed economic and sporting sanctions on the South African regime. It could be argued that a global ethic as a secular entity put pressure on an inhumane government. Part of this ethic sought the restoration of justice and democracy where oppression had dominated the political landscape. In other words, apartheid was a political arrangement influenced by religious organisation that justified its behaviour on biblical documentation. At the same time however, Murray asserts that ' in South Africa language, as the expression of political sentiment has always assumed a pronounced and almost exaggerated importance'.[137] Briefly, what Murray alludes to is that after the 1976 Soweto uprising, the language of the Black Consciousness - articulated 'nation building' and the unity of the oppressed.[138] The point which should not be overlooked in this case is, the other aspect of the Church in opposition to apartheid. Or rather, the efforts of the Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a Nobel peace laureate whose activism brought pressure on foreign governments to impose

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[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Murray, M.,*South Africa: Time of Agony, Time of Destiny*, (London: Verso, 1987), p. 235.
[138] Ibid.

economic and political sanctions in an effort to bring down the apartheid regime. In a climate where reform was not on the then President Botha's agenda, and the banning of many organisations, 'virtually the only legal voice of opposition came from Tutu'.[139]

In the contemporary period, South Africa like many other nations experienced a transition in a globalised world. We can say in brief, that while there is dissemination of information through networks and by individuals such as Tutu, such communications have a reciprocal effect when there is a sense of a global ethic that publicly condemns a regime's behaviour. To sum up, we have examined a situation where a church, and therefore in a general sense, we can distil this down to organised religion as contributing (in part at least) to the events in apartheid South Africa. At the same time, we can acknowledge Tutu's Anglican Church as a force, together with other religious bodies and a secular international community, seeking justice, democracy and some moral order.

2.12 Israel: the Jewish experience

A study of the Jewish faith in terms of its biblical, historical, sociological and political context is a colossus in itself. Hence, this study is restricted to the period since 1948 when the state of Israel was created as a result of UN intervention. Nonetheless, for the Jewish people, their political thought and world view dates from biblical origins. The earliest political expression for this is partly found in the concept of Zionism.[140] In any event, some

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[139] Worden, N., *The Making of Modern South Africa*, op. cit. p. 136.

[140] Zionism can be defined as a political creed, dating from the early diaspora, that the old Jewish national homeland of Palestine should be regained by Jews and run as a national home and centre for world-wide Jewish solidarity. A secondary meaning sometimes given to Zionism refers to the internal politics of Israel, and especially to the extent to which the theological , rather than purely ethnic and cultural aspects of Judaism, should be enforced or encouraged by the state. See Robertson, D.,*The Penguin Dictionary of Politics*, op. cit. pp. 494-495.

preliminary comments deserve immediate mention. There would be little argument against the view that a common theme permeates through the above analysis and in the following instances. In other words, by way of recapping on some fundamental concepts, Neusner instructs the reader that :

> A religious system sets forth a theory of the social order, encompassing three main components: a world-view, a way of life, and an account of the character of the social entity that realises the way of life through the specified world view.[141]

With this assertion we can begin to understand Neusner's next postulate when he states: 'One may speculate that for the first three centuries of Christian history, with the Church confronting a hostile state, introduced the distinction between the Church as an autonomous social entity and the empire'.[142] On the surface, this may appear as an oblique way Neusner uses to introduce his argument, but I suggest here it provides an immediate orientation or reference point as to the approach used. In brief, Neusner alludes to a comparison between the Christian and Judaic traditions in relation to *moral order*, and therefore governance. For instance, he distinguishes the working of 'politics', under the rubric of sanctions by legitimate violence; whereas religion is differentiated by power. Although, ambiguity arises in Neusner's interpretation in that 'the encompassing framework of rules, institutions and sanctions is explained and validated by appealing to the myth of God's shared rule'.[143] A possible meaning of 'the

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[141] Neusner, J., " Why and How Religion Speaks through Politics: The Case of Classical Judaism" in *Temenos*, Vol. 32, 1996, p. 155,
<http://www.abo.fi/comprel/tenemo32/neusner.htm>.
Sighted May 24, 1999.

[142] Ibid.

[143] Ibid. p.157. By way of an illustration, according to Neusner 'Moses rules as God's prophet but also as God's political agent, and Israel takes the shape as God's people: a kingdom of priests and a holy people'. Moses is portrayed as the king of Israel, law-giver and *head of state.* Ibid. p. 156 (Emphasis added). Moreover, the language Neusner uses in his study has a strong resonance with the concepts used by Hobbes's reference to the Sovereign and the people of Israel in *Leviathan*.

myth of God's shared rule' may be the overlap of religious and state roles, as well as authority.

Christians in the early period were a persecuted minority, but in later centuries, Christianity can be identified with empire status, an early form of nationalism. Conversely, the state of Israel is a minority in the context of the Arabs in the Middle-East. The point which Susser makes in his interpretation of Buber's social and political philosophy is, with the disintegration of Christianity, first institutionally, and then as an effective moral force, the national groupings in which ' isolated individuals took their shelter', the nation became the 'shelter from uncertainty'.[144] Zionism , as Susser argues, 'combines national existence with an interlocking community of faith' and therefore, of all the ancient peoples in whom faith and nation constituted a unity, only Judaism 'survived the combined thrust of Christian universalism and the fragmenting effect of the secular nation-state'.[145]

However, before the Jews became a community of faith, they had already become a people, in virtue of a ' mighty shaping event---the Exodus from Egypt'.[146] Thus, pausing here to make a comparison, there is a similarity in the above South African instance, where the Great Trek represents the Afrikaners' exodus to Natal, thus providing the 'symbolic images crucial to the ethos of Afrikaner nationalism'.[147] In brief, it is safe to say in both experiences, such events impact upon the collective psyche of an aggregation of people. Although, notable difference in the Jewish experience however, is, we can add to the above, the cataclysm of the Holocaust. Through the collective experience of the revelation at Sinai, nationhood came to the Jews when they

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[144] Susser, B., *Existence and Utopia: The Social and Political Thought of Martin Buber,* (New Jersey: Associated University Presses, Inc. 1981), pp. 144-145.
[145] Ibid. p. 145.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Worden , N., *The Making of Modern South Africa,* op. cit. p.12.

were forged into a community of faith and Israel became the carrier of a historic mission: it stood charged with chosenness, that is, the responsibility to establish the "Kingdom of God" on earth, to transform a community of faith into a community of deeds.[148]

A more recent development of Judaism is perceptible in the state of Israel, which is also the spiritual centre of the scattered Jewish people. Having won national independence, Jews can live there as a whole way of life, a civilization expressed partly in social institutions based on the Bible.[149] Such a social institution is found in the collective village, the *kibbutz* where everything is shared in common. This 'community of deeds' has the goal to realize the ideal of *social justice.*[150] (Emphasis added). Moreover, the traditional values of the kibbutz include equality and direct democracy. Yet again, in the Israeli experience, the relationship between religion and politics is intertwined, even to the point where an *ideology* has evolved. To use the term 'kibbutzism' is unsatisfactory because it avoids elucidation of what is the essence of such a social organisation --- a purist form of *socialism.* At the same time, it should be borne in mind, there is a reliance on Buber's interpretation here in examining a *limited* range of Judaic concepts. As he notes :

> [N]owhere, as far as I can see, in the history of the socialist movement were men so deeply involved in the process of differentiation and yet so intent on preserving the principle of integration.[151]

Moreover, Buber also argues that the Jewish commune "owes its existence not to a doctrine but to a situation... to certain problems of work and construction".[152] For Buber's Zionism, he also means the expression of a dream

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[148] Susser, B., *Existence and Utopia,* op. cit. p. 145.
[149] *Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 13* in 23 Vols. (Chicago : William Benton Publisher, 1970), p. 116.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Buber, M., in Susser, B., *Existence and Utopia,* op. cit. p. 158.
[152] Ibid.

as well as a reality, where the biblical-messianic vision despite its secular dress, the kibbutz represents a contemporary case of the prophetic spirit at work.[153] On the other hand, it should also be noted that kibbutzism accounts for only 3 per cent of the Israeli population.[154] Therefore, a focus on kibbutzism can be misleading in an interpretative analysis of Israeli experiences in the sacred and the profane spheres. In the same way, the foci of Roman Catholicism will have different connotations in the Vatican (a sovereign state) and say liberation theology in Latin America. By this we mean, in the two instances there are extremes when it comes to sacred and secular relations. To be sure, in Judaism, Classical Reform promotes the total integration of Jews into American culture and disavows 'all vestiges and symbols of Jewish nationalism'.[155] While at the same time, a blend of Orthodoxy and mysticism is represented by the chief rabbi of mandated Palestine, Abraham Kook, who spiritualised Zionism maintaining that there was a mystic connection between the souls of the Jews and the Holy Land.[156] Again, we witness here a strong overlap between religion and politics, and the relationship between Scriptural writings and the promised destiny of a Chosen People in their own nation-state. Another observation is found in the contemporary period, that is, the division between Palestinians and Israelis marked by armed conflict, each claiming a separate and independent homeland.[157] Yet, Buber, on religious and humanistic grounds advocated an Israeli-Arab understanding,[158] the creation of a bi-national state.[159]

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[153] Ibid. p. 160.

[154] Rosner, M., and Tannenbaum, A. S., "Organisational Efficiency and Egalitarian Democracy in an Intentional Communal Society: the Kibbutz" in *The British Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXXVIII No. 4, p. 522.

[155] *Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 13,* op. cit. p. 115.

[156] Ibid.

[157] The Middle-East conflict mirrors the armed struggle in Northern Ireland in a number of ways. In this instance however, attention is drawn to the concept of "chosenness" held by a society, using the Bible as empirical evidence for their spiritual and political destinies. This concept of "chosenness" is also found in the Protestant tradition in Northern Ireland and is further discussed in Chapter 5.

[158] *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* Vol. 13, op. cit. p. 115.

2.13 Poland

In 1939 when Poland was invaded, it had just barely existed as a sovereign nation-state for twenty years. Steeped in a strong Christian tradition since its conversion from paganism in 966, and having experienced four partitions, the *Polish identity* withstood an atheistic Marxist regime after 1945, because of its religious identity as a predominantly 'Catholic nation'. In this part of our study, the focus is not on the contemporary situation (that is, a democratic state with, a NATO membership and some EU membership), but rather the relationship between a communist regime and the Catholicism of the people and the role of the Vatican.

The notion of a communist regime in Poland in the post-war years and the Vatican being seated geographically within a country with an active Italian Communist Party is ironical in itself. Hence, a comment is warranted here to briefly put Italian politics in perspective. Nevertheless, the end of the war not only saw the demise of Mussolini, and not long after that the monarchy, but also the emergence of a powerful Christian Democratic Party. Nichols argues this meant that 'there was no longer a strong secular figure interested in or capable of supervising the Church-State agreement'.[160] Moreover, Pope Pius XXII was of the idea that the Christian Democrats should make an alliance with the neo-fascists (of Rome), in order to have unity against the communist influence in national politics.[161] Catholic Democracy and the Catholic Church

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[159] Susser, B., *Existence and Utopia*, op. cit. p. 165. See also pp. 168-169 for further discussion of Buber's concept of bi-nationalism. He realised that even in the eventuality of an Israeli victory, it would result in a fortress Israel living in an encirclement of hostile Arab states. For this reason Buber advocated bi-nationalism. Moreover, Buber, deeply shaken by changes made to his draft for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and also by a number of bloody incidents, withdrew from Zionist politics for a number of years. Ibid. p. 169.

[160] Nichols, P., *The Politics of the Vatican*, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p.217.

[161] Ibid. p. 223. At the time there was considerable anxiety as to how to form a coalition with Catholic Action, social democrats and liberals who had anti-fascist feelings. Interestingly, the Vatican intended forming, in the event of the failure of the Christian Democrats to make an alliance with the neo-fascists, a second list of Catholics drawn from the ranks of the

were driven by a fear that in the post-war years, Italy might go over to communism. Thus, 'there emerged a partnership which was ideological and electoral', making anti-communism an immensely appealing slogan and one which would guarantee American aid to rebuild post-war Italy on a full scale.[162] However, as Nichols points out, the confrontation with Italian communists, were at the same time adherents of the political force that was crushing political and religious liberties in Eastern Europe.[163]

Pius XII's successors, John XXIII and Paul IV had different outlooks, which made the Vatican less compulsively concerned about Italian national politics. However, the understanding between the hierarchy of Church and the hierarchy of party in Poland was the exact reverse of Rome's political situation in Italy.[164] In view of its virulent anti-communist stance, explains why the Vatican did not care to underwrite the agreements made by the Polish bishops with the Polish state.[165] The first agreement was signed in 1950 and later modified in 1956 had the significant point that both party and hierarchy wished to be seen as the embodiment of Polish patriotism.[166]

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governing party. These candidates would have the support of the Vatican but such a development would have meant the Vatican's abandoning of the Christian Democratic Party. Ibid. p. 223.

[162] Ibid. pp. 219-220.

[163] Ibid. p. 220.

[164] Ibid. p. 228.

[165] Ibid.

[166] Ibid. p. 229. Nichols also makes the point that for years it was difficult for an Italian to reconcile a strong patriotic feeling with religious obligations. The opposite was true in Poland. To be Catholic and Polish was to be doubly patriotic because the faith and the nation, to the majority of Poles were identical. Ibid. p. 228. I would disagree with Nichols's assertion where he states: 'In so far as the nation existed, it did so through Catholicism. At the same time, Catholics felt a loyalty to their national government, albeit a communist government.' (Ibid. p. 229). Certainly, there is little argument with the Polish faith in Catholicism, and there is less argument with the notion of patriotism. But, not to 'their national government'. For instance, Milosz notes that:

> Despite the important reforms and the destruction of the old ruling classes [after Stalin's death in 1953], the entire country was gripped by a single emotion: hatred. Peasants receiving land, hated; workers and office employees, joining the Party, hated; socialists, participating in the government, hated; writers endeavouring to get their manuscripts published, hated. This was not their own government; it owed its existence to an alien army.

Politically, the Catholic Church has rarely stood for nationality.[167] Moreover, as Nichols points out, there are

> ...a few areas where it has managed to settle easily into the national consciousness --- Ireland and Poland come to mind: both cases, significantly, of ethnic combined with religious oppression.[168]

Interestingly, the official ideology of the postwar socialist state stands opposed to a nationalism that 'is associated with Polish chauvinism (glorification of the Polish national character)'.[169] While official socialist state doctrine favoured an internationalist view, practical politics dictated that national feelings be acknowledged.[170] In other words, ironically the Vatican and the party shared a common doctrinal point here.

In any event, in 1961 Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Polish party leader, accused the Church in Poland of looking for conflict on the instructions of the Vatican, which needed persecutions and martyrs for its own ends.[171] A reply from Cardinal Wyszynski, the Polish primate, affirmed that no pope or Secretary of State had ever instructed the Polish bishops on how to conduct themselves. The communists would have had an impossible task if they had tried to do away with the Church in Poland or attack it frontally; its popular following

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See *Solidarity, The Analysis of a Social Movement:Poland 1980-1981*,A.Touraine, F. Dubet, M.Wieviorka, and J. Strzelecki, translated by D. Denby, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 22. Moreover, the workers' uprising in Poznan in 1956 mirrored the uprising in Hungary in the same year. Also, the number of Polish citizens who fled to the West, although a minority of the population, it does represent a sentiment of dissent despite the appearances of conformism which the Party tried to portray.

[167] Nichols, P., *The Politics of the Vatican*, op. cit. p. 229.

[168] Ibid.

[169] Kennedy, M.D., and Simon, M.D., in *Religion and Politics in the Modern World*, Merkl, P.H., and Smart, N., (eds.), New York: New York University Press, 1983), p.122.
The origins of the above may be traced to Marx himself. For instance, Marx sees nationalism as a form of 'egotism' which brings about the ruin of a nation. See *Karl Marx: Selected Writngs*, McLellan, (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 148.

[170] Kennedy, M.D., and Simon, M.D., *Religion and Politics in the Modern World*, op. cit. p.123.

[171] Nichols, P., *The Politics of the Vatican*, op. cit. p. 230.

was too great for that.[172] However, it should be noted, the Church had something to thank the Polish authorities, in that by occupying the Oder-Neisse territories and resettling them, the communists had replaced largely Protestant German population with wholly Catholic Poles.[173]

In more recent times, the election of John Paul II in 1978, heralded the first non-Italian pope which broke a monopoly that had existed since the early sixteenth century. This was a significant milestone in itself, especially in the context of the Cold War. It can be said, the newly elected pontiff making it a priority to visit his homeland, stated on his second visit the need for 'morality'. By this he meant not the meaning of morality in common usage , but the morality of human rights, freedom of speech and association --- not necessarily a call to religious practice and obedience.[174] At this stage martial law had been imposed by General Jaruzelski, an action done as a result of indirect pressure from Moscow, as the threat of Soviet intervention loomed, if Jaruzelski did not restore order. In global terms, the above also belonged to the Cold War phenomenon. Ideologically however, it was a clash between Catholicism and Communism. But despite decades of socialism, the Catholic Church remained the preeminent institution in terms of commanding allegiance.

In the meantime, prior to the Pope's visit, *Solidarnośc*, the first free trade union in Eastern Europe had taken root under the charismatic leadership of Lech Walęsa. Walęsa, a devout Catholic had the support of his like-minded

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[172] Ibid. p. 231. I would differ with Nichols on this point in view of the imprisonment of Cardinal Wyszynski from 1953 to 1956. To be fair, at the time of publication(1968) Nichols did not foresee the events of the 1980s. Nevertheless, in such struggles, there are martyrs and Father Jerzy Popieluszko was one of them during the communist regime in Poland, just as was Father Maximilian Kolby during the Nazi regime.

[173] Ibid. p. 231.

[174] The Pontiff called for this 'morality' as part of His sermon at Jasna Góra in Poland which was transmitted by Radio Free Europe, June 4, 1983. The author of this study heard the above broadcast in Offenburg, the 'Black Forest' region of Germany.

countryman such that a political intrigue unfolded during those tense developments of civil disobedience in the Polish state.[175] As Kennedy and Simon claim:

> Even when the secularization [sic] of religious beliefs is noted, it is clear that the grip of the Church over the Polish population remains quite firm. The explanation for this is found in the role of the Church as the guardian of national values.[176]

Catholicism has been able to tap into and express Polish nationalism. Put another way, " For us, the Church signifies patriotism, tradition, continuity, and stability".[177] In the 1980s, the Solidarity (*Solidarnośc*) movement drew on this reality by integrating strong national sentiments and religious *symbolism.* [178] To sum up, Solidarity sought the approval and protection of the Church. Solidarity as an organisation and the Catholic Church as an institution were mutual beneficiaries of this relationship.[179]

2.14 Islam

Although a large body of literature exists on the Middle East and it has occupied centre stage in world politics for the past two centuries, the recent focus has broadened to consider phenomena like Muslim separatism in Aceh, Mindinao, Central Asia and fundamentalist conflicts in Algeria and Afghanistan. The latter instances, are extreme examples of the relationship between religion and politics. In order to understand these issues, we must examine some of the concepts expressed in Islamic political thought.

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[175] For a more detailed account on what I mean here by 'political intrigue' see Bernstein, C., "The Holy Alliance" in *Time*, February 24, 1992 Vol. 139 No. 8, pp. 28-35. Former president Reagan and Pope John Paul II agreed on a campaign to hasten the demise of communism in Eastern Europe. The campaign focused on destabilising the Polish government and preserving the outlawed Solidarity movement.

[176] Kennedy, M.D., and Simon, M.D., *Religion and Politics in the Modern World,* op.cit. p. 129.

[177] A young student quoting his/ her position cited in Lawrence Weschler, *Solidarity: Poland in the Season of Passion,* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 20.

[178] Kennedy, M.D., and Simon, M.D., *Religion and Politics in the Modern World,* op. cit. p. 129. The symbolism in this instance refers to pictures of Pope John Paul II , the Black Madonna of Czestochowa and crucifixes being displayed everywhere.

[179] Ibid. p. 130.

Firstly, the Koran (also spelt Qur'an) does not contain a theory of politics.[180] Like other scriptures, Al-Azmeh points out that it is a 'text for all occasions, to be referred to, and quoted, all in ceaseless enterprise'.[181] It is to be noted, however, that like its Christian counterparts, the Koran in the general sense, together with the appointment of a caliph has the authority capable of imposing *order* and *justice* on the community thus formed.[182] (Emphases added).There is a common theme noted here, in that orthodox Christianity and Islam have all drawn on severe hierarchical authoritarianism. In the Islamic situation, state and religion 'are indissolubly linked, for without the state religious authority and duties cannot be maintained, and without religion the state will become sheer tyranny'.[183]

While, the notion of fundamentalism first gained currency in the discussions of nineteenth-century American movements, it was Talcott Parsons's study of the "fundamentalist reaction" which attempted to explain the rise of European Fascist movements.[184] According to Rose, the basic problem with the concept of Fundamentalism is that it is an ethno-centric,'militantly secularist sociological categorization based on specious cross-cultural analogies'.[185] Nevertheless, I argue that contemporary phenomena also need to be examined in a (comparative) historical context. For instance, Islamic political thought in the nineteenth century is associated with Jamal al-Din Asadabadi whose efforts were concentrated on an attempt to unify all Muslim powers in

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[180] Aziz Al-Azmeh, cited in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, David Miller, Janet Coleman, William Connolly and Alan Ryan (eds.), (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1987), p. 249.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Ibid. The above bares similarity with the Hobbesean notion of the Sovereign as the wise and just ruler whose authority comes from God. Moreover, Hobbes refers to the Bible as the scriptural evidence for the above.
[183] Ibid. p. 250.
[184] Rose, G.F., in *Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World*, Emile Sahliyeh (ed.), (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), p.219.
[185] Ibid.

order to counter colonial encroachment.[186] Thus, it comes as no surprise when Libya's Quaddafi asserts,' It [Christianity] has absolutely no divine message. It as always been a tool of imperialism and allied with capitalistic exploiters'.[187] There is an element of truth in Quaddafi's statement, but at the same time specific meanings have been imputed into the Koran by generations of Muslim authors. For instance, the Wahhabi-inspired notion of *hijra* is used for its modern adepts and, the necessity of stepping apart from corrupt society in order to form a *salafi* alternative which adheres to all examples set by pious predecessors.[188]

However, there exist divisions within Islam which resemble those noted above in this study of Christianity and Judaism. In the Islamic experience, the religious and juristic spheres correspond to the major denominational division of Islam into Sunnite and Shiite. Sunnites hold that political and religious authority should be vested in the person of an imam-caliph, while Shiites hold that their position is justified by the specific designation by Muhammad. Moreover, modern radical Islamism refuses to countenance any compromise with the corrupt present.[189] This line of thinking is crucial to the understanding of contemporary events in the Islamic world. As Al Azmeh points out, outside the *hijra*,

> Society is not only corrupt, but impious, and the sole manner of dealing with it is by direct political and military action which seeks to bring about the foundation of a political system conforming to pious paradigms in every sense.[190]

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[186] Aziz Al-Azmeh, *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, op. cit. p. 252.
[187] Cited by Marius Baar in *The Unholy War: Oil, Islam and Armageddon*, (Worthing: Henry E. Walter Ltd, 1980), p. 71.
[188] Al-Azmeh, *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, op. cit. p. 253.
[189] Ibid. p. 252.
[190] Ibid. p. 253. This kind of political theory identified with Ruhollah Khomeini, who interpreted it as the exclusive sovereignty of God, but the viceregency on earth is represented by one person, Khomeini himself.

More recently, the behaviour of some Islamic states have translated the above into an anti-Western (and an anti-Israeli) posture. In contemporary experiences, in other words, *jihad* (holy war) has found expression in open armed conflict, terrorism, airline hijacking and hostage taking. Yet, in the Koran it states "One man should not pay for the sins of others".

Finally, if we are to examine the location of yet another variant of Islam, Indonesia, the world's most populous Islamic State serves as a case in point. Sukarno, the architect of its constitution or Pancasila (Five Pillars)[191] insisted on the provision of Article 1, which states: There is one Almighty God. In spite of its vague wording, this article protects those pursuing customary or mystical patterns of belief as well as the minority Christians. (That was the theory at least, if not the practice in view of recent events). Moreover, in Java there is a marked practice of syncretic religion, where Islam is blended with Buddhist mysticism and a degree of polytheism. Sukarno's successor now the former president Suharto, believed that he had received *wayang*, a message from a Javanese god telling him he was the chosen ruler. Nevertheless, Sukarno had the vision if not the pragmatism, for the newly formed independent state to avoid any rise of Islamic fundamentalism. In other words, the separatist movement in Aceh is attempting to reverse the latter by the establishment of an Islamic state. In spite of Sukarno's constitutional intentions, politics and religion are intermingled, and at the forefront of contemporary Islamic objectives.

[191] For a more detailed account see Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 184-202. Ramage discusses the meaning of Pancasila discourse, linkages between the elites, armed forces and the proponents of an Islamic state.

2.15 Conclusion

It is often cited in the discourse on the subject of the relationship between religion and politics, and between Church and State: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's".[192] Clearly, this is an oversimplification, and there is a difference between Caesar's state and God's church. Yet, even before Caesar's time, there existed the notion of the ruler who had godly, or a divine status. Nevertheless, variants of the above have transpired, both in theory and in practice till modern times. This is a common thread, which has been emphasised throughout this chapter, cannot be ignored, as it recurs across different cultures --- East and West.

However, modernisation and secularisation of thought, especially during and after the Enlightenment period dispelled the myth of the divine right of kings. For instance, Marx argued that in part, the Enlightenment movement was a liberation of the people from religion. In one sense, the concreteness and imaginativeness, which Vico refers to in the archaic mind, became revised in scriptural texts. That is, the latter became the concrete, or even the empirical basis for participating in or witnessing messianic missions. Although, it can be argued that the English political culture for instance, exemplifies the separation of Church and State, the English monarch is the head of the church in the Church of England. Moreover, the evidence shows that constitutional structures endeavour to keep religion and politics separate, but the above and other Anglo-American experiences clearly indicate otherwise. Certainly, the relationship is not only restricted to the above illustration. Rather, we can cite an abundance of instances where the relationship between politics and religion, and between church and state, is complex, ambiguous, controversial and contradictory. We established that although ethical convictions are rooted

[192] New Testament, *The Holy Bible*, the Gospel according to Matthew 22:17.

in religious faith, it does not disqualify them from the political realm. For the believers and adherents, the Church deals with the eternal order, eternal salvation, which is to be found ultimately in the Kingdom of God. The State deals with the temporal order, which is concerned with the here and now, the material well being of citizens.

In reality however, conflicts occur between the two spheres of activity and authority that are in principle separate but in practice sometimes overlap. As a result the state has historically been bound up with religion either explicitly or implicitly. The above examination of a variety of experiences cited in the cases of Germany, South Africa, Israel, Poland and East Timor, intersect at several points, but in a general sense they demonstrate an oppressive nature of the State in its relationship with the Church. The evidence also shows that in times of oppression, people turn to 'hope' and 'faith' in God, so they be spared or become free. This is also found in the Northern Irish experience. Therefore, it can be argued here there is a resonance in Marx's assertion:

> Religious suffering is at the same time an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feeling of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless circumstances. It is the opium of the people.[193]

Whether we consider the relationship at a micro-level, for instance, social justice issues, welfare policies or, whether we consider same at a macro-level, the point is that religion and politics in many instances are inseparable. In a word, this relationship is *symbiotic*. It may be more accurate to say that: both religion and politics cannot be removed from morality and order. One significant role of religion in a general sense is, it often attempts to monitor and regulate the morality of politics.

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[193] Marx, K., in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, McLellan, D., (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 64.

Chapter 3

Popes, Priests, Politics and Paradoxes: An Irish Experience

Rise, Cú Chulaind!'
Of all the warriors in Ulaid and Ériu, whatever their merit,*
None is equal for courage and skill and honour.
You are the supreme warrior of Ériu, and the champion's portion is yours, without contest.
Whoever might dispute this judgement, I swear by what my people swear by,
his life will not be long.'[1]

3. 0 Introduction

A mural on a corner of Springfield Road, a Nationalist area in West Belfast has the caption that reads, "History is written by the winner". The victor in Cú Chulaind's time probably did not foresee how myth needs to be separated from recorded history, in which the latter has had several different winners. This chapter examines the Irish historical experience of the relationship of religion and politics and between church and state, by investigating the milestones that have impacted on contemporary political phenomena. In other words, there is no need to rehearse the events in detail, but rather a need to examine how they influenced this relationship.

However, there is frequent debate about the precise historical location of the beginning of the Irish conflict. That is no concern for us here because in this analysis we discuss for instance, the arrival of Christianity in Ireland and how

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* The Ulster people.

[1] From *Tales of Cú Chulaind: Irish Heroic Myths*, Translated by Jeffrey Gantz, translation copyright 1981, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1996), p. 87. Collections of stories were first written down in the eighth century AD, but date back to seven centuries before Christ.

other European countries shaped domestic social organisation as well as international relations in the known world. Indeed, these European powers impacted upon Ireland's political and religious structure. The sixteenth-century Reformation, was a fracture in Christianity that had a profound effect on political behaviour resulting in massive human population movement and colonial activity. In the latter period, socio-economic issues, as well as political issues have been salient in contemporary Irish history, both in the Republic, and in Northern Ireland. But perhaps more importantly for our study, this chapter identifies the political behaviour of, *vis-à-vis*, Catholicism and Catholics and in a similar way the political behaviour of Protestantism and Protestants. Another factor may be briefly described here as 'the clash of cultures'. This chapter concludes with the introduction of an examination of the start of the 'Troubles' in the province of Ulster.

3.1 The Bronze Age in Ulster and early history

Archaeological evidence in 1975 recorded by Chris Lynn revealed ornaments and relics which seems to indicate that early Irish tradition 'attests to veneration of sacred pools, severed head cults, animal sacrifice and votive offering'.[2] In fact, the Celts had arrived in Ulster long before the Christian era. According to Bardon, the Celts were the first people north of the Alps to emerge in recorded history.[3] There is no clear evidence as to when the Celts came to Ireland. Moreover, archaeological enquiry does not show evidence of invasion, but rather there was a steady infiltration from Britain and the European mainland over the centuries.[4] Nonetheless, a cult did spread across the Continent to preserve the memory and devotion of a Celtic sun god. In 59 BC Julius Caesar began his conquest of Gaul and the Celtic hegemony was

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[2] Cited by Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1992), p. 8.
[3] Ibid. p. 9. Bardon notes that their culture spread during the second millenium BC between Bohemia, the east bank of the Rhine, north towards Denmark, south-east into the Balkans and west to France, Portugal, the Netherlands and Britain. By 500 BC the Celts dominated the northern half of Europe. Ibid. p. 9.
[4] Ibid.

collapsing before the might of Rome. Ireland, however, did not become a part of the Roman Empire, but influences from Roman Britain did reach the island.

3.2 St Patrick and later developments in Christianity

Among the influences, which came to Ireland from Roman Britain, was that of slaves, one of who was Patrick. As Bardon cites:

> I, Patrick, a sinner, the simplest of country men... was taken away into Ireland in captivity with ever so many thousands of people.[5]

The important point here is the authenticity of Patrick's written record copied into the Book of Armagh, or as Bardon claims, it is this inscription where written Irish history begins.[6]A number of locations associated with his name are found in the northern part of Ireland, suggesting that he did most of his work in Ulster around the middle of the fifth century. Moreover, Patrick's mission was successful, particularly amongst the ruling class, although he anguished over the slaying of his Irish converts by British Christians.

Before the arrival of Christianity, we can observe the similarity of ritualistic behaviour described by theorists noted in Chapter 1. In brief, offerings were made to appease the gods. Different months signified different or specific rituals concerning the supernatural. For instance, the Gaelic year began at *Samhain* (now Halloween), and this was a time when spirits flew between the real world and the other world. Another example is the feast of *Bealtaine*, at the start of May. In this instance, the ritual was intended for the purification of cattle, ceremoniously driven between two fires. Interestingly, some of the pagan gods were later Christianised. Moreover, places which were once important as ritual sites and 'where druids made incantations and prophecies', were favoured as locations for churches and monasteries which

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[5] Ibid. p. 15.
[6] Ibid.

became significant centres of the Church in Ulster.[7] In the centuries that followed, Gaelic rulers gave generous grants of land to the Church, as local kings vied with one another to be patrons of monasteries and their founders became saints.[8] However, as the ruling classes who had been the principal patrons from the outset made sure that they kept control of the monasteries; abbots, bishops and other high clergy married and passed on ecclesiastical offices to their children.[9] The monasteries became centres of learning, particularly at Kells, Bangor, Durrow and Swords in Leinster. From these centres Irish monks took their mission to Europe, setting up monasteries in part areas of France, Austria, Germany, Italy and Switzerland. Writers such as Bardon assert that Bangor and Iona played a leading role in bringing Christianity to Northumbria and others from Ulster followed in the path of Columbanus to the European mainland.[10]

3. 3 Vikings , Normans and internal conflicts

Viking raids on Ireland in the late eighth century met with little opposition because there was no unity due to the island being fractured into so many warring kingdoms. The Church was the main victim in the early attacks and again the monks were the chroniclers of these events, viewing the Vikings as barbarians. In spite of Ulster bearing the brunt of Viking attacks, there were occasions when the Ulster kings were able to inflict overwhelming defeat on the Vikings. This in turn, transferred the Vikings' attention further south.

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[7] Ibid. p. 16. Bardon gives here a fuller account of pagan rituals performed throughout the calender year. He notes the Breastplate attributed to Patrick is in effect a Chritianised druidic incantation:

> I arise today through a mighty strength, the invocation of the Trinity, through belief in the threeness, through confession of the oneness of the great Creator.

8. Ibid. p. 17.
9. Ibid. pp. 23-24. For instance, the Clann Sínaich was almost a dynasty which monopolised Church posts for generations at Armagh. Ibid. p. 24.
[10] Ibid. p. 20.

Hence, Ulster failed to benefit from the commercial and town building expertise the Vikings displayed in Dublin, Limerick and elsewhere.[11]

According to Bardon, Viking incursions did quicken the pace of political change in Ireland, as political unity of the whole island was near to being achieved when the Normans landed in Wexford in 1169.[12] Yet, in one sense this is hard to imagine as for over one and a half centuries earlier the provincial kings allied and clashed with each other. It seems that their objective was to seize the high-kingship. At the risk of oversimplification, it is suggested here that even in these early times, there existed an antagonism between Ulster and the remainder of Ireland, or at least a sense of geo-political separateness. Evidence of this can be found in Bardon's study. For instance, Muirchertach O'Brien of Munster and Turlough O'Connor of Connacht were all high kings 'with opposition'.[13] That opposition was often in Ulster. Despite the southern regions' kings sending fleets, Ulster could not be subjugated. Yet, Ulster kings never had the strength to impose their will on the rest of Ireland for they had not the wealth of Viking cities such as Limerick and Dublin to draw on -- indeed the province was considered the poorest in Ireland until the middle of the seventeenth-century.[14] Moreover, a powerful kingdom emerged in the eleventh century on the Ulster-Connacht borderlands: Bréifne, centred on the counties of Cavan and Leitrim and ruled by the O'Rourkes, who effectively blocked expansion south from Tír Eóghain.

Despite the conflicts noted above, the high-king Brian Boru reached Armagh in 1005 leading the armies of Munster, Leinster, Meath, Connacht and Norse Dublin. In brief, it was a southern dynasty, the Dál Cais which came closest to dominating all of Ireland in the years that followed. Boru paid twenty ounces

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[11] Ibid. p. 26.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid. p. 30.
[14] Ibid.

of gold to the Church, recognised Armagh's claim to ecclesiastical primacy, but ordered that it be written in the Book of Armagh, the words *Imperator Scottorum* , 'Emperor of the Irish'. For our purposes, although lacking perhaps the sophistication of the relationship between state and church in a latter period, we can recognise here an intertwined *symbiosis*. However, in this period it would be more accurate to put the above in a broad context. In other words, the relationship is between a *tribe*, or between the ruler of a tribe (or clan), and the Church.

Between the years 1102 and 1109, Donal and Cellach, abbots of Armagh managed to arrange armistices between contending kings. Cellah took the lead in reforming the Irish Church and his protégé Malachy, became a powerful ally in helping to obtain support from Pope Innocent II and official papal recognition of Armagh's primacy.[15] Malachy was appointed archbishop of Armagh and primate in 1132. In 1142 he founded the first Cistercian monastery in Ireland. However, the political and ecclesiastical rise of Armagh did not, lead to a revival of learning. The Church reformers of Armagh were not respecters of tradition; thus the maintenance of Gaelic culture was left increasingly to secular poets, bards and historians.[16] Yet, Bardon argues, by the beginning of the fourteenth century it could be said ' that Ulster's most distinguishing feature was that it was the most Gaelic province in Ireland'.[17]

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[15] Ibid. p. 31.

[16] Ibid. See also, *Encyclopaedia Britannica* Vol. 12, in 23 Vols. (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Ltd, 1953), p. 619. According to the above source, it states:

> In 1172, came the Anglo-Norman invasion, which completely overturned the traditional life of the country. From that date onwards foreign [sic] methods and ideas impressed themselves with increasing intensity. The *immediate* result of the invasion was the total extinction of the traditional arts...[the] Gothic style was violently forced on the country from without, and was never assimilated.

[17] Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, op. cit . p. 26.

Nonetheless, conflicts between the kings continued throughout the twelfth century. It was the notable battle between Rory O'Connor of Connacht and Dermot MacMurrough, King of Leinster, which set in motion the events leading to the Norman invasion of Ireland.[18] Macmurrough, who was also a supporter of ecclesiastical reform in Ireland, sought the support of Henry II. Henry II had proposed the annexation of Ireland in 1155 but was discouraged by his mother, Empress Matilda. Eventually influential Churchmen prevailed on Nicholas Breakspear, elected as Pope Adrian IV in 1154, to grant Ireland to Henry. As Geraghty notes:

> English intervention in Ireland had started in 1155 in a curiously oblique fashion, via Rome. The only English Pope, Adrian IV, invited Henry to impose order on the Celtic church in Ireland. He did so in a papal letter, a bull entitled *Laudabiliter*, " to the King of the English approving of the said king's intentions to enter Ireland to improve the state of the Church there".[19]

Indeed, I believe that this is one point in Irish history that contemporary Catholic nationalists would prefer to ignore. By the start of the fourteenth century, Norman Conquest in Ireland had reached its zenith and with a sparse population in the north, the earldom was vulnerable as a great Scots army prepared an assault on Ulster.

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[18] Ibid. p. 31.

[19] Geraghty, T., *The Irish War*, (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998), pp. 248-249. Geraghty has employed a shorthand in his text. John of Salisbury, adviser to the archbishop of Canterbury, wrote:

> In response to my petition the Pope granted and donated Ireland to the illustrious King of England, Henry, to be held by him and his successors. He did this in virtue of the long-established right, reputed to derive from the donation of Constantine, whereby all islands are considered to belong to the Roman Church.

Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, op. cit. p. 32. Moreover, Bardon also suggests that given the Normans' success and skill in warfare (for instance their conquests extended as far as Sicily), it could be a matter of time before they would come to Ireland. Ibid. This may be speculation on Bardon's part, but Torbjörn Knutsen's assertion supports the notion that political speculation was, in a word, indistinguishable from theology. See Knutsen citation p. 5 below.

3. 4 A preliminary interpretation

Although the central focus thus far has been at a 'state' [20] level, my point is national contexts of the relationship between religion and politics overlap into the realm of international politics. Let us establish some important points. First, the Roman Empire imposed unity and order upon Europe from about 50BC to 400 AD. When the western half of the Empire collapsed, the tribes, which then overran the old Roman provinces, did not maintain political organisation. By 1000 AD the Greco-Roman world had disintegrated. Second, as most of the European continent had been part of the Roman Empire, it had an imposed unifying and imperial infrastructure.[21] This included a system of churches, monasteries, and Christian schools. In spite of the fragmentation noted above, medieval political speculation took place within the framework of Greek logic and Christian mythology.[22] For the Church, the core of its claim lay in the teaching that the world was created in six days by God for an ultimate purpose. Man had fallen from grace into sin and error, thereby incurring the penalty of eternal damnation. But God had in his infinite benevolence and mercy, provided a way of salvation. In brief, life on earth was just a temporary test, or a means to a greater end. The good and the faithful would be gathered with God, and dwell in his Heavenly City in perfection for ever. But the evil and sinful were reserved a place of everlasting punishment. As Knutsen points out, this attitude provided the precondition for the immense power of the medieval Church.[23] Thus, the medieval world view was *dualistic*.[24] In other words, it distinguished sharply between this

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[20] I have used the term 'state' here as a shorthand. In other words, the modern concepts of 'state' and 'nation' were embryonic in comparison to the previous analyses of church and state relations in Chapter 2.

[21] Knutsen, T.L., *A History of International Relations Theory*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 14.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

world and the next. The Church defended this distinction with references to the Bible. This dualism was presented in a systematic way in St Augustine's (354-430) *City of God*, in which Augustine maintained that man inhabited two parallel realities: this world of violence, war, hunger and misery on the one hand, and the Kingdom of God on the other.[25]

The concepts argued by Augustine were rehearsed in much the same way in a latter period. For now, it is sufficient to say that his argument was that Man requires government and coercive laws, because of his sinful and corrupt nature. God created monarchs and princes to impose some order upon human society. Moreover, He has given these rulers authority to defend civil order. Therefore, the system of a medieval government took the form of a complex feudal hierarchy of kings and lords who made up a fiefdom. The king or the lord would give a part of his land to an important military leader who in return swore allegiance to him. Our Irish study thus far, closely follows this pattern.

The fact remains however, this ordering principle was fragile and provided ample opportunities for private warfare. Medieval life was 'intensely local and gave no nourishment to geopolitical speculations.[26] As Knutsen notes, the Church had a virtual monopoly of education and all theorising reflected ' the omnipresent obedience to the axioms of the Christian religion'.[27] In brief, political speculation was indistinguishable from theology. However, as noted above, prior to 1000 AD most of the peoples in the Irish experience, organised themselves in roving tribes and were led by warring chieftains. (This was the case in most of the Far West of Europe). The notion of social organisation was

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[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid. p. 15.
[27] Ibid.

guarded and articulated by the Church and, later, by the Holy Roman Empire.

Whether we cite the Irish experience or other European instances, it is safe to say that people gave their loyalties to the Church. People belonged to the land, which belonged to a lord; but people also belonged to the Church, where God was the ultimate lord. Duties and responsibilities of lords were confirmed by religious oaths. Most people owed allegiance to the local clergy, as the Pope was far removed in Rome. Nonetheless, during the eleventh century, the Church emerged as increasingly disciplined, unified, and with more centralised leadership. In the twelfth century, churches became wealthy and clergy held high posts in government. Here, we can state Bellah's assertion:

> Doctrines of established religion had come into existence because of ignorance and deliberate chicanery of priests, who were serving their own-self interest as well as that of secular despots who were often their masters.[28]

The reign of Charlemagne marked a distinct feature in the concept of the relationship between religion and politics. One may be forgiven for considering this to be synonymous with the church-state relationship, for two reasons. First, the above introduced a powerful actor into European politics, and it sowed a new, secular conflict between pope and emperor concerning power and authority over vast *territories*.[29] (Emphasis added). Previously, in the above, we noted a similar theme concerning the acquisition of territory in Pope Adrian IV's time. Nevertheless, both instances although different in nature, introduce and consolidate the early theory and practice of

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[28] Bellah, R.N., in *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Vol. 13, in 16 Vols. David L. Sills (ed.), (The Macmillan Company and the The Free Press, 1968), p. 407. Bellah is specifically referring to the rationalist tradition, which was closely associated with the rise of secular thought and scepticism in England and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
[29] Knutsen, T., *A History of International Relations Theory* , op. cit. p. 17.

international relations. The conflict between emperor and pope raised theoretical debates about the nature of power and the division of political authority between religious and secular actors over the Christian world. This in turn alludes to the second reason which Knutsen argues, that is, if the pope had his authority from God, from where did the emperor have his authority?[30] From the pope (as the pope maintained)? From God (as the emperor argued), or the men (as was claimed by the seven German princes who elected the emperor)?[31]

The above analysis should assist concerns of the Irish experience. To sum up for now, the above demonstrates the following: Early Irish rulers were patrons of the Church by granting land and in some cases 'purchased' their ecclesiastical status. Put another way, a pecuniary arrangement could galvanise the relationship between ruler and Church. Or, the ruler could give the Church protection. The clergy (abbots) played a diplomatic role in the settling of feudal conflicts. Religious doctrine was used as a form of social organisation and control, giving immense power to the Church. The Church considered itself to be above 'politics' in terms of territory. The Church became engaged in a realist form of international relations.

After Henry II's invasion of Ireland, he received all the kings of Ireland except those of Connacht and Ulster. The Irish bishops met at the Council of Cashel and, after enacting various reforms, declared:

> Divine offices shall be celebrated according to the forms of the Church of England, for it is right and just that as Ireland has received from her lord and king from England, she should accept reformation from the same source.[32]

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[30] Ibid.
[31] loc. cit.
[32] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 13, op. cit . pp. 602-603.

This was a task for which the papacy commissioned Henry. That is, the submission of the Church in Ireland to the English Crown as a papal fief. Thus, it can be said, that the Church of Rome exacted a foreign policy in collusion with the English monarch. Or, put another way, English royal authority in Ireland rested *de jure* on a papal grant and *de facto* on conquest.[33]

3. 5 The Reformation: Early Anglicisation

A brief definition of 'the Reformation', is the 16th-century movement for reform of certain doctrines and practices of the Church of Rome resulting in the establishment of Reformed or Protestant Churches. The Reformation, or the Age of Religious Discord marked not only a fracture in Christianity, but it also was accompanied by the birth of the modern state system and a world economy.[34] Moreover, the popular religious movement changed to a *political* movement led by the princes. The anti-clerical revolution is explained by the special position of the Anglican Church in England, which, without representation in the House of Commons, had little contact with the nation. Appointed by the king, the upper clergy had anti-papal tendencies. Moreover, the bourgeois laity's criticism of the Church's wealth led to parliamentary proposals for secularization to the advantage of Crown and Parliament. By the same token, a plan dating back to 1518, was to secure Henry VIII's dominions from his enemies by holding down Ireland with an effective military force.[35] Furthermore, papal power was to be exploited by extending to Ireland 'the legatine authority' of Cardinal Wolsey in an attempt

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[33] MacCaffrey, W.T., *Elizabeth I : War and Politics 1588-1603,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 329.

[34] Knutsen, T., *A History of International Relations,* op. cit. p. 43. Knutsen also notes that the 16th-century marked further development in international relations theory. As a precursor to later events during the Reformation period which also impacted on Anglo-Irish relations, Henry VIII of England joined the 'Holy League to Liberate Italy'. As part of the attempt to end the Spanish-Habsburg domination of Italy, Henry VIII joined Maximilian I of Austria in the league and encircled Louis XII of France, who in turn was able to incite Scotland to attack England. This brief account demonstrates the intricacy of international relations between the powers of medieval Europe. A similar situation was to repeat itself in the late 17th-century.

[35] Edwards,R.D., *Ireland in the Age of the Tudors: The Destruction of Hiberno-Norman Civilization,* (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1977), p. 40.

to end the flow of 'benefice- seekers from the independent parts of the country, who acted as agents for those involved in 'intrigues with the continental powers'.[36] However, the *Curia* rejected Henry's proposal to divorce Catherine of Aragon and this precipitated the break with the Church of Rome and the coercion of the clergy to recognize the king as the supreme head of the Church. In 1542 he proclaimed himself King of Ireland.

As Hindley's title of *The Death of the Irish Language : A Qualified Obituary* not only suggests, but also reveals *language loss*.[37] The Tudors under Henry VIII and his successors enforced English law and imposed the English *language* as a means to subjugate the Irish.[38] Thus, it was inevitable the Irish would need to use an *alien* language, English, just as *Gaeltacht* (Irish) would have been alien for the English. It can be said: the domination of the Gaelic language, or in other words, it being replaced by English, also disadvantaged the Irish politically. Both languages however, serve as ethnic markers.

3. 6 Elizabethan policy and Ireland

The Anglo-Norman invasion of Ireland had a strong impulse at the beginning, but its influence dissipated before the process of transformation was complete. By 1500 Ireland was a bifurcated society.[39] Further, the Elizabethan policy on transforming Ireland into an English colony was met with varied approaches, responses and outcomes. Firstly, English or anglicised society was limited to a portion of the country. Counties immediately around Dublin, parts of Leinster, and the port towns of Waterford, Cork, Galway and Limerick had the politico-legal and socio-economic underpinning of a miniature England.[40] The rest of the country

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[36] Ibid.
[37] Hindley, R., *The Death of the Irish Language: A Qualified Obituary*, (London: Routledge, 1990).
[38] Ibid.p. 5.
[39] MacCaffrey, W.T., *Elizabeth I : War and Politics*, op. cit. p. 330.
[40] Ibid.

remained not only Gaelic-speaking but also Celtic in its social and political institutions, '*alien* in virtually everything but its *religion*'.[41] In the case of Old English earldoms, the Geraldines of Kildare and Desmond and the Butlers of Ormond 'ruled over a hybrid world in which Gaelic ways blended with English in a pragmatic combination'.[42]

Decisions about the life of Irish society were made in the island itself, but that balance and that autonomy changed when English royal policy shifted in the 1530s. The open revolt of the Kildares ended in the destruction of their power and the balance they had played in recent decades. Then came the statutory transformation of the medieval lordship of Ireland into the modern Kingdom of Ireland in the early 1540s. This task of transformation, or perhaps more precisely the implementation of royal authority, was to prove to be the most far-reaching undertaking for the Tudor monarchy other than making of the Reformation.[43] At the same time, Ireland steadily and increasingly drained the royal treasury as inputs outweighed outputs. Although the royal court agreed on the need for "reformation", it deliberated over its policy of transformation of Irishmen into Englishmen. In other words, what strategy would accomplish it? By brute force, or by the radical position of English colonists?

Moreover, MacCaffrey argues that there was no timetable or strong sense of immediacy to reduce Ireland to obedience to the English crown?[44] Tudor policy towards Ireland was restrained, not only because of limited resources, but also because of more pressing problems elsewhere, in particular, the presence of the Spanish on the high seas. At the same time, Irish resistance was neither more consistent nor sustained. Nevertheless, the possibility of

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[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid. pp. 330-331. "Old English" is used hereafter to designate the English- speaking descendants of the original English settlers as distinguished from the members of the Gaelic-speaking community.
[43] Ibid. p. 332.
[44] Ibid. p. 335.

Spanish intervention was not dismissed from the minds of English politicians. Thus, as early as 1565, Burghley had drawn up a comprehensive scheme for the settlement of Ulster. On the one hand, crown interest was 'essentially inertial in character'.[45] Yet it would have been unthinkable for a sixteenth century monarch to voluntarily abandon a part of his inheritance. On the other hand, among the English deputies, soldiers like Drury, Bagenal or the Lord Chancellor, Loftus, had strong convictions how English rule should be exercised.

There were several considerations as to how anglicisation was to be achieved. One, the country must be must be ruled by a corps of English officials responsible to London. Secondly, an obvious precedent was that of Wales. The Welsh elite, having accepted English law and custom, were now allowed to participate in English political life, to sit in Parliament and to act as sheriffs and justices at home. In Ireland, Old English or Gaelic persons were increasingly to be crowded out of positions of responsibility and power, to be replaced by an immigrant bureaucracy, military and civil.[46] One scheme which had been proposed was the offer of a legal formula whereby the chieftain could submit to the English crown, formally relinquishing his indeterminate powers over men and land, in return with a new legal persona as a landowner with defined title and fixed rights. However, Old English and Gaelic lords developed a countering impulse, as they felt their traditional power was endangered by the new order.

Between 1568 and 1583, two rebellions led by the Munster Geraldines, had raised the standard of religion, calling on Catholics to reject 'the heretic queen and her government'.[47] The hope of peaceful anglicisation of the inhabitants

[45] Ibid. p. 339.
[46] Ibid. p. 340.
[47] Ibid.

had withered. Sir Henry Sidney, who had been less than content with gradualist strategies, looked to English colonisation to solve the problem, by physical displacement of the native population and their replacement at least partially, by English settlers.[48] Ulster, *the most intractably Gaelic province,* was envisaged as a site for such an enterprise.[49] Thus, the logic of the coercive school seemed most plausible. Continual fighting between the English forces and Gaelic armies -- in Ulster against the O'Neills, in Munster against the Desmonds, led to an endemic explosion of violence elsewhere in the country.

While the Old English escaped the worst of this, they were distrusted, especially because of their lukewarm acceptance of the new faith and the suspicion that they still adhered to the old. As MacCaffrey puts it, 'The infection of anti-popery, already so virulent in England, added to the measure of hostility towards all Irishmen'.[50] It is of note, that in the long perspective of four centuries, despite the failure of colonisation on at least three distinct attempts, the Elizabethan conquest, marks a definitive turning point in Irish history. The imposition of direct English rule throughout the island also meant the crushing of Gaelic culture. It marked the beginning of the Ascendancy.

3.7 Ireland 1600 - 1848: From the Ascendancy to the Great Irish Famine

3 .7.1 Cromwellian Ireland

After Elizabeth I's death, the Stuarts (James I and Charles I) ruled England until 1649 when the latter monarch was executed. The English Civil War preceded the above regicide as well as the massacre of Catholics at Ulster in 1641 by Parliamentary forces, led by Oliver Cromwell. Moreover, Parliament had earlier demanded safeguards against arbitrary arrest and taxation.

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[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid. p. 345.

However, in the years 1629 to 1640, there was government without Parliament, which witnessed the persecution of all religious and political opponents (Dissenters, Nonconformists), especially of the Puritans. This Calvinist movement, based on a free form of evangelical Christianity and an ascetic mode of life, sought to purge the church of Catholic influences. The new parliamentary army under Cromwell who, convinced of his *mission*, was able to forge his ' God possessed Ironsides' into a Puritan elite.

Cromwell's dictatorship hallmarked England's first experiment in 'republicanism'. A Puritan cleansing of Catholic Ireland and Scotland by Cromwell included complete confiscation of Irish landed property. The process was exemplified by the massacre of the civilian population at Drogheda and the garrison at Augher. Although a desperate unity of Catholics existed under the Protestant commander Ormond, the final betrayal was Charles II's revocation of support for the Irish forces, made at Dunfermline, which abandoned Ormond and Irish Catholics.[51] The remaining opposition was led by the inadequate Bishop of Clogher, even though Daniel O'Neill was more resourceful, he was considered as not sufficiently Catholic.[52] Yet, those that fought on were clear that they were prosecuting 'a holy war for religion, king and nation'.[53] By the late summer of 1641, resistance was restricted to guerrilla bands, as Foster notes, living a 'tory' existence.[54]

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[51] Foster, R.F., *Modern Ireland 1600-1972*, (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1988), p. 103.
[52] Ibid. pp. 102-103.
[53] Ibid. p. 103.
[54] Ibid. The term 'tory' is derived from the Irish word *Toraidhe*, meaning 'raider'. It was applied from the mid-1640s to the banditti remnants of the Irish armies. It later became a satirical sobriquet for political 'outlaws'. Heber [sic] MacMahon (1600-1650) became the Bishop of Down and Connor in 1642 and then Bishop of Clogher in 1643. The point here is, a hierarchical involvement in conflict. MacMahon became leader of the Ulster forces but was defeated at Scariffhollis. He was wounded, imprisoned and executed. Described by a French envoy as a violent Ulster Catholic, bent on making Ireland a Spanish fief. Ibid. p. 103. Moreover, as Foster points out:

3. 7.2 Effects on Religion

Cromwell's administrators (son and sons-in-law) initially had a positive concept of their role(s) in the Irish Council. An insight into this matter is found in Foster, where he notes how one parliamentary commissioner described being led by God 'into a strange land, and to act in as strange a work, a work that neither we nor our forefathers knew or heard of: the framing or forming a commonwealth out of a corrupt rude mass'.[55]

Foster argues, the Irish conditions 'moderated evangelical intentions'.[56] For instance, much of the Church of Ireland's ethos was compatible enough with Puritanism. Episcopalianism and royalism were rooted out of Munster, although local variations remained, often through clergy being retained by local patrons, guilds and corporations as well as individuals.[57] Wholesale conversion was limited because there was uncertainty as to what doctrines would be officially acceptable. Although an effort was made to proselytize in Irish, the conversion of Catholics was not really attempted.[58] Legislators were slow propagating the gospel, but the army had imported religious radicalism which left a residue and sects like the Baptists recruited impressively.[59] The general approach towards Protestant sects was fairly tolerant, though a tough line was taken with those Ulster Scots who had turned against Parliament.[60]

> The history of Ireland in the ensuing decade of Cromwellian rule has often been passed over, by historians and even by reflective contemporaries, for political reasons as well as lack of evidence. It was for many an interlude more tactfully forgotten; while to historians, the landscape simply appeared an exhaustive desert, though that perverse Victorian, J.A. Froude, persisted in describing it as Ireland's golden age.

Ibid. ff. p. 103. This demonstrates historical bias by some writers in the face of well documented massacres committed by Cromwell during his purge of Irish Catholics.

[55] Ibid. p. 104.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

3. 7.3 Effects on Ulster

Nonetheless, the subjugation of Ulster was bloody and protracted. Plague and famine swept over the province, where millions of acres had been confiscated. Only those, mainly Protestants who could prove being "pro-parliamentary" in their affections were spared on the proviso that their fines were paid, but almost all Catholic landowners disappeared in Ulster. Under Cromwell's regime Catholics endured much persecution. Their worship was outlawed and confined to a 'Mass rock' in a remote place.[61] The Gaelic aristocracy, virtually wiped out, gave way to a plantationist control over Ulster. This really marked the beginning of another political era, but a part of a continuing process. Political and social defeat of the Catholic landed aristocracy in the seventeenth-century, became the 'emotional taproot' of Catholic *nationalism.* [62]

3.8 The Boyne and after

The accession of Charles II (usually referred to as the Restoration) ushered in a new era of toleration for all.[63] Catholic worship became public again, Mass houses were built, and religious orders began to return.[64] The Government ceased to interfere with the Presbyterians who accepted the *regnium donum,* a grant from the king for the upkeep of their ministers.[65] Bardon notes that Connacht and not Ulster became the poorest province in Ireland, as the policy of plantation showed some success, even though many of the original aims had not been achieved.[66] In some places, planters and natives mingled more

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[61] Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster,* op. cit. pp. 141-142. Bardon provides some estimates of the amount of land that was confiscated. For instance, in Ulster the biggest confiscations were in the east and south of the province: 41 per cent of the land of Antrim; 26 per cent of Down; 34 per cent of Armagh; and 38 per cent of Monaghan. Only 4 per cent of Tyrone was confiscated and Cromwell's charter restored Derry property to the City of London. Ibid. p. 142.

[62] Garvin, T. , *The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics,* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1981), p. 14.

[63] Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster,* op. cit. p. 145.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid. p. 146. The province was in a poor economic condition on the accession of Charles II and recovery was not helped by restrictions placed on Ireland by the Westminster

than is often acknowledged. Religion, rather than blood, 'was the badge of ethnic division - a division which yawned wide again on the accession of James II'.[67]

The Jacobite War in Ireland of 1689-91 has become a political symbol in Ireland. As Ellis asserts, 'no other battle in history has created the effect that the Battle of the Boyne has and yet, in terms of the war itself, it was not of great military significance'.[68] This illustrates yet another paradoxical event in history, but the contemporary traditions of the Orangemen express Protestant heroism and sacrifice.

In terms of military significance, the Battle of Aughrim was the decisive conflict of the war.[69] It was another hundred years before an Irish army took the field again when Jacobinism replaced Jacobitism as the rallying philosophy of the Irish nation, uniting as it did Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter.[70] Nonetheless, in terms of this study, that is, the relationship between religion and politics, finds significant substance in the fact that Pope Innocent XI, among others, backed King William since James was the 'tool of the excommunicated French monarch Louis XIV'. In another sense, that is, in terms of international politics Louis's intervention on behalf of James focused William's attention on Ireland.[71]

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parliament. In an attempt to protect English farmers, the export of cattle was prohibited from 1663. By 1681 the ban had been extended to sheep, pigs, beef, pork, bacon, butter and cheese. Yet recovery did take place due to the rising prosperity of England and her colonies, together with growing trade opportunities on the European mainland. Ibid.

[67] Ibid. p. 147.

[68] Ellis, P.B., *The Boyne Water: The Battle of the Boyne, 1690,* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976), p. xi. There are over 3,000 Orange Order marches in Ulster each year. However, the climactic date in the marching calendar is 12th of July, marking the defeat of James II by William of Orange.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Geraghty, T., *The Irish War,* op. cit. p. 355. It is of note that James II is portrayed in unflattering terms in some literature, including Irish publications. For instance, he is referred to as Seamus a Chaca (James the Shit), while Patrick Sarsfield is given an undisputed heroic status for his defense against William's 'The Siege of Limerick'. See *About Limerick,* Souvenir Edition, Vol. No. 1, 1997, pp. 1-5. (Author not cited).

3.9 Analysis

The slogan to which I referred to at the outset, (history is written by the victor) is clearly a unilateral assertion (in this case Republican). Therefore, it leaves questions for Republican/Nationalist zealots, asking themselves whether Dermot MacMurrough in collaboration with an English Pope Adrian IV, acted in a treacherous manner. In the context of historical circumstances, Catholicism had more gravity and priority than notions of cultural territoriality. Yet, as Geraghty notes, Republican literature omits 'the ghosts of Irish resistance fighters who were not Republicans', such as Patrick Sarsfield, first Earl of Lucan, and others who were members of English and Irish aristocracy.[72] But, the Jacobite War can be viewed as a European war fought on Irish soil. Certainly, at this stage of world history the concepts of 'nation' and 'state' were still embryonic. Nonetheless, the evidence is clear that the Church dominated over a monarchical political system. Further, there seems to be an absence of protest by the Roman Church during Cromwellian massacres in Ireland. In fact, some Catholic bishops who led the resistance were captured and hanged, therefore making them martyr saints.

To be fair however, some denominational variations or anomalies should be noted. For instance, whilst the Jacobite Parliament sitting in Dublin in 1689 had tried to abolish all religious discrimination by law, passing Acts XIII and XV, religious freedom became a myth.[73] After William's victory the only religion recognised was that of the Church of England. The fact is, penal laws were enacted against *Catholic* and *dissenting Protestant*. In William's 'new era of religious freedom', a Presbyterian minister could face jail sentences and

[72] Ibid. p. 247.
[73] Ellis, P.B., *The Boyne Water*, op. cit. p. 151.

hefty fines (£100) if they celebrated the Lord's Last Supper.[74] Presbyterians were punished if they were discovered to have been married by a Presbyterian minister, and they were excluded from holding positions in public office. Intermarriage between Presbyterians and Anglicans was declared illegal and as late as 1772 Presbyterians were punished for holding religious meetings.[75] Thus, it is suggested here, that hardliners such as Reverend Ian Paisley tend to overlook this chapter in Northern Irish history, but rather find sanctuary in an anti-papist position. Moreover, the irony is palpable, if we consider papal backing of Williamite forces in the Battle of the Boyne. At the same time, but from a Euro-centric viewpoint, the most important function of James and the French in Ireland was not to liberate the Irish or eliminate Protestant settlements in Ulster, but to entice a massive diversion of anti-French military resources away from the more important battleground of Continental Europe.[76] Yet, in the wake of Williamite policy on religion, between the years 1717 and 1776 some 250, 000 Protestant Ulstermen migrated to America to find religious liberty.[77] It was the descendants of these Ulster Presbyterians who later were to play a prominent part in the American War of Independence and a creed of republicanism.

3.10 The Beginning of Irish Nationalism, Splinter Groups and The Rebellion of 1798

The cause of Irish nationalism has been briefly noted above. Perhaps more importantly, the above can also be viewed as the origins of the association of religious identity with national and/or political identity. Further causal factors may be summarised here as: legal discrimination against Catholics; the hostility and contempt of many of the ruling caste for the religion and culture

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[74] Ibid. The Holy Mass in the Catholic tradition is also another form of commemorating the Lord's Last Supper.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Geraghty, T., *The Irish War*, op. cit. p. 251.
[77] Ellis, P.B., *The Boyne Water*, op. cit. p. 151.

of the defeated Catholics; an intensely exploitative land system; Counter-Reformation Catholicism and residual feudal loyalties all reinforced each other and assisted the growth of a diffuse, anti-Protestant and anti-English popular nationalism.[78] However, the above assertion would be deficient if it were not to include a republican philosophy that united the Protestant and the Catholic, under the common name of Irishmen in their bid to throw out the imperial English yoke.[79]

Early Irish republicanism contained elements of secular democratic liberalism and a nationalism that quickly became defined in racial and religious terms.[80] Adding to the contradictions in Hibernian history thus far, Curtis points out that the United Irish movement was riddled with contradictions, stemming largely from the fact that it started in Ulster among middle-class, radical Presbyterians who eventually sought to enlist the support of the aggrieved Catholic peasantry throughout the rest of Ireland.[81] Some clarification is needed here. While urban radicals and rural insurgents shared common ground in their hatred of the Anglo-Irish ascendancy, they viewed their oppressors in different ways. To the middle-class radicals, the ascendancy represented illiberal government.[82] To the rural Catholic poor, the ascendancy simply represented the descendants of conquerors and confiscators.[83] To many Catholic United Irishmen, Irish Protestants were foreigners.[84] As Curtis argues, ' the United Irishmen, who desired above all a union of Catholic and Protestant, unwittingly contributed to further division among their countrymen'.[85]

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[78] Garvin, T.,*The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics,* op. cit. p. 16.
[79] Ellis, P.B., *The Boyne Water,* op. cit. p. 151.
[80] Curtis, N.J., *The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791-1798,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 10.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid. p. 11.

The notion of secular politics warrants further comment because it is not a matter of purely denominational, doctrinal or canonical differences, but rather a position in the political thought. Firstly, radical Irishmen launched their movement for political and economic liberation. In doing so, the original Irish republicans adapted a cultural and intellectual heritage with Britain. For instance, they turned to the commonwealth tradition of Harrington, to the moral and economic philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, and to Locke's notions about the right of citizens to overthrow tyranny.[86] The above also coincided with the modernisation, and, increasing secularisation of thought, both in Europe and America. Tom Paine's *Rights of Man* materialised in seven editions between 1791 and 1792, thereby diffusing Enlightenment traditions through Belfast 'society'.[87] But most of all, in the 1790's, the United Irishmen turned to France, as ideas of universal male suffrage and complete Catholic emancipation gathered momentum. As Foster notes, the Belfast radicals' 'admiration of the French army and French military achievements was axiomatic, apparently overwhelming all local divisions'.[88] For the French, Ireland was the backdoor to England as it had been for the Spanish in the sixteenth-century.

However, what should be borne in mind as Foster points out, the Presbyterian tradition of libertarian republicanism long antedated 1775 or 1789.[89] To be sure, Foster argues:

> Dissenting ideology is there from the beginning: far more apparent, and far more galvanic, than the vague and shadowy Gaelic nationalism that was taken on board in the late 1790s.[90]

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[86] Ibid. p. 36.
[87] Foster, R.F., *Modern Ireland*, op. cit. p. 265.
[88] Ibid. p. 270. The French invaded Ireland in 1689, 1690, and 1691 to support the claims of the earlier claims of the Catholic James II to the throne of England. In 1760, France again attempted an invasion of Ireland.
[89] Ibid. p. 265.

Moreover, deism *was not popular* and northern radicals retained a basic dislike of Catholicism.[91] At the same Defenderism (also referred to as Ribbonism, see below) can be claimed to have been 'republican' in a national, anti-monarchical sense before the input of United Irish influence.[92] In her study, Curtis further unravels a series of ironies and contradictions which existed at the time. The United Irishmen showed themselves to be immersed in British Whig culture, often accompanied by anti-popery. At the same time, the Catholic Church seemed to:

> ...represent all the illiberal forces of arbitrary despotism, privilege, and tradition, and the ignorance and superstition which retarded the progress of rational and virtuous government.[93]

Although all prejudices were not alleviated, expediency as well as principle militated for a union of Catholic and Protestant. Clearly, this period illustrates an exponential rise in the symbiotic fusion between 'religion' and 'politics' in one sense, but markedly secular in another sense. Indeed, it can be argued that the relationship between state and church has not withered in this context, but the evidence indicates that in this case, the State, that is, Britain, and not the Church is the definitive institution. Rather, its brethren have taken the role of secular political activism (as revolutionaries), striving for an

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[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] The phenomenon of fragmentation in resistance movements deserves mention here. Popular unrest was expressed by the varied and complex structure of agrarian 'secret societies'. The 'Oakboy' movement in the north sprang up against taxes levied for road-building, especially when used to private advantage by landlords. It mobilised Catholics as well as lower-class Presbyterians and Anglicans. The more widespread 'Whiteboy' movement in the south, mobilised a wide range of grievances -- even anger at excessive exactions by Catholic priests, as well as the potato tithe. In brief, the grievances were socio-economic, as well as political. However, my point is that other groups included, Rightboys, Steelboys and the Peep O' Day Boys. Hence, my use of the term 'splinter groups' in the eighteenth century context has also been mirrored in present times. For instance, paramilitary splinter groups such as the Continuity-IRA (CIRA) has some support in Limerick, the Real-IRA (RIRA) formed in Dundalk, and has some notoriety in the border towns. In the north, Protestant splinter groups have also been recently established. The 'Orange Volunteers' and the 'Ulster Defenders' are just some examples.

[93] Foster, R.F., *Modern Ireland*, op. cit. p. 265.

independent and secular political arrangement. Put another way, on the one hand there appears to be an obfuscation here about the relationship between religion and politics, and the relationship between church and state, in a word, illusory. On the other hand, the relationship continues simultaneously at two levels: at the micro and macro levels respectively.

Moreover, middle-class Protestants realised from previous experience that they alone could not pressure an intransigent government into reforming itself. Therefore, the price of Catholic support could be no less than full civic and political equality with Protestants, thereby prompting the Protestant nationalist leader Wolfe Tone producing his pamphlet, *An argument on behalf of the Catholics of Ireland.*[94] During the 1790s, Irish taxes, hitherto kept at a low level began to rise, leading to a violent resistance to attempted tithe collection during late 1797.[95] In spite of Tone's non-sectarian ideology, latent Protestant-Catholic tension remained in most country areas. As Foster argues, the new taxes (such as on malt, leather, and salt), marked a 'turning point in Irish fiscal history' which set the stage for emotional resistance to the highly-charged issue of tithes; and eventually for sectarianism which swept the country at all levels and facilitated rural mobilisation in 1798.[96]

Matters of fiscal policy as a contributory factor to popular discontent has been alluded to above. It follows, in keeping with the allocation of resources in a political process, economic factors such as landholdings played a role among agrarian agitators, who sought the support of the rural classes. This was closely related to the rural economy of Armagh, with the land hunger attendant upon the linen industry. The Armagh linen culture has been used

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[94] Curtis, N. J. ,*The United Irishmen*, op. cit. p. 36. The annual commemoration ceremonies at Wolfe Tone's grave in Bodenstown, Co. Kildare, are an annual high-water mark of affirmation of Republican beliefs.
[95] Foster, R.F., *Modern Ireland*, op.cit. p. 271.
[96] Ibid.

as an explanation why Protestant tenants became Orangemen rather than United Irishmen: an alliance with landlords was necessary to maintain perceived economic status as much as Protestant Ascendancy.[97]

Moreover, Foster provides some useful insights into the beginnings of contemporary sectarianism in Ulster. Sectarian incidents were set off by undisciplined groups such as the 'Peep O' Day Boys' who claimed they were 'simply enforcing the Penal Laws reneged by the gentry'.[98] Protestant aggression increased as Defenderism attempted to counter the above activities. By the mid 1790s local clashes such as in County Armagh, which inaugurated the Orange Order, 'had taken a definitively sectarian tinge'.[99] Protestants wanted to ban Catholics from the local linen industry; Protestants were colonising traditionally Catholic areas, and most importantly, Foster argues, local Protestant gentry openly supported the Orangemen.[100] In these conditions, Defenderism rapidly became an 'anti-Protestant, anti-state ideology'; it was also anti-English and capable of spectacular violence.[101]

To sum up, at the top of this colonial system were the English Protestants and it was from this privileged community that the leaders of a national movement emerged. This movement split however, into two factions that can be loosely termed constitutionalists and revolutionists. In the former instance, the constitutionalists wanted legal reforms (some which they had achieved in 1779 and 1793, such as a Parliament of Ireland), reservation of taxation and expenditure in Ireland to Parliament of Ireland and the relaxation of laws against Catholics and Presbyterians, to name but few. For the revolutionists,

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[97] Ibid. p. 272.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Bartlett, T., "Select Documents XXXVIII: Defenders and Defenderism in 1795", *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. xxiv, No. 95 (May 1985), p. 375.

the United Irishmen led by Wolfe Tone, these achievements were unacceptable. They desired a termination of all links with Great Britain and the establishment of a republic. To achieve those ends they turned to Revolutionary France. Tone attempted to invade Ireland once in 1796 and twice in 1798, but was defeated. Without French military aid, the Irish insurrection of 1798 collapsed. The revolt ultimately failed, because it assumed the nature of a religious war with Catholics killing Protestants.[102]

3.11 The 1800 Act of Union and after : the loss of language

Strategic concerns could not be separated from the religious discord in Ireland. Convinced by the insurrection that the political relationship with Ireland posed a threat to the security of Britain, the British Parliament passed the 1800 Act of Union. This resulted in all the powers gained for Ireland by the constitutionalists, and the Parliament of Ireland itself which had existed since 1297, were abolished. According to Fallon:

> Only with the end of the Napoleonic Wars did the Catholic Church become interested in Irish nationalism, and then simply as the means for achieving three specific goals: the right of Catholics to vote and hold office, the disestablishment of the Protestant Church of Ireland, and the creation of a Catholic education system.[103]

Interestingly, when this nationalism defined Irish identity in terms of nationality, not Catholicism, however, it was attacked.[104] Moreover, the concepts of nationalism, Irish identity and the location of language in this context may appear to be confusing. To be sure, Williams gives us some useful insights here. By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries many of the native literati had accepted the reformed faith while remaining

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[102] Fallon, J.E., "Ireland: Two States, Two Nations", *World Affairs* Vol. 158, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 72-74.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.

Irish speakers.[105] After the Cromwellian and early Williamite periods, the better land fell to the immigrant Protestants settlers, and the hills and boglands were left to the native Irish Catholic tenantry.[106] The significance of this is, it related not only to a denominational distribution, but also 'the linguistic result of this was for about two centuries a quiltwork pattern of English - and Irish - speaking districts'.[107] By the early eighteenth-century, 'the religious pattern and with it the pattern of Irish and British settlement was effectively fossilized.[108] According to Hindley's study, in the census of 1911 where Catholics formed 30-40 per cent of the population, there is evidence that Irish was still spoken by all or most of the indigenous inhabitants around 1800.[109]

The Act of Union in 1800, Hindley argues, made a fundamental psychological change over the nation, in that it coincided in date with the time when 'the majority decided that collectively it needed English for its own utilitarian purposes'.[110] Interestingly, all Irish political leaders had come to accept that the future of Ireland and its people lay through the English language.[111]

The Irish Great Famine and its consequences contributed to the decline of the Irish language, as the nationalist movement focused on tenants' rights and land reform, leaving it with little energy to save the language.[112] A clearer evaluation of the consequences of the Famine in terms of language loss can be

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[105] Williams, N., in *The Oxford Companion to Irish History*, Connolly, S.J., (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 301.
[106] Hindley, R., *The Death of the Irish Language*, op. cit . p. 6.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid. p. 12.
[111] Ibid. p. 13.
[112] Williams, N., *The Oxford Companion to Irish History*, op. cit. p. 301. There is an element of ambiguity which presents itself when examining the evidence of Hindley and Williams. For instance, while the consequences of the Famine are not disputed here, Williams claims immediately before the Famine, 'Irish was still spoken by about half the population of 8 million'.

considered in terms of its population decline. According to Wheatcroft, of the million who died and the million who emigrated immediately (apart from the millions more who followed), most were Gaelic speaking.[113] Moreover, those who were left behind felt their ancient language as an embarrassment, 'even a badge of shame'.[114] In contrast to other ethnic groups which landed in America, such as those speaking German, Italian, Yiddish, or Polish, the Irish abandoned the Gaelic movement and, 'politically active Irish-Americans regarded the revival movement as an irrelevant distraction from the task of fighting the English'.[115]

However, it should also be noted, in a climate of Catholic nationalism, the planters had been Gaelic speakers from Scotland and as late as 1835 the Synod of Ulster made Irish a necessary subject for the training of all Presbyterian ministers.[116] Moreover, as Williams notes, in 1841 the Presbyterian General Assembly published a handbook for teachers of Irish, which was described as 'our sweet and memorable mother tongue'.[117]

In any event, Williams summarises the above in the following passage:

> The shift from the indigenous language (Irish) to the language of the conquerors (English) weakened the attachment of the Irish to their own country. Indeed it can be argued that the loss of the Irish language is the most decisive event in Irish history, since it altered radically the self-understanding of the Irish and destroyed the continuity between their present and their past.[118]

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[113] Wheatcroft, G., "The Disenchantment of Ireland", in *The Atlantic*, July 1993, Vol. 272 No. 1, page number not cited in hardcopy obtained from Document Delivery Services, Morris Miller Library, University of Tasmania.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Williams N, *The Oxford Companion to Irish History*, op.cit. p. 301.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.

The Repeal movement of the 1830s and the 1840s, which sought to repeal the Act of Union, was opposed by Pope Gregory XVI.[119] Furthermore, during this period a number of secret societies proliferated. Ribbonism was a Catholic countermeasure to Orangeism, and it too shared Orangeism's addiction to oaths, banners, sashes, emblems and parades.[120] Secret societies were under a general ban of the Catholic Church with the serious penalty of excommunication. Certainly, on the one hand the activities of these secret societies not only included political agitation but also racketeering, intimidation, petty crime and murder. Nevertheless, the Catholic Church's position, as well as sections of its community, is ambiguous. As Garvin argues, it was, however, the continued refusal to grant Catholic emancipation rather than the issue of Repeal that brought the higher strata of the Catholic community into the political arena in reaction to the sectarianism of the English Constitution.[121]

Moreover, the Catholic Association founded in 1823 avoided the militarised methods used by the United Irishmen. Thus, for the Catholic emancipation campaign in the 1820s, the Catholic Church provided a readymade political apparatus to mobilise people behind the association. However, emancipation, which only affected the upper strata of the Catholic population, was supported by the urban middle class and by the stronger Catholic farmers.[122] It seems to have meant relatively little to the general peasant population.[123] Further, it seems that the Catholic Church distanced itself from the gravity of the bigger political issues such as the Repeal of the Union, by supporting protagonists such as Daniel O'Connell in his election campaign, because of fear of Protestant proselytism. In other words, the Catholic Church

[119] Ibid.
[120] Garvin, T., *The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics*, op. cit. p. 38.
[121] Ibid. p. 46.
[122] Ibid. p. 47.
[123] Ibid.

encouraged the bishops to see O'Connell's enterprise as a campaign for religious freedom or even the preservation of that community.[124] Yet, to be fair, one must consider the position taken by the English government in its effort to implement the policy of 'concurrent endowment'.[125] This policy meant providing income for clergy of all religions that were publicly practiced within the UK, so clergy for the Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, and Church of Ireland would all have an approximately equivalent income. In brief, the policy of 'concurrent endowment' also aimed at a distinctive principle in Church-State relations by attempting to establish a model that would be ' productive of the most perfect religious harmony'.[126] But this was rejected by the Catholics.

3. 12 From the Great Famine to the Home Rule Bill

3. 12.1 The Famine years

There appears to be a number of events throughout Irish history, which have been catastrophic. The Great Irish Famine (1841-51) was such an event. This chapter in Irish history has left a profound effect upon the collective psyche to this day.[127] For nationalists, it is often interpreted in genocidal terms. Yet, during these times of human tragedy, the Catholic Church had taken a rather vague, non-committal and ambiguous, if not a lukewarm stance towards the

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[124] Ibid. p. 48. O'Connell was, essentially Whig in his political principles and was not really sympathetic to separatism. He appears to have wanted equality within the United Kingdom for Catholics, along the lines of the settlement secured by the Scottish Presbyterians. Ibid.

[125] Smith, D.A., "The Birth of 'Concurrent Endowment': George Cornewall Lewis, *The London Review* and the Irish-Church Debate, 1835-6" in *The English Historical Review*, June 1999, Vol. No. 457, p. 658.

[126] Ibid. p. 659. The principle of a model that would be 'productive of the most perfect religious harmony', belongs to G.C. Lewis. However, Smith notes the first vehicle for publicly promoting what 'became known as concurrent endowment', was John Stuart Mill's new venture ... and less dogmatic philosophical radicalism, the *London Review* of 1835. Ibid.

[127] For a detailed discussion on collective mental states and the collective psyche see Bostock, W.W., "Disturbed Collective Mental States: Their Impact on Human Behaviour", in *Perspectives: A Mental Health Magazine*, November-December, 1999.
<http://mentalhelp.net/perspectives/articles/art110119992.htm>.
Sighted December 21, 1999.

realities of the day. The following sources reveal the prevailing attitude by the Catholic Church.

In a copy of the apostolical letter of Pope Pius IX, the pontiff on the one hand acknowledges the suffering of the starving population in Ireland and urges 'in conformity with the undoubted principles of Christian morality' of:

> [The] obligation of exhorting the members of your flock, who have the means of complying with the great precept of almsgiving which is so peculiarly imperative in the present distressed circumstances of the poor.[128]

On the other hand, in the same letter, there seems to be a preoccupation with ritualistic protocol with regards to the celebration of a jubilee. That is:

> We direct that the hymn *Veni Creator Spiritus*, and the psalm *Miserere*, be recited in Latin or in English, either before or after every mass for the congregation on each of the four Sundays comprised within the time of the jubilee.[129]

In a papal encyclical of April 1847, addressed to all the Church hierarchy, the Pope directs them to 'implore the divine aid in favour of the kingdom of Ireland'.[129] Certainly, there is no question about the spiritual obligations of a church leader urging charitable deeds during such conditions as the Famine. However, it should be borne in mind that in spite of the hunger, the economic liberalist principle of *laissez-faire* was encouraged and adhered to with fervour. The argument here is that the Church as a moral force would have an ethical obligation in bringing about pressure to change or re-direct distributive policy.

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[128] *Freeman's Journal*, Dublin, 9 January 1847, cited in *The Famine Decade, Contemporary Accounts 1841-1851*, John Killen (ed.), (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1995), p. 90.
[129] Ibid.
[129] *Belfast Commercial Chronicle*, May 3, 1847, cited in *The Famine Decade: Contemporary Accounts*, Killen, J., (ed.) op. cit. p. 138.

Moreover, in another letter by the clergy of Killala, the tone of sectarianism is palpable. There, the Catholic clergy alleged:

> [T]he nefarious, unchristian wickedness of a pre-concerted system of proselytism now in active operation in that district, and to invoke public assistance to save famine-orphans and other destitute creatures from the claws of the proselytising [sic] vultures that are pouncing upon them.[130]

The language in this letter is caustic to say the least and is not amenable to any co-operative spirit, especially when the author of this letter further attacks the agents of charitable associations by accusing them of opening:

> ... a slave market of immortal souls,...[T]he guilty agents in this immoral traffic are chiefly the almoners of the Society of Friends. Their sphere of their operations is as unlimited as the ruin of the famine in the locality. The population of the diocese was 160,000 souls. Of this number no less than 100,000 were receiving government support, and are consequently now to be fed on the bread of proselytism or die.[131]

Yet, it was the Society of Friends, the Quakers, who in 1848 set up the Central Relief Committee of the Society of Friends, in Dublin, supported by a sister-committee in London. Moreover, it was this society that set the objective of obtaining 'trustworthy information' on the real state of the more remote districts, and the members of the Society of Friends are 'witnesses whose integrity it is difficult to challenge'.[132] The membership of the Society of

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[130] *Weekly Freeman's Journal*, Dublin, September 25, 1847, cited in *The Famine Decade: Contemporary Accounts*, Killen, J., (ed.) op. cit. p.152.

[131] Ibid.

[132] Woodham-Smith, C.,*The Great Hunger: Ireland 1845-1849*, (London: Penguin Books Ltd,1962), p. 157. Woodham-Smith makes the point that the sufferings of the people of Ireland during the famine, ' might be dismissed as exaggeration if it were not for the calm and sober evidence of the Quakers'. Moreover, the point of the Holy See being removed from the realities of the famine, and therefore the burden being borne by the local clergy is vindicated by Count Strzelecki, an anglicised Pole of the British Association. 'The priests', testified Strzelecki, 'often endure the same privation as their people... no food but stirabout, no tea and sugar...' Ibid. p. 341. In Ireland, Woodham-Smith argues, 'the influence of the parish priest was incalculable; he was at once the spiritual guide, the practical adviser, the leader and the comrade of his flock'. Ibid.

Friends extended all over Ireland.[133] At the same time, according to James Connolly :

> When the starving peasantry was called upon to refuse to pay rent... and rise in revolt against the system that was murdering them, the clergy commanded them to pay their rents, instructed them that they would lose their souls should they refuse to do so, and threw all the weight of their position against the revolutionary movement for the freedom of Ireland.[134]

3. 12.2 Rebellion 1848

The year of 1848 is often associated with Marx's prophetic words, 'the spectre of communism' was haunting Europe. However, the revolutionary climate in Europe needs to be differentiated. For writers such as Hobsbawm, the 'fear of the proletariat' which affected not merely factory-owners in 'Lancashire or Northern France but civil servants in rural Germany, and priests in Rome'.[135] Furthermore, Hobsbawm argues in 'the literal sense it was the rising of the labouring poor in the cities - especially the capital cities - of Western and Central Europe'.[136]

On the other hand, Woodham-Smith asserts:

> In spite of the sufferings, the rage and the despair of the Irish people, the popular rising which the British Government feared was not being planned, and when a revolutionary movement did come it originated not among the starving masses but with the intellectual and middle classes.[137]

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[133] Ibid.

[134] Cited in Geraghty, T. , *The Irish War*, op. cit. p. 294. James Connolly took part in the Dublin Rising of 1916 and before a British firing squad ended his life in 1916, he carefully documented the political conservatism of the Roman Catholic Church in the matter of the Irish Question. As Geraghty notes, from the twelfth century and Henry II onwards, Connolly suggested, the church was lavish in its threat or use of excommunication, against nationalist rebels opposed to English rule. According to Connolly, not even the victims of the famine, were immune from priestly discipline, along with their other offerings. Ibid. p. 294. Clearly, this demonstrates a variation here in the interpretation of Irish history.

[135] Hobsbawm, E.J., *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848,* (London: Abacus, 1962), p. 368.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Woodham-Smith, C., *The Great Hunger: Ireland*, op. cit. p. 329.

In brief, during this critical period the officials of the Repeal Association' turned their backs on the terrible realities of the famine, became involved in party politics and party intrigues'.[138] This explains the secession of the Young Ireland party from the Repeal Association. The Young Irelanders differed from the Repeal Association in that, the latter organisation was in the Catholic tradition of the 'great silent masses' being led by priests.[139] In the former instance, several of their leaders were Protestants. One prominent leader was William Smith O'Brien, whose unbroken lineage can be traced to Brian Boru, the supreme Monarch of Ireland who vanquished the Norsemen in 1014. O'Brien, an aristocrat and parliamentarian pleaded the cause for independence for fifteen years. Interestingly, he was a member of the Catholic Association and a Repealer, in spite of being a Protestant. The point here is, a non-sectarian characteristic of a political struggle. However, another leader, John Mitchell who was a son of a Presbyterian minister in Ulster, advocated 'to prepare the country for rebellion'.[140]

Once again, the Catholic Church makes an intrusion as to the conduct of its 'shepherds of the flock'. Gavan Duffy, a Young Ireland leader, estimated some twenty-three priests who had supported the above cause. But in a Papal Rescript brought about by intense British pressure, dated February 5, 1848, Pope Pius IX 'admonished the Irish priesthood and forbade political activities'.[141] Father Kenyon, was one patriot priest who had considerable

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[138] Ibid.
[139] Ibid. p. 330.
[140] Ibid. p. 334.
[141] Ibid. p. 342 Another example of the Catholic Church's pattern of interfering in political issues is found in the case of Father Corrigan. Father Corrigan was a young priest who was active in non-violent anti-Vietnam protests in Hobart in 1970. He participated in protest marches against Australian and American involvement in that war. The Archbishop of Tasmania at the time , Guilford Young had warned the young cleric to cease his activism. When Corrigan refused, the archbishop banished him to a diocese in the Solomon Islands. Moreover at the time, the Democratic Labor Party was rather vocal and it was associated with the National Civic Council, an organisation which had Church involvement and fervently anti-communist. This era also demonstrated another example of the Catholic Church's opposition to leftist political sympathies. In the Australian experience, it was alleged such

influence in Tipperary, but was reprimanded and suspended for his support of the Young Ireland movement.

However, it is of note that to be in communication with the See of Rome was still a crime by the law of England. Therefore, diplomatic intercourse, by either clergy or secular individuals would have been hampered, to say the least. Moreover, this adds to the ambiguity of the Catholic Church's position here. It raises the question as to whether the Church attempted to distance itself from the political issues, or whether it was accommodating towards British domestic policy. In brief, it seems the Catholic hierarchy adopted one position, one of distancing itself from politics, whereas the clergy, at parish level was active in the issues of the time. Yet, the relationship between the Church and its brethren, alters when Fenianism arose in 1858 advocating independence for Ireland, was condemned in 1863 by the Catholic hierarchy of Ireland, and in 1870 by Pope Pius IX.

3. 12.3 The Home Rule Bill [142], Partition and the advent of modern Irish nationalism

The connection between the Roman Catholic clergy and their flocks noted above, was to provoke in due course the accusation that Home Rule would mean Rome rule.[143] By retaining the Union, it meant an effective guarantee for the security of the various Protestant groups. The Church of Ireland's authority was eroded when Catholic emancipation, relaxation of the penal laws, and the fight against paying tithes to Anglican clergy, all dealt a blow to

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leftist orientations existed within the Australian Labor Party and trade unions. A similar situation exited in Ireland in the early part of the 20th century, where the Catholic Church did not approve of the Irish Labour Party. See Lyons, F.S.L., *Ireland Since the Famine*, (London: Fontana Press, 1973), pp. 524-526.

[142] For purposes of clarification, the Home Rule Bill was presented in parliament (House of Commons) by Gladstone in 1886, by Parnell in 1893, and by Redmond in 1912. Rather than give an analysis of each attempt to have the Home Rule Bill passed, I have retained the discussion in a general historical context to maintain the theme here of the relationship between religion and politics.

[143] Lyons, F.S.L., *Ireland Since the Famine*, op.cit. p. 22.

the established church. However, Lyons points out, Presbyterianism became stronger in the latter part of the nineteenth-century as 'a wave of religious emotion' known as the 'Ulster revival', reinforced the taste for 'high-powered evangelical preaching', together with a conservative, if not fundamentalist approach to the Bible, were to be the hallmarks of Ulster Presbyterianism until well into the twentieth century.[144] Moreover, this heightening of religious fervour contributed to the intensification of sectarian rivalry within the province which in time overflowed into politics, especially after Home Rule had emerged as a real challenge to the *status quo*.[145] The consequence of this not only affected Ulster, but all of Ireland as Protestantism was increasingly identified with the maintenance of the Union. Between 1885 and 1914 parliamentary contests were more or less between Nationalist and Unionist parties. Another consequence is found in the revival of the Orange Order with the rise of the Home Rule movement. From the Catholic side, the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH) also revived as a counter-organisation, which also acted as a defence against episcopal attempts to set up a priest-run or a bishop-run Catholic political party in Belfast. As Lyons points out, Orangeism, 'in its new incarnation, had both a social and psychological value for it devotees'.[146] On the one hand it provided a rallying-point for Protestant Unionists regardless of denominational, social or economic differences. On the other hand, with its parades and symbolism, it injected an element of *political hysteria*.[147]

At the same time, agrarian issues had not subsided since the pre-Famine years. A few well-publicised evictions provoked an increase in agrarian violence. Thus, in response to grievances such as rent increases, landlord or

[144] Ibid. p. 24.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid. p. 25.
[147] Ibid.

state incursions, the Land League was formed and preceded the setting up of the Irish Party. However, the Land League was suppressed by the government in 1882 and eventually resurrected under a new label as the Irish National League (INL) By 1886, the INL reached its peak by having 1,262 branches , or close on one branch for every parish in Ireland.[148] Again, there is a curious interplay between politics and religion. On the one hand, Parnell, the chief proponent for Home Rule had placed the INL under direct parliamentary control from its inception and introduced the clergy into the county nomination conventions, to balance the agrarians and ex-Fenians.[149] On the other hand, within the nationalist community, it seemed no one could stand against it. Even the Catholic hierarchy at best attempted diplomatic relations with its leaders; the local clergy participated at grass-roots level but cooperated with the INL's central office and ensured that its wishes were respected locally.[150] As Garvin argues, the bishops rarely tried to tell the leaders what to do: a papal condemnation of the Plan of Campaign in 1888 was openly denounced as an impertinence by the Irish MPs and the clergy were divided on the issue.[151] The evidence suggests I would argue, that by now the Vatican had developed a 'tradition' of issuing platitudes shrouded in pious language in response to Hibernian crises and conflicts. Briefly, take for instance Pope Leo XIII's *Etsi Cunctas* of 1888. This brief communiqué to the bishops of Ireland does not state anything of great substance. It follows the characteristic lukewarm, vague or non-committal position, which can be illustrated in the following:

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[148] Garvin, T., *The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics*, op. cit. p. 80.
[149] Ibid. p. 81. It is of note, that in the 1885 election, the INL's candidates won eighty-five of the eighty-nine seats contested in Ireland, plus a seat in Liverpool. In effect, the party won the votes of Catholic Ireland and very few of the votes of Protestant Ulster. What is important however, the INL had an undeniable legitimacy in British constitutional theory, and it was far more than a mere federation of electoral nomination caucuses. Moreover, it could claim to contain the vast body of Irish Catholic public sentiment. Ibid. p. 81.
[150] Ibid. p. 82.
[151] Ibid.

> We have admonished them repeatedly and finally sent our decree because we saw that our advice and our decree were consonant with truth and justice, on the one hand, and would benefit your affairs, on the other. We could never intend to harm in any way the cause of Ireland with interference that rightfully could be censured.[152]

The 'truth and justice' of the matter is the legitimate electoral status of the INL. On the one hand, what the Church is conveying here, is its reluctance to become involved with the Anglo-Irish political agendas. Yet, as the political landscape of the period was loosely divided into pro and anti-Parnellite groups, clerical influence at the 1891-2 polls, the canvassing of the priests in favour of the anti-Parnellite candidates was extremely aggressive, reinforcing the *sotto voce* anti-clericalism of advanced national opinion.[153] Moreover, the Parnell split is viewed as a decisive event which enabled the Church to fill a political vacuum and which robbed the nationalist movement of its unity and energy.[154] In a sense, it may come as no surprise when in 1905 Sinn Féin, meaning "Ourselves Alone", was formed, the name itself perhaps has more than one connotation given the history of ecclesiastical intervention.

3.13 From Partition to the beginning of the Troubles

The revolutionary war of 1919-1921 between Irish nationalists and the United Kingdom ended with the Anglo-Irish Peace Treaty of 1921, but resulted in the partition of Ireland. Northern Ireland, consisting of six of the nine counties of Ulster, withdrew from the Irish Free State and rejoined the United Kingdom in 1922. A faction of the IRA, however, would not accept partition, and an Irish civil war raged from July 1922 to April 1923. In brief, the Irish population was divided into pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty groups. A steady hardening of public opinion which was both reflected in and influenced by the Catholic Church's severe condemnation of the anti-Treaty position, is

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[152] His Holiness Pope Leo XIII, *Etsi Cunctas*, 'On the Church in Ireland, December 21, 1888. Source: <http://www. knight.org/advent> .
Sighted September 6, 1999.
[153] Garvin, T., *The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics*, op. cit. p. 86.
[154] Ibid. p. 87.

found in the latter threatening excommunication. As Garvin argues, it is impossible to estimate what this may have cost the anti-Treaty cause, but upon a population which was devoutly Catholic it could not fail to take effect.[155] Nevertheless, a number of intransigent republicans remained and retained the name Irish Republican Army, refusing to recognise the *status quo* in either the twenty-six counties or in Northern Ireland. The IRA planned to reunite Ireland by force.

After defeat 1923, most of the Republicans accepted constitutional politics and entered the Dail, or Irish Parliament as the Fianna Fáil party. (Fianna Fáil literally means 'Warriors of Destiny'). By reviewing the events of the previous century and up until the end of the Civil War of 1922-23, Whyte identifies a trait in Irish Catholicism -- the ability to profess loyalty to the Church while rejecting its guidance on particular issues.[156] This is self-evident, if, on the one hand from a moral point of view, one acknowledges the Church's position as being one of insisting that agitation must be carried on by peaceful means. However, on the other hand, while the Catholic hierarchy appeared to be 'passive', what the clergy considered permissible, (especially in regards to the oppressive land system) and what public opinion was prepared to tolerate, just did not coincide.[157]

Nevertheless, the phenomenon existed which marked out Ireland from other Catholic countries. In other words, a rejection of clerical views on one issue led to the questioning of clerical views in general, and a feature of every other Catholic country has been the strength of anti-clerical parties.[158] Ireland is

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[155] Ibid.

[156] Whyte, J.H., *Church and State in Modern Ireland 1923-1979*, 2nd ed., (Dublin : Gill and Macmillan, 1980), p. 11. For a full discussion see Chapter II, ibid. pp. 24 - 61. Whyte has called this chapter: "The Catholic Moral Code Becomes Enshrined in the Law of the State, 1923-37".

[157] Ibid. p. 12.

[158] Ibid. p. 12. For instance, anti-clerical parties have been evidenced in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Malta, Belgium, and countries of eastern Europe and Latin America.

exceptional among Catholic countries in that it has never produced an anti-clerical party.[159] Yet, there has been a 'tradition of aloofness between Church and State'. A good illustration of this is found in the 1922 constitution of the new State. Article 8 of the 1922 constitution did not even mention the Catholic Church, let alone accord it a special position. (See Official Documents Appendix No. 3). However, this was to change in the 1937 constitution, when as a result of Eamon de Valera's own decision, it contained an acknowledgment of the 'special position' of the Catholic Church, although as Whyte argues, it is doubtful this altered the juridical position of the Church.[160]

At the same time this 'aloofness between Church and State' is contradictory for several reasons. First, we can begin to explain this by asserting that during de Valera's leadership, there existed a marked symbiosis in the relationship between the Church and State. In other words, it may be useful to examine de Valera's persona. In particular, he was a devout Catholic of conservative religious views. With his religion went a puritanical morality.[161] 'His strictures', as biographer Mary Bromage wrote:

> ... extended beyond the evils of drink to the evils of jazz, the evils of betting..., the dangers from indecent books, and he concurred in the Government's bill to censor publications. The literary censorship, should be aimed at sexual immorality and should apply not only to books and moving-pictures but to the Sunday papers.[162]

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[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid. p. 15.
[161] Ibid. p. 40.
[162] Dwyer, T.R., *Eamon de Valera,* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1980), p. 97. There are several examples which highlight de Valera's moral conservatism. For instance, in the preamble to the 1937 constitution, he stated: ' We, the people of Eire, humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial...'. See J.H. Whyte, *Church and State in Modern Ireland,* op. cit. p. 48. Moreover as Whyte points out, in legislation Fianna Fáil proved as willing as its predecessors 'to employ the power of the State in safeguarding Catholic moral standards'. The censorship act of 1929 had made it illegal to advocate the use of contraceptives. Also, in 1935, the government dealt with another matter 'which aroused episcopal anxieties', by passing the Public Dance Halls Act 1935. Ibid. p. 49.

By the same token, de Valera's 1937 constitution, under Articles 2 and 3 had a nationalistic element by claiming the natural boundary of Ireland was all of the island of Ireland. On the surface at least, it appears as Nichols argues, 'there are a few areas where it [the Catholic Church] has managed to settle easily into the national consciousness' --- Ireland and Poland come to mind: both cases, significantly, of ethnic combined with religious oppression.[163] Nonetheless, de Valera's constitutional stance would still add fears to the Ulster Protestants of being subsumed by a papist state. Yet, de Valera took umbrage to Pope Benedict XV's telegram during the negotiations of the 1921 Partition Treaty, reminding the pontiff that it was not trouble in Ireland, but rather, the trouble was between Ireland and Britain. De Valera himself represents a contradiction, he was both a rebel, and later, the 'respectable' statesman.

The innovations of Pope John XXIII and of the Second Vatican Council had profound effects on world Catholicism which were paralleled in Ireland. A brief statement of Vatican II's consequences include: growth of the *ecumenical* movement; growing freedom of discussion within the Church; and, Catholic social teaching found in the papal encyclical *Mater et Magistra*, which was the first comprehensive treatment of social questions since Pius XI's encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* of 1931. Yet, Labour parties did not enjoy a comfortable position within the Catholic Church in Ireland, hence Labour's political ineffectiveness in the interwar period. In brief, the reasons for this are attributed to Labour's perceived association with a socialist ideology, the Irish Trades Union Congress (ITUC) leader, James Larkin's vision of the overthrow of capitalism, and the IRA's programme inclined towards social radicalism. Moreover, Larkin was one of Sinn Féin's Marxist theorists. Hence, the unwillingness of the working-class leaders, to fall foul of the Church by

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[163] Nichols, P., *The Politics of the Vatican*, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 229.

openly espousing socialist doctrines in a country where rural and small-town conservatism outweighed urban radicalism.[164] However, Sinn Féin did become the revolutionary-led government which won the 1918 elections with a 65 per cent majority, of which de Valera had been a prominent member. Although, in recent times, I suggest there is support from the Church for the moderate Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), and even more so in the light of its leader John Hume acquiring Nobel peace laureate status.

3.14 The Troubles begin: The struggle for Civil Rights and Social Justice

Since partition the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) held the monopoly of power in Northern Ireland. It followed then that the Unionist government was responsible for policy to allocate scarce resources. Terence O'Neill, who had been appointed prime minister in 1963, pledged in 1969, 'to make Northern Ireland economically stronger and prosperous... and to build bridges between the two traditions within our community'.[165] Although he was dedicated to the constitutional status quo and continued Unionist rule, O'Neill was the first Northern Ireland prime minister to state clearly that reconciliation was a central part of his programme.[165] Moreover, despite his optimistic spirit to regenerate the economy, O'Neill caused frustration within the minority by his inability to deliver thoroughgoing reform, while more and more loyalists were convinced that he was conceding too much, and turned against him.[167]

In order to put the events that followed in 1968 and thereafter, we need to consider some electoral/ political data. Firstly, proportional representation was abolished in 1922, thus giving Unionists a free hand to maximise their vote. Proportional representation was reintroduced in 1973 when the White Paper proposed a devolutionary scheme, led by Brian Faulkner, a former

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[164] Lyons, F.S.L., *Ireland Since the Famine* ,op. cit. p. 673.
[165] Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, op. cit. p. 622.
[165] Ibid.
[167] Ibid. pp. 622-623.

prime minister and Chief Executive of the power-sharing administration in 1974. Secondly, until 1945 the local government franchise in the United Kingdom was restricted to owners or tenants of a dwelling, and their spouses. Although Westminster removed these anomalies between 1945 and 1948, Brookeborough's government refused to follow Britain and the Election Franchise Act of 1946. This restricted the local government franchise even further. Manipulation of local government boundaries was a means of retaining Unionist control and therefore laid them open to the charge of *resisting democracy* and gave civil rights activists a powerful slogan, first coined by the Northern Ireland Labour Party: 'One Man, One Vote'.[168] Thirdly, as Bardon notes:

> Local authority housing was intimately connected with political power... the ruling Unionists had a strong political motive not to build houses for Catholics.[169]

For instance, in the town of Dungannon, where the population was evenly divided, the urban district council was sectioned into three wards; two with a Protestant majority and one with an overwhelming Catholic majority. Since 1945, when the Homeless Citizens' League was founded, not a single new house had been built in the Nationalist ward, and no Catholic family had been given a permanent council house for thirty-four years.[170] The League's first public protest had been to picket the urban district council offices when Catholic families were refused any of the 142 houses just completed in the

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[168] Ibid. p. 637.

[169] Ibid. The causes for violence in Northern Ireland from 1968 have been investigated elsewhere. This study is not concerned with determining the precision of the above. However, it is of note, two main currents of debate exist. One argument on the causation of paramilitary violence by the Catholics is, the rising tide of Irish nationalism. The other argument focuses on the factors noted above, namely: housing, unemployment and the franchise, particularly gerrymandering. Kassian Kovalchek, provides a critique of Christopher Hewitt, who embraced the discriminatory aspect of Catholic grievances, and Denis O'Hearn, who investigated increased Irish nationalism, as a causation of the violence. See Kovalchek, K.A., "Catholic Grievances in Northern Ireland: Appraisal and Judgement" in *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXVIII , No. 1, pp. 77-87.

[170] Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, op. cit. p. 637.

Unionist wards.[171] By 1969, Northern Ireland was on the brink of a revolutionary crisis.

It is interesting to note how, according to McElroy, analyses of the civil rights campaign in Northern Ireland 'overlook the subtle influence that the Church exercised on that campaign'.[172] The further point McElroy argues, is the focus of certain analyses on the executive of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). What is important here, the civil rights movement involved mass mobilisation without strongly centralised leadership, was prone to ideological tensions.[173] Moreover, violence was not far from the surface and by August 1969 the rule of law had collapsed in parts of Belfast, Derry and Armagh City. Although British troops were deployed, an uneasy peace led to the realignment of republican forces, with the Provisional IRA (PIRA) being the most prominent contenders for the leadership. In brief, there was a lack of political consensus. At the same time, protests and street violence which ended in bloodshed not only received television coverage, but also, television had exposed Unionist policies. Furthermore, the incongruous position of the Ulster Unionists was suddenly highlighted: a seemingly monolithic party had been split down the middle over the questions of reforms in Northern Ireland.[174] To add to the complexity of the situation, loyal British subjects were being told to adopt British standards of democracy by a British government, and in the process, were becoming increasingly isolated from Westminster.[175] Finally, as McElroy argues, the position of Northern Ireland Catholics was equally incongruous: people whose identity had never really been anything but Irish, but who had never accepted the legitimacy of

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[171] Ibid.
[172] McElroy, G., *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Crisis 1968-86*, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1991), p. 9.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Ibid. p. 3.
[175] Ibid.

the province, now looked to the British Government as the guarantor of their rights.[176]

Thus, the political landscape has been sufficiently stated in the above to begin an examination of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the conflict in Northern Ireland. Garvin provides some useful insights which help to unravel this relationship. Firstly, the Catholic Church 'supplied much of the organisational sinew... and its priests were to be involved up to the 1970s in Northern Ireland'.[177] The same observations could be made of the Protestant churches.[178] In the nationalist community, the Catholic Church could wield massive direct political power not only through its participation in party politics, but also through its role in shaping education, organising public opinion, the pulpit and the popular press.[179] In one sense, *the churches were the first Irish political parties.*[180]

To sum up, the central objective of the civil rights movement was to expose the injustice of the status quo in Northern Ireland. As McElroy asserts, Derry was to be the most affected by the agitation, and the way in which clerical influence entered the civil rights movement was by the relationship which existed between the Catholic Church and the Derry Citizen's Action Committee (DCAC); as part of a *multi-denominational* group in the city called the Industrial Churches Council; *by co-operation between the Catholic and Protestant churches;* through the activities of Catholic priests at grass-roots level; and, the endorsement of the civil rights campaign by Cardinal Conway and the Bishop of Derry, Dr. Farren.[181]

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[176] Ibid.
[177] Garvin, T., *The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics*, op. cit. p. 179.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.
[181] McElroy, G., *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Crisis*, op. cit. p. 11.

3.15 Conclusion

The earliest evidence shows how the worship of gods and ritual in Ireland resembled the practices found in other cultures. When Christianity took root in Ireland, it was consolidated by the establishment of an early relationship between the Church and the Gaelic rulers who became patrons, by donating land for the building of churches and monasteries. However, constant feuding between chieftains prevented political unity to form on the island. Consequently, invasions by Vikings and Normans in the Middle Ages, in the longer term contributed to what I have argued to be the earliest foundations of international relations, both in theory and in practice. In brief, the above demonstrates a formidable force and influence by the Church of Rome in terms of territorial expansion, which later became the Holy Roman Empire. In a sense, Ireland became a "politico-religious pawn", as the European powers fought among themselves in the quest for regional hegemony. This form of international relations set a pattern that can be traced through the medieval period, the Reformation and until the mid- nineteenth century.

Yet, since the Reformation, which marked a convulsion in the Christian world, when monarch fought monarch, in the name of religion. At the outset of this chapter, I noted that this study examines some of the salient milestones in Irish history, which have shaped the relationship between religion and politics, and between Church and State. These have included the Williamite conquest of 1690, the rebellion in 1798 and 1848, as well as the Famine. As part of this evolutionary process, the above has revealed contradictions, paradoxes and ambiguity in both ecclesiastical and statist spheres. Such characteristics have manifested themselves in the behaviour of warring bishops, the aloofness and manipulation by Rome in times of crises, the non-sectarian posture of the United Irishmen, and the admonition of revolutionary

activities in the face of tyranny or oppression. In brief, the conclusion here, is the inseparability of religion from politics, and the Church from the State in Irish affairs.

Finally, the Irish experience demonstrates another contradiction. The Catholic Church by its own conservatism, dogmatism and influence has created a form of Irish religious nationalism. Further, it is ironically that Ireland is an exception in that it does not have an anti-clerical political party, for at the same time the Church has repeatedly denied electoral recognition of parties such as the INL and Sinn Féin, therefore refusing to acknowledge their legitimacy. Yet, it is the religious identity of Catholicism which in turn indelibly brands a political identity onto the Nationalist community, as nowhere in the English speaking world are the divisions between Protestant and Catholic so acute. It is in the former instance, which is the theme of the chapters which follow, and the argument for the why political pluralism has not evolved.

Chapter 4

From the pulpits to parishioners, to Rome and back again.

We may become the makers of our fate when we have ceased to pose as its prophets.[1]

Karl Popper

4.0 Introduction

So far this study has been theoretically and empirically focused on the relationship between religion and politics. We also examine the relationship between the Church and State, with an introduction to the Irish conflict at the end of the previous chapter. The purpose of this chapter is as follows: Part I examines the above relationships in a general sense, that is, the politico-religious dimensions during the period 1969--1999. This section also investigates the relationship between the Church and the paramilitaries from both traditions. In Part II our analysis examines concepts such as ecumenism and the implications of the Second Vatican Council in relation to Northern Ireland. Although the relationship between the Catholic Church and the State has been noted in the latter part of Chapter three, it marks only the genesis in a certain period. In other words, over the thirty-year period, the Northern Irish conflict (or the "Troubles") has taken on its own political momentum including stalemates, agreements, disagreements and cease-fires[2]. Our analysis in the previous chapter illustrated the conflict's own evolution, spanning centuries, depending on which historical point of view one chooses.

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[1] Cited by Jay, J., (ed.) , *The Oxford Dictionary of Political Quotations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 295.

But for present purposes, the contemporary period has witnessed the transformation of several key players, such as Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams into people acquiescing to constitutional means in their political struggle for a united Ireland. At the same time, similar transformation processes have been echoed in the Unionist camp. But, violence is still very much at the surface in both communities, and in spite of recent initiatives, decommissioning of weapons remains a sticking point up to the time of writing.

The Church's role, however, is perhaps more difficult to assess because of the perceived 'silence' on the one hand, that is, its position is highly ambiguous, and its disproportionate representation on the other hand. For instance, figures like Reverend Ian Paisley, whose vociferous persona adds to the complexity of such an assessment, in view of the fact he represents a minority faction found in the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). In brief, his representation does not account for the entire Presbyterian denomination, let alone the Protestants in Ulster. By the same token, the symbiotic relationship between the Catholic Church and the State continues, if we are to consider the Catholic Church's role in the secret negotiations between moderate John Hume of the SDLP and Sinn Féin's president Gerry Adams since 1988. The secret talks were the foundations of the Peace Process. The Peace Process has been a key focus of Tony Blair's New Labour Government since coming to office on May 1, 1997.

It should also be noted, as an effect of the longevity of this conflict, society in Northern Ireland has changed. Not only is it a generational change, but also the province's place in the world.[3] In brief, ecumenism and secularisation

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[2]At a seminar (Public Policy Series) presented by M.L.R. Smith titled "Peace Process, War Process: The Disintegration of the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement", (School of Government, University of Tasmania, October 13, 1999). Moreover, Smith quoted *Times* columnist Simon Jenkins as viewing "Northern Ireland as a boring problem of local

could be viewed as subsets of globalism itself. Moreover, the latter concept of secularisation is also a subset of the European Union (EU). Hence, Part II examines these two concepts. It should be borne in mind; such an analysis is located not only within the demographic context of the United Kingdom, but also in a global context. To be sure, Derbyshire and Derbyshire's estimates may well be misleading when they cite regular church attendance and religious practice among Anglicans at 5 per cent.[3] For present purposes, Morrow notes how numerous surveys have shown that the Northern Irish are among the most loyal churchgoers in Western Europe.[4] Over half the population still attend church services at least once a week, while more than 80% retain some attachment to a church, as Morrow maintains.[5]

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government". Moreover, Smith's assertions were, the conflict has "no global impact, and there are no global issues at stake". The above requires some adjustment here. Firstly, the historical survey in this thesis demonstrates the significance of Ireland during European conflicts involving Britain, France and Spain. Certainly, this scenario is not replicated in the twentieth century. Secondly, in view of the Irish diaspora, Irish connections with Australia, the United States and elsewhere, cannot be under-estimated. In the television series *The Irish Empire*, Fintan O'Toole makes the point of 'Irishness' as a culture, rather than a nationalist identity. In addition, O'Toole claims identity is not necessarily connected by territoriality (for example Liam Neeson's place in Hollywood). By this he means globally, there is an 'Irish Empire' of culture, literature and spiritual power. (*The Irish Empire*, Episode 5, Special Broadcasting Service, SBS-Television Australia, August 22, 1999). However, it should also be borne in mind Ireland and Northern Ireland (as part of the United Kingdom) are members of the European Union (EU), and therefore they are part of the EU's jurisdiction. Moreover, in view of the Republic of Ireland's impressive economic growth, the northern province (Ulster) will not attract foreign investment as long as there is a continuation of the conflict. M.L.R. Smith, is the author of *Fighting for Ireland: The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*, (London: Routledge, 1995), and focuses on the strategic aspect of the conflict.

[3] Derbyshire, J.D., and Derbyshire, I., *Political Systems of the World*, (Oxford: Helicon Publishing Ltd, 1996), p. 517.

[4] Morrow, D., in *Northern Ireland Politics*, Aughey, A., and Morrow, D., (eds.), (London and New York: Longman Group Ltd, 1996), p. 190.

[5] Ibid.

Part I (A)

McElroy provides us with a comprehensive study of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the conflict during 1968 to 1986.[6] The relationship, however, after McElroy's timeframe, enters a different or a more sophisticated dimension. For instance, the Peace Process, as it has become known, has its genesis in 1988, when the Catholic priest, Father Alec Reid acted as a mediator and negotiator between Sinn Féin's president Gerry Adams and SDLP leader John Hume. Both parties in essence, are nationalist although the latter has a more moderate posture. Nevertheless, the above are among the main protagonists who contributed to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

4.1 The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Conflict 1968-86

At the beginning of the above conflict, it seems the Catholic Church's position was far *less* ambiguous than in its previous history. For instance, the civil rights movement received support from local Catholic clergy as well as the hierarchy. However, the church emphasized peaceful, non-violent protest. McElroy also emphasises the grievances that prompted a sustained protest campaign. These grievances centred on social justice issues which included housing, employment and universal franchise.[7] It is of note that the ecumenical or multi-denominational concern was about civil rights.[8] Moreover, whilst the Cameron Report focused on the influence of the churches' influence to dissuade violence, the Paisleyites maintained a campaign of counter-demonstrations that lead to rioting. In brief, however, *other* leading Protestant churchmen acknowledged the issues of social justice

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[6] McElroy, G., *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Crisis 1968-86*, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1991).

[7] Ibid. p. 12. Throughout his first chapter, "In Search of Political Progress", pp.9-64, McElroy frequently emphasises the issues of housing, unemployment and franchise, as the main grievances in the Catholic community.

[8] Ibid. pp. 12-13.

and a statement comprehensively defending and supporting the civil rights movement (CRM) evidences this.[9]

Moreover, we should note the specific role of the clergy during this time. For instance, priests such as Father Eustace *supported* the civil rights movement, but *did not* lead it. Eustace and other Catholic clerics were careful about their involvement, as even the most liberal Protestants could interpret their roles as a push for "Rome Rule".[10] Similarly, the stance of Cardinal Conway, Bishop Cahal Daly and Dr Farren (Bishop of Derry), that is, the support of the civil rights movement, was implicit, rather than explicit.[11] The Catholic hierarchy did not wish to undermine the civil rights movement, by simultaneously avoiding the border issue.[12] It is of significance, as McElroy points out, that the hierarchy refrained from recognising the *illegality* of civil rights marches.[13]

At the same time, however, not all of the clergy converged with the same political position. While the Church and its clergy shunned the use of violence as a way of achieving reform, some priests differed in their political views. According to McElroy, as the balance of power within the Catholic community shifted towards more militant elements, the Church and the SDLP 'was finding a position of peaceful reform more and more difficult to

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[9] Ibid. p. 24. In order to give some appreciation of the Protestants' sentiment, the following quotation may be useful:

> We profoundly hope that the government will demonstrate in good faith during the next few months by concrete action to remove the grievances with which the civil rights movement is concerned.

Ibid. Note also, the use of the abbreviation CRM in the uppercase as shorthand for the civil rights movement. This is not to be confused with the Civil Rights Association (CRA), which was an established organisation, and often used to mean the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, NICRA.

[10] Ibid. p. 20.

[11] Ibid. p. 25.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

sustain'.[14] Street violence became a reality and compelled the SDLP to withdraw from Stormont in July 1971. Amidst the disquiet among Northern Catholics, a small pressure group was formed in early 1971 calling itself The Catholic Minority Rights Group. As McElroy points out, though an obscure and short-lived group, 'its significance lies in the fact that nine of its members, including its vice-chairman were priests'.[15] Moreover, this disquiet was not quelled by the appointment of a Catholic chaplain to Stormont, because the appointment was not a high priority of Cardinal Conway, and it marked 'more a sign of diminishing political options than of confidence in the institutions of the state'.[16]

Perhaps, a more accurate view of the political crisis is found in a pastoral letter issued by the Northern bishops in late 1971 that stated:

> The problems of this divided community will never be solved until a radical reform of the institutions of democracy here is introduced. Mathematical "majority rule" simply does not work in a community of this kind... .[17]

As McElroy asserts, such a statement underlines how difficult the position of the Church had become. The hierarchy still advocated reform of the Northern State.[18] But McElroy noted that such a policy was opposed by a relatively small number of priests who belonged to a radical (though short-lived) group called the Association of Irish Priests (AIP). In late 1971, the AIP issued a lengthy statement calling for *a united Ireland.*[19] However, it is of note, only two international figures, 'both of whom fused temporal positions with

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[14] Ibid. p. 40.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid. pp. 38-39
[17] Ibid. p. 40.
[18] Ibid. pp.40-41
[19] Ibid. p. 41

spiritual leadership, Pope Paul VI and Archbishop Makarios, dared to speak of Irish unity'.[20]

During the early period of the conflict, certain developments unfolded. First, the Unionists saw the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) and the civil rights movement as fronts to destabilise the state. Second, although the civil rights movement had some influence on British public opinion regarding discrimination that existed in the province, the clerical influence to dissuade violence in the streets waned. Thus, the civil rights movement became marginalised. Third, as the balance of power within the Catholic community shifted, this made way for a political vacuum. In other words, the Catholic community lacked political coherence, as there was no body that could speak for the Catholic community as a whole.

The factors contributing to this situation were: the deployment of British troops, the erection of barricades, especially in Derry where the civil rights movement was prolific, touched a raw nerve among republicans. Further, as McElroy argues, the curfew in the Falls Rd area (often referred to as 'the Falls'), 'profoundly affected the political consciousness of anti-Unionists in Northern Ireland'.[21] The above factors in turn, served as an impetus for other members of the community to seek more direct ways of defending themselves by joining the IRA.[22] Although, it should be noted, the Church had used the

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[20] Arthur, P., and Jeffrey, K., *Northern Ireland Since 1968*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1988), p. 91. Moreover, Arhur and Jeffrey note that others who spoke of Irish unity were more controversial: the Chilean dictator, President Pinochet, 'expressed concern at the existence of concentration camps in Ulster', and the Ugandan leader Idi Amin demanded a briefing from the British High Commissioner in Kampala. Ibid. pp. 91-92.

[21] McElroy, G., *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Crisis*, op. cit. p. 38.

[22] A theory of terrorism is provided by Clive Walker in *The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986). Another notable theoretical framework is found in the study by Richard Clutterbuck. Briefly, Clutterbuck sums up the above theory by arguing:

> 'The terrorists' object is to shake the faith of the man in the street, in the government and its local representatives, especially the police, so that in the end a desperate

pulpit to attack the IRA. Moreover, as the campaign of violence began to escalate, it was Cardinal Conway, Primate of all-Ireland who was engaged in talks with the then Home Secretary, James Callaghan. In brief, one of the main themes of their communiqués was the British Government's proposal of 'equality of citizenship'.[23]

4.2 The "Silence of the Republic"?

Cardinal Conway's position as the Primate of all-Ireland, enabled him to represent and speak for the Catholics both in the Republic of Ireland, and in the North. Yet, the evidence suggests a curious 'silence' among the brethren in the former, or certainly at grass roots level. Certainly, the Irish press, such as *The Irish Times,* to name but one newspaper has given, and continues to give the conflict a detailed coverage. A cynical viewpoint may be that the conflict has driven the wheels of media capitalism, locally and elsewhere. Of course, there is some danger in making generalisations. That is, compromising the validity of such claims. However, these assertions of 'silence' are based on two sets of observations. First, during my field research in Ireland (particularly in the south), the perception(s) of some Irish regarding their northern counterparts, seemed to have an air of apathy or indifference. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the prosperity enjoyed by the

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population will seek security, not from the authorities, but from the terrorist and his political allies'.

See Clutterbuck, R., "Does Terrorism Work?" in Paul Smoker, Ruth Davies and Barbara Munske (eds.), *A Reader in Peace Studies,* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1990), p.61.

[23] Ibid. p. 27. Significantly, the document referred to five areas which were fundamental to confidence building:

(i) Equality of opportunity for all in public employment;
(ii) Protection against incitement of hatred against any citizen on the grounds of religious belief;
(iii) The allocation of public housing;
(iv) Effective means for the investigation of grievances against public bodies;
(v) Proper representation of minorities 'by completely fair electoral laws, practices and boundaries. Ibid. p. 27.

Republic. A survey, which I conducted in 1997-98, though limited, showed only five respondents from a population sample of one hundred, felt their Catholic counterparts in the north were fighting a just cause. Another possible explanation is the saturation of the media coverage of the conflict's protracted violence. In brief, there is a sense of collective fatigue. It seems peculiar, even in a small land mass such as the entire island of Ireland, the Republic's population still perceives the conflict as happening 'somewhere else', or in vague connotations as 'up in the north'. Although, in the border towns such as Dundalk, the nationalist sentiment appears to be stronger. For instance, splinter groups such as the Real IRA, whose political wing is the 32 County Sovereignty Committee, have been linked to the Omagh bombing in August 1998.

The other set of observations is based on the ecclesiastically oriented publication *The Leader*. In December 1970, the paper celebrated its seventieth anniversary. It is of relevance to cite the paper's philosophy:

> *The Leader* was established to combat those forces that would destroy the nation, and it raised its voice fearlessly against those who aped, like slaves, their British "betters" in education, manners and morals. *The Leader* proclaimed a comprehensive nationalism based not on the bombast of politicians but on the lore of the traditions and lore of our people and on a healthy self-respect for our own abilities in commercial and industrial affairs.[24]

Surprisingly, *The Leader* makes little reference to the conflict. For instance, for the purposes of this study, all publications examined from January 1968 to August 1971 revealed only *six* citations. Moreover, in one of these citations titled "On Anti-Partitionists", (referred to below as the shorthand 'Antiparts'

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[24] *The Leader*, December 1970, Vol. 70, No. 12, p. 1. (Author not cited). It is interesting to note Bardon's reference to *The Leader* early last century. At that time, *The Leader* stated 'the Irish nation was Catholic and that if Protestants refused to accept the majority culture then the only solution was partition, leaving the Orangemen and their friends in the northeast corner'. See Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1992), p. 422.

[sic]) the author, MacConaill argues for the irrationality of such an approach. For instance:

> Dogs, cats and Antiparts have this in common, that they have many different forms and tempers, also they are not disposed to the full use of reason. Dogs and cats can't help irrationality, not being human. But the only partial rationality of so very many Antiparts in a matter always grave and now urgent is to be deplored, for it is with the total rationality of a good soldier disposing himself for either action or retreat. Your soldier is honest with himself about the enemy in every particular.[25]

A little more than six months later, thirteen unarmed civil rights protesters were shot dead by British paratroopers in Derry.

4.3 Other perspectives

To be fair, it should be borne the above is only one example which gives an insight into the Catholic Church's view of the conflict. For instance, Father Desmond Wilson is described as, 'solemn about the injustices, the deaths, the arbitrary treatment of the poor --- by the church, by the British government, by the soldiers'.[26]

Wilson's provocative criticism continues when Jones claims he described 'a church unmindful of the poor, geared only onto holding on to its property and controlling its Catholics through education and its hold on their morals and emotions'.[27]

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[25] MacConnail, M.A., in *The Leader*, June 1971, Vol.70, No. 6, p. 5.

[26] Cited by Arthur Jones in *National Catholic Reporter*, October 24, 1980 Vol. 17 No. 1, p.1. Father Wilson is known for two things, his integrity and controversy, according to the back cover review of his book *Democracy Denied*, (Dublin: Mercier Press, 1997). Wilson is a Catholic priest working In West Belfast and was a curate from 1966 to 1975, when he resigned from his clerical position because he disagreed with his superior about the use of Church resources in the six counties. In the past twenty years he has been awarded several international prizes.

Therefore, we find a very different viewpoint in Father Wilson who urges Catholics to think for themselves and emerge from "their terrible subservience to the clergy".[28] The issue, which may arise here, is an encouragement of civil disobedience. But, it can be argued that on the basis of the grievances noted above, the justification of civil disobedience 'is demanded when there is some reason to think that an act is bad or wrong'.[29] In brief, according to Childress, justification consists not only of giving reasons for the act in question but also of demonstrating that they outweigh the reasons against it.[30] In one sense, and at the risk of speculation, the Catholic hierarchy and local clergy may have supported the civil rights movement because they viewed the protest and marches as just causes, despite the illegality of such acts.

4.4 The Catholic Church and the Conflict Since the Civil Rights Movement

Church opposition and condemnation of paramilitary violence is well documented. The vast majority of clergy have consistently opposed political violence in Northern Ireland. As Morrow points out, the clergy are regarded 'among many Nationalists as the strongest 'internal' opponents of the IRA'.[31] Moreover, Morrow argues, this has led to accusation from republicans that the church is an agent for Unionism.[32] But Morrow could be a bit more explicit in such an assertion. For instance, McElroy has noted the republican strength in the ghettos (particularly Andersonstown in West Belfast), when the then president of Sinn Féin, Ruairi O'Bradaigh launched a severe attack on Cardinal Conway's peace initiatives by stating:

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[27] MacConnail, J.F., *The Leader*, op.cit. p. 5.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Childress, J.F., *Civil Disobedience and Political Obligation: A Study in Christian Social Ethics*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), p.167.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Aughey, A., and Morrow, D., (eds.) *Northern Ireland Politics*, op.cit. p. 193.
[32] Ibid.

> In his excursions into politics, all the influence he can command is being thrown behind direct rule, just as his predecessors had urged the acceptance of the disastrous treaty of surrender in 1921.[33]

Furthermore, a study by O'Hagan arrives at a similar conclusion. As O'Hagan asserts, Irish republicanism rejects the legitimacy of the British state in Ireland.[34] More importantly, O'Hagan makes the point, 'Irish Catholicism has adopted a position with which it has been historically and ideologically most comfortable'.[35] That is, in the main, the Irish Catholic Church has been supportive of established authority.[36] It can be argued however, Cardinal O'Fiaich is an exception to O'Hagan's assertion.

After O'Fiaich visited the Maze Prison in 1978, his statements on the conditions of the H-blocks were pointed.[37] Not only did he condemn the prison conditions as unfit for human beings, but he also made it clear in an interview that he was in favour of a declaration of intent by Britain to withdraw from Northern Ireland.[38] According to O'Malley, it was O'Fiaich's criticism of the prison conditions, and *not* his latter comments, which led the *Church of Ireland Gazette* to conclude that O'Fiaich's statement 'left the rest of us in little doubt about where his loyalties lay'.[39] Moreover, O'Malley points out, the *Gazette's* comment was an indirect reference to O'Fiaich's background.[40] In other words, he was born in Crossmaglen, the heartland of militant Republicanism and 'he called himself a Republican'.[41] But it should

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[33] McElroy, G., *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Crisis*, op. cit. p. 43.
[34] O'Hagan, D.A., *Allies or Antagonists? Irish Catholicism and Irish Republicanism 1980-1996*, Ph.D thesis abstract citation, Queen's University of Belfast, Northern Ireland, 1998. I would like to note here that regrettably, access to Dr. O'Hagan's dissertation was not possible.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] See O'Malley P., *Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), p. 172.
[38] Ibid. pp. 172-173.
[39] Ibid. p. 172.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.

be noted, O'Fiaich strongly opposed the violence of the IRA, and 'repeatedly ... denounced the murder of brother Irishmen, Catholic or Protestant'.[42]

However, a study such as this cannot be objective without including a range of opposing viewpoints. For instance, Cardinal O'Fiaich disagreed with the Irish government on whether voters can morally support and cooperate with Sinn Féin, the political wing of the guerrilla IRA.[43] A point which is often overlooked if not omitted, but substantiated by O'Fiaich, that is, 'people might be morally justified in joining or voting for Sinn Féin if they wanted to improve their community'.[44] *The National Catholic Reporter* further stated O'Fiaich 'did not think Sinn Féin's political program at the local level spoke of armed struggle'.[45]

It would seem that, Sinn Féin is demonised, not only by Unionists, but also within the Catholic community in the Republic and by sections of the Church. Thus, the Protestant assumption that Sinn Féin could be stopped by excommunication is questionable given the outspoken anti-clericism of many supporting Sinn Féin.[46] The following statements reveal a bitter anti-clerical sentiment and are therefore quoted in full:

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[42] Ibid.

[43] See *National Catholic Reporter*, January, 27, 1984, Vol. 20, No. 14. (Author not cited).

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid. It is of note, in the town quare of Crossmaglen in South Armagh, there is a memorial plaque dedicated to Cardinal O'Fiaich. It is also of note Crossmaglen is known as an IRA 'heartland' and has been termed as 'bandit country' by Merlyn Rees, a former Secretary for Northern Ireland. The point is, the nationalist community of Crossmaglen must have held O'Fiaich in high regard to pay him this honour. At the other end of the square there is a human statue symbolising the release from the 'chains of oppression'. The fact remains, however, O'Fiaich was born in Crossmaglen and this, together with his statements on the prisons conditions gave some Protestants reason to believe 'the cardinal was a surrogate spokesperson for the IRA.' See O'Malley, P., op.cit. p.172. See also *Margaret Thatcher: The Downing Street Years*, (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993). Thatcher, who was the British prime minister from 1979 to 1990, regarded O'Fiaich as 'a romantic Republican, whose nationalism seemed to prevail over his Christian duty of offering unqualified resistance to terrorism and murder'. Ibid. p. 392.

[46] *The Churches and Inter-Community Relationships* by Duncan Morrow, Derek Birrell, John Greer and Terry O'Keefe, Centre for the Study of Conflict, The University of Ulster, Coleraine, Northern Ireland, 1994, p. 76.

> I tried to figure out the Catholic Churches [sic] relations to the Irish State. The Catholic Church is directly responsible for the slaughter of the Irish Language through the building of Maynooth.[47] It was a condition of the building of Maynooth. They went about it deliberately too. You've heard of the tally-stick...? Every time the child used Irish a notch was put in the tally stick and corporal punishment was administered one blow for each notch. If that's Christianity ...the Gas Chamber would be too good for them.[48] (Sinn Féin Councillor)

Indeed, these are strong words and they beg the question, why? Bostock notes, language grief 'in Northern Ireland is unresolved and without official acknowledgement'.[49] Irish language and culture has been relegated to second-class status.[50] Therefore, it can be said, there are linguistic implications for the Irish conflict. Although the issue of language grief may be a part of ethnic conflict and in turn, a part of cultural nationalism, it should not be overrated

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[47] There are two approaches, which may to explain the above citation. St Patrick's College at Maynooth was founded in 1795, primarily, though not exclusively as a seminary for the training of priests. However in the 1830s, from a political as well as an educational standpoint, the British Government attempted to address the issue of higher education for non-Anglicans. Higher education had been monopolised by Trinity College, Dublin (founded in 1591), and it had been a 'bastion of the Ascendancy'. Sir Thomas Wyse, an exponent of mixed education influenced Sir Robert Peel who in 1845, as a 'placatory gesture towards Irish Catholics', established three new colleges at Cork, Galway and Belfast under the Provincial Colleges Act. These were denounced as "godless colleges" by Daniel O'Connell. Not only did the Pope, but also the Catholic hierarchy oppose them. See Lyons, F.S.L., *Ireland Since the Famine*, op. cit. pp. 90-94. From a linguistic standpoint, an explanation may be found in the following. Professor McDonald makes the following points:

> The use of Latin as a school-language is one of the most potent of the causes that have been retarding the progress of theological science in Rome as elsewhere. How many lay people are there who may have need to communicate with Rome... ? ... while the evils that accrue from the use of a dead language in seminaries are daily growing, with the progress of science and history, both of which are now taught exclusively in the different vernaculars.

Although McDonald does not specifically refer to the 'Irish' language or *Gaeltacht*, he is critical of the use of Latin, a dead language to maintain unity and communication with the Holy See. Moreover, McDonald is critical of the Catholic faith, which 'was closed with the last of the apostles'. See McDonald, W., *Reminiscences of a Maynooth Professor*, (Cork: Mercier Press Ltd, 1967), pp. 137-138.

[48] Morrow, D., Birrell, D., Greer, J., O'Keefe, T., *The Churches and Inter-Community Relationships*, op.cit. p. 76.

[49] Bostock, W.W., " Language Grief: A 'Raw Material' of Ethnic Conflict" in *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 3 No. 4, Winter 1997, p. 105.

[50] Ibid.

as a causality in the Northern Irish conflict. Rather, the conflict may be viewed more accurately as one of political nationalism. Nationalists have a tendency to stress authenticity in order to legitimise their demands and this occurs when 'the past is being mined, ideologized, and symbolically elaborated in order to provide l rights movement as fronts to destabilise the state. Second, although the civil rights movement had some influence on British public opinion regarding discrimination that existed in the province, the clerical influence to dissuade violence in the streets *oirse* (Freedom) and *Oglaigh Na hEireann* (Irish Republican Army). Yet, again we can observe the Church and the secular sphere (or laity) working in opposing directions. For instance, on one level the role of the Catholic Church in Ireland cannot be overlooked in its part of contributing to language loss. At another level however, the late nineteenth century witnessed a Gaelic revival, local branches of the Gaelic Athletic Association and the Gaelic League lacked leaders, especially in Ulster, 'fell easily under the control of the Catholic clergy'.[52] Moreover, a visiting Italian priest noticed when visiting Ireland in the early twentieth century noticed:

> The curious fact that the language revival is accompanied by an intensification of missionary zeal, a re-awakening of that ardour for winning converts to the Faith.[53]

However, the above does not fully explain the role of the Catholic Church and its part in language loss, although the experience at Maynooth does provide an insight into this issue.

In the previous chapter I proposed the idea that Nationalists would rather ignore some aspects of Irish history for reasons of perhaps 'embarrassment'

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[51] Fishman, J.A., *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective*, (Clevedon, Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters Ltd, 1989), p. 113.
[52] Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, op. cit. p. 422.
[53] Ibid.

when the evidence reveals a form of collaboration between Rome and the English monarch, Henry II. Thus, the above instance seems to hold significant resonance in contemporary sentiments. For instance:

> The Catholic Church rules Ireland in the interest of the British. I can't think of any other logical explanation for the attitude of the Catholic Church towards nationalism. They see Ireland as part of the UK and as a stepping-stone back to Britain.[54] (local man). [sic]

Yet, we noted earlier (see p. 112) the Catholic Church made exceptions towards nationalism in the cases of Ireland and Poland. Thus, it seems the Holy See does not consistently hold a position on specified national affairs or, ideology when it is in the interests of Rome, that is, when the political circumstances potentially consolidate the Vatican's power and influence. However, a contradictory position is identified in other conflicts where populations are oppressed or persecuted. The experience of the Jews in Nazi Germany is just one example in which the Roman Catholic Church was referred to as the 'silent Church'.

An explanation suggested here, is the Church's unease not only with its eroding capacity to challenge the "micro-world view" but also its own authoritarian posture is under challenge. In brief, another factor is Sinn Féin's manifesto, together with the IRA's ideology, is based on Marxism. The above is perhaps summed up in the following:

> The clergy are finding it difficult to see how their authority is flaunted. The priests in those days were held in awe. To be a good Catholic was to be a good Irishman. We learnt the bitter truth that it wasn't what mattered.... What matters is the social and economics.[55]

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[54] Morrow, D., Birrell, D., Greer, J., and O'Keefe, T., *The Churches and Inter-Community Relationships*, op. cit. p. 76.

[55] Ibid. p. 76. By way of contrast, in the above study a Catholic businessman expressed, "The Churches [sic] do a good job. The old Parish priest would have visited the other clergy, nice

Thus, even among the clergy there is some convergence of opinion on contemporary and secular matters, as observed in Cardinal O'Fiaich, and Father Wilson. They seem to acknowledge social justice issues more openly.

Again, as intimated by O'Fiaich, Sinn Féin is a community-oriented entity. Putting the political struggle aside for a moment, the Sinn Féin 'advice centres' throughout Northern Ireland also serve the function of welfare agencies. In other words, these centres assist with accommodation, applications for various welfare entitlements, counselling in drug and alcohol problems and domestic violence.[56]

4.5 Peace Process Diplomacy

One may be forgiven to regard the relationship between the Church and the State at best, as confusing or ambiguous, or at worst, inconsistent. Due to the media exposure of recent times, others would be forgiven to think the 'Peace Process' is solely a Blair/New Labour initiative. In fact the peace process has its genesis in 1988. What is not well known, is the role of Father Alec Reid of Clonard Monastery in West Belfast and his efforts in initiating a peace

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and quietly. In his own quiet way he went on." Ibid. More recently, the literary world has been a vehicle to tell others perhaps the true realities of poverty in Ireland. In brief, we have returned to the issues of social justice, although written in the style of an autobiography by Frank McCourt in his recent successful novel, *Angela's Ashes* (London: Harper Collins, 1996). In McCourt's writing, he recounts his own experiences of extreme poverty, but punctuates it with a strong anti-clerical line of criticism.

[56] During successive visits to Northern Ireland, the author observed several Sinn Féin advice centres and their activities. Certainly, there is a political component in the objectives of these centres, but the demands of assistance with social welfare were also quite evident. When I inquired as to why Sinn Féin was involved in such activity, I was told it was necessary to do so because of inadequate allocation of resources by the Westminster Government. However, it should also be noted, the IRA's method of "civil administration", involves violence in its retribution towards informers and petty criminals. The rationale for such aggression is the unacceptability of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in certain areas. Central to the counter-insurgency role of the RUC, this also means the entrapment and recruitment of petty criminals as informants. The above in a sense creates a policing vacuum; hence the republican movement's need to create an alternative justice process. See also Connolly, J., " Beyond the Politics of Law and Order: Towards Community Policing in Ireland", *Policing in a New Society Series*, Centre for Research and Documentation, Belfast, 1997, pp. 22-23.

process. A process, which would eventuate in bringing all the conflicting parties to the negotiating table.[57] In brief, Father Reid acted as an intermediary between John Hume, leader of the SDLP, Sinn Féin's president Gerry Adams and the Dublin government. These negotiations paved the way for politicians on both sides to accept that the future of the six counties rested with the will of the majority of its people. Secrecy still shrouds this process.[58]

Part I (B)

4.6 The Protestant Church and the Conflict

Some aspects of the Protestant Church's relationship in the conflict in Northern Ireland have been noted above, although briefly. It can be said, on the one hand, the root of antagonism to all British authority, as found in the nationalist/Catholic viewpoint, are on the other hand as deep as the defence of them by the Protestant side. However, an inquiry under the above heading may prove difficult. Although Presbyterians and Anglicans (Church of Ireland) account for over 75 per cent of Protestants, there are more than 45 separate denominations in a population of less than 800,000.[59] This contrasts sharply with the Catholic population, unified into one institutional body. As Morrow points out, this difference has had political as well as religious significance, 'as the institutional unity of Catholicism has sometimes been

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[57] Details of this negotiating process between Father Reid and representatives of Sinn Féin, the SDLP and officials from Dublin are limited. Peter Taylor's account in *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin*, (London: Bloombury Publishing Plc, 1997), makes only a brief mention of this process. See p. 300, p. 306 and p. 308. Ibid.

[58] An interview on January 3, 1998 with Father Gerry Reynolds at Clonard Monastery in Belfast, Reynolds, who had assisted Father Reid in these negotiations, disclosed very little information about the process. Father Reynolds spoke in rather general terms, but expressed optimism about the province's political future. In a letter from Father Reid, he wrote: ..."I would like to do anything to help but unfortunately, as Father Reynolds as [sic] indicated, the confidentiality which binds the Clonard peace ministry prevents us from giving interviews about its work". Source: Personal letter, regarding a response to request an interview from Father Alec Reid to Ted Cichon, January 18, 1988.

[59] Morrow, D., *Northern Ireland Politics*, op. cit. p. 191.

seen as threatening when contrasted with the fragmentary nature of Protestantism'.[60]

The term 'Protestantism' is often used as the counterpart to Catholicism in Northern Ireland. Certainly, there is some validity when referring to divisions of political loyalty (that is nationalists identified as Catholics, unionists being identified as Protestants and vice versa), but there is no single institution that can claim to speak for all Protestants. Moreover, there is no unified 'Protestant' teaching on church structures or even central doctines.[61] Thus, the conflict is not based on purely doctrinal grounds. However, many Protestants have always been overtly hostile to Catholicism and in particular, encyclicals from Rome.

In any event, whether we examine the relationship between the Catholic Church and the conflict in Northern Ireland, or the relationship between the Protestant Church and the conflict, we are compelled to return to the teaching of Christianity. The teaching of Christianity is applied to the issues of the State, of war and revolution. For the purposes of this study, the focus is on the context of the conflict in Northern Ireland, especially in the last three decades, rather than a theological examination of 'just war theory', or the pursuit of virtuous social goals by non-violent means. It is useful to enumerate some conditions for legitimacy of the ultimate use of force as seen in war, or of revolution, in relation to the Protestant Church. The following are six conditions that need to be met to 'justify' Christian involvement in such activity in the Protestant doctrinal view:

1. There must be a just cause.
2. Force must be the only way left of effecting change.
3. There must be a properly constituted authority to direct the action.
4. There must be a feasible goal.

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[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid. p. 193.

> 5. The means must be appropriate to the end.
> 6. *Reconciliation* must be sought as the ultimate end.[62] (Emphasis added).

This source lends its reliance to the author, both here and below as a comprehensive document, central to this thesis.

4.7 The Church of Ireland's attitude to violence

The following extract succinctly summarizes the issues as viewed by the above Church of Ireland, but is generally shared by the other main Protestant denominations.

> The recent and growing concern about the role of the Church of Ireland in the political, economic and social life of the island, has to be seen against the background and extent of the changing Church involvement in society and of the changes in that society.[63]

Several points are made here. Not only is their acknowledgment of the basis of the conflict, but also an acknowledgment of secularisation. Although this report is tabled by the General Synod Committee chronologically (1970-75), the Church's position and role maintains its relevance in the 1990s. Therefore, the main features are noted in the following, as stated in an official document:

> 1. We warmly welcome the programme of social reforms introduced in Northern Ireland. We believe that this programme should meet reasonable needs and grievances and that it is a basis for a more just and peaceful society. (This resonates with Vatican II's statement, see below).
>
> 2. We believe that in Ireland there is no excuse for violence or intimidation, and we condemn them both outright.
>
> 3. We are perturbed by statements occasionally made by some professing Christians who hold positions of influence in the

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[62] *Violence in Ireland: A Report to the Churches*, (Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, Dublin: Veritas Publications, 1977), p. 61, author(s) not cited.
[63] Ibid. p. 94.

community, in which it would appear that an attempt is made to place the active pursuit of violence, under certain circumstances... .

4. The members are agreed in regretting the use of internment but recognised the difficulty involved in releasing people against whom there are those who might organise violence and inflict suffering. The Committee welcomes the investigation of all allegations of torture and brutality.

5. There must be total condemnation of ALL killing and wounding, the infliction of mental and moral anguish, and particularly the suffering and involvement of children. Revenge contradicts the Christian Gospel.

6. There is no justification for violence in any of its forms from any source in our present situation. We, therefore, welcome especially the firm resolve of the White Paper to establish the rule of law as a compelling priority.

7. The Committee welcomes and supports whole-heartedly the January, 1973, condemnation by the four Church leaders of sectarian and political marches, whether of civilian or security personnel. The appeal which they made to bring this evil practice to an end deserves and should receive full support from all responsible citizens.

8. One of the most significant developments ... has been the re-emergence of organised bodies of private individuals who have embarked on activities of a paramilitary nature while claiming some allegiance to political ideas. It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of the existence of these private armies which exercise considerable influence within the community and which have been able to impose their will and purpose upon much of the Province. The acts of terrorism may be perpetrated by a small minority, but there are many more who accept violence as a method of enforcing political change.[64]

[64] Ibid. pp. 95-101.

4.8 Analysis

The above extracts comprehensively state the position of the Church of Ireland in relation to the conflict, but also emphasize the condemnation of violence. Clearly, the Church of Ireland is critical of the paramilitaries and their agendas. It can be suggested here an implicit reference is made to the Paisleyites in point (3), when the report claims, 'some professing Christians who hold positions of influence...'. Indeed, it can be argued that such a claim is open to interpretation, but the inference is not ambiguous. Finally, it seems as if the Church has acquiesced to a state of lawlessness, but at the same time appeals for the restoration of some kind of moral order.

The clearest statement from the Church of Ireland hierarchy was that of the Primate, the Most Reverend G.O. Simms, Archbishop of Armagh, in November 1973:

> I again condemn unreservedly all acts of terrorism whether perpetrated by or on Roman Catholics or Protestants in the name of one organisation or another, be it an illegal organisation or not. I want only to see peace in our land.[65]

4.9 The Methodist attitude

According to the same-tabled report examined thus far, the Methodists sought to live at peace and in understanding with Roman Catholics. There are many references in official documents to that desire, but in times of communal or national stress there was a strong indication as to where the Church's sympathies lay.[66] Historically, the Methodists have expressed concern and disapproval of violence (dating back to the time of the Home Rule movement), but also in this study it is noted, 'an implicit suggestion that

[65] Ibid. p. 102.
[66] Ibid. p. 103.

basic liberties go hand in hand with maintenance of link with the Crown'.[67]Moreover, according to this report:

> There is a seeming unawareness --- or at best a very occasional recognition --- of the social ills that contribute to and exacerbate community unrest, for example, bad housing, unemployment, low wages and other unsatisfactory social conditions. A recurring, though not frequently asserted, fear and suspicion of Roman Catholic stances and claims.[68] [sic]

However, the report notes a change in the Methodist Church's position from 1960 onwards. For instance, the Methodist Church began to express concern about unemployment in Northern Ireland. Its intention now became a Christian doctrine of *reconciliation* and to promote a just society by including an end to discrimination.[69] Furthermore, the theme of inter-church cooperation and conflict resolution gains momentum throughout the 1970s. Although the Methodist Church re-iterates the position of the other denominations, the language becomes more direct when it calls for *political power sharing* by Protestants and Catholics.[70] For instance, members of secret organisations are urged to consider duty to God before that owed to Ireland or Britain.[71] The reality is however; the Protestant paramilitaries circumvent this doctrine by combining their 'mission' as one of being "For God and Ulster".

Nonetheless, the Methodist position demonstrates little ambiguity when it calls for taking the gun out of Irish politics. The Methodist Church addresses other social issues, including drug abuse, housing and a call for a solution to

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[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid. p. 104.
[70] Ibid. p.107.
[71] Ibid. p. 106.

the problem of policing. But, it also needs to be noted here, there is a strong *ecumenical* concept advocated by the Methodist Church.[72]

4.10 The Presbyterian attitude

The Presbyterian Church in the twentieth- century, has placed an emphasis on the teaching of Romans 13: 1-7 and Peter 2: 13-17, in that the government of a country is divinely ordained and has the citizens' respect, support and obedience.[73] It has thus supported the use of force by the state and has been opposed to all violence against the state.[74] This position becomes problematic. If we are to consider a theoretical framework of state sponsored terror or pro-state terror found in the work of scholars such as Walker, Clutterbuck and Bruce,[75] the behaviour of these groups is no different than of the paramilitaries, who are viewed to be against the state. In this case, in the former we mean the Loyalists. Yet, historically several Presbyterians have been prominent in armed struggle *against* the state. Moreover, certain Presbyterians (for instance Tone and O'Brien) were non-sectarian and secular individuals with political aspirations of an *independent* and *united* Ireland. Thus, it can be argued, whether we refer to rebels in earlier centuries, or paramilitary organisations in the 1990s, political aspirations or struggles ignore the virtuous tenets of Christian doctrine. In other words, street politics do not coincide with 'official' pronouncements on ethics made by the Protestant or Catholic Churches.

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[72] Ibid. pp. 105-107.
[73] Ibid. p. 109.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Bruce, S., *The Red Hand*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), for a detailed study on Loyalist paramilitaries associated with the Royal Ulster Constabulary and British security forces.

4. 11 Critique of an "over analysed study in conflict" [76]

Despite the idealism that which has been expressed by the major denominations, it is argued here, that violent behaviour is not just political behaviour or some other variant that which is immune from the widest intellectual interrogation. It seems curious at times when some literature on the Northern Irish conflict is premised on rigid political prescriptions, while forgetting that this conflict like every other conflict is a *human conflict*, and therefore the analyst should also draw upon sociological and psychoanalytical disciplines. Wars can erupt for a variety of reasons, be it a result of old grievances, territorial expansion, or any other complexity of factors. While writers such as Smith focus on the strategic aspect of *this* conflict, I suggest, because it is taking place within a microcosm, behavioural aspects are perhaps more accessible for observation and analysis.

It is useful at this stage to introduce the concept of deviance.[77] Disobedience at the collective or civil level and disobedience by individuals (private sphere) is rebellious behaviour. Deviant behaviour is found across cultures. Therefore, the political scientist is bound to present an explanation of a universal phenomenon. Violence can be the subject of political theory, but it does not make the issues less complex. The conflict in Northern Ireland is multi-faceted, just like human nature is multi-faceted. It follows that there are several processes or phenomena occurring at the same time. In other words,

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[76] Smith, M.L.R., seminar paper, 'War Process, Peace Process', University of Tasmania, op. cit. According to Smith, the conflict in Northern Ireland is the most analysed conflict, but is "not intrinsically unique". There may be some contradiction here.

[77] The concept of deviance is problematic here. In a sociological context, deviance differs from a criminological treatment of certain behaviour. Waters and Crook, for instance, define deviance as behaviour, which violates the norms which apply in any given social situation and which are specifically proscribed there. See Waters M., and Crook, R., *Sociology One*, 3rd ed., (Melbourne: Longman Australia Pty Ltd, 1993), p.141. Another point to consider is, for Durkheim, crime is a social necessity because it clarifies the norms, it maintains the norms, and it modifies the norms. Ibid. pp. 148-149.

while there may be a strategic aspect to the activities of the paramilitaries as Smith views it, we can safely say there are also ecumenical, political, economical and criminal dimensions. Besides, the theoretical and empirical perspectives of the relationship between politics and religion, between Church and State have been examined in the first two chapters. They consistently demonstrate an overlap between the two spheres, the sacred and the profane, the public and private, especially in maintaining a *moral order.*

However, we are reminded of individuals as well as individuals within organisations, whether at a corporate or paramilitary level, that there will be an element predisposed to psychopathological manifestations. 'White collar' crime is an example of deviance in the corporate world. Violence and crime are examples of other manifestations of deviance. Thus, the study of violence will be interpreted differently by the different disciplines of sociology, criminology, psychology and political science. But it is of note, that violence perpetrated by the paramilitaries, has not been referred to as *sin* by the Churches in the research for this thesis. The Churches' literature thus far, acknowledges the conflict as having social and political characteristics. Another interpretation that identifies the position of the Churches, can be termed here as 'ecclesiastical antagonisms'.

4. 12 Later Presbyterian perspectives

The Presbyterian Church has been closely in touch with the British government. For instance, the Church's response to the Government White Paper, "Northern Ireland; Constitutional Proposals" is in the following General Board of the Church stated that:

> Lawless violence must be repudiated. Christians may differ on whether armed force is ever justified; but if it is it should be used in defence [sic] of life and liberty under the rule of law. It should not be used for the preservation or gaining of privilege, but against men of

> violence who would impose their will upon an unconsenting community and who are the enemies of all.[78] (March 1973).

However, the evidence in the following passages will also demonstrate two vital points. According to this report which states:

> Again and again in the recent years, the Presbyterian Church has expressed unequivocal opposition to violence and called for support for the security forces.[79]

In the second statement by the Presbyterian Church examined here, it claims:

> However humanly imperfect the forces of law or order may be, they should be given practical assistance by citizens on all sides in their difficult task.[80]

First, a fundamental exposition of the Church's political position is identified when it 'called for the support for the security forces'. To use the Biblical reference, in this instance, is it not 'rendering unto Caesar'? In other words, the Church is expressing its obedience to the State, the United Kingdom. Second, although the consistency of opposition to the use of violence, there is tacit support of the use of force by the security forces, especially when the Church at the same time claims:

> The first obligation of the Government should be to give security to those who wish to live in peace and go about their lawful business.[81]

Clearly, the nationalist/Catholic population initially thought the security forces were going to give security and peace when British troops were first deployed. But that sentiment changed. Moreover, the evidence tells a

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[78] *Violence in Ireland*, op. cit. p.110.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid. p. 111.
[81] Ibid.

different story. If the allegations by the nationalists of loyalists colluding with the armed and security forces are true, [82] then the Church's role as a moral force, and, as a teacher of Christian doctrine is blatantly defied by a small but powerful group of individuals. This in turn, gives a certain ambiguity to the claim of 'unequivocal opposition to violence', when loyalist paramilitaries perform the functions of the security forces.

As the report notes:

> The deep sense of indebtedness to the security forces, a feeling made quite explicit at other times, that they have acted with restraint and courage in the face of severe provocation ... but a sensitivity also, to the fact that the forces of law and order must themselves be subject to law and order.[83]

Again, the above is the *ideal*, but the political reality is something else. For instance, the conflict is also surrounded by such events as the murder of the nationalist lawyers, Finucane and Nelson; human rights abuses; the firebombing of houses; one of which resulted in the death of three young brothers who were Protestants. These are some of the sinister aspects of what has been termed by the media as a 'dirty war' and do clearly indicate that all parties (loyalists, republicans and the security forces) are implicated.

Yet, at the same the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church has consistently resolved 'to continue to condemn the use of brutality from any quarter'.[84] Perhaps our *coup de grace* arrives, when one of the encouraging

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[82] For further detail, see *Collusion 1990-1994, Loyalist Paramilitary Murders in North of Ireland,* compiled by Relatives for Justice, Derry 1995. Author(s) not cited. This booklet contains forensic or ballistic details of 229 killings by loyalist paramilitaries, 207 of which were of a sectarian nature. The main argument of this publication is loyalist paramilitaries colluding with the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and British security forces in killing nationalist civilians. Further allegations of collusion are found in postcards, available for sale from republican outlets (for example, the Green Cross shops), one of which has pictures of machine guns with a caption, which reads, "Sold in South Africa, bought by MI5, supplied to UFF/UDA Death Squads".

[83] *Violence in Ireland,* op. cit. p.111.

[84] Ibid. p. 112.

aspects of the Presbyterian stance in this recent period has been 'an awareness of the Church's partial responsibility for the terrible situation'.[85]

The following statement amounts to an admission.

> In what has happened we are reaping the harvest of mutual suspicion and fear, of non-co-operation, vested interests and party advantage... Although our General Assembly and Church have repeatedly spoken out on issues of social injustice and have tried to act in fairness to our fellow citizens of whatever communion, we must confess that we have not done so with sufficient zeal and urgency, sufficient self-examination and self-denial. We have not always loved our neighbour as ourselves and have not infrequently made the conduct of others an excuse for inaction or reaction on our part.[86]

The subtext of this particular report is an acceptance of responsibility for the 'Troubles' by the Presbyterian Church. These are very significant statements because they are also a basis for reconciliation and ongoing ecumenism. The purpose here is not one of placing culpability with the Presbyterian Church. In fact, it deplored the decision of the United Kingdom 'to prorogue the Northern Ireland Parliament'.[87] Moreover, two important points emerge from this report. Firstly, that there should be a sharing of responsibility and power between different sections of the community. Secondly, that the Church encouraged its membership 'to a much more determined effort to understand the viewpoint of the Roman Catholic community and to work with all men of goodwill towards a genuine peace with justice for all'.[88] The Methodist Church had called for a similar arrangement earlier in 1971, when it proposed a joint

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[85] Ibid. pp. 112-113.

[86] Ibid. p. 113. See also Timothy C. Morgan, " For God or Ulster? Northern Ireland takes a 'leap of faith' toward peace", in *Christianity Today*, October 6, 1997, Vol. 41, No. 11, pp. 74-79. In 1998, a number of evangelical leaders decided to make a public stand against sectarianism. Their assertion was, 'for too long, an evangelical constituency that did with Dr. Ian Paisley has been silent,...'. These evangelical leaders are a group of about 200 evangelical pastors formed as the Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland (ECONI). It is of note, in their 20-page document, 'For God and His Glory Alone' it states, 'Evangelicals have been partly to blame for the alienation of Catholics'.

[87] *Violence in Ireland*, op.cit. p. 114.

[88] Ibid. p. 115.

Protestant-Roman Catholic Committee. Therefore, the evidence suggests a willingness on the part of the major denominations to work for a common aim of peace, understanding and cooperation among all confessions; in a word, *ecumenism.*

Part II

4. 13 Defining ecumenism

The Encyclopaedia Britannica does not provide a definition of ecumenism. Rather, it approaches this concept in the context of an organised activity. Hence, an encyclopaedic definition uses the term 'ecumenical movement', which is the name given to a movement for co-operation and unity among most Christian churches.[89] The English word "ecumenical" is derived from the Greek participle *oikoumene* ("inhabited") used in classical times as a noun to mean the "inhabited world".[90] About the 19th century, the particular usage of *oecuménique* in French, the word ecumenical acquired the significance of "that which is concerned for the unity and renewal of the church".[91] It is in the specific sense of unity, co-operation, peace and reconciliation, that it is used throughout this part of the thesis.

4. 14 A brief history

When the Reformation was threatening Christendom with a deep doctrinal division, great hopes were placed in the convening of a council. The Council of Trent (1545-1563) served only to deepen the divisions. It was Pope Pius IV who emerged after the death of Pope Paul IV in 1559, to resume the Council

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[89] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 23 Vols. (Chicago: William Benton Publisher, 1965), Vol. 7, p. 958.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid.

so as to reform the Roman Catholic Church in response to the Calvinist advance. Moreover, the Religious Peace of Augsburg in 1555 meant that subjects were obliged to follow the confession of the prince (*cuius regio, cuius religio*). However, the consequence of this Treaty has a curious resonance, which is witnessed in the present period.[92] Briefly, the nation-state triumphed over the idea of a universal empire. It can be said, that Henry VIII of England triumphed over Rome, and was able to make himself the head of the Church in England. The dualism within the Empire was decided in favour of the princes; confessional discord was perpetuated.

Although, in the seventeenth- century the Scottish evangelist John Dury did some notable work, in an attempt to bridge the confessional gaps. Nevertheless, the century was inflamed by theological passions. However, the nineteenth- century was the great age of the voluntary Christian societies, as in missions and Bible societies. For instance, some of the organisations that were formed include the Young Christian Women's Association (YCWA) and it male counterpart, the YMCA. The Foreign Bible Society was also formed. But, these were unions of heart and feeling, rather than of doctrine.[93]

The International Missionary Council (IMC) had its first meeting in 1910, in Edinburgh. The first conference of the IMC took place in Lausanne in 1927. It is of note that the Church of Rome declined to have anything to do with the Lausanne conference, but the Orthodox churches that had not been present in Edinburgh in 1910 were well represented.[94] The World Council of Churches

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[92] The analogy here can be extended to contemporary Ulster. In other words, the geographical divisions between Catholics and Protestants, such as the Falls and Shankill Roads respectively, Newry and Enniskillen, to name but few, are similar to the concept of *cuius regio, cuius religio*. The difference is only titular. That is, instead of princes, today they are leaders or commanders of the respective paramilitary forces. Or, as some media sources call them the "terrorist godfathers".

[93] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 7, op. cit., p. 958.

[94] Ibid. It is of note here, the doctrinal and ritualistic similarities between the Orthodox and Roman Catholic confessions.

(WCC) emerged, but its activity was limited due to the outbreak of World War II.

4. 14.1 Other forms of ecumenism

As the Encyclopaedia Britannica notes, 'it would be a mistake to identify the ecumenical movement with the WCC, or to limit the use of the word to this particular form of ecumenism'.[95] At least three other lines have to be taken into consideration. These lines include: the Roman Catholic Church, the Movement for Church Union and Denominational Ecumenism. A brief comment on each is given below.

4. 14.2 Roman Catholic Church

This church on its own principles *refuses to* have official dealings with other churches or movements. But it is deeply concerned with unity.[96] The appointment of Cardinal Agostino Bea in 1960 as the president of a special commission for ecumenical affairs was the first official recognition by the Roman Catholic Church of the existence of the ecumenical movement.[97] This was of great importance. However, it can be argued that the Roman Church bears some responsibility in the obstruction of free thought or belief, free association (for example, the Labour Party in Ireland, the trade union movement) and shows a degree of obstinacy emanating from Rome, which affects the political involvement in the conflict of Northern Ireland. This is discussed further below.

4. 14.3 Movement of Church Union

From 1910 to 1961, forty-two mergers of churches took part in various parts of the world, especially in the Church of South India and the union of French

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[95] Ibid. p. 959.
[96] Ibid. p. 960.
[97] Ibid.

Protestant Churches. In Australia, the Uniting Church was formed as a result of the union of the Protestant denominations, namely, the Methodist, Presbyterian and Congregational Churches in 1977.

4. 14.4 Denominational Ecumenism

In brief, this movement is one where every one of the main confessional groups has its international organisations. In a sense, the Corrymeela Community aspires to grow from an inter-state organisation to an international body through its organ called, 'Friends of Corrymeela'. But this is not so much a matter of membership of an ecumenical group as such, rather, an attempt to broaden the parameters of awareness in the Community's objective of peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. (See below). At the same time, there exist other groups in Northern Ireland that are working towards the same goal as the Corrymeela Community. The Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland (ECONI), the Cornerstone group at Clonard, and the Christian Renewal Centre aim to bring Protestants and Catholics onto more neutral sites and away from their sectarian surroundings in hopes of stimulating discussion and reconciliation.

4. 15 The Second Vatican Council (Vatican II)

4. 15.1 Background data

Pope Pius IX summoned the first ecumenical council in 300 years to the Vatican in 1869. At that time the papacy was losing its traditional temporal power in Italy and was challenged over faith and morals by new teachings and doctrines.[98] In January 1959 Pope John XXIII summoned a second Vatican Council to discuss renewal of the faith, peace and ways of promoting church unity. The Second Vatican Council (also referred to as Vatican II) opened in

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[98] Palmer, A., *The Penguin Dictionary of the Twentieth-Century History* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1997), p. 409.

Rome on 11 October 1962, and closed on December 8, 1965. Attended by more than 8,000 bishops, it included observers from other Christian traditions, notably the Orthodox and Anglican churches.

4. 15.2 Consequences of Vatican II

The Second Vatican Council gave to the Roman Catholic Church 16 new laws (decrees), which, without in any way changing its doctrine, profoundly modified its position in the eyes of the world.[99] It sent an appeal to 450 million Catholics to participate in the 'construction of a world, more just, more peaceful, in collaboration with all men, of whatever religious or ideological faith'.[100] It adopted religious liberty as the natural right of man.[101] This notion, under the text of Promotion of Christian Unity, made it clear that religious liberty was to be understood not as indiscriminate liberty of conscience but as judicial liberty in religious matters in secular society.[102] In other words, no one may be constrained by any human power to act against his or her own conscience, within the limits imposed by the rights of others and by public morality and order.[103] Other issues that received consideration included birth control, mixed marriages, conscientious objection and the morality of defence with nuclear weapons.

Turning to the more specific matter of ecumenism, by decree Vatican II made a complete reversal of Catholic attitude, by describing in positive terms the authentic Christian features to be found in the other Christian churches.[104] It recognised that both sides 'must share responsibility for the division among

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[99] Encyclopaedia Britannica Yearbook 1966, (Chicago: William Benton Publisher, 1966), p. 667.
[100] Ibid.
[101] loc. cit.
[102] Ibid. p. 668.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid. p. 667.

Christians' and called upon all Catholics to 'play their part in the ecumenical movement'.[105]

However, despite its good intentions, it can be argued that a strong element of ambiguity, if not provocation emanates from this decree. For instance, an examination of the Vatican's documents seems to vindicate, as noted above, new decrees but 'without changing its doctrine'. Vatican II's gesture is subtle, therefore perpetuating ambiguity. The point is, the ideal of 'Christian unity' would be an acceptable proposition. But, the Council's claim, stated by Pope Paul VI:

> The restoration of unity among all Christians is one of the principal concerns of the Second Vatican Council. Christ the Lord founded one Church and one Church only.[106]

Furthermore, this theme of exclusivity is evident in the following:

> We believe that this *one true religion* continues to exist in the *Catholic* and Apostolic Church.[107]

The danger here is a common thread of monism, which runs through a number of religions, although with slight variations. For instance, the Jews claim they are God's Chosen People. Another example is found in the Jehovah's Witnesses, that is, the claim that *it*, is the only true church on earth.

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[105] Ibid. The Protestant denominations at the meeting of the Second Vatican Council (on the subject of ecumenism) expressed consternation when the Vatican stated Protestants "seek God" rather than "find God". In other words, the latter could only be realised through the Roman Catholic Church. Ibid.

[106] Vatican II Decree on Ecumenism, *Unitatis Redintegratio,* New Advent Catholic Website, <http://www.knight.org/advent>.
Sighted September 6, 1999.
The above was proclaimed by Pope Paul VI on November 21, 1964.

[107] Vatican II Decree on Religious Freedom, *Dignitatis Humanae,* New Advent Catholic Website, <http://www.knight.org/advent>.
Sighted September 6, 1999. This Declaration on Religious Liberty was made on December 7, 1965. Although this citation does not have to be indented according to referencing conventions, the above practice has been adopted to emphasize my point.

The Church of Christ, by its very name suggests divinity in the one Christ. Simultaneously, although Islam acknowledges the existence of Christ, Christians are viewed as 'infidels'. Reverend Paisley has claimed that 'Ulster is the last bastion of Christianity/Protestantism', and this has a resonance of exclusivity. This concept received detailed analysis under the rubric of the 'sociology of religion' in Chapter two. Yet, at the same time, Vatican II details the necessity of freedom of religion in civil society in its document, *Dignitatis Humanae*. The practice or reality is different, meaning that Vatican II reinforces a degree of division, and in fact, the Catholic Church admits it. Consider the following extracts:

> The differences that exist in varying degree between them and the Catholic Church - whether in doctrine and sometimes in discipline, or concerning the structure of the Church -- do indeed create many obstacles.[108]

Moreover, whilst Vatican II states 'the brethren divided from us also use many liturgical actions of the Christian religion', at the same time it recognises that 'these liturgical actions must be regarded as capable of giving access to the community of salvation'.[109]

This quotation indicates that the Church of Rome has an exclusive access to salvation. Yet, at the same time Vatican II continues to maintain an ambiguous position, by stating, 'it follows that the separated Churches and Communities as such, we believe them to be *deficient* in some respects...'.[110] (Emphasis added). Furthermore, the position of the Catholic Church is rehearsed again when it claims:

> Nevertheless, our separated brethren... *are not blessed with that unity which Jesus Christ wished to bestow on all those* who through Him were

[108] Ibid.
[109] *Unitatis Redintegratio*, op. cit., p. 3.
[110] Ibid.

> born again into one body... .[F]or it is only through Christ's Catholic Church, which is "the all-embracing means of salvation," that they can benefit fully from the means of salvation.[111]

Finally, we can add to this maze of ambiguity when the Roman Church speaks of the divisions that have occurred over the centuries, but among those in which Catholic traditions and institutions in part continue to exist. Thus, we further observe the Vatican's position when it states, 'the Anglican Communion occupies a special place'.[112] Moreover, Vatican II gives the Eastern Churches 'special consideration', but in spite of their separation, they possess special sacraments and some worship in common. However, the stipulation is, 'given suitable circumstances and the approval of Church authority, [some worship in common], is not only possible but to be encouraged'.[113]

To sum up, on the basis on the above evidence, ecumenism is difficult to assess. Despite the virtuous intentions stated by the Vatican regarding ecumenism, the Catholic Church continues to be authoritarian and its monist approaches does not allow room for *religious pluralism.*[114] Hence, I argue, in the former instance, this is bound to engender resentment, bigotry and suspicion among other Christian communities (and non-believers). Northern Ireland is no exception. According to Collins, 'British Catholics have been slow to accept the deeper changes flowing from Vatican II'.[115] At one level, it

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[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid. p. 7.
[113] Ibid. p. 8.
[114] See Byrne, P., *Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism,* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995) for a definition of 'religious pluralism', pp. 1- 30. Byrne also makes the point that many facets of religious diversity are not of primary interest to pluralism. He goes on to argue that diversity in 'claimed achievements create cognitive conflicts between the faiths', and the alleged achievements of other faiths are illusory. Ibid. p. 1. In any event, this raises the question which faith is illusory and for whom? Is the Roman Catholic faith illusory to the Protestants, and vice versa?
[115] Collins, P., *Mixed Blessings: John Paul II and the Church of the Eighties, The Crisis in World Catholicism and the Australian Church,* (Ringwood: Penguin Books Australia Ltd, 1986), p.138.

seems there exists a doctrinal division, and on another level, whether in Ulster or elsewhere, there is an ideological clash within the Christian community. Besides, if there is a universal belief in Christ and his teachings, does this not constitute a unity of faith? Ironically, the Church also reminds its brethren "God has given them free choice." One could consider the following analogy. If Party A is a conservative political party, but a party which upholds the notion of liberal democracy, and Party B is a social democratic party and believes in the same basic tenets of democracy, it follows, there is unity in the belief of democratic principles. In other words, as secular humans we engage in dualistic behaviour. On the one hand, we accept some degree of uniformity (or conformity), but on the other hand we want diversity or pluralism, and freedom of choice.

Although some modifications were made to accommodate to the modern world, such as the liturgy be recited in the vernacular rather than in Latin, other issues such as education, divorce and birth control compound the above position. On the one hand, the Catholic Church speaks of the dignity of humanity, freedom of religious expression and so forth. But on the other hand, it should be borne in mind, these same commitments have become a shorthand under the rubric of human rights, which were stipulated by a secular body in 1948, as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Finally, it must be noted that neither Catholicism nor Protestantism are universal entities, the former (Catholic dogma) proclamation notwithstanding.

4.16 Conclusion

The conflict in Northern Ireland in its phase since 1969 has evolved into the present stage, which is also termed as the Peace Process. It would appear that in the early phase of the conflict there existed more solidarity in the Catholic Church. That is, the Church hierarchy and its clergy were supportive of the civil rights movement. However, as the above process evolved, 'dissidents' such as Cardinal O'Fiaich and Father Wilson voiced their protest against the Catholic Church itself. In brief, the Catholic Church's highly ambiguous position has not diminished. Perhaps, in some ways Vatican II has perpetuated or compounded the ambiguity of the Church. At the same time, no worldwide institution has changed as radically as the Roman Catholic Church in recent years. Yet, it remains a paradox. Some people see it as a reactionary force while others experience it as a powerful movement towards radical social and political change.

The Protestant denominations, together with the Catholic Church, have unequivocally denounced violence in the Province, and have appealed for co-operation, understanding, peace and reconciliation, which is the basis for ecumenism in Northern Ireland. Moreover, it is of note, the Presbyterian Church's admission of partial responsibility for the violence which has erupted and continued for the past three decades. The converse position, Irish Catholicism and Irish republicanism seem to be antagonists rather than allies. At the same time, Protestantism in Ulster is fragmenting, as Protestants continue to struggle with their national identity.

Therefore, it is in this political environment that ecumenical organisations such as the Corrymeela Community aspire to achieve peace and reconciliation. So far, this study has expressed some reservation about ecumenism as a constructive force. It may be possible in other communities,

such as Australia or even in the Republic of Ireland. Moreover, no matter how idealistic the intentions of Vatican II's *Unitatis Redintegratio* may be, religious pluralism is just one precondition before political pluralism can exist. The examination of these concepts within the context of the Corrymeela Community is the subject of analysis in the following chapter.

Chapter 5

We are called to be peacemakers, not by some movement of the moment, but by our Lord Jesus.[1]

The Corrymeela Community: 'The Hill of Harmony', or an Illusion?

5.0 Introduction

The name Corrymeela literally means, "the hill of harmony", (hereafter it is also referred to as the Community). From the outset, it should be noted that an ecumenical organisation in a peaceful context differs from one in the circumstances of conflict or war. Therefore, the concept of hope alone in this study will have different connotations. In other words, the hope for peace and reconciliation in a broad or global context has rather diffuse ramifications. There are currently some thirty conflicts in progress on the globe, but no major world war. By way of contrast, ecumenical activity in a localised and conflictual situation such as in Northern Ireland is expected to have more specific objectives. Corrymeela's philosophy is one of peace and reconciliation, and secular and religious bodies mostly support this.

However, this chapter also argues that peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland are fundamentally political as well as collective aspirations. Such ideals require a significant degree of compromise and reconciliation. In essence, it is safe to say they are the concerns of a secular polity. No matter how much the religious labels of Protestantism and Catholicism are used in daily discourse, peace and pluralism need to be embraced by the collective membership of the six counties, before any religious organisation can

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[1] Cited by Hogan, M.J., in " Managing Dissent in the Catholic Church: A Reinterpretation of the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace", in *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, November 1989, p. 400.

effectively reach the people with its Christian message. Hence, this chapter is an evaluative one, as it examines not only the effectiveness of the Corrymeela Community, but also the concept of ecumenism as it is found in this environment. In order to perform such a balanced assessment, it is useful to consider several perspectives and variables. For instance, this chapter employs a theoretical analysis of pluralism to test or measure the political fundamentals of the situation in Northern Ireland. Thus, the assumption here will be that a theoretical blueprint of pluralism is considered as an ideal arrangement. At the same time, empirical data such as Corrymeela's organisational structure, aims and activities provide the materials for further theoretical perspectives, in particular an inspection of different or comparative mobility capacities experienced by different groups.

The above would be incomplete without some discussion of the limitations which can ultimately determine how an active or passive role, a community such as Corrymeela can play in Northern Ireland politics. This study draws upon other analyses that are indicators of demographic change, changing relations between Church and State, changes in the attitudes of Catholics in the Republic of Ireland, and the impact of the European Union (EU) membership. However, a concept that is germane to this whole thesis is that of anti-Catholicism. I have relied on the work of Brewer and Higgins who provide a valuable analysis and explanation in their treatment of this often neglected piece in the conflict's theological complexity. Thus, it is treated as another variable, which in turn is correlated with our assessment of Corrymeela as an actor.

Moreover, at the time of writing, the main issue was centred on the problem of paramilitary decommissioning of weapons, in order to pave the way for a power-sharing cabinet in Stormont. Thus, a resolution is about 'political

peace' --- not just religious peace.[2] The conflict has often been reported as a purely sectarian conflict. This image has been widely created by the media, but is not accurate. The problem that undermines the above situation is that religious identity in Northern Ireland is also an ethnic identity, which is ultimately transferred to a political identity. This affects adherents of the main confessions, as well as non-adherents.

By way of contrast, during the Two World Wars, both opposing armed forces were composed of Christians. Catholics and Protestants were part of the Allied forces in World War I, as they were in the opposing German side. Similarly, in World War II, there existed a situation where Catholics and Protestants fought together, in the respective forces (excluding Soviet and Japanese forces). In brief, the ultimate aim for all those involved in the conflicts was peace after victory. Yet, after World War I churchmen such as Archbishop Nathan Söderblom wrote:

> During the war Christians and servants of the Church in the separate countries took part in national self-adoration in a way that we should like to delete from the pages of history.[3]

Therefore, ecumenism in a relatively peaceful Irish Republic differs from that in the North. Put another way, whether it is an active or a passive actor, the

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[2] David Trimble put forward the recommendations of former US Senator George Mitchell, the mediator in the stalled peace process to a meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) on November 27, 1999. Fifty-seven per cent of the UCC's 858 delegates voted to allow the Assembly members (Stormont government) to form an executive administration that would include Sinn Féin ministers.
Sources: Millar, F., De Bréadún, D., and Tanney, P., "Trimble stakes leadership on UUC verdict at meeting", *The Irish Times on the Web*, November 27, 1999.
<http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/1999/1127/north8.htm>.
Sighted November 29, 1999.
The Irish Times on the Web, November 29, 1999.
<http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/ireland/1999/1129/north50.htm>.
Sighted November 30, 1999. Author not cited.

[3] Hudson, D., *The Ecumenical Movement in World Affairs*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 34.

ecumenical movement in Ulster has a political relationship in this conflictual environment. For instance, State-Protestant Church relations in the Republic are in a spirit of cooperation, such as generous funding of Protestant schools.[4] Moreover, the Protestants in the Republic consider themselves as being Irish, and having an Irish *identity.* [5] Whereas in the context of the Republic it will have far less of a political characteristic. Nevertheless, the significance of the actions of those involved in the ecumenical organisation found in the Corrymeela Community does not necessarily lay in their chances of success or their probability of failure. Rather, such actions taken by men and women also means representing churches, and institutional Christendom -- at least the neutral part of it. In other words, given the symbiotic nature that distinguishes the relationship between Church and State, Corrymeela's actions express a concern, recognition, however imprecise, of Christian responsibilities for the actions of a civil society. A civil society which has not yet matured in Ulster, because as much as the conflict between Catholics and Protestants is viewed by some as a religious conflict, it a political struggle

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[4] Brian Duffy, the headmaster of Bandon Grammar School in Dublin speaks favourably of the Republic of Ireland's policy on funding Protestant schools. Duffy also claims the younger generation of Protestants and Catholics see no difference in terms of each other's status. He cites the example of students at The High School in Dublin. By way of contrast, Reverend Ian Paisley is critical of the fact Protestant taxpayers fund Catholic schools in Northern Ireland. At the same time, Myles Duncan, a broadcaster and writer claims others have chosen Protestantism over Catholicism in spite of being raised Catholic because of disillusionment after brutal treatment by Christian Brothers in former years. Duncan feels this is not 'treasonous', as it is a religious choice and not a political choice. He attributes this to religious affiliation in the Republic is not as tribal as in the North. Source: *No Offence: Ireland's Other Protestants*, Network Ireland Television, Chistera Productions, transmitted by Special Broadcasting Service Television (SBS-TV, Australia), June 27, 1999.

[5] According to the above source, it claims there is an increased feeling of Irish identity, because people in the Republic no longer feel a sense of having to be Catholic and speaking Gaelic to be Irish. Moreover, this source claims Protestants feel proud to speak Gaelic and Southern Protestants are contented with their 'Irishness'. This in turn has changed the perceptions by the Protestants in the South regarding the Protestants in the North. Ibid. *Irish Times* journalist, Finton O'Toole, however, expresses an opposing view. According to O'Toole, Irish identity was "invented" at the foundation of the State and derived from a combination of land, nationality and religion. He further argues Catholicism has ceased to be a mark of political identity. The latter may well be the case in the Republic, but it is argued here that Catholicism *is a political identity* in the North. Source: Cullen, P., "Conference is told of death of identity", *The Irish Times on the Web*, November 29, 1999.
<http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/ireland/1999/1129/hom21.htm>.
Sighted November 30, 1999.

territorially symbolised by either the Union Jack or the Republican tricolour. In this sense, it is an example of Söderblom's 'national self-adoration'. Christianity *per se*, is universally symbolised by the Holy Cross, and the altar, whether they are in a Protestant church, or a Catholic church.

5.1 Previous Peace Movements in Northern Ireland

The Peace People was a peace movement founded in 1976, by Betty Williams, Mairead Corrigan and Cairan McKeown who were awarded the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize. Initially, the movement was known for its large rallies in Belfast and other centres in Northern Ireland. It defined its aim as 'non-violent movement towards a just and peaceful society'. [6] Some of the movement's activities were similar to those of the Corrymeela Community. These activities had a strong emphasis on youth work, including summer camps for mixed religious groups (see Corrymeela's programme [sic] below), as well as its own forum (the Peace Assembly) to debate current social and political issues.[7]As Flackes notes, on the political side, the movement had been active in 'campaigning for reform of emergency legislation and in opposing the secrecy of the Anglo-Irish talks'.[8] Moreover, its leaders were critical of established politicians, but the latter paid little attention to the movement.[9] It is suggested here, that it is often the case where politicians 'dismiss' the *vox populi* and prefer to maintain the *status quo*. Nevertheless, after 1980 serious internal dissension led to the movement's executive members pursuing their separate careers.[10]

It is useful here to cite Bardon's acknowledgment of the Peace People's efforts:

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[6] Flackes, W.D., *Northern Ireland: A Political Directory*, (London: Ariel Books, British Broadcasting Corporation, 1980), p. 177.
[7] Ibid. For the purposes of clarity, the vernacular use of the word *programme* has been maintained in this chapter, rather the Australian English spelling of 'program'.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.

> [G]roups such as the Women Together and Protestant and Catholic Encounter had been working hard to promote reconciliation, but this new group captured the imagination of Northern Ireland people to an extent that others previously had not.[11]

Moreover, Bardon also notes the extent of the support that the movement attracted crowds in excess of twenty thousand people at peace rallies in Belfast and Derry in the latter part of 1976.[12] But, despite the initial support and the acclaim the movement won across the world, '[I]n such a deeply divided society... the Peace People found it difficult to sustain widespread support'.[13] Thus, with factors such as the lack of support, attacks on the movement by loyalists and republicans alike, lack of recognition by governmental institutions and, internal dissension, the Peace People's *raison d'être* evaporated. Moreover, in the latter instance, it can be argued the above movement lacked sustained mobility, organisation and unity. Certainly, it lacked the capability of mobilisation as seen in political parties. To add to this, it incurred the hostility of minority groups who wished to perpetuate the culture of violence.

Finally, any mobilisation of peace movements or groups seems to be limited to small numbers of individuals.[14] Small groups such as Families Against Intimidation and Terror (FAIT) have catalogued a detailed report of

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[11] Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, op. cit. p. 727.

[12] Ibid. It is of note here to cite Bardon's account of collective behaviour towards the Peace People:

> Residents of the Shankill warmly shook hands with nuns and priests during the peace march there but the Peace People walked up the Falls in torrential rain to a more hostile reception of abuse and stones. Ibid.

Another example of refusing to recognise the Peace People's efforts came after they received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo on 10 December, when the Unionist-dominated Belfast City Council had decided against giving the Peace People leaders a civic reception. Ibid. p. 733.

[13] Ibid. p. 727.

[14] See *Peace Movements of the World: An International Directory*, Day, A.J., (ed.), (Harlow, Essex: Longman Group UK Ltd, 1986), under Ireland and Northern Ireland entries.

paramilitary crime since the Good Friday Agreement.[15] Moreover, FAIT had earlier urged all political parties to sign a new anti-violence charter following weeks of bloodshed, and to build upon the Mitchell Principles.[16] Nevertheless, it is encouraging to see a supra-national contribution to the peace initiative. For instance, the EU's first phase of funding of 900 peace projects, is noted by its allocation of £10 million from its peace and reconciliation programme.[17]

5.2 The Corrymeela Community: Background information

Ray Davey is considered to be the founder of the Community and his experiences during the Second World War encouraged him to seek new ways to deal constructively with conflict situations and to develop new relationships between "traditional enemies".[18] The 1960's were viewed by many as a time of change reflecting a new mood of optimism in Europe.

While students throughout the world brought about their own form of activism (for instance, protest against the Vietnam war), students in Northern Ireland from Roman Catholic and Protestant homes 'were discovering each others' values and prejudices in quite an unprecedented way'. [19] In brief, there were polarities in these times. Religious "communities" associated with Queen's University were fostering a new openness and holistic approach to life.[20] At the same time, political societies were exploring a "New Ireland",

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[15] Grattan, G.,"FAIT report calls for action to end violence", in *Belfast Telegraph On Line*, November 23, 1998.
<http://www. belfasttelegraph.co. uk/cgi-bin/ArchiveSearch.cgi>.
Sighted November 30, 1999.
[16] Source: "FAIT bid to end bloodshed", in *Belfast Telegraph On Line*,
January 27, 1998. Author not cited.
<http://www. belfasttelegraph.co.uk/cgi-bin/ArchiveSearch.cgi>.
Sighted November, 30 1999.
[17] *Belfast Telegraph On Line*, May 5, 1997.
<http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/cgi-bin/ArchiveSearch.cgi>.
Sighted November 30, 1999.
[18] Fowler, C., "The Corrymeela Community and its Programme Work", Part 1, July 1995, n.p..
Email correspondence from Trevor Williams, <belfast@corrymeela.org.uk> to Ted Cichon, April 21, 1999. p. 1.
[19] Ibid. p. 2.
[20] Ibid.

while the Reverend Ian Paisley was preaching on the theme of, "Tickets For Hell and Where They Are Bought".[21]

However, the experiences of the Iona Community in Scotland and the Agape Community in Northern Italy inspired Ray Davey to establish a new approach to the challenge.[22] It is within this context, and primarily focused upon the Presbyterian Chaplaincy at Queen's University, that in 1965 the Corrymeela Community was born.[23] Moreover, before the 'Troubles' erupted, the Community felt an anxiety of providing 'an opportunity for the churches of Northern Ireland to rediscover the concept of community'.[24]

5. 3 The early aims of the Community.

At the time of the creation of the Community certain core aims were identified. For the purposes of this study, I have enumerated those aims that are relevant to the aspect of the Northern Ireland conflict. These changed and developed over time:

(a) To help train Christian laymen /women to play a responsible part in society and the Church.

(b) Through work camps, to bring crafts-people and voluntary workers in a realistic Christian fellowship.

(c) To provide a meeting point for reconciliation work in the wider community and in Church life.[25]

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[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid. p. 3.
[24] Ibid. The aspiration 'to rediscover the concept of community' may have limitations here. In view of increasing globalisation, Northern Ireland is not immune from the impact of transnationals corporatism and secularisation. Moreover, Northern Ireland is becoming more heterogeneous, with small Asian and sub-continental groups entering the demographical composition. The above supports the argument of *Gessellschaft* as outweighing the traditional concept of *Gemeinschaft*, thereby making Corrymeela's aspiration in one sense seem rather idealistic. However, Corrymeela is a 'community' in that it is a collection of peoples with a normative force.
[25] Ibid. p. 5.

5. 3.1 Current Aims of the Community.

The following aims are an abridged list, but at the same time it provides evidence of how the Community's work is responding to the ongoing situation in Northern Ireland.

(a) To be a sign and a symbol in a divided society that Protestant and Catholic can share together in a common witness to Christ who transcends our divisions and leads us to a larger vision of reconciliation; to be a question mark to the existing structures of our churches in Ireland.

(b) To provide opportunities for people from all sections of our society and support them through advocacy and work in order to dispel ignorance, prejudice and fear and to develop new relationships of mutual respect, trust and co-operation [sic].

(c) To stand beside all victims of suffering and injustice in our society and support them through advocacy and work for social change: to encourage new initiatives in economic, social, cultural, educational and political spheres, in the search for a more just society.

(d) To nourish a healing community in diverse and imaginative ways so that we might find freedom from the enmities and bitterness in which we are trapped by our historic conflicts.[26]

In brief, it can be said the Community aspires to re-socialise its younger age group by interactive activities between Catholics and Protestants.

5. 4 The Central Role of Reconciliation

The Community never set out to be a community relation's agency or to focus solely upon the religious/political divisions in the North of Ireland. As John Morrow (Leader of the Corrymeela Community from 1980-1993) wrote in his short pamphlet "The Corrymeela Community":

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[26] Ibid. p. 6.

> The work of reconciliation can only be understood within the concrete context in which we live and work. This is not the place for a treatise on Irish history,[27] but it is essential to understand the kind of divided society, which we have inherited, if the witness of Corrymeela is to make sense. There are an overlapping series of dimensions to the conflict which include cultural aspects like British or Irish identity, religious tradition (Protestant or Catholic), social or economic opportunity etc[sic]. It is not possible to limit our work to even these dimensions and any approach to the Christian understanding of reconciliation must take on board relationships between people of all ages, disabled and able-bodied, from both sexes, from different social classes, of conservative and liberal temperaments and the wider issues of race, other religions, or no religion. Peace is indivisible and although we have to work in particular concrete contexts, we do not exclude wider international issues and contacts and any issues which bear on our common humanity. Indeed, it is often only when some of the intractable local divisions are put in this wider setting of the search for a fuller humanity that significant change begins to happen.[28]

Moreover, the Members of the Corrymeela Community 'are always encouraged to live out their commitment to reconciliation work within their own local situation and circumstances'.[29] This means involvement within local churches, work places, community centres, schools, youth centres and political parties. In the latter instance, the Community has attempted initiatives that seek to explore the nature of conflict and to establish mediation networks, such as projects like the "Faith and Politics Group".[30]

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[27] Ibid. p. 8. It may be pragmatic for the Community to downplay the historical aspect of the contemporary issues and the subsequent conflict, but it can also be argued that the present is the product of the past. Historical factors aside, there are issues such as abortion, contraception and divorce, which in terms of canon law are beyond the control of the Catholic laity, let alone 'ordinary' churchgoers. For a more definitive essay, see O'Mahony, T.P., "Ireland: Church State Tensions", in *America*, April 13, 1985 pp. 300-302. O'Mahony makes the point that after 1972, when the special position of the Catholic Church (as in the 1937 Constitution) was depleted by popular referendum, changes became apparent in church-state arrangements. This is evidenced by, for instance, the 1983 Pro-Life Amendment debate in the Oireachtas (Parliament). Moreover, the legislation on contraception in the Republic was an important development, as 'it would be welcomed from the point of view of the Northern Ireland perception of "Rome rule" in the Republic'. Ibid. p. 302.

[28] Fowler, C., extract from "The Corrymeela Community ", op. cit. p. 8.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

5. 4.1 Other Aspects of the Community's Aims

The area of Family and Community Work was one of the first strands of programme work to evolve and develop. However, over the years, a wide variety of programmes have also been developed which 'seek to explore the explicit connections between Christian faith and contemporary issues'.[31] By this, the Community claims the dimension of Christian education, an area that underpins all areas of programme work and the wider life of the Community. In brief, the Community sees itself as an opportunity for *ecumenical* education.

Other Community programmes are focused on the individual and the significance of the "person", and not as a "client". Put another way, it is apparent how Corrymeela endeavours to foster the maximisation of an individual's potential in the broader community. These aims are extended to youth and families. However, the Community stresses this area of work is not primarily, 'about "cross-community contact" encounters'.[32] Furthermore, the Community also emphasises its work is holistic, since it recognises the inter-relation between "man' and "woman", between "Catholic" and "Protestant". As a core value and principle, 'Reconciliation is a much broader concept than merely bringing two traditions together'.[33] Thus, Corrymeela's work is not about "Prejudice Reduction and Conflict Resolution".[34] It is, however, 'about understanding personal prejudices, recognising them in future and trying to change behaviour or responses accordingly'.[35]

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[31] Ibid. p. 24.
[32] Ibid. pp. 67-70.
[33] Ibid. p. 68.
[34] Ibid. p. 69.
[35] Ibid.

5. 5 Organisational Structure of the Corrymeela Community

For the purposes of this study, the Community is considered to be a non-government organisation (NGO). It comprises of a core group of 178 Full Members and a further 15 individuals who are Provisional Members.[36] The administrative section is based in Belfast and the personnel there include the Leader of the Community, the Financial Administrator, the Appeals Officer, Secretarial Staff and the Programme Field Workers. In addition, the Community has Volunteers and a body of "Friends of Corrymeela", numbering over 2,300 people from around the world who pledge their support to Corrymeela's work by giving a donation of at least £10 per year (current subscription).[37] Moreover, the Community has Cell Groups that are aimed at providing an opportunity for interested individuals to maintain their links with the Community and its work in their own setting.[38]

At Knocklayd and Ballycastle, in County Antrim, (also referred to as the Ballycastle Centre), the Community has three residential units for use by groups which can collectively, accommodate up to a maximum of 120 people during any one period. A branch of the Community exists in London and it is known as the Corrymeela Link. There is another unit called "Cedar Haven" for use by individuals/families under stress and intimidation.[39] The following is a brief statistical presentation of the Community's membership as well as providing a profile summary. Out of the 178 Members, the total number of Protestants is 118, and the total number of Roman Catholics is 60.

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[36] Ibid. p. 11.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid. p. 16
[39] Ibid. p. 9.

In simplified terms, this means, a ratio of almost two-to-one. Similarly, in terms of gender Protestant members nearly double Roman Catholic male and female members. [40]

5.6 Maintaining the peace message and an evaluation

The Corrymeela Community is recognised as a charity by the Inland Revenue Department of the UK. As noted above, it is mainly financed by public subscription and is largely dependent on donations. However, there is another dimension to this. Certainly, it is clear that its administrative functions and the activities of promoting the ideals of peace and reconciliation, incur financial obligations. Moreover, it is of note how the Community's efforts to finance itself extend to marketing strategies. For instance, the Community's magazine *Connections*, published three times a year, is accompanied by incentives to introduce others as subscribers to Corrymeela's aims. These incentives include free gifts, which are usually in the form of books or other literature relating to religious or political matters.

Moreover, publications of the *Connections* magazine contain articles relating to the conflict in Northern Ireland, conflicts in other parts of the world, ecclesiastical references and, anecdotal accounts. While this dissemination of information may be commendable, it is however confined to a limited number of people. That is, individuals who are either directly, or, indirectly associated with the Community. It is suggested here, a fair proportion of the above information is available through other outlets and mediums. In the case of anecdotal evidence, it is widespread in Northern Ireland, whenever the subject of the 'Troubles' arises. Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind, the Corrymeela does offer for the bereaved, a place of solace, counselling and

[40] Ibid. p. 13. A further numerical analysis and profile summary has been reproduced from the extract used in this study and is detailed in Appendix 5.

comfort. Corrymeela therefore serves as a place for healing of grief, both individually and collectively.

At the same time, it should also be noted, the Community is:

> A dispersed community of people of all ages and Christian traditions who, individually and together, are committed to the healing of social, religious and political divisions in Northern Ireland and *throughout the world*.[41] (Emphasis added).

In the latter instance, it can be argued here, that while on the one hand, the quest for world peace is a universal Christian aspiration, on the other, such an aim may dilute, or weaken the Community's energies to be more proactive in the context of Northern Ireland's conflict. That is, a focus on world peace is an easy way to lose sight of a local conflict. Moreover, it can be argued that the Community's mission is broad, rather than a sharper focus that could include political lobbying to change the political process in Ulster. This proposition is verified when Trevor Williams, Leader of the Corrymeela Community in Belfast admits:

> What we do would not be described as lobbying. We have connections and build relationships with political parties and government and seek to influence their opinions and their work by sharing with them who we are and the work we are doing. I suspect that Corrymeela's 'lobbying' of government will need to be much more proactive in the very near future as there will be many other pressing demands on limited resources.[42]

Therefore, if we return to the above notion of marketing strategies engaged by the Corrymeela Community, it can be argued here, that this organisation attempts to prove or demonstrate its professionalism to attract potential

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[41] Ibid.

[42] Email correspondence from Trevor Williams, Leader of "The Corrymeeela Community", in Belfast, <belfast@corrymeela.org.uk>, to Ted Cichon on the question of how the Community is not as proactive as it should be.
Sighted January 20, 2000.

donors to its cause. In any event, it is fair to say 'marketing' is an economic necessity in order that Corrymeela like other NGOs are able to continue with their causes. Moreover, the reasons for such strategies may well lie in the fact that, firstly, it lacks the mobilisation that is needed to exert an influence on the political process. In other words, unlike a major political party, the Corrymeela Community is limited in working towards any form of power, or as an organisation, in galvanising a unity of interest and opinion in Northern Irish society. In the latter instance, an example of popular opinion was reflected by a majority vote of 71 per cent for peace in the May 22, 1998 referendum. Thus, it can be said this referendum was an expression of the Irish people at grass roots level, and a process of democratisation.

During this decisive period in the peace process, it seems that there was an absence, or lack of leadership at grass roots level, which could propel a peace movement into prominence. Strong leadership, such as that exemplified by the late Martin Luther King in the American experience, could take a peace movement to a position where a culture of peace and reconciliation could influence the collective consciousness. Yet, the members of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) were inspired by the *success* of Luther's movement. The fact that the protagonists of the Irish peace process were the elite members of various political parties in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Britain meant that the task was one of mobilisation in which the constitutional outcomes would reflect the will of the Irish people. Nonetheless, it is a curious phenomenon in that the Northern Ireland referendum of 1998 reflected such a majority vote for peace and change, but at the same time popular mobilisation such as mass protest or demonstrations, has been noticeably absent.

If we were to compare the above with the size of popular mobilisation by the Peace People in 1976, it numbered more than twenty thousand at a peace rally in Belfast. Or, the massive participation by the Protestant Ulster Workers' Council General Strike of 1974, then these instances make contemporary popular participation look inert. In situations such as the clashes at Drumcree during the Orange Order marching season in 1998, were confronting and violent. Yet, it is of note that at the time of writing, other parts of Europe witnessed significant expressions of popular opinion and its mobility. For instance, in Spain demonstrations occurred against Basque terrorist violence, and in Austria, popular protests against Jörg Haider's far right Freedom Party. The point here, is, an absence of popular mobility in Northern Ireland. The second reason for Corrymeela's limitations may be due to the small number of members of the organisation.

On the surface, 178 Community Members in a microcosmic environment such as the six counties of Northern Ireland may appear to be impressive. Certainly, there exists the potential for a small organisation to exert pressure so as to influence the government of the day. This also means influencing a political process that can either preserve the *status quo*, or, adopt reformist policies. Therefore, an organisation such as the Corrymeela Community, which is a non-government organisation, needs to be evaluated by, comparing it with other non-government organizations. In the first instance, we can say, Corrymeela is a *normative* oriented organisation. Furthermore, organizations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace can also be considered as normative oriented organizations. Two points present themselves here. One, successes of the respective NGOs are varied and difficult to assess in quantifiable terms. The second point for consideration is the respective organisational structure --- which is *quantifiable*. Corrymeela claims to have 2,300 'Friends' (supporters) from around the world, while

Amnesty International has over one million members and supporters in over 150 states and territories.[43] Greenpeace, which began as a movement against nuclear weapons testing in the early 1970s, has moved more into 'mainstream political activity and organisational complexity'.[44] It does not enlist members, but relies upon donations to finance its cause and its donors are known as 'Friends of Greenpeace'.

Moreover, it should be also noted, organizations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace have global familiarity, especially in terms of publicity, but at the same time, they are also dependent on donations. By way of a comparison, Corrymeela does not have the same exposure. It fails to even reach the almost household level of awareness of Amnesty International or Greenpeace when they have lobbied, protested or confronted parties they consider culpable. Yet, by the same token, the conflict in Northern Ireland has had extensive world wide media coverage, and it has in a broad sense, reached an international dimension. In the latter instance, two points come to mind: one is the Irish diaspora, and two, the Anglo-American diplomatic input during the Peace Process.

A point that may be overlooked in such a study is peace and reconciliation are not exclusive aspirations held only by some NGOs. Similarly, it can be stated in general terms, environmental or human rights issues do not exclusively belong to the above. Therefore, it is argued here, there is a constant plea for peace and reconciliation throughout the globe. Although church hierarchy and clerics may call for peace from the pulpit, formal participation by the people through ritual and liturgical means, is also a collective activity towards reaching those ideals. Moreover, a demonstration by a group of

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[43] Evans, G., and Newnham, J., *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1998), p. 18.
[44] Ibid. pp. 210-211.

citizens calling for peace and reconciliation can be either a secular, or a sacred form of expression of these ideals, but without necessarily being bound by organisational constructs. Christian rituals and liturgy can also take place in the private sphere (at home), and at the same time they can be considered to be a basic unit of a church or, an ecumenical movement. However, such activity in the private sphere may be fragmented, incoherent and ineffectual. An organisation such as Corrymeela, therefore, acts as a cohesive medium for collective aspirations of peace and reconciliation.

Yet, it must be noted, the Corrymeela Community has received acknowledgment from unexpected quarters, such as the 1997 Niwano Peace Prize from Japan, which is worth £100,000.[45] Moreover, given the magnitude of the task, Corrymeela is still functioning and every impulse towards the peace process has value, bearing in mind how hard it is to change a situation that has existed for a long time. Thus, the above suggests much about its value and contribution. Therefore, the Community needs to continue with its work. At the same time it needs to continue grow and expand so that the message of peace reaches all levels of Irish society.

In any event, this study is limited in making a comprehensive assessment of Corrymeela, because that would require an extensive participant observation in the Community's activities. Research participation in these activities would include, administrative, residential, spiritual, educational and reconciliatory programmes.

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[45] See McGahan, C., "Japan Honours Work of Centre", *Belfast Telegraph On Line*, February 22, 1997, <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/ArchiveSearch.cgi>.
Sighted November 30, 1999.

5.7 Christian Idealism and Political Realism: An evaluation by examining some inherent problems.

The above is basically a descriptive account and later, supplemented by an evaluative one. It attempted to provide some essential background of the Community and the context of its work. The brief history of the Corrymeela Community crystallises some of its more important aspects.

5.7.1 The problems of mobility, a secular European Union and Vatican II

There are several problems that present themselves here. First, Corrymeela lacks mobility. This may be due to the fact, the Community, as an organisation does not have competing interests. Intrinsically, it does not vie for political power, but rather for the ideals of peace and reconciliation. This is not to say that the Community cannot have an influence on the political process. However, its ecumenical characteristic restrains mobility in the political sense. Political parties such as the Alliance Party (AP), which prides itself on giving priority to attracting support from both sides of the community,[46] has demonstrated a considerable degree of mobility. For instance, in its first electoral test, the May 1973 district council elections, it got 13.6 per cent of the votes.[47] Its share of the poll in the 1983 Westminster elections fell to 8 per cent.[48] In spite of the Alliance Party's varied electoral fortunes, it must be noted for its policy of shared government at all levels. In a sense, it mirrors the sacred notion of ecumenism in the profane sphere,

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[46] Flackes, W.D., *Northern Ireland: A Political Directory*, op. cit., p. 31.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid. p. 32. By way of illustration, in the Australian experience Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party emerged out of the 1996 federal elections. Initially, One Nation posed as a protest vote against the dominant two party system. In the state election of Queensland, which followed, the party won 10 seats. This represented 23% of the vote. The point here is however, new groupings or political parties can enter into politics as part of a pluralistic arrangement. Source: Arkley, L., " The Hanson Factor: A Fiery MP with a racial message is wild card in Australia's election", in *MacLean's*, September 14, 1998, Vol. 111, No.37, p. 26.

because the Alliance Party has an equal number of Protestants and Catholics in its membership.

The other minor political party that has demonstrated a reasonable degree of mobility is the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP). It is the party that speaks for the majority of Catholics in Northern Ireland. Founded in 1970, it absorbed most of the supporters of the old Nationalist Party, National Democratic Party and Republican Labour Party, and served to weaken the appeal of the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP).[49] However, it is interesting to note, the AP absorbed those who had formerly backed the NILP.[50] In brief, these loose partisan associations, show Labour or left of centre political orientations, to be weak if not ineffectual in Northern Irish politics. Yet, the AP and SDLP are considered as moderate, and their membership is mostly made up of the middle-class stratum. Nonetheless, be that as it may, the SDLP withdrew from the Stormont government in July 1971, as a protest against the institutions of government. The imposition of direct rule from Westminster in 1972, with the suspension of Stormont, gave the SDLP new opportunities to propose new forms of government.

It should also be noted, the formation of the SDLP had on its agenda to co-operate with the Protestants, in creating a democratic society, after defeating the clerical candidate.[51] As Wilson asserts, the SDLP wanted 'a party without the old clerical links and so did the people'.[52] Yet, in 1996, 12 members of whom three, Smyth, Paisley and McCrea were Protestant clergymen represented nationalists and unionists in Westminster.[53] Such is the contrast between the two political camps, but it must be stated, Protestants were in

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[49] Flackes, W.D., *Northern Ireland: A Political Directory*, op. cit. p. 213.
[50] Ibid. p. 31.
[51] Wilson, D., *Democracy Denied*, op. cit. p. 105.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.

1995 discussing the severing of links between their religious Orange Order and the UUP.[54]

A comparative approach also reveals significant, if not intriguing, *political behaviour*. In this instance (the SDLP) illustrates a coalition of competing interests: the Catholic Church and secular politicians. We are reminded of the negotiations between Clonard Monastery cleric, Father Reid, and John Hume (SDLP) and Gerry Adams (SF), to procure a peace process. Thus, it can be said the above was a constructive input by the Catholic Church in Northern Ireland. However, the emergence of Sinn Féin from 1983 onwards pushed the SDLP 'into the ambit of the clergy again whether they wished it or not and the clergy into the ambit of the SDLP'.[55] After the Maze prison hunger strikes by republican inmates in the early 1980's, Sinn Féin was rising to challenge this position and at one period in the following years Sinn Féin got 43 per cent of the Catholic vote.[56] There was 'practical cooperation' between the Catholic clergy and the SDLP to adopt an increasingly hostile attitude to Sinn Féin, should the latter become the majority leader of the Catholics.[57] But, Wilson makes a point when he argues:

> Neither the SDLP, the two governments [Dublin and London] nor the churches recognised that republicans had a right to negotiate for anyone, even if mandated to do so by a substantial popular vote.[58]

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[54] Ibid. The above separation of the Orange Order from the UUP has been mooted several times. The most recent suggestion was reported in *The Irish Times*, November 27 1999. See "UUP may cut Orange Order link", in *The Irish Times on the Web*, November 27, 1999. < http://www. ireland. com/newspaper/front/1999/1127/fro2.htm>. Sighted November 29, 1999. Author not cited. The point here is, a possible change (dilution) in the notion of Protestant identity expressed through a quasi-religious organisation such as the Orange Order.

[55] Wilson, D., *Democracy Denied*, (Dublin: Mercier Press, 1997),. p. 106.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid. p. 107

Yet, Sinn Féin acknowledged the need for *accommodation* of the Unionists, if there were to be a peace process, which in turn necessitated all party talks. In brief, the Nationalists mobilised themselves in the political struggle by constitutional means. Thus the above is a prelude to our discussion on pluralism, but it also demonstrates manoeuvring by the Catholic Church, party mobility and counter-mobility measures. Connolly's claim of 'new grouping can enter into politics in the give and take of pluralism'[59] may be subject to some scrutiny here. Indeed, new political groupings can enter, but at what expense? There is the illusion of democracy because of the various parties' uneven representation at Westminster. Moreover, we need to also consider the elections at local government level, which reflect Nationalist representation. (See Appendix 5 for detailed election results). However, if members of the SDLP became leading members of Catholic Church bodies, as Wilson claims,[60] it demonstrates the Catholic Church's position as inconsistent and averse to pluralism. Republicans and socialists were excluded by the coalition discussed above. It also demonstrates the Church's intolerance of politics that are at the left-of-centre. In spite of its name, the SDLP is a moderate political party, with the Catholic Church's tacit approval. Lastly, it also demonstrates an erosion of the Church's power, but at the same time it highlights the Catholic Church's attempt to hold onto its authority in a society that is moving increasingly towards secularism.

Nevertheless, the point that is of note here is the capabilities of smaller parties (not associated with paramilitaries) to mobilise themselves, in the face of say, the UUP, the largest political entity in Northern Ireland which provided government at Stormont since 1921. Put another way, the UUP held the monopoly on power since partition. Thus it follows, another problem that is

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[59] Connolly, W., in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1991), Miller, D., Coleman, J., Connolly, W., and Ryan, A., (eds.), p. 377.
[60] Wilson D., *Democracy Denied*, op. cit. p. 107.

inherent in the Irish conflict, is pluralism. Rather, the lack of pluralism, notably *religious pluralism,* which should be translated into *political pluralism.* In the former instance, there is little crossover membership, or inclusiveness. Put simply, one group of brethren go to one church and another group go to its church. The Corrymeela Community however, enables a crossover of membership. In brief, however, it can be argued here Northern Ireland has experienced *pseudo-pluralism* and a *pseudo-democracy.*

If we are to be serious about the concept of democracy as a virtuous arrangement in the context of this discussion, then the situation in Ulster is a repeated pronouncement of the 'tyranny of the majority' under Unionist rule. Moreover, it should also be borne in mind that partition created a minority Catholic population in the six counties. Thus, in other words, a minority existed which lacked political representation and, an issue that was compounded by the absence of a universal franchise and gerrymandering. As Flackes points out:

> The Unionists held around forty of the fifty-two seats in the Northern Ireland House of Commons,... and many Unionist MPs had never had to fight an election.[61]

The above does not reflect a democratic process.

However, divisions within the Unionists began to appear during the prime ministership of Terence O'Neill (1963-9), and more so when the parliament in Stormont was suspended in 1972. In brief, the UUP was forced into a combination with smaller Unionist parties. Although the Unionists were a coalition made up of left and right positions in the political spectrum, this did not reflect a true pluralistic phenomenon. Even though some Unionists backed the power-sharing policy of Westminster, the inclusion of the SDLP

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[61] Flackes, W. D., *Northern Ireland: A Political Directory,* op. cit. p. 238.

and the Alliance Party in the Executive, omitted one vital ingredient in a democratic process. That is, the lack of an effective *parliamentary opposition*.

A lack of parliamentary opposition in a political, intellectual, ethical and philosophical context must surely tempt us to challenge the historical *status quo* of a democratic deficit. Inadvertently, our argument embraces some concepts expressed in 'theories of the state'. Moreover, according to Dunleavy and O'Leary, 'all pluralists are hostile to centralized [sic] states'.[62] In a sense there is a paradox here. Because, whilst a number of Unionists supported a Northern Ireland parliament at Stormont, the majority who supported the maintenance of the links with the United Kingdom, inadvertently maintained this by precipitating direct rule. In other words, direct rule from Westminster, meant a centralised government. Moreover, if we view the general strike by the Ulster Workers' Council as a means to sabotage the creation of a power-sharing Executive, then such activity further precludes pluralism. Another aspect of this argument asserting pseudo-pluralism and pseudo-democracy, is, proportional representation had been abolished since 1922. When it was reintroduced in 1973, Bardon notes, 'in spite of the kaleidoscope of party labels, Unionist candidates performed impressively in local government elections'.[63] Although in the recent developments of establishing a power-sharing Executive (in 1999), there is an absence of an opposition, as witnessed in those liberal democracies, which are based on two major parties competing at elections to form a government.

The above issue requires further clarification. Pluralism, defined by Connolly, is:

> An ideology which does not accept any single account as the ideal but which itself functions in a plurality of ways. It provides an

[62] Dunleavy, P., and O'Leary, B., *Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1987), p. 57.
[63] Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, op. cit., p. 702.

> alternative to the competing ideologies of communalism and individualism, both defective in their purest form, as recipes for the good life. There is no single purpose or good that deserves the highest support of all rational people. Instead there is a plurality of goods, each capable of rational support and all appropriately included as options for individual choice (free choice itself being one). Pluralism fosters stability without depending too heavily on direct state coercion or communal unity. New groupings formed perhaps by changes in economic position or in generational experience, can enter into politics and shift the balance of power in the give and take of pluralism.
>
> Pluralism is variously defined as an ideal of the good life; as a characterization of politics in western, capitalistic democracies; as a theory of ethics relevant to the politics of liberal societies; and as a doctriner [sic] of cultural diversity that endorses neither a relativist nor a monist assessment of alternative cultures. It is possible to endorse any one of these views without endorsing all the others, but most 'pluralists' will endorse several of them.[64]

The choice of the above definition or version of pluralism is the one that is adopted in the discussion below.

Several issues arise here with Connolly's definition when applied to the Northern Ireland conflict. Firstly, Connolly's theoretical assertion of 'there is no single purpose or good that deserves the highest support of all rational people', *philosophically* contradicts not only Corrymeela's ethos, but also that of the wider community in Northern Ireland. This however, is not our argument here. Surely, peace and reconciliation deserve the highest support. At the same time, under this definition, the paramilitary organizations or their ideologies cannot claim to be the ideal. Neither are the ends (unionism or republicanism), which they seek to achieve coercively.

In view of the evidence presented thus far, ecumenism cannot foster pluralism either. For, in spite of idealistic rhetoric by the Churches, the Catholic Church in particular, has developed a moral ambivalence. It uses

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[64] Connolly, W., in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, op. cit. pp. 376-377.

overtly religious language when addressing the faithful, but when it addresses the nation it employs religiously neutral language of natural law.[65] As McShane argues in the American experience, it is a language suited to the political arena.[66] It seems to be a parallel posture assumed by the Church in Northern Ireland. This also has resonance with O'Hagan's thesis, that is Irish Catholicism and Irish republicanism do not complement each other. In other words, Irish Catholicism, is ideologically and historically more comfortable with the authoritative position of the United Kingdom. We witnessed a similar sentiment echoed in an earlier discussion (See footnote 54, page 184).[67]

Moreover, in Chapter four and elsewhere, I argued that the position of the Catholic Church is highly ambiguous. This is evident in the area of the ecumenical movement. Therefore, although Vatican II reduced the motive for theological intolerance towards other religions, it is acutely aware of the challenges of pluralism. Carroll, whom McShane cites to explain the above as, gives the reasons for this:

> Perceiving that a pluralist environment demanded both civil tolerance and theological intolerance, he [Carroll] was convinced that any church that lacked a lively sense of uniqueness and its necessary role in securing human salvation would fail in the religious market-place.[68]

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[65] McShane, J.M., (S.J.), "The Catholic Experience at Taming Pluralism" in *The Christian Century*, April 26, 1989, p. 445. Although McShane is referring to the American experience, when Catholics were a minority, and Protestants the majority in the formative years of American history, the parallels are nonetheless similar in the way the Catholic Church expressed its attitude towards pluralistic arrangements in the American and Irish experiences, respectively. In the American experience, the Catholic Church had discouraged Catholics (at least passively) to pursue an ethnic identity.

[66] Ibid.

[67] For a further comparison, such as that found in McShane and O'Hagan's work, see Tom Kelly, "The Bonfires, the Bishop, and Seamus Duffy", in *Christianity and Crisis*, November 6, 1989, pp. 349-351. In brief, Kelly is critical of Cahal Daly, then bishop of Down and Connor was also the Catholic hierarchy's spokesman on matters political in the North. Seamus Duffy was a child killed by a plastic bullet. Kelly criticises Daly for focusing his attention on ceasing commemorations of historical events, rather than the circumstances of Duffy's death (coercion by British security forces).

[68] McShane, J.M., *Christianity and Crisis*, op.cit. p. 443.

Therefore, it can be argued here, the above position by the Catholic Church remains unchanged. But, to be fair, as we have observed in the previous chapter, other denominations also claim their uniqueness. Moreover, in the case of the Corrymeela Community, the Catholic membership is almost half of its Protestant counterparts, but the reason for this is unclear. In any event, Corrymeela has an ethos of inclusion.

From a quantitative perspective, there is no apparent difficulty in establishing Corrymeela's adherents. Their political identity is *neutral*. It seems that scholars such as Morrow struggle with establishing a reliable estimate of denominational adherents in Northern Ireland. For instance, his estimates of the province's brethren who maintain a connection with their church are as high as high as 80 per cent.[69] But, this would suggest that citizens in the Republic are less likely to look upon the church as a legally protected repository of national or ethnic identity. Thus, compared with their Catholic counterparts, Morrow's estimates would suggest the converse situation in the North. Morrow's estimates are questioned here, as the evidence points towards a decrease in church attendance; (see Appendix 5) and a more secularised Irish society. Moreover, there is another influence to be considered here. In other words, the Catholic Church has in effect suppressed the ethnicity of nationalist Catholics and subtly advocated full Catholic incorporation in a unionist life, that is, the United Kingdom.[70] Does this position foster pluralism in an increasing multicultural arrangement in the British Isles?

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[69] Ibid. p. 444. However, it should be noted here, recent arguments further claim a shift from Catholicism as being part of an Irish identity. Reference to contemporary discourse regarding this concept has already been made in the former part of this chapter. See footnote No. 5.

[70] Again, the emphasis is made here, which is found in McShane's work resonates not only in the American experience, but is also witnessed in the Irish experience.
See also O'Hagan, D. A., *Allies or Antagonists? Irish Catholicism and Irish Republicanism* 1980-1996, Doctoral dissertation, (Queen's University of Belfast, Northern Ireland, 1998).

Another reality, under the rubric of pluralism that needs to be considered is the impact of the EU. As noted above, both Ireland and Northern Ireland (as part of the UK) are EU members. As the EU's regulations allow the free movement of people, capital and labour, it is suggested here, there is a spill over effect allowing the free movement of secular ideas. For instance, liberal ideas and practices such as those particularly witnessed in the Netherlands, and elsewhere in the EU, are bound to affect attitudes within the UK. Moreover, modern technology, such as the Internet facilitates the importation and exchange of ideas. At the same time, the EU by its very nature promotes cultural diversification. Such an arrangement also fosters a spirit of voluntarism. In brief, the Church views a pluralistic and consequently a secularist environment, as one that offers the ultimate challenge of the freedom not to believe.

As a consequence of the above, it is possible to examine several aspects of the Irish (north and south) membership in a wider 'community', the European Union. The first point that needs to be noted is the rise of the Irish economy from the 1970s till the present day. In brief, Ireland lagged behind other European states that experienced economic miracles in the post-war years. It is fair to say, the European counterparts which experienced the above economic growth and prosperity, also experienced changes in their respective societies. Those years witnessed a rise in material wealth among the middle-income earners. Moreover, as Ireland gained more economic prosperity, it became more of a part of Europe by catching up with European social trends. For instance, the feminisation of the labour market is but one such feature. Therefore, for our purposes, the above hold the link to several phenomena which have altered, not only the structure of Irish society, but also it is important here to discuss these changes which *should* in theory at least, counter ignorance and prejudices towards Catholicism in Ireland.

The deliberations of Vatican II included *Humanae Vitae* that went to the core of the issues, marriage and sex. Issues such as abortion, divorce, and birth control had prominence and controversy. Although the lack of the Second Council's impact on Irish society has been alluded to in the above, demographic evidence reveals a distinct shift to a secular approach in matters of family planning. In brief, the agrarian structure with implications for the institution of marriage has become weakened.[71] Demographic trends show the following features: Decreased fertility and postponement of first and subsequent births; a rise in childlessness; lower marriage rates; higher levels of cohabitation; increased divorce rates; increased life expectancy, and a rising trend in births outside marriage.[72] Since the abolition of the Marriage Bar in 1974, maternal choices now may reflect decisions by mothers (and consequently couples) based on whether children are an asset or a cost.[73] As Drew concludes, "Ireland has the lowest marriage rate in the world; it is strange for a "Catholic nation".[74]

Although the Republic does not acknowledge a divorce rate, as figures are unavailable, Drew estimates, there were 4,404 divorced persons in Ireland in 1996. Moreover, according to Drew, the Protestant Church of Ireland not so much objected to the referendum on the above issue, but protested about several members of the current Irish Dáil. That is, Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and the Finance Minister, Charlie McCreevy cohabiting with women whilst remaining married to their previous spouses. Another aspect is that of

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[71] "Reconceptualising Families in Ireland: Changes in Demography and Family Forms", a paper presented by Dr Eileen Drew at the School of Sociology, University of Tasmania, November 16, 1999. This paper was presented at the British Society for Populations Studies Annual Conference, University College Dublin, 6- 8 September 1999. Dr Drew holds a post at the Department of Statistics/Centre for Women's Studies, Trinity College Dublin.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

abortion. Northern Ireland did not adopt the abortion laws of the rest of the United Kingdom.[75]

On the basis of the above, a significant move away by Irish society from the teaching of the Catholic Church in matters considered sacred, such as the institution of the family is indicated here. Since 1974, when the Marriage Bar was abolished, Irish women in the 1990s now experience a higher level of financial independence. Hence, women in Ireland have more choices about deciding their destinies. Yet, as Hill argues, the Irish bishops' intolerance of civil and religious liberties remain because they still view the Protestants as being "in error".[76] It seems there exists persistence in Catholic clergy attitudes, which may be viewed as stereotyping. When viewed by Protestants in Northern Ireland, Hill maintains, 'this attitude of the Catholic bishops has been singled out over and over as a major obstacle to a united Ireland'.[77] Addressing the Family Planning Bill, the Church of Ireland declared that people cannot be legislated into sexual morality. In spite of this, Catholic Irish bishops have pressed for civil laws to reinforce canon law even as they reject the notion of the "confessional state" and promise to protect the civil and religious liberties of Protestants.[78] In a sense, the Catholic Church in Ireland

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[75] Ibid. It is suggested here, the fact that Northern Ireland did not adopt mainland Britain's abortion laws is a peculiar phenomenon. Drew is quoted here as saying at her University of Tasmania seminar, "The fact that Northern Ireland did not adopt the British laws on abortion, was in no way an act of deference to the Catholic Church". However, Drew does not offer a fuller explanation neither in her seminar, nor in the above paper. An earlier study which mirrors the work of Drew is found in Hayes, B.C., "Female Intergenerational Occupational Mobility within Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland: The Importance of Maternal Occupational Status" in *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1, pp. 67-76.

[76] Hill, T.P., "Church, State and Bishops In Ireland" in *America*, July 27, 1985, pp. 29-31.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid. Hill points to the fact that constitutional factors as seen in the American experience is also a legal expression of the separation of Church and State, which theoretically at least, outweighs the doctrinal position. Moreover, Hill argues that the position of Irish and American bishops are quite different and if Irish bishops were to follow the American example, 'they would ease considerably the anxieties of Protestants, further substantially reconciliation between both parts of Ireland, and do this without compromising their doctrinal position'. Ibid. p. 30. It is also of note; Hill claims 'There is no formal separation between church and state in Ireland'. It can be argued here, on the basis of Drew's evidence, the relationship between church and state in Ireland is no longer absolute. Moreover, the

has to contend with two sets of contemporary forces. On the one hand, there is the changing attitudes and practices among its own Catholic brethren in a modernised and secularised society, and on the other, the notion of *difference* or *inequality*, which the Catholic Church perceives, in the Protestant confessions.

However, it should be noted, there has been a significant trend in Northern Ireland where an increase is observed in the number of households that do not offer a religious classification. Moreover, according to the Continuous Household Survey conducted in 1988 and again in 1998/99, there has been a minimal change in the number of mixed marriages in the households surveyed. (See Appendix 5)*. Yet, according to the same survey, the number of 'same religion' households (that is both partners), shows a decrease of 13 per cent. Although it is noted that these are not reliable figures, it is reasonable to suspect that there is a steady increase in mixed marriages (Catholics and Protestants). Similarly, church attendance by Catholics and Protestants, surveyed by the same organisation shows decreases of 13 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively in the years 1998/99 compared with 1992/93.**

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changes to Articles 41 and 44 of the Irish constitution meant the deletion of the 'special position of the Church' in the Irish republic. The above instances, in particularly Drew's study, are further evidence of increased secularisation. Although, one study for the Bishops' Council for Research and Development, shows that 60 per cent of young Catholics in the north aged 15 - 24 years old in the province go to Mass every Sunday, compared with 50 per cent in the south. In any event, the concept of secularisation remains problematic to assess in quantitative terms. Source: *Belfast Telegraph On Line*, December 3 1998.
< http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/cgi-bin/ArchiveSearch.cgi>.
Sighted November 15, 1999. Author not cited. A search of *Belfast Telegraph On Line* Archives however, reveals further evidence of a decline in church attendance. For instance see, McAdam, N., "Shock figure in Mass survey", *Belfast Telegraph On Line*, November 7, 1998, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/cgi-bin/ArchiveSearch.cgi.
Sighted November 15, 1999.

* Source: Continuous Household Survey, Northern Ireland Central Survey Unit. Email correspondence from McNeill, M., <michael.mcneill.csu@nics.gov.uk>, June 9, 2000. Information requested on the subject of contemporary trends in mixed marriages and church attendance in Northern Ireland.

** Ibid.

However, this still remains an incomplete argument. It is only a part of the argument, and therefore a reflection of the multi-faceted aspects of this Irish conflict is required. By keeping this in mind, we are simultaneously analysing the linkage between human behaviour and political behaviour. In brief, we mean the dynamics of collective behaviour, particularly in terms of consensus and dissensus, as well as the concept of accommodation. That is, the accommodation of minority groups in the socio-political environment. Thus, there is a need to examine some theoretical blueprints, and how they relate to the political realities of the province.

5. 8 Theoretical perspectives in evaluating pluralism

Does ecumenism, that is, Christian unity, mean consensus, or does it mean agreement? In other words, whilst there is little argument about Corrymeela's shared objective of peace and reconciliation, the Community is also unified by its belief in the pacifism of Jesus Christ. However, does the philosophy of such a Community run counter to the principles of pluralism? In order to answer these questions, let us look at the work of theorists such as Rescher, Sartori, Smootha and Figgis.

5.8.1 Defining pluralism and identifying its limitations

Agreement or consensus can prevail among diverse individuals and groups. For instance, although there are some difficulties with the present Peace Process in Northern Ireland, it is fair to say, all the conflicting parties reached an agreement in 1988, which became known as the Good Friday Agreement. As Rescher points out, there can be agreement or disagreement in three main areas: the theoretical/cognitive, which is concerned with agreement or disagreement in matters of *belief*; the practical/pragmatic, which is concerned

with agreement or disagreement with respect to *action*; and the evaluative/axiological, which is concerned with matters of *value*.[79]

Therefore, according to Rescher's thesis, it can be argued that in a society such as Northern Ireland, there is political disagreement between the unionists and the republicans, as the former group *believes* in a union with the UK, whilst in the latter instance, the republicans *believe* in a united Ireland. The two groups are also ideologically opposed. However, the reality is also a majoritarian group (the unionists), with a dissenting minority, the republicans. Thus, from a philosophical perspective, Rescher's argument is problematic on the grounds that his central argument is 'pluralism: against the demand of consensus'.[80] Moreover, Rescher's study is troubled if we are to consider Sartori's claim that:

> My reason for dwelling on consensus is that this concept is central not only for the democracy-pluralism context but also --- as I shall now move on to argue --- for the understanding of "community" and, in this connection, of the currently burning issues of multiculturalism, ethnic vindications, xenophobia and, conversely, xeno-acceptance.[81]

Two issues immediately arise here. Firstly, in the context of the Corrymeela Community as an ecumenical "community", it encourages and 'practices' a form of consensus by the fact of church unity, tolerance, common goals of peace and reconciliation. But at the same time, the occupancy by its membership of Catholics and Protestants hinders political dissensus within the organisation. Indeed, this is not the ethos of the Community, but by this "restraint" the Community may not effectively influence or impact upon any political process in the province. One possible explanation for this is, the

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[79] Rescher, N., Pluralism: *Against the Demand for Consensus*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) p. 5.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Giovanni Sartori, "The Background of Pluralism", prepared for delivery at the XVI World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin August 21-25, 1994, p. 17.

Community is a physically closed or self-contained environment. Yet, it can also be argued the Community, as an organisation can be a part of a pluralist arrangement as an actor within civil society. It seems there is a theoretical contradiction here, if we consider Rescher and Sartori's treatises.

5. 8.2 Smootha's concept of pluralism

For Smootha, the definition of pluralism is a 'continuous, multidimensional phenomenon, of which cultural diversity and social segmentation into corporate groups are the most important'.[82]

Moreover, Smootha makes an important distinction when he asserts:

> The nonplural society has large sub cultural rather than cultural differences; some degree of social and residential segregation rather than discontinuity; integration through consensus, crosscutting affiliations and balance of power rather than structural segmentation, political domination, economic interdependence, and exploitation; and institutional arrangements for peaceful change rather than fundamental vulnerability to violence and instability.[83]

There are several inconsistencies with Smootha's argument here, but it should be borne in mind that his study is a synthesis of other scholars' work, notably Kuper, van den Berghe, M.G. Smith and Schermerhorn. For instance, no political party in Northern Ireland has held the balance of power. Rather, there has been political domination by the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). Further, from a historical perspective, exploitation was a hallmark of colonialism. Although the British government has stated it has 'no selfish, strategic or economic interests in Northern Ireland',[§] in a contemporary sense, the province has seen systematic discrimination in resources. If one considers

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[82] Smootha, S., "Pluralism and Conflict: A Theoretical Exploration" in *Plural Societies*, Vol. 6 No. 3, Autumn1975, p. 69.
[83] Ibid. p. 70-71.
[§] Cited by Taylor, P., in *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 1997), p. 325.

employment and housing as units of social capital, we can identify or assess the notion of pluralism more accurately. Briefly, there are three strands of pluralism: social, cultural and structural. For present purposes, we can exclude social pluralism as a reality in Ulster, if we concur with Kuper's argument in which he makes the following points:

> The dominant group uses its power to derive maximal material benefits, to prevent mobilisation of the subordinate group, and to render ineffective cultural similarities and social bonds that develop with growing contact and industrialisation.[84]

Clearly, the historical survey of Northern Ireland previously outlined is evidence to support Kuper's assertion in the above. Thus, the empirical data further reinforces his thesis, especially when focusing on the notion of conflict:

> [T]here are many conditions conducive to violent conflict including growing domination and discrimination, status incongruity among sections of the subordinate group, or disjunction between rising expectations and dissatisfaction.[85]

Moreover, at the time of writing, institutional arrangements for peaceful change, although fragile, have been put in place, but there still exists a vulnerability to violence and instability. In brief, the concept of pluralism in the context of Northern Ireland is problematic for theorists. One explanation is, it does not fit comfortably into one theoretical model or another. In one debate, van den Berghe emphasizes that 'stable democracy is compatible with moderate pluralism'.[86] The argument here, however, is Ulster's society *appears* to be pluralistic, but it does *not* satisfy the criteria for true political pluralism.

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[84] Kuper, P., cited by Smootha S., *Plural Societies* op.cit.p. 76.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid. p. 79.

Certainly, there is cultural pluralism in the province, but not political pluralism. In the former instance, Smootha makes the point:

> Theoretically it is expected, that to sustain cultural pluralism it is necessary to maintain separate institutions like schools, churches and neighbourhoods, but why should culturally similar groups remain separate, if not because of racism or ethnocentrism or for perpetuating inequality and domination?[87]

This theoretical exploration is further complicated by the May 22, 1998 referendum, which demonstrated direct democracy in practice. However, the above instance of participatory democracy does not effectively control affairs of the province. Rather, the affairs of the province have been controlled by tribal elites representing territorial interests. Therefore, on the basis of the above considerations, ecumenism, in the context of the Corrymeela Community has ambiguous, if not paradoxical characteristics. The reasons for this assertion are:

1. By definition, ecumenism calls for unity, therefore a notion of consensus.
2. One of the programmes of the Community espouses "single identity" programmes. (While it is not unusual to have two national identities such as Irish and British, it is not clear how Corrymeela enacts its "single identity" programmes).
3. According to Smootha's thesis, cultural pluralism *does* translate into the segregation of institutions (schools, churches and neighbourhoods).

To sum up, structural pluralism is deficient when all the actors, such as pressure or lobby groups, trade unions, peak bodies and other institutions are excluded from the political process.

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[87] Ibid. p. 78.

5.8.3 Figgis's notion of the Church challenging the State

Figgis begins his study by referring to the Italian aphorism *Libera Chiesa in Libero Stato*, (a Free Church in a Free State), which is meant to sum up the ideal of statesmanship 'for the solution of the perennial problem of the two powers'.[88] This concept has some resonance with the 1937 Irish Constitution that de Valera drafted under the rubric of the 'special position of the Catholic Church'. However, Figgis makes his following assertion:

> Christian holiness is not only never [sic] achieved in perfection, but it is far less nearly and less frequently achieved than the ethical ideals of Pagans or Mohammedans [sic]. [89]

According to the above, Figgis is making an admission of the facts; non-Christians are capable of 'creating 'an ethical or virtuous social arrangement. Therefore, it follows, Protestants and Catholics as organised religions, are not exclusively ordained to create a peaceful and conciliatory arrangement in a society such as Northern Ireland. If we follow Figgis's above argument, non-adherents, or even atheists are able to reconcile. Furthermore, the laity or the secular sphere can be instrumental in either creating or resolving conflict. However, the Hibernian case is more complex in that whilst the clergy are not bearers of arms[90] , but the competing ideology (dogma), which they represent or preach, is the protagonist of conflict and violence. It is not religious dogma

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[88] Figgis, J. N., *Churches in the Modern State*, (London: Longmans, Green and Co.,1914), p. 3.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid. By way of illustration here, it is of note to point out extreme behaviour, which can be found in such a phenomenon as fundamentalism. A Protestant clergyman, who is also a senior member of the paramilitary group, The Red Hand Defenders was charged with possession of explosives with intent to endanger life. He and another man were arrested after a pipe bomb exploded in a vehicle outside Dungannon, County Tyrone.
Source: Murphy, C., "Preacher due in Court on Bomb Charges", in *The Irish Times on the Web* <http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/ireland /1999/1029/north6.htm>.
Sighted October 29, 1999. By the same token, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher notes in her autobiography of the Father Patrick Ryan case. Ryan, a non-practicing Catholic priest was well known in the security service as a terrorist. He played a significant part in the Provisional IRA's links with Libya and avoided extradition from Belgium in 1988 for charges of conspiracy to murder and explosives offences. See Thatcher, M., *Margaret Thatcher: The Downing Street Years*, (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), p. 413.

alone, or a denomination that is mobilised as a society within the greater society we call the State, but rather political parties are mobilised with religious labelling or identity.

There is an element of truth in Figgis's study when he argues:

> [T]hat we are divided from our adversaries by questions of principle, not of detail; that the principle is concerned not with the details of ecclesiastical privilege or with the special position of an Established Church, but with the very nature of the corporate life of men, and therefore with the true nature of the State.[91]

However, 'the corporate life of men' (and women) is *not* dependent on the Church. It may however, be the view of Church hierarchy, because such a relationship intrinsically gives the Church the power it needs in order to survive as an institution, and as an instrument of moral order. Thus, theoretically at least, there is no democratic space for pluralism within the Church. 'True' pluralism is often manifested by dissent. We have cited above clerics like Wilson, O'Fiaich and even Reverend Paisley could fit this mould of dissension. In the case of Paisley, he founded the Free Presbyterian Church in 1951, which in my view is not only a manifestation of a splinter group, but also an expression of dissent. The Free Presbyterian Church was founded in protest against ecumenism and alleged apostasy in Irish Presbyterianism. Although it may have broken away from the major Presbyterian Church, there are several other instances of splinter group formation in both unionist and republican communities. But, the point is, splinter groups broadly share the same political objective as their larger associate bodies, whether it be unionism or republicanism and are all divided 'from [their] adversaries in questions of principle'. Moreover, in the Protestant community, splinter groups among other factions have demonstrated the phenomenon of fragmentation of Protestant identity.

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[91] Figgis, J.N., *Churches in the Modern State*, op. cit. pp. 49-50.

Interestingly, Figgis goes on to argue the following:

> In Church matters, now that the conflict is passing from one on matters of ritual to questions which concern the deepest facts of social life, we shall have many willing to make common cause with us who previously were disposed to be contemptuous of what appeared a mere partisan conflict... .[F]ree Churches are not so free as they supposed, so long as this doctrine of State omnipotence remains unconquered.[92]

Indeed, we can concur with the ecumenical movement's notion, in that the conflict has passed from issues about ritual. But, in spite of the *multiplicity* of denominations in Northern Ireland, a paradox arises when on the one hand there is a call for unity, and on the other, these denominations continue to maintain exclusivity. This is contrary to the above definition of pluralism, as argued by Connolly. Moreover, despite Figgis's view of the State as being omnipotent, in Western liberal democratic arrangements, pluralism, and therefore in instances of dissent, are also part of the democratic space. Finally, it should be noted, although briefly, the schism in the Church that began in 1499 was in essence dissent against the Church of Rome. It was the genesis of religious pluralism in the Christian world.

5.9 Does ecumenism undermine pluralism?

The following analysis has ramifications for global aspects of the sacred sphere, but in any event, it does not lose its relevance in the context of Northern Ireland. As Hill points out, Catholic bishops are unwilling to embrace the demands of a genuinely pluralistic society in the Republic of Ireland. It follows; their obvious reluctance to embrace pluralism will continue to be an overriding concern of Protestants in the face of the complex issue of future relations between the North and the Republic.[93]

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[92] Ibid. p. 50.
[93] Hill, T. P., Church, State and Bishops in Ireland, *America*, op. cit. p. 30.

Let us begin by referring to an assumption made by ecclesiology, in that secular humanism leads to human affairs taking on an exaggerated form. Or put another way, ecclesiastical teaching maintains spiritualism is an antidote for the difficulties of this life. First and foremost, the above is based on the existence of God. The consequence of this, leads us to ask the questions: What constitutes Christianity, and who is Christ? Is he God? Indeed, these are questions or topics of discussion elsewhere, but for present purposes; I will remain within the parameters of this analysis, one that focuses on Christian unity. However, if ecumenism does exist as a dynamic, then it follows, there is a consensus on the works and teachings of Christ. Peace, is but one tenet of Christ. Be that as it may, it should be borne in mind dissensus is crucial in a pluralistic arrangement. Consequently, this is also paramount in a democratic arrangement.

Historically, however, conflict (including wars) has characterised the behaviour of Christians and peace has been made as a part of secular humanism, but not by the hierarchies of Rome, Mecca or Canterbury. Thus, the above prompts the question of whether human secularism is exaggerated as previously claimed. Moreover, the political process determines the history of societies. Religion is but a part of the historical process.

In order to unravel the question of ecumenism and its implications for pluralism, we need to revise some aspects of Vatican II's consequences for ecumenism. More specifically, how does the Second Council's agenda translate into pastoral realities? Firstly, the Vatican II documents were statements of principle and guidelines for renewal of the Church. The implementation of the above is not an easy process because one has to take into account local history. Another factor is the multiplicity of views about what Vatican II did, in other words official and unofficial interpretations by

individual theologians and commentators. At best, Martins maintains Vatican II had some confusing effects, and at worst disorienting some priests, such as those who left the priesthood and married.[94] An extreme case is that of Archbishop Lefebvre in Switzerland who considered ecumenism to be evil.[95] Hans Küng was dismissed as a Catholic theologian because he was considered to be too humanist and incorrect in his interpretations of Catholic 'truths'.[96]

Vatican II also brought about changes of how individuals saw the authority of the Roman Catholic Church. For instance, *Humanae Vitae*, the document on contraception, resulted in some priests telling people they could follow their own conscience in matters of contraception.[97] In brief, however, it is *against Catholic moral teaching*. On this issue alone, I argue, divisions will occur in Christian communities where there is an antipathy towards Catholicism. Yet, at the same time the above study by Drew indicates a decline in the Catholic Church's authority, in that attempts to press civil laws that reinforce canon law are failing in the face of Europeanisation. Moreover, in Northern Ireland, where some Protestants view the Republic as a papist state, such attitudes are further compounded by the conservative and authoritarian nature of the Catholic Church. This point cannot be underestimated. The latter, by its own nature and ideology, fuels the notion of Protestants as being a community under "siege". At the same time, it should be noted the Corrymeela Community aims to dispel the idea of Protestants being under "siege".[98]

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[94] Father Joseph Martins is a Roman Catholic priest and he is a part of the University of Tasmania's chaplaincy. The information used in this section is the result of an informal discussion with Father Martins on November 8 1999, rather than a formal interview.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Fowler, C., "The Corrymeela Community and its Programme Work", op. cit. p. 31.

Moreover, by way of clarification, some comment is required as to the way the Catholic Church sees itself (as among other religions). Basically, there are three levels: faith, worship (union with God), and institution (hierarchy as a service organisation). In those three levels there are differences between the different religions, although they do agree fundamentally, that is a common faith, as noted above. The second level, that is, in worship or religious practice, the different religions are not in agreement. For instance, according to the Vatican, only the Orthodox Church shares the understanding of the Mass. Thirdly, the organisation or hierarchical structure is different among the religions. In brief, the structure of the Catholic Church is essentially based on a monarchical system, with the pope as its head.

Nonetheless, the question remains: how does the above relate to the notion of pluralism? Or how, it does not relate to pluralism? Take for instance, baptism. Baptism is also a part of Christian unity in that most Christian churches use it and the Catholic Church recognises the baptism by many other Churches.[99] However, if the Catholic Church takes the above position regarding the sacrament of baptism, then it does not necessarily alleviate the anxieties of Protestants who maintain a primacy of conscience in matters of marriage and family.[100] Placing other issues aside, such as language, culture and territory, the above Catholic dogma must certainly contribute in part at least, to a conflictual environment at grass roots level. In other words, in this instance, Catholicism does not satisfy Connolly's theoretical blueprint of pluralism when he argues that in order to have a pluralist ethic, 'there is no single purpose or good that deserves the highest support of all rational people'.[101] Thus it seems political pluralism is undermined. At the same time, however,

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[99] See *Directory for the Application of Principles and Norms of Ecumenism*, (London: CTS Publications, 1993), pp. 53-56.
[100] See O'Malley, P., *Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), p. 186.
[101] Connolly, W. E., in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, op. cit. p. 376.

Martins argues that 'if pluralism is radicalised too much, you end up with relativism '.[102]

Moreover, as ecumenism advances Martins argues, it should reduce pluralism in the 'essentials' of Christianity. Faith and salvation are fundamental or 'essentials' in Christian teaching, and are shared at the organisational level among the different confessions. In the 'non-essentials' of Christianity, variety (for instance theological opinion, devotional practices, cultural elements, aspects of church organisation and structure) is not only permissible, but also desirable.[103] Celibacy and the ordination of women are issues that stand in the way of pluralism. The analogy, in the words of a university chaplain is:

> On the matter of women priests, it is not that the Church does not want to have women priests, it can't. You cannot celebrate Mass with beer, it has to be wine.[104]

In other words, according to the Catholic Church's teaching essential features of the sacraments are determined by Christ, not by sociological determinants or human preferences.

Martins asserts, 'some pluralism on non-essential matters means that the Church is committed to religious freedom'. That is, the Church cannot use coercion. Moreover, the Church maintains that a person can embrace the truth freely. But, this does not mean that it does not matter what a person believes. Again, it can be argued here that the above presents certain ambiguities. On the one hand the Catholic Church is saying that religion should be embraced freely and according to the individual's conscience, but on the other hand, it

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[102] Martins, J., op. cit. It should be noted however, in this instance Martins refers specifically to the concepts of freedom and truth.
[103] Martins, J., op. cit., November 8, 1999. Take for instance, the concept of 'inculturation'. In some African countries, Mass is celebrated by incorporating traditional indigenous choreography.
[104] I bid. Discussion with Martins, J., November 8, 1999.

claims that 'not all religions are equally valid because it would betray Christ'.[105] Yet it is claimed, the pope is the instrument of ecumenism.[106] According to Martins, the pope is not there to enforce opinions; he is the focus of unity. He is open to suggestion of new ways in which the pope can be a servant of the Church and even among non-Christians. (At the time of writing in March of this year, Pope John Paul II made a historic visit to the Holy Land, not only for spiritual reasons, but also as an attempt to reconcile the Catholic Church with the Jewish faith, and with Islam).

The question that needs to be asked here is: What does this all mean to the Republican or Loyalist paramilitaries or terrorists. I strongly argue very little, if anything at all. This is not to say that all terrorists are void of some spiritual dimension, or capable of 'redeeming' themselves. For instance, US Senator George Mitchell chairman of the Peace Process comments:

> I think one of the great lessons out of this whole process, which may be incidental to the result but nonetheless important in human terms, is the capacity for human redemption. The ability of people who have made serious tragic errors, violent errors, committed brutal atrocities, to accept responsibility, to be punished for it, to accept that punishment and then change --- genuinely change.[107]

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[105] Ibid. Martins, J.

[106] Encyclical Letter Pope John Paul II, *Ut Unum Sint* (That They May All Be One), Australian edition, (Homebush: Society of St Paul Publishers, 1995), pp. 98-100.

[107] Source: *The Loyalists*, Episode 3, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 1999, transmission by Special Broadcasting Service Australia (SBS-TV) on February 27, 2000. By way of contrast, if not a contradiction of Senator Mitchell's claim, former IRA member Eamon Collins among others renounced the use of violence in an interview with George Negus in the television documentary, *Foreign Correspondent.* Ironically, a few weeks after this interview, Collins died in what seemed to be an execution-style of killing by the IRA. Source: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, (ABC -TV), *Foreign Correspondent,* transmitted on May 25, 1998. Moreover, in the above BBC documentary, it also highlighted an active anti-Catholic sentiment expressed in clubhouses around the Protestant Shankill and Portadown areas. Since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, crimes of violence continue to occur in both communities. Although these instances of 'rehabilitation' are admirable, it should be borne in mind, they represent only a small number of all the paramilitary personnel. No matter how some media reports may appear, it is difficult to assess the level of criminal violence as being distinct from political violence. For instance, it is reported that there have been 1,000 paramilitary beatings since the start of the cease-fires. Which cease fire remains unclear in the following media report. See Thornton, C,. "1,000 paramilitary beatings since start of ceasefires", *Belfast Telegraph On Line,* November 4, 1998, <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/cgi-bin/ArchiveSearch.cgi>.

Nonetheless, the Corrymeela Community in its endeavour for 'peace and reconciliation' is ready for the challenges the task presents. The Community's commitment to the above Christian message is remarkable. It is of note, a 'war' situation such as in Northern Ireland during the past thirty years, together with social justice issues (unemployment and deprivation), creates an environment for killing and violence. War entails killing people. Social justice issues can serve as a rationalisation for violence. Even when some theorists such as Walker[108] or Clutterbuck[109] equate terrorism with criminal banditry, one must also consider the psychopathology of the terrorist(s). Although their political leaders may manipulate the terrorists, the danger of their activities not only instils a feeling of romanticism (freedom fighter mentality), but also a sense of euphoria, perverted as it may be. The lure of money exacted from extortion rackets, robbery and so forth, can be transferred into a sense of *power*.

However, there remains an umbilical connection between paramilitary organizations, their political aspirations and their religious labels. All together, these characteristics have to capacity to impinge on the collective mental state of a community. In brief, they can outweigh any influence from Corrymeela. To sum up, a former Belfast photographer writes about his experience as a former Community member:

Sighted November 30, 1999.
Note: In some of the literature, the word 'ceasefire' is written as one word, but in other references, it is spelt as two separate words.

[108] See Walker, C., *The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 4-5. However, Walker makes the distinction between 'political ends' and the use of violence by referring to Section 14 (1) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1984, which distinguishes 'political violence' from 'ordinary' criminal acts.

[109] See also Clutterbuck, R., "Does Terrorism Work?" in Paul Smoker, Ruth Davies and Barbara Munske (ed.), *A Reader in Peace Studies*, (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1990), particularly p. 61.

> Corrymeela is a good organisation, but where I see it fails, and as some one who has attended it when I was a kid, is the fact that you are taking groups of people from different religions and putting them in a neutral environment for a couple of days and when they return to their own communities there is no backup system in place to continue the healing process. It would be like getting members of an Aboriginal Group and a group of Racists on a two day holiday together and after that time letting the Racists carry on as before without following up on the exercise.[110]

The above comment has resonance with my critique of an experience cited by Doob and Foltz in their study titled, "The Belfast Workshop: An Application of Group Techniques to a Destructive Conflict".[111] In brief, this study concerns a group of fifty-six people mimicking group therapy and focusing on conflict resolution. Thus, this workshop, like Corrymeela is in a sense an artificial environment with controls. On the one hand it resembles the above photographer's experience in that when the group is "discharged" from such an environment. The realities, which in this case are the *political* realities of violence, troops on the streets, no provincial power-sharing government, or its collapse, and so forth, do not have the controls noted above. Yet, on the other hand it must be noted the above is only *one* view expressed by the photographer. It would not be an exaggeration to use the analogy of a 'therapeutic community' when we consider Corrymeela's other activity/programmes. For instance, the Family and Community Work programme includes interventions such as providing "respite". It 'concentrates upon working with people, in which individuals can relax, enjoy... and look to what the future might hold for them'.[112] In recent years

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[110] Sean 'A' is a photographic journalist living outside of Belfast and his work includes coverage of political developments, both at Stormont and within the province. Email correspondence from Sean 'A' to Ted Cichon November 9, 1999. Electronic mailing details suppressed at the request of the above person.

[111] See Doob L.W., and Foltz, W.J., "The Belfast Workshop: An Application of Group Techniques to a Destructive Conflict", in *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* September 1973, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 489- 512.

[112] Fowler, C.," The Corrymeela Community and its Programme Work", Part 1, prepared July 1995, op. cit p. 34.

Corrymeela's support network has expanded to include follow-up of individuals and families in their own communities.

The above activities are not limited only to peace oriented groups. Similar interventions exist in other organizations that may or may not be necessarily church based. State agencies can intervene in times of a household crisis, whether it is assistance with seeking accommodation, or protecting a family against violence. Violence in many western societies is not political or sectarian in nature. Nevertheless, the metaphor that is found in the medical model when describing a 'sick society' need not be lost in the case of Northern Ireland.[113] Human catastrophes, such as the Great Irish Famine have impacted upon the national psyche. But briefly, in terms of the Irish conflict, bitter ideological prescriptions in a divided community have resulted in fratricide, together with the phenomena of collective grief, collective fear and generalised paranoia.

Theoretically the notion of a healing community is appealing, but the reality in the metropolis is that of a Hobbesian notion 'of every man against every man' and, the 'causes of quarrel', in human nature 'maketh men invade for gain...for safety ... and for reputation'.[114] Indeed, the paramilitary organizations on both sides within Ulster have long histories, traditions and in their perceptions there are reputations to protect. As long as either or each community, Catholic or Protestant, claims to be defending itself against the

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[113] In 1973 Cawte proposed the term *sick society* in a study referring to the Aboriginal Australians. Moreover, Cawte was referring to 'a society that has a high amount of psychiatric disabilities, as a result of exceptional stress from ecological and economical hardships, natural and human-produced disaster, disturbance of domesticity, interference with vital strivings and social fragmentation'. It is argued here, that not only Cawte's analysis has a similar application in the Northern Ireland situation, but also if we consider Bostock's concept of collective mental states, then collective behavioural phenomena, such as collective grief, the latter has been a hallmark of contemporary Irish history.
See Bostock W.W., "Disturbed Collective Mental States: Their Impact on Human Behaviour", in *Perspectives; A Mental Health Magazine*, November-December 1999, <http://mentalhelp.net/perspectives/articles/art11o119992.htm> p. 3.
Sighted December 21, 1999.

[114] Hobbes, T., *Leviathan*, introduction by Minogue, K.R., (London: Dent, 1973), p. 64.

other, hard line Loyalists or hard line Republicans are not likely to surrender their weapons, let alone reach reconciliation.

The latter instance of reputation is particularly valid in the context of negotiations involving former US Senator George Mitchell. In other words, the decommissioning of weapons by the IRA, translates into *surrender* for the republicans. Therefore, they consider their reputation is at stake here. However, it can be argued, the reputation of both protagonists in this quarrel are at stake here, that is, the leaderships of Adams and Trimble. Interestingly, under these circumstances, an agreement between Sinn Féin and the UPP on the above issue is possible, no matter the amount of compromise that may contribute to such an agreement. It seems under these circumstances, or specific agendas, pluralism is either paused, or considered not to be an option, especially when one party (the UUP) insists on whilst there are guns, there is no government. Meaning, a power-sharing government will not be formed unless the IRA decommissions its weapons. Thus, with due respect, the Corrymeela Community pales into insignificance as an actor, because neither the Community, nor the Churches are able to take the gun out of Irish politics. In brief, it is the role of a constitutional government to remove the guns, rather than canon law in an increasingly secularised society. However, by the same token, it is the moral responsibility of a constitutional government to allow the circumstances for a civil society to flourish.

5.10 If pluralism is undermined, what are the implications for a civil society in Northern Ireland?

Firstly, let us recapitulate. Hitherto now, the historical data shows mostly an existence of the notion of a coalition between the Church and State, but at the same time, the relationship has soured when the circumstances were either those of political or popular dissensus, or the consequences resulting in

conflict. Briefly, as Marx noted, 'religion is the opium of the people'. Thus, in the case of post-war Poland, the Catholic Church was the opium for its flock during the communist regime. The coalition between the Vatican and Lech Walesa is a notable example. We have also noted the Catholic clergy's support and involvement in the Civil Rights movement in Belfast and Derry. Thus, in the Irish experience, Catholicism became the opium, if we use the Marxian concept here. In essence, the relationship between the Church and the State is perpetuated in the Northern Irish conflict. What is not readily acknowledged by commentators of *both* denominations is that the Protestant and Catholic Churches are symbiotically fused with the political landscape in Northern Ireland. The Church too is a political animal. If the Church takes a stand on one side or the other, or takes a stand not to take a stand, it is still a stand---positive, negative or neutral. As Father Gilbert Padilla puts it:

> If we seek to muzzle the church politically, we stand in favour of the ruling regime --- just or unjust. If we allow the church to speak out politically, we take a stand for or against that regime. Either way, the church will be involved, even if by silence.[115]

Perhaps for propagandistic purposes, although unintended, the focus is greater on the Catholic Church's radical conservative position because Irish national identity is so strongly coupled with Catholicism. Commentators such as O'Toole dispute this. Nevertheless, the notion of a Catholic identity in turn impinges on the profile of say the IRA, because of its objective of a united Ireland. But, the means of the campaign by the IRA for a united Ireland as an end in itself, does not equate to a papist state. In light of Sinn Féin's manifesto, *Saol Nua* (A New Way of Life)[116] as being based on a secular, socialist

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[115] Padilla, G., "Opinion" in *National Catholic Reporter*, August 1, 1986, Vol. 22, No. 36, page number not cited in hardcopy.
[116] Republican Sinn Féin Homepage,
<http://www. irlnet.com/sinnfein>.

democratic platform may also exacerbate the Catholic Church's anxieties. Moreover, terrorist groups do not have a mandate, nor legitimacy, but the people do, in that the people elect their representatives, be they Unionist or Nationalist. Therefore, does the Catholic Church through its radical conservative position undermine the notion of a civil society? Does the Corrymeela Community have a role in civil society? Traditionally, the Church has been outspoken on social justice issues. In the Northern Ireland situation, it seems there exists a perception that the Catholic Church has been a voice for the republican issues, even in matters of social justice. The Corrymeela Community, however, ought be viewed as being neutral. But at the same time it is an actor in civil society.

5.11 Corrymeela against the odds of sectarianism: The final analysis

In the above, we have examined the variables, which exist in the same parameters of the conflictual environment as the Corrymeela Community. In other words, there exists an antagonism of not only an ethnic conflict (to use a shorthand), but also a sectarian force against Corrymeela's ecumenical aim of peace and reconciliation. A variable or a concept, which is a salient part of the dynamics of Northern Ireland's conflict, is --- *anti-Catholicism.* Certainly, this concept has been alluded to in the course of this study, but its force and content has not been fully understood. Although this concept is often cited, its analysis has been only partial or omitted altogether. Anti-Catholicism is as much a sociological process as a theological dispute about doctrine, which is critical to the self-defining identity of certain Protestants.[117] Thus, it can be argued here that the force of anti-Catholicism has the potential to overwhelm

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Sighted August 19, 1997.

any pacifistic overtures or endeavours, such as those of the Corrymeela Community. As Brewer and Higgins argue, anti-Catholicism 'becomes used as a resource in group mobilisation' and continues to thrive in a setting where 'its reception is amongst an audience or primary constituency'.[118]

Moreover, anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland is a form of theology linked with political loyalty, economic privilege and cultural superiority.[119] Thus religious difference, which is critical to Protestants, stands in reinforcement of ethnic identity and thus represents the patterns of differentiation in an ethnically structured society. Anti-Catholicism is mobilised to define the boundaries and the groups involved in competition over power, wealth and status.[120] It is mobilised to regulate and control that competition, and is used in social closure to defend the monopoly of the Protestant ethnic group.

The mobilisation of Protestants to defend their socio-economic and political position has already been rehearsed in this study. In brief, the above are manifested by discrimination against Catholics and the ideological antagonism between Unionism and Republicanism. However, it is in times of 'political threat and instability, conservative evangelism acted as the sacred canopy'.[121] This has long historical roots in ethno-national traditions in Northern Ireland. But as Brewer and Higgins point out, anti-Catholic language can be called a 'discursive formation' and it permeates deep within Northern Irish popular culture.[122] The effectiveness of anti-Catholic rhetoric in the past is also a current phenomenon, if not intensified amongst opponents

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[117] Brewer, J.D., and Higgins, G.I., " Understanding anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland in *British Journal of Sociology*, May 1999, Vol. 33 No. 2, p. 237.
[118] Ibid. p. 238.
[119] Ibid. p. 239.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid.p. 240.
[122] Ibid.p. 241.

of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, a peace process that could not be trusted.[123] This is the environment in which the Corrymeela Community has assigned itself to the mission of bringing about peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. The potential for the Community's success may be retarded, because not only is anti-Catholicism highly mobilised, but also 'anti-Catholicism comes with its own immutable and in-built legitimation'.[124] Its legitimation, according to the Protestants, comes from God's Scriptural injunction to oppose doctrinal error. [125]

Brewer and Higgins identify four modes of anti-Catholicism. They distinguish between 'passive anti-Catholicism' as one mode, but in the case of 'active anti-Catholicism', it is distinguishable by covenantal, secular, and Pharisaic modes.[126] The covenantal mode is based on ideas from the Old Testament, whereby God promises untold blessings, *including land*, to a chosen people so long as they remain faithful to Him.[127](Emphasis added). This mode emphasizes how Protestantism has a divine mission in Ireland to save the country from the Roman Catholic Church.[128] There is an overlap between the covenantal mode and the Pharisaic mode, as politics and theology are interwoven, with the Scripture being used to support union with Britain. Moreover, advocates of these modes are found among conservative and fundamentalist Protestants, sometimes calling themselves 'Bible Protestants', 'in contrast to those Protestants whom they see as using the 'Protestant' self-appellation solely as a political identity'.[129]

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[123] Ibid. The example of anti-Catholicism Brewer and Higgins use to illustrate the point is, Prime Minister Tony Blair is married to a Catholic. Ibid. pp. 239-240.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid. p. 242.
[127] Ibid. p. 243. It is notable here, the resonance the Protestants' faith has with the people of Israel, who also claimed they were God's chosen people in the Old Testament. This concept received detailed analysis in Chapter two.
[128] Brewer J.D. and Higgins G.I., *British Journal of Sociology*, op. cit. p. 243.
[129] Ibid. p. 245.

Perhaps one of the most rigid if not disturbing aspects of these modes, as part of an ideology, is found in the notion that 'since Catholicism is unchristian and seeks to annihilate Protestantism, no meaningful relationship with Catholics or their Church can ever be countenanced'.[130] However, if anti-Catholicism is equated with it as being a form of hatred, then surely, such a posture is also *unchristian*. Thus in these circumstances, Corrymeela is faced with a seemingly insurmountable task which is further compounded by the secular mode of anti-Catholicism. In other words, not only is the secular mode based on political ideas supporting the Union, but also, this mode includes those militant Loyalists whose paramilitary activities are not without theological conviction. To be sure, there is little theological content in the secular mode, but the *language* of anti-Catholicism is based on an overlap of covenantal and Pharisaic rhetoric. Nevertheless, the language of anti-Catholicism become artefacts found in slogans such as 'No surrender'; no Pope here'; 'the whore of Babylon'; 'Taigs out'; 'for God and Ulster' and, 'Ulster will fight and Ulster is right'. This form of ideology is reproduced and is vital to the constituted Protestant national identity. Thus, Corrymeela's programme of ecumenical education among other activities is vital in socialising a younger generation towards tolerance, understanding and peaceful co-existence. Moreover, there are two significant factors that cannot be ignored here. One is the statutory requirement that Northern Ireland's schools integrate Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU). This is a provision for children to learn about other religions. Secondly, there are communities in Northern Ireland where Protestants and Catholics *do* live in peaceful co-existence. Omagh and Poyntzpass are two towns that come to mind. Therefore, not only do the above have the potential to reinforce

[130] Ibid.

Corrymeela's efforts, but also, the above factors must weaken the force of anti-Catholicism.

Finally, the Pharisaic mode is called such because it has ideas reminiscent of the Pharisees. According to Brewer and Higgins:

> Its advocates believe that they know the Biblical truth and have the right doctrine. Adherents of this mode believe the Catholic doctrine is in error, and evangelism of Catholics is stressed in order to bring them back to Biblical truth, which is why relationship and dialogue are permitted with Catholics in ecumenical settings.[131]

Although the Corrymeela Community is an ecumenical setting, it is not subject to the dictates noted above. Rather, it is suggested here, its mission is faced with a language and a cognitive phenomenon of anti-Catholicism that is 'closed, immutable and resistant to change'.[132] For Corrymeela to have an impact or some measure of success, this would mean an almost complete change in attitude across the province. In brief, this would also mean a complete "re-socialisation" of Northern Irish society and popular culture, and in view of the Community's limitations noted above, the aims of the Community may only be realised in the very long term. The fact is, this is what is required, and a pivotal part of this process is reconciliation. As one Shankill Road resident puts it as a metaphor:

> Expecting the IRA to decommission their arms is like offering the people of Northern Ireland a red herring. What is needed, is the decommissioning of the mind.[133]

Thus, the above must be seen as a positive attitude. Indeed, such an approach *is* shared by a number of Catholics and Protestants within and without the

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[131] Ibid. p. 246.
[132] Ibid. p. 248.
[133] Radio Deutsche Welle, (English Language News Service) transmitted by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio PNN, February 20, 2000.

Corrymeela Community. However, it requires a cohesive organisation to work towards peace and reconciliation. The Corrymeela Community has this cohesion. Not only because it is a Christian ideal, but also it is the Community's commitment to an end that is for the greater good.

5.12 Conclusion

There is in a sense that the above study could be reduced to one basic question: Why do some organizations succeed and not others? But that perhaps would be too reductionist, because the interplay of circumstances such as those accentuated by leadership prowess or charisma, nationalist aspirations, cultural nationalism, economic nationalism, territoriality, financial viability, and so forth, are important variables. In any event, this chapter's primary focus has been an evaluation of the Corrymeela Community as an actor in a divided society. Inevitably, there is also the sense of returning to fundamental definitions of religion and politics, and how we return to the familiar concept of allocating resources. The Church is not excluded from this process. The religious sphere reflects the political sphere in that it too has competing ideologies and therefore mobilises them. Moreover, the religious sphere also enacts social policy, which also belongs to the state, such as health, education, and welfare, to name but few. Education, or perhaps more precisely, socialisation, and to a certain degree, welfare are also programmes of the Corrymeela Community.

This chapter has also argued the case for the role of secular politics in creating the institutions of just and democratic government. At the same time, the Catholic Church maintains its ambiguous position, while the Protestants' situation is far more fragmented. Moreover, the respective Churches share a political relationship with their members in Ulster's polity. Nevertheless, among the political actors, the Corrymeela Community finds itself posited

outside the political process in Northern Ireland, but at the same time calling for peace and reconciliation in the province. In a sense, the place of the Community in relation to the rest of Northern Ireland's society, sits as just a *part* of the *whole*. The Community is on the periphery of the political process. Yet, ironically it can be said that the *whole* as an ideal would mean an environment of peace and reconciliation across both sides of Ulster's community. However, the existence of ecumenism or an ecumenical organisation as noted above, not only creates practical difficulties in itself, but there is also a *theoretical tension* associated with the concept of pluralism itself. Rescher and Sartori have demonstrated this difficulty.

Therefore, it is not for conceptual reasons that the success of the Corrymeela Community is challenged here, but rather, the practical ones of its limitations to penetrate the institutional political process, thereby more actively mobilising its Christian message. Moreover, realistically, the variables of renegade paramilitary splinter groups, ongoing social justice issues, and the psychopathology of individuals or groups of individuals may continue to obstruct a consensual and a pluralistic environment. The Corrymeela Community's limited resources and mobility may be outweighed by the resources of anti-Catholicism. But this phenomenon should not be overstated. Anti-Catholicism and for that matter, anti-Protestantism, are both anti-pluralistic and anti-ecumenical. This level of antipathy may be difficult to reconcile with the popular will for peace expressed in the May 22 1998 referendum. Yet, in spite of these difficulties (theoretical and practical), which have been examined in this study, the Community continues to grow since its origins in 1965. Corrymeela's aspirations, as an ecumenical organisation are *unambiguous*. That is, the concept of peace and reconciliation is unambiguous.

To sum up, the Corrymeela Community may prove more beneficial in the long term, than in the short term after, the competing parties at Stormont demonstrate a successful power-sharing arrangement. But at the same time, by the nature of the Community's activities and programmes, short-term benefits would be experienced by those who have availed of themselves of the above. For this reason, the Community needs to promote itself, not only in the metropolitan areas, but also throughout the six counties. It is then that there is a greater chance of inclusive membership and a crossover between the two communities, which in a 'trickle-down' effect can influence collective behaviour in the religious sphere.

Conclusions

The relationship between the Church and a society is often difficult to determine or define. Relations can range from the ambiguous or inconsistent and detached to the clearly defined and obvious. The type and closeness of the relationship can be influenced by many factors, including war, conflict, oppression, social injustice and peace. In the cases of Christianity, Islam and Judaism, there are claims of uniqueness or exclusiveness, whereby these respective religions believe that they have the key to salvation. At the same time however, the above religions' relationships with the political sphere is closely linked, as they often overlap. They overlap in terms of policy, ethnicity, social justice issues, territory, identity and nationality. For present purposes, these are rather broad assertions. We will discuss these assertions in the following.

In the first instance, this study defined the terms 'politics' and 'religion'. We observed that in the ancient period, Plato and Aristotle defined the early political arrangement as the *polis*, where participation in the polis required citizenship. The Enlightenment theorists who formulated the concept of the social contract refined the concept of participation. In brief, the concept of participation was later distilled to what is termed as representative democracy. What is important here, although the concept of politics may be considered as an evolutionary process, and adapts to the changes in society, which in turn can be regarded as a metanarrative of human history. But the central tenets in a definition of politics remain unchanged. That is, even in the contemporary period, the allocation of scarce resources leads to inequality that leaves some individuals, or groups feeling dissatisfied. Therefore, it follows; politics is intrinsically a conflictual phenomenon. In brief, we

adopted an allocative theory of politics, rather than a systems theory in ascertaining a working definition of the term 'politics'. However, it must be borne in mind, other definitions of politics received more detailed discussion in Chapter one.

Certainly, in order to allocate these scarce resources, a government or a ruling body needs to carry out a policy to perform this task. A policy may be at a micro level or at a macro level. In any case, a conflictual phenomenon can exist. In the former instance, allocation of resources such as public housing, employment opportunities, education and cultural capital are some examples of the resources, which may be distributed unequally. Thus, it is safe to say, this has been the case in Northern Ireland. But this may be the consequence of a macro level policy such as colonisation by a greater power that institutionalises these inequalities, or, simply the cohabitation with an ethnically different minority. Thus, in the contemporary period we have witnessed new groupings enter the political sphere as a means to achieve more equitable distribution of resources, rights and so forth. These new groupings may take the form of single issue or minor parties, lobby groups and non-government organisations. In brief, individuals or groups may choose to mobilise themselves to achieve their aspirations by constitutional means. Moreover, this approach is manifested at a micro level of politics, but the *modus operandi* or agenda may differ. In other words, the objectives may include those of the micro level, but the methods may include violence to achieve aspirations such as self-determination.

Struggles of self-determination, or in the case of Northern Ireland, where by accidents of history, there are two conflicting groups: the minority nationalist group which seeks a united Ireland, and a majority unionist group that wants to remain a part of the United Kingdom. The complexity of this struggle is

exacerbated when religious labelling is introduced to this discussion. In specific terms, these labels refer to the ideologies of Catholicism and Protestantism. Thus, before attempting an analysis of the relationship between the Church and the conflict in Northern Ireland, Chapter one defines the term 'religion'. Moreover, not only it clarifies the above faiths in terms of organised religions, but also distinguishes them, among others, from the contemporary phenomena of quasi-religions cults, sects and New Age spiritualism. At the same time, all of the above occur in a global environment where the polarity of secularisation and fundamentalism, are a part of sociological and political processes. Thus, Durkheim's definition of religion as:

> A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden --- beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.[1]

Durkheim's definition of religion remains useful and sufficient for the purposes of this study.

Again, Chapter one discussed the anthropological, psychological and sociological contributions that led us to understand the meaning of the term, religion, in this study. However, our study revealed difficulties in defining religion and our survey noted the intervention by the federal governments of Germany and Australia, both having to define religion when the Church of Scientology challenged respective constitutional legislation.

Moreover, we have argued that in establishing the definitions of politics and religion, they also required an analysis of the sociology of religion. In other words, a discussion was essential on the relationship between religion and

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[1] Durkheim, E., *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* 2nd ed., first published 1915, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1975), p. 47.

politics, and the relationship between the Church and State. Indeed, in many instances the relationships are used interchangeably to mean the same thing. Furthermore, a historical examination reveals the position of the ruler and his/her subjects in relation to the supernatural world. Even in the Oriental context, we observed the Chinese concept of the ruler in order to govern, needed 'a mandate from heaven'. A similar phenomenon has been observed in the Rastafarian religion centred in the Caribbean islands. On the surface, this may appear to be an anachronistic concept, but it must be borne in mind, the present English monarch is not only the head of state, but also the head of the Church of England. Yet, we can safely say, the United Kingdom is a secular state, rather than a theocratic arrangement. This is one instance among several, which demonstrate the overlap between church and state in their roles of moral order. By way of comparison, the case in the US demonstrates a situation where theoretically and constitutionally, the church and state are intended to be separate, but in practice they overlap.

By way of a historical comparative methodology, the relationship between church and state shows similarities in different cultural situations and in different political arrangements or regimes. It has been demonstrated in five separate case studies, there exists a symbiotic relationship between church and state. Thus, in the case of Ireland, this relationship is not unique. But what is important here is, in a 'Catholic nation' such as Ireland and elsewhere, the position of the Roman Catholic Church is ambiguous, inconsistent, and at times politically provocative. To be sure, it is meant here that the Catholic Church in Ireland is obedient to its centralised body, the Holy See or the Vatican in Rome.

A common thread that was found in our brief case studies discussed in Chapter two, was the relationship between the Church and the State in

conflictual or oppressive situations. At this point, the inconsistency of the Catholic Church becomes more apparent. Interestingly, during the Nazi regime, the Catholic Church not only tried to appease this regime, but also acquiesced to Hitler's Third Reich by forming a quasi-religion of *Deutschglaubich*. In other words, Christianity in this case, (Protestants and Catholics) was supplanted by a creed of German identity. This notion is not too dissimilar to the situation in Ireland during the twentieth-century. That is, Catholicism as an identity came before an Irish identity.

In the case of South Africa during the apartheid regime, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) felt that it had a messianic role. This demonstrates another instance of a religion, asserting its exclusivity. Moreover, members of the secret society, the *Broederbond,* were members of the DRC as well as influential figures in the government that formulated and executed the policy of apartheid. In brief, it can be said here the DRC colluded with an oppressive regime. But, by way of contrast, the Anglican Church in South Africa led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, spokesperson for the non-white Africans against the apartheid regime, became instrumental in the establishing of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission during the 1990s. Thus, we cannot conclude that there is uniformity in the positions taken between churches in certain conflictual situations, nor is there uniformity within a particular church or denomination.

Judaism and Islam, also share a similar phenomenon of exclusivity, although in the case of Judaism, there is a stronger focus on territory or a 'promised land'. Nonetheless, we observe a similarity between the Judaic and Protestant traditions of using Biblical sources to confirm their claims. In the case of some Protestants in Northern Ireland, it is a Pharisaic basis for their claims of territory and the distribution of resources. As noted previously, the

theoretical framework established in Chapter two, not only establishes our definitions of politics and religion, and the relationship between them, but also we can identify patterned political behaviour in the cases under investigation.

The position of the Catholic Church during the post war communist regime in Poland reflects a different stance to that of the Church's position during the Nazi regime. Notwithstanding the election of a Polish pope in 1978, the Vatican took a proactive approach against Marxism. But this does not necessarily signify an unambiguous position taken by the Roman Church. For instance, in 1979 when Pope John Paul II visited Latin America, he reprimanded El Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero.[2] The Pontiff's reprimand was not only for Romero's inclination towards 'liberation theology', but also the Pope told the archbishop 'not to exaggerate the level of persecution there'.[3] Yet, Romero was a fearless campaigner for human rights.

Our historical analysis of the relationship between religion and politics, and between Church and State in the Irish experience also reveals a number of inconsistencies, if not paradoxes. During the medieval period, the granting of Ireland to Henry II by Pope Adrian IV perhaps marks the beginning of a peculiar international relations arrangement. The geo-political position of Ireland during the Reformation period and after also facilitated the Protestant Ascendancy in what is now referred to as the British Isles. It has been argued

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[2] Source: Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC-Television), "Rivals for Paradise", Part 1 *Compass*, transmitted January 2, 2000.

[3] Ibid. Archbishop Romero was shot in his cathedral at San Salvador on March 24, 1980 while officiating at a Requiem Mass for a demonstrator killed on the streets of the capital. Moreover, the number of political murders averaged 120 a week in early 1982 and reached 5,399 for the whole year. A similar political situation existed in Nicaragua. See Palmer, A., *The Penguin Dictionary of Twentieth-Century History 1900-1991*, 4th ed., (London: Penguin Book Ltd, 1992, p. 137 and p. 300. For a detailed analysis see Jones, D.,"El Salvador Revisited: A Look at Declassified State Department Documents-Some of What the U.S. Government Knew- And When it Knew It" in *National Catholic Reporter*, September 23, 1994 Vol. 30 No. 41, pp. 17- 33.

in this dissertation, that Ireland became a "political pawn" during the continental superpowers' struggle for regional hegemony. Moreover, a religious issue was never far from the surface. In other words, both Spanish and French military strength also represented a threat to Protestantism in England. Thus it can be said, but put another way, there is a resonance here with contemporary Protestant attitudes toward the Church of Rome in the Republic of Ireland. In brief, this also reflects late nineteenth-century and beyond, perceptions by the Protestants of "Home Rule is Rome Rule". Yet, the historical evidence reveals paradoxes, in that key figures in the struggle for a united and independent Ireland were Protestants. By the same token, there is little mention of the fact, that the now celebrated Williamite victory at the Boyne, took place against a background of Pope Innocent XI undermining James II's assistance from the French, because of France's monarch Louis XIV being excommunicated.

Moreover, from about the mid nineteenth-century there is a sense of dualism or ambiguity within the Catholic Church. On the one hand, the hierarchy took a passive position toward the plight of those starving during the Great Irish Famine, and one of condemnation of the humanitarian activity of the Quakers on the other. However, it is also of note that in Chapter three the Catholic clergy at grass roots level, was seen to have a closer association with those affected by the Famine. This was not only in terms of providing comfort, but also the clergy was more politically active, notwithstanding papal decrees to the contrary.

The incidence of paradoxes in Irish history reinforces our argument of an inconsistent position of the Catholic Church. This can be evidenced by the immediate consequences of the Irish Civil War after partition in 1921. One of the main protagonists in the formation of the Irish Free State, Eamon de

Valera, was Sinn Féin president as well as a member of the IRA. Interestingly, the political party Fianna Fáil was formed from a faction of the IRA and has been the party of government for most of the period in the Republic since partition. De Valera later became the architect of the 1937 Irish Constitution, to formulate Article 44. Under Article 44 of the constitution, the State acknowledged 'the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens'.[4] Certainly, Article 44 was amended in early 1973 after a popular referendum, but it has been maintained in this study, that its perception by the Protestants in the North as an antagonistic codification that has influence to this day.

Since partition, the unionists in Northern Ireland have had a monopoly over power in the six counties. In a sense we return to the concept of majority rule. But, it should be noted, the unionists' monopoly on power did not correlate with power won through democratic means on the British mainland. Ulster, for more than fifty years experienced pseudo-democracy, compounded by the abolition of proportional representation and the absence of universal suffrage. Moreover, manipulation of the electoral boundaries by the unionists precluded the Catholic population from entering the democratic space, or representation at a government body. Thus for most of our period, the political environment in Ulster did not accommodate for a pluralistic society. Also, it has been a recurrent concern for the unionists that, any concessions made by the British government to appease the nationalist/Catholic minority in the North, have overtures of a 'sell out' of the province's unionists. This has been one of the main reasons for the fragmentation of Protestantism in the province. Protestantism has splintered in the hope that the formation of

[4] Cited by Whyte, J., in *Church and State in Modern Ireland 1923-1979,* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1980), p. 164.

subsequent groups will preserve the Union. Indeed, there is also a theological component to this phenomenon that is manifested as anti-Catholicism.

In any event, we have observed that the unionist monopoly on power, the distribution of resources and citizens' rights, led to a state of crisis in Ulster in 1968. To summarise these events, we can describe them as a campaign for social justice. Again, the position of the Catholic Church here is an ambiguous one. It is acknowledged however that Catholic priests supported the civil rights movement (CRM), but did not lead the movement. At this point, the position of the Protestant Churches begins to gain some salience in their relationship to the conflict in Northern Ireland. In other words, we witness the early signs of inter-denominational cooperation in relation to the grievances of the Catholics in Northern Ireland. At the same time however, it should be borne in mind inequalities also exist among the Protestant population, mainly those of class.

In any event, as the CRM gained momentum during the late 1960s and early 1970s, advances in technology, such as television brought the conflict in Northern Ireland to a worldwide audience. It demonstrated what unionism stood for. A similar phenomenon is found in the coverage of the Vietnam War, in that the media aroused condemnation of American presence there, in different parts of the world. However, it can be argued here, that given the religious labelling of the Irish conflict, even a casual observer would question the tenets of Christianity. That is, tenets of 'love thy neighbour', 'peace on earth' and serving Jesus Christ as He intended Christians to do so, seems to have lost their currency among Catholics and Protestants alike. Thus, notwithstanding the subscription to any cynical overtones, the Protestant denominations were obliged to announce their position on social injustices experienced by the Catholic minority in Ulster.

Although it may be argued that the 1960's decade saw the Second Vatican Council occur as an historical coincidence, the point here is, Vatican II probably made some impact on ecclesiastical consciousness elsewhere. But, this thesis has argued that the influence of Vatican II has been limited at the grass roots level in Northern Ireland. The issues of mixed marriages, birth control, divorce and education, remain unresolved in the minds of many Protestants. Nevertheless, the efforts of Northern Irish inter-denominational cooperation are assessed here on their merits.

On the basis of the available evidence, it is difficult to make such an assessment of the all the denominations' positions, especially in relation to the CRM. However, the available evidence does suggest that the Catholic clergy's support for the CRM was implicit, rather than explicit. The evidence is not convincing to suggest that the Catholic Church was outspoken on social justice issues, let alone political issues such as universal franchise. The resentment expressed by some Sinn Féin members noted in Chapter four is palpable and concurs with other findings. Although it was not possible to completely examine the study by O'Hagan in this thesis, her analysis implies the Catholic Church's obedience to the established authority. In brief, O'Hagan's work suggests that Irish Catholicism has been antagonistic towards Irish republicanism. In any event, this reflects the position taken by the Catholic Church during the Famine; that is, it urged obedience from the oppressed and starving by paying their rents. Returning to our period, there are some notable exceptions when it comes to being outspoken. Cardinal Tomas O'Fiaich criticised the conditions in the Maze Prison. Father Desmond Wilson attacked the Catholic Church for its poor management of resources and its lack of assistance to the poor. Wilson also 'defends' Sinn Féin as a community oriented organisation. There is some truth in the latter assertion,

contrary to the demonisation and propagandistic connotations voiced by its critics and adversaries.

However, our reliance on the literature found in *Violence in Ireland: A Report to the Churches,*[5] is significant. Interestingly, the first reference made by the Protestant Churches is that of a just cause. In other words, it outlines the conditions for legitimacy of the ultimate use of force as seen in war and the conditions that need to be met to justify Christian involvement in such activity. This document appears to be neutral or ambiguous, because there is no specific reference to either of the paramilitary forces, republican or loyalist, nor the British security forces. There is however, an oblique reference to the security forces to help maintain the rule of law. Needless to say, a debate on the justification of the republican strategy of guerrilla warfare, or terrorism, or the British counter-terrorist measures, would occupy another study elsewhere. But, at this point there is no condemnation of political violence, nor a categorical acknowledgement of the social injustices experienced by Catholic brethren. At best, the wording is vague in several instances. The point that is significant however, is a collective view by the Protestant Churches, to seek reconciliation.

The Church of Ireland's position is more specific. Not only it welcomes social reforms, but also the Church of Ireland unequivocally condemns *all* killing and violence.[6] One can only speculate that the Church's statement regarding 'Christians who hold positions of influence in the community, in which it would appear than an attempt is made to place the active pursuit of violence,'[7] is an indirect reference to Reverend Ian Paisley's behaviour as a

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[5] See *Violence in Ireland: A Report to the Churches,* (Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, Dublin: Veritas Publications, 1977), author(s) not cited.
[6] Ibid. pp. 95-101.
[7] Ibid. p. 96.

political provocateur. Another point in this document is the reference to internment. On the one hand, the Church of Ireland regrets the practice of internment, but acknowledges the difficulties associated with this process on the other. Again, as a Church and as a Christian faith it is morally bound to make a statement such as: 'The Committee welcomes the investigation of all allegations of torture and brutality'.[8] There is no suggestion of this denomination's insincerity here; rather it is another instance of reaction to international pressure, or a global ethic. Ironically, as alluded to in the above, growing technology in the media 'industry' allows for the media to behave as some variant of "moral entrepreneurs", or guardians. In any event, on the basis of the Church of Ireland's position found in the literature, it seems that the Church of Ireland prefers the political *status quo*.

In the case of the Methodist Church, it re-iterates the position of the other Churches. But, the evidence also shows that the Methodist Church addresses the issues more directly, than say the Church of Ireland. For instance, while it can be agreed that violence, or 'revenge contradicts the Christian Gospel', this is not a new discovery. In the latter instance, the Methodist Church highlights the issues that contribute to conflict and community unrest. It is of note, that the Methodist Church goes a few steps further to address the concept of political power sharing, policing and ecumenism. However, more recent evidence indicates that the concept of ecumenism remains an unresolved issue among the major Christian denominations. The discussion below demonstrates the complexity of this issue.

Again, in the case of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, it condemns the use of violence from any quarter. Perhaps, the most significant statement made by any of the Churches, comes from the Presbyterian Church. For this reason, it

[8] Ibid.p. 97.

is warranted here to re-iterate some of the key points that were discussed in Chapter four. The Presbyterian Church has been courageous in its admission of '... partial responsibility for the terrible situation'.[9] Moreover, it confesses to its inaction in addressing social injustice issues. From a Christian perspective, it is also of note to cite the following:

> We have not always loved our neighbour as ourselves and have not infrequently made the conduct of others an excuse for inaction or reaction on out part.[10]

The above contrasts with the sentiments expressed by the founder and leader of the Free Presbyterian Church, Reverend Ian Paisley. Paisley is also the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and is the author of the slogan "no surrender". A loose interpretation of this catch-cry seems to imply the notion of Protestants as being 'under siege'.

As stated in Chapter four, the position here is not one of culpability aimed at the Presbyterian Church. Chapter four also attempted to focus on violence from a behavioural aspect. Certainly, this aspect may well belong to the disciplines of psychology and criminology, but given that our focus here is centred on an ecclesiastical perspective, the Church as an institution and instrument of moral order and social control has failed. In brief, from a sociological perspective, the social control system, which includes the preaching and confessional aspects of churches have failed to curb the violence perpetrated in Northern Ireland during the course of the conflict.

In spite of the unity of the Irish Churches on the issue of violence, there is patchy evidence to suggest their unity on theological matters. It can be argued here, one of the main contributing factors to this conflict is that of their claims

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[9] Ibid. pp.112-113.
[10] Ibid. p. 113.

of exclusivity. In particular, the Roman Catholic Church claims to be the 'one true and Apostolic Church'. In other words, it is a monist position. Again, it is argued here, such a position taken by Rome is an obstruction to religious pluralism. By its authoritarian nature, the Roman Church does not allow dissent within its own hierarchy or at grass-roots level, even though on the surface it claims it encourages theological debate. Hence, there is serious reservation here about the success of the ecumenical movement, especially in Northern Ireland. Certainly, some progress has been made by the main denominations, but at the same time, there remains a sense of antagonism, between the Roman Church and the Protestant denominations. Events such as joint prayer services, meetings between the heads of the Churches and other similar gestures are misleading in the assessment of the ecumenical ethos. The Catholic Church's persistent claim of the Protestant faiths as "being in error" in itself is evidence of the above assertion. Moreover, the well-rehearsed issues of mixed marriages, segregated education, contraception and women priests, perpetuate mutual suspicion. It seems rather peculiar, that the main denominations cannot adopt a principle of ecumenism found in the late nineteenth-century, which had the only requirement of allegiance to Jesus Christ.[11]

The demographical evidence presented by Drew, demonstrates significant changes in Irish society. In brief, it can be said that secularisation in Irish society has run parallel to its growing economic prosperity in recent decades.

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[11] See "Ecumenical Movement" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1965 Vol. 7, p. 958.
A recent ecumenical summit in Canada was attended by Dr Anthony Farquhar, Catholic Bishop of Down and Connor, and former Church of Ireland Bishop of Connor Dr Samuel Poyntz were among Protestant and Catholic bishops from 13 regions around the world. The point is, the summit was threatened by a picket of Protestant evangelicals, claiming the event was a "sell out" to Rome 'and a further dilution of reform faith principles. See McAdam, N., "Bishops Unite to Attend Ecumenical Summit", in *Belfast Telegraph On Line*, May 6, 2000. <http://www.belfasttelegraph.com/today/may06/News/ecum.ncml>.
Sighted May 7, 2000.
Moreover, the intention of church unity may well be evident, but this may not necessarily be the case at grass-roots level.

However, it seems that despite the amendment of Article 44 in the Irish Constitution, thereby removing the 'special position of the Catholic Church', and changing attitudes in the Republic, there exists intransigence by Protestants in the North. Moreover, recent amendments to Article 41 saw the introduction of the Family Law (Divorce) Act of 1996. Ireland is now part of the Europeanisation process, which includes phenomena such as feminisation of the workforce. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the UK is also a member of the EU. Thus, demographic and secular trends will impact upon Northern Ireland in much the same way as they do in the Republic. Although it is safe to say that endogamy is one reason for the divisiveness in Ulster, it is interesting to note an increase in mixed marriages and an increase in the number of households that are unable, or unwilling to classify the religion in the households surveyed (see Appendix 5). Yet, there still exists a theology of anti-Catholicism in the North.

On the basis of the data and its examination thus far, it would seem that there is little chance of achieving peace and reconciliation in the Province. The discussion in Chapter five investigated a range of variables in order to make a comprehensive assessment of the Corrymeela Community and its potential to reach the ideals of peace and reconciliation. Some of the adversities the Corrymeela Community faces are noted above. We have argued in Chapter five, the size and the resources of the Community do present some difficulties for it to be an effective organisation. Its limited resources in turn, hamper the Community's mobilisation and this is not a problem unique to Corrymeela. The difference, however, is related to the size and structure of an organisation (NGO). For this reason, and by way of comparison, we briefly examined operations of Amnesty International and Greenpeace.

Although the Community may have access to various politicians or political parties in Northern Ireland, it still needs more resources to effectively lobby political institutions. Perhaps, there were missed opportunities for Corrymeela in 1998, when the Good Friday Agreement and the referendums were held in the Republic and in the North in close succession. At that time, that is, during the negotiations and manoeuvring during the peace process, despite the obstacles that were encountered, the Community could have been more proactive in its approach. By this, we mean that it could have not only highlighted the peace message to a broader population, but also pushed reconciliation into the public forum, given the compromises made by the conflicting parties.

However, it would be an insufficient exercise here to simply focus on what has passed and events that have been catalogued into the annals of history. The peace process as a political process is still evolving and will continue. Thus, our evaluation of the Corrymeela Community is focused on the present and its potential for the future, in view of our preceding analyses. In the first instance, given that the Community was founded in 1965, it has outlasted the duration of the conflict. Since the Community's foundation, it has expanded and its programmes not only include respite and support for those traumatised by the conflict, but also the Community has introduced a "political re-education" through some of the influential politicians in the North.[12] However, it is safe to say the Community's position, politically, is neutral. One of its main foci is the 're-socialisation' of its participants through ecumenical education. The above approach (political re-education), can be considered as a vehicle used to supplement its "Working Party on Faith and

[12] For instance, in *Corrymeela Connections*, a magazine published by the Community, a recent edition has the first of a series of articles under the heading of 'Understanding Each Other' written by various politicians. David Ervine, spokesperson for the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) discusses the perceptions and myths surrounding Loyalism. See *Corrymeela Connections*, Vol. 2 No. 1, January-April 2000, pp. 8-10.

Politics Group". The Community's "Mixed Marriages Group" can be viewed as a pragmatic approach in dealing with religious differences between partners, because it is void of any dogmatic prescriptions. In brief, these are efforts to bring about understanding of different religious and political traditions through education. It is a step towards overcoming the barriers of ignorance and prejudice. Surely, the ability to carry out these programmes must give Corrymeela a distinct advantage. In other words, as an ecumenical organisation it is not restrained by a centralised authority such as the Vatican, or some other denominational body's hierarchy. In a sense, the Community has "hierarchical immunity" from the above structures because it *is* an ecumenical entity that is also comprised of mostly laypersons. Interestingly, this community claims that it is not threatened by diversity among its members or participants. At the risk of making a theoretical contradiction, while there is unity in diversion, and consensus in the Community, its vision is:

> ... to find a basis for a pluralist society in which both Irish and British traditions are recognised and given free expression, and where all sections of our society can feel a sense of belonging and have a real chance to participate,[13] ... .

The concept of peace may be easier to comprehend than the concept of reconciliation. Peace, in Northern Ireland could be equated with 'taking the gun out of Irish politics', notwithstanding some signs of decommissioning by the IRA at the time of writing. But is it real peace, if it requires the presence of British troops? This may be an erroneous perception of peace. On the one hand, we are becoming increasingly familiar with, for instance, peace-keeping forces deployed in the world's flash points by the UN. On the other hand, true peace means that the military is confined to its usual peacetime duties. The different locations of military presence amount to the same state

[13] Morrow, J., in a pamphlet titled, *A Corrymeela Community Paper*, p. 7. Other publication details not cited.

of an imposed peace. Thus, peace needs to be to be the will of the people, the will of the paramilitary groups (republican and loyalist) and the will of the politicians. Peace is a precondition of reconciliation. Moreover, another pre-requisite for a move towards peace and reconciliation is *forgiveness*. This approach does not necessarily require sacred dimensions or characteristics. As noted in the last chapter, 'a decommissioning of the mind', can be interpreted as a euphemism for forgiveness. Therefore, forgiveness can be a process that can take place in the ecumenical setting of the Corrymeela Community, as well as in the broader and secular aspects of Irish society. The act of forgiveness, not only has the capacity to heal in a psychological sense, but also, it is a process that can have individual as well as collective dimensions. The recent release of convicted Catholic and Protestant paramilitaries from the Maze Prison will test the collective capacity for forgiveness.

To be fair, it should be noted; the politicians and especially those who led the way to the Good Friday Agreement have met the above requisite. Also, these politicians have instituted a power sharing arrangement, notwithstanding numerous difficulties. At a political level at least, the conflicting parties have achieved what Corrymeela is advocating in the above vision -- participation. Moreover, the majority of the population has signalled their desire for peace through the referenda held in 1998. Thus, it can be said here, in a sense reconciliation remains an obstacle to true peace.

The Corrymeela Community's vision of achieving reconciliation is:

> ... an overlapping series of dimensions to the conflict which include cultural aspects like British or Irish identity, religious tradition,(Protestant or Catholic), social or economic opportunity etc.[sic] It is not possible to *limit* our work even to those dimensions and any approach to the *Christian understanding* of reconciliation must

> take on board relationships between people of all ages, disabled and abled-bodied, from both sexes, from different social classes, of conservative or liberal temperaments and the wider issues of race, other religions or no religion .[14]

The above is a comprehensive, but quite an ambitious aspiration. Certainly, its Christian ethic is not to be devalued here. But, it also resonates with a social policy. In the sense of proportion, there is also a similarity with the Community's aspiration for world peace, as well as peace in the Province. Nonetheless, it is another illustration of the religious sphere overlapping with the political sphere, so as to achieve the common good. In brief, the Community's vision implies equitable distributive justice or, in a broad sense, an equitable allocation of resources.

However, by returning to the concept of reconciliation in a more specific context, just as peace requires a multi-dimensional approach, so does reconciliation. Thus, the potential of Corrymeela's work is significant here. Given its denominational neutrality and unambiguous position, it is well placed to work with a Stormont government to institute a *reconciliation process*. Such a process would need to include the British government, or at least the participation of the Secretary for Northern Ireland. This is not altogether a new concept. For instance, in Australia, the indigenous population and its elites or elders have embarked on a reconciliation project with the federal government. After the ceasefire in Nicaragua in 1990, President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, continued to pursue a policy of national reconciliation. More recently, East Timor's interim leader, Xanana Gusmao moved quickly towards reconciliation when the former Indonesian territory gained its independence. It may be premature at this stage, to say we

[14] Ibid. p. 4.

have entered the 'age of reconciliation' on a global scale. But, if a reconciliatory policy were adopted, it may by example, have implications for the resolution of other protracted conflicts, such as the violence of Basque separatists in Spain and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.

Thus, the size of Corrymeela as an organisation may have little impact upon its efficacy. It does not have to be an organisation of the same proportion as Amnesty International in order to exert an impulse towards peace and reconciliation. The Community has demonstrated its tenacity and persistance in the face of adversity. It is suggested here, in light of some policies already in place, such as Education for Mutual Understanding, there should perhaps be more governmental liaison with Corrymeela to assist popular reconciliation. To conclude, there is a case for the efficacy of Corrymeela as an ecumenical organisation, contributing to the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. However, without an input from the State, the Community's benefits may only remain short term rather than long term.

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Appendices 1-5

Table of Contents

Appendix 1

1.0 The Problems of Truth

There would be little argument about the existence of religions as a known truth. The difficulty arises however, when religions claim to hold the truth about the meaning of life, humanity's destiny, both here and in the after world. Interestingly, there is no definition of 'truth' found in the *Penguin Dictionary of Religions*.[1] This is not to say that a religion may not hold the truth for its adherents, in the eyes of its adherents. For instance, adherents of religions may believe it to be true that God or a god is all knowing, omnipresent and omnipotent. Similarly, assertions of truth can be made about salvation or everlasting life, or of certain rituals. It is of note that in philosophy, the existence of God, can supply answers to fundamental questions in metaphysics and ethics.[2] However, this is not the same as the 'religious concept of a personal being who ought to be worshipped, [and] obeyed'.[3] Moreover, in philosophy, the truth in which philosophers are mainly interested in is 'an attribute of beliefs, opinions, theories, doctrines [and] statements'.[4] Clearly, the above eludes an infallible definition of 'truth'; if for instance, we consider a theory, or theory as a concept to be speculative knowledge. At the same time, the proper contrast is with falsity. It remains, however, the concept of a 'true religion' also escapes verification.

The above theme assumed a momentum that received a detailed discussion throughout this thesis. But, the concept of truth is also difficult to define in the secular sphere, and this includes the *truth about* empirical data, (for instance

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[1] Hinnells, J.R., (ed.), *Penguin Dictionary of Religions*, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1995).
[2] Mautner, T., (ed.), *Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy*, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1999), p. 223.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid. p. 573.

natural sciences). By way of contrast and an illustration, the Microsoft Company reluctantly allowed one of its software products that provide an encyclopaedia program, to be translated into six languages. The company argued that the truth would be lost in the translation, but the apparent reason was found to be that by maintaining this monopoly, the product would be considered to be too "American".[5]

[5] National Public Radio (NPR), *All Things Considered*, transmitted through the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ABC Radio PNN, July 11, 1999.

Appendix 2

2.0 Ridicule and religious persecution

The point made by Conway[1] in this chapter, merits further discussion. Certainly, his account of the anti-clerical campaign launched in the Austrian press during the Nazi era may be viewed as an extreme case, given the tragic events that followed. Conway cites a series of fifty notes prepared for a propaganda speech. For present purposes, the following is sufficient to give some idea of the Nazi sentiment.

1. Christianity is a religion for slaves and idiots.
2. Christianity equals Communism.
3. According to Christianity, negroes [sic] and Germans are equal.
4. The Church is international.
5. The New Testament is a Jewish fraud of four Evangelists.
6. The Church always works by violence and terror.
7. Christianity corrupted the Germans because it introduced the ideas of adultery and theft hitherto unknown.
8. The Ten Commandments are the depository [sic] of the lowest human instincts.
9. The Bible is a continuation of the Talmud, which is purely a Jewish composition.
10. Christianity is simply the mask of Judaism.[2]

It is interesting to note in this particular piece of propaganda, out of fifty notations, only seven directly attacked Jews or Judaism and, seven notations directly attacked the Catholic Church.[3] There are no specific references made to the Protestant Church, although it is possible this was disguised by the reference to Christianity. The point, which is being alluded to here, is religious vilification,

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[11] Conway, J.S., *The Nazi Persecution of the Churches*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), pp. 226-227.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.

which can range from a low intensity, such as ignorance if not immaturity, to, an extreme point that involves violence and destruction. For instance, a religion or its adherents may be labelled as superstitious. However, doctrinal prejudices may also be a part of ethnic or racial vilification. In the German experience, as Conway notes, it was claimed 'the Papacy is a swindle. The Pope claims to be God's representative on God's earth, but after Peter there was no Pope for 150 years'.[4]

Certainly, it is not a new phenomenon for the Pope's infallibility to be questioned or scrutinised, by believers and non-believers in different societies across the globe. But in a divided society such as that in Northern Ireland, an anti-papist sentiment expressed by the Protestants is common. Although the historical contexts are different, the Nazi accusation that Moscow was "the daughter of Rome", has some resonance with the Unionist claim of "Home Rule is Rome Rule". In the former instance, the sentiment expressed by the Nazis is one of anti-communism, and in the latter case, it is one of anti-Catholicism. This concept is discussed further in Chapter 5, to help our assessment of the Corrymeela Community. Nonetheless, this concept is palpable if we consider Bruce's examination of Reverend Ian Paisley's sermon, where the latter claims:

> Now it [the Catholic Church] condones the violence of the IRA as Irish nationalism strives to destroy one of the last strongholds of the evangelical gospel.[5]

However, the evidence in Chapters 3 and 4 clearly dispute Paisley's assertion. Moreover, for the purposes of this study, the similarity in Paisley's claim and that of Nazi propaganda noted above, cannot be overlooked. As Bruce notes:

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[4] Ibid. p. 227.
[5] Cited by Steve Bruce in *New Statesman*, November 29,1996 Vol. 125 No. 4312, p. 23.

> A European super-state is one of the events prophesied in the Bible (and, as Paisley puts it, "prophesy is history before it happens") as marking the approach of the (Biblical rather than chronological) millennium. The 12-star flag of the European Union is a popish symbol, the crown of the Virgin Mary.[6]

The Paisleyite sentiment in the above clearly demonstrates an anti-Catholic phenomenon. This concept's discussion may well be justified here. But, despite its relevance, I have reserved its analysis for the Chapter 5 where Pharisaic sources lend themselves to Protestant dogma of anti-Catholicism.

2.1 Clerics as leaders or followers?

In Chapter 2, the five brief case studies of Germany, South Africa, Poland Israel and Islam warrant more elaboration here. Although the relationship between religion and politics, and between the Church and State, may in one sense, appear to be broad, there are some differentiation's which can be made. For instance, the notion of differentiation between the hierarchy and grass roots level clergy. In other words, the clergy can assume a dualistic or even ambiguous role. Thus the question, when is the clergy a leader of a movement, and when is it a follower. It can be said for instance, the position of Reverend Ian Paisley is one of leadership, both at a political and dogmatic level. Paisley can lead the political party he founded, or he can lead from the pulpit. In brief, contemporary discourse often cites the above cleric's dynamism as Pailseyism. His followers are Paisleyites. The Civil Rights Movement in the late 1960s in Northern Ireland attracted the Catholic clergy as followers, or supporters, rather than as leaders. Let us consider another situation, as that found in East Timor. Bishop Belo *symbolises* leadership, to use the metaphor, as the shepherd of his flock, but the political leadership of the East Timorese struggle, has been found in that of Ramos Horta and Xanana Gusmao.

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[6] Ibid. pp. 23-24.

Yet, the clerical position can never be clear, because it is possible that a cleric may espouse his or her own political view and sentiments, regardless of directives from the central body. It is argued here, that by definition, and by the assertion of humans as being political animals, clerical conduct is spiritual and, political. At the same time, in the Islamic tradition, the Koran implies the overlap of religion and politics. In the United States, Louis Farrakhan's "Nation of Islam", reflects say, an aspect of race politics, a leader mobilising Negro Muslims. Another example of political *activation* is found in Tibet's Dalai Lama. His leadership embraces both the spiritual and a political context.

However, it should be apparent, in Chapter 2 and in Chapters 3 and 4, there is an identifiable pattern between the clergy in its relationship to politics, in the Roman Catholic Church, compared to the Protestant denominations. Certainly, while this theme is introduced in Chapter 2, it is cultivated in subsequent chapters. Nevertheless, the main distinction is that of the authoritarian nature of the Catholic Church as compared to a more flexible, if not a more tolerant approach by Protestant denominations. However, in the case of Northern Ireland, it is the Protestant churches which fly the Union flags from their spires. Thus, a church through the use of symbols can express a nationalistic sentiment. Some Protestant clergy are also members of the Orange Order, an organisation that has as one of its main objectives, the defence of the Protestant succession to the British throne. During my visits to Ireland, I did not sight one Republican tricolour hoisted from a Catholic church building. Finally, another distinction is made here, by Protestant clerics, serving as members of parliament. By way of contrast, Father Desmond Wilson, who has been critical of the Catholic Church in Ireland (as well as the other actors in the Irish conflict) has also demonstrated

leadership qualities. However, his dissent, or at least being outspoken, precipitated an 'early retirement' as a diocesan priest.

Among his criticisms, Wilson makes an assertion that reflects the notion of religious uniqueness or exclusivity. This concept has been discussed in the course of Chapter 2 and elsewhere, but its relevance is reinforced here when Wilson argues:

> A sense of superiority is still expressed by the title 'The Church of Ireland' which suggests that other Irish churches do not exist. The Anglican claim to be 'The Church of Ireland' although it is a minority parallel to the Roman Catholic Church claim to be the one authentic Christian church, whether it is small or large in any place. During discussions about possible ways of creating reconciliation between Christians the leaders of these churches have not indicated willingness to withdraw either of their claims.[5]

2.2 Marx's concept of religion as 'the opium of the people'

The above expression has often been cited by atheistic Marxist regimes not only as a form of propaganda, but also, it can be used as a form of ridicule. In fact, Marx's analysis bears strong affinities to the view of religion put forward by Nietzsche, who views those professing religious beliefs as sick individuals, malicious to themselves and to others.[6] Nietzsche's genealogy reveals the evil root of religion,[7] but Marx is more sympathetic to religion's content than

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[5] Wilson, D., *Democracy Denied*, (Dublin: Mercier Press, 1997), p. 77.

[6] See Nietzsche, F., *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Sell-Pearson, K., (ed.), translated by Diethe, C., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 127. Here Nietzsche claims:

> Man, the bravest animal and most prone to suffer, does *not* deny suffering as such: he *wills* it, he even seeks it out, provided he is shown a *meaning for* it, a *purpose* of suffering.

Nietzsche's own italics and punctuation have been retained in the above text.

[7] Satz, D., "Marxism, Materialism and Historical Progress, in Analyzing Marxism, Ware, R., and Neilsen, K., (eds.) (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 1989), p. 421.

Nietzsche.[8] According to Satz's analysis, Marx believes that religion has a positive aspect, a root that is not evil.[9] For Marx, 'religion is the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not found himself or has already lost himself'.[10] In simple terms, Marx's metaphor can also mean that the function of religion is to pacify the masses for political control. At the same time, Satz argues this self-affirmation, as religion, is misdirected and is a form of 'false consciousness', producing illusions about man's true nature.[11]

Two points present themselves here. First, Marx's analogy of religion as an opiate enables us to understand this concept in that its overuse will result in malaise. In the second instance, it can be said the 'false consciousness' which arises from the use of opium, may manifests itself collectively when a society is *dependent on* religion to numb the pain of the oppressed. In other words, as Marx argues: ' Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also the protest against real distress.'[12] Thus, in situations where societies have endured oppression, as discussed in Chapter 2, religion has been a form of 'false consciousness' in that it has offered hope of being freed from an oppressive regime. This has a very similar application in the case of Northern Ireland. However, another paradox presents itself here. Christians are called upon to venerate the suffering of Christ. Christ's suffering has been iconised by, for instance, the Stations of the Cross. Yet, Christ's teaching was also one of peace and reconciliation.

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[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Karl Marx, Introduction to *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 131-2.
[11] Satz, D., op. cit. p. 421.
[12] Ibid.

2.3 When the State avoided defining 'religion': The Case of The Church of Scientology Inc. (Plaintiffs) and Woodward and Others (Defendants).[13]

In 1982, the High Court of Australia ruled on a case which arose when the members of the Church of Scientology Inc., sued the Honourable Albert Edward Woodward (who at that time was the Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO)), and, the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth of Australia. In brief, the plaintiffs alleged:

(i) ASIO was prohibited from continuing to obtain, correlate and evaluate intelligence relevant to security within the meaning of the 1956 Act'[14] ...(The Australian Intelligence Security Act).
(ii) The plaintiffs claimed that... 'they were not persons in respect of whom the Commonwealth and Territories needed protection from acts of espionage, sabotage, or subversion'[15] ... .

In brief, in the course of the above case, the High Court was told of the role of ASIO as set out under the Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act 1979, (hereafter referred to as "the 1979 Act") and the term 'security' were defined by the Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth. Further, the plaintiffs claimed that the 1979 Act was 'a law prohibiting the free exercise of any religion and was therefore invalid by section 116 of the Constitution'.[16] Thus, the conduct of ASIO was seen to be restricting the freedom of religion. However, the considerations of the High Court, lead to the conclusion 'that it was not intended that a court

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[13] Source: *The Commonwealth Law Reports: Cases Determined in the High Court of Australia*, 1983-1984, Vol. 154, Merrals, J.D., (ed.) (Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1985).
[14] Ibid. p. 28.
[15] Ibid. p. 29.

should have power to decide whether ASIO has exceeded its proper function, and obtained intelligence which is not relevant to security'.[17]

Moreover, it was claimed that ASIO 'characterised the second plaintiff and other members of the first plaintiff as "security risks" by reason of their membership and by reason of their being practising adherents of Scientology religion'.[18] But, the High Court also concluded that the meaning of "subversion" was 'a narrow point' used by ASIO, because if subversion meant the overturning of a system of government, then in this case 'the promulgation of the religion of Scientology was subversion in itself'.[19] Interestingly, the High Court, relied on previous decisions concerning the freedom of religion, and ruled[20] that 'a corporation could not have a religious belief'. In any event, the Church of Scientology's appeal was dismissed by the High Court. The above case is similar to the situation in the German experience, in that it involves a federal or state institution to arbitrate in a claim of freedom of religion. But the two situations differ, because in the German experience, the Constitutional Court based its decision on cultural grounds, whereas in Australia the High Court not only dealt with an issue pertaining to the freedom of religion, but also an issue of national security.

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[17] Ibid. p. 52.
[18] Ibid. p.82.
[19] Ibid. p.85.
[20] Ibid. In the above, the High Court referred to the Adelaide Jehovah's Witnesses Inc. v. The Commonwealth, (1943), Commonwealth Law Reports, Vol.116, p. 147.

Appendix 3

3. 0 The significance of the Irish language

3.1 Background information

In his study titled "Language Grief: A 'Raw Material' of Ethnic Conflict", Bostock [1] argues that language grief can over time resolve itself, as it has done in the Republic of Ireland but, it can also be a cause in the breakdown of accommodation, as it has in the North. As noted by Foster[2] in his study, and furthermore by Bardon,[3] Hindley also points out 'it is remarkable that throughout medieval Irish history the province exhibiting least English was Ulster'.[4] Moreover, in pre-modern times government impinged little on everyday life, so unless there were some other pressing reasons to learn English, for instance for trade, there would be no cause to do so; nor would the government 'be concerned with the language of ordinary people'.[5] Thus, the question of language loss becomes another addition to the catalogue of paradoxes in Irish history, if we consider the position taken by the nationalist Daniel O'Connell. In brief, although O'Connell was a native speaker of Irish, he was dismissive of the language.[6]

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[1] Bostock, W. W., "Language Grief: A 'Raw Material' of Ethnic Conflict" in *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 4, Winter 1997, p. 94.

[2] See Foster R. F., Modern *Ireland: 1600-1972*, (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1988), p. 5. Foster here refers to Ulster as the most 'intractably Gaelic' province.

[3] See Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1992), pp. 420-422. Bardon refers to the 'Gaelic revival' at the turn of the last century. This revival was led by some influential Protestants, one of whom was Professor Robert M. Henry, who persuaded Queen's University Befast to teach Gaelic. Other Protestants involved in the language revival included the Presbyterian journalists Robert Lynd and James Winder Good, the novelist Forrest Reid and the actor-playwright Samuel Waddell, to name but few.

[4] Hindley, R., *The Death of the Irish Language: A Qualified Obituary*, (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 4.

[5] Ibid. p. 4.

[6] Williams, N., in *The Oxford Companion to Irish History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1998), p.302

The question of language as a 'raw material' of ethnic conflict in the Irish context is obfuscating because the focus or emphasis on Irish identity has changed. For instance, Beckett stated in 1966, 'Ireland, not free only but Gaelic as well; not Gaelic only but free as well!'[7] However, the evidence suggests that in the Republic, during the time of Beckett's work, Irish identity was associated with Catholicism. In other words, religion was an identity marker over nationality. Furthermore, we can locate language as a marker of ethnic identity in Davies, when he writes in English:

> To impose another language on... a people is to send their history adrift...to tear their identity from all places... To lose our native tongue, and learn that of an alien, is the worst badge of conquest --- it is the chain on the soul.[2]

Fishman takes this concept one step further. According to Fishman, 'language equals nationality and nationality equals language'.[3] Indeed, it can be argued here, that Fishman is stating another variation of a theme as noted above by Williams. However, as Williams concedes, although the revival of the Irish language has not been entirely successful, 'all surveys show that a majority of Irish people value the language as a mark of identity'.[4] The question which needs to be asked here is, whether this an experience or perception shared equally in the Republic as well as in the North? Certainly, there is little argument with Davies's observation noted above. But some confusion arises when a contradiction presents itself in Bostock's study, in which he notes, Gerry Adams, the President of Sinn Féin 'is critical of efforts at revival in the Republic...'.[11] Yet,

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[7] Ibid. p.301.
[2] Davies, T., in Fishman, J.A., *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective*, (Clevedon, Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters Ltd, 1989) p. 279.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Williams, N., op. cit. p. 302.
[11] Bostock, W.W., *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, op. cit. p. 105.

during his visit to Australia when Adams gave a public lecture, he gave his conclusion in Gaelic.[12]

Certainly, this needs to be investigated and would be the topic of another study. However, it should be noted, Irish (*Gaeltacht*) is the first official language in the Republic, but English is most widely used and Irish is spoken only in restricted areas, mainly in the West (coastal) region. Moreover, official documents are printed in both languages, and bilingual signs are the conspicuous facets of the Irish landscape. In addition, and perhaps it is an attempt in the revival of the Irish language, the television channel *Telefis na Gaelige* transmits programs, only in the native tongue. At the same time, however, the Irish language in the West region is further threatened by factors that are unrelated to the notion of an ethnic conflict, but economic forces.[13] In other words, as real estate demand increases (especially in areas like Connemara), urban and non-Irish speaking groups are capitalising on the property boom and forcing out native speakers.

3.2 Official Documents

It appears that relevant Articles of the Constitution of Ireland are overlooked by some of the *conflicting parties* in Northern Ireland, particularly matters pertaining to the issues of freedom of religion, education and marriage. The following are extracts from the Constitution which address (codify) the above concepts. By way of comparison, Articles 8 and 9 make no mention of the position of the Catholic Church in Ireland, but this changed in 1937 and again in 1972 by a referendum.

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[12] Adams, G., (President of Sinn Féin) Public Lecture at the University of New South Wales, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, (ABC-Television), transmitted on August 22, 1999.
[13] See Pól O Muirí, "The Bearla Burbs", in *The Irish Times On the Web*, June 23, 1999. <http://www.irish-times.com>.
Sighted June 23, 1999.

3.2.1 The Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) Act 1922... passed by Oireachtas of Saorstát Eireann during the year 1922.[14]

3.2.2 Article 8.

Freedom of conscience and free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen, and no law may be made either directly or indirectly to endow religion or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof or give any preference, or impose any disability on account of religious belief or religious status, or affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction at the school, or make any discrimination, as respects State aid between schools under management of different religious denominations, or divert from any religious denomination or any educational institution any of its property except for the purposes of roads, railways, lighting, water or drainage works or other works of public utility, and on payment of compensation.

3.2.3 Article 9.

The right of free expression of opinion as well as the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, and to from associations or unions is guaranteed for purpose not opposed to public morality. Laws regulating the manner in which the right of forming associations and the right of free assembly maybe exercised shall contain no political, religious or class distinction.

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[14] The Constitution of the Irish Free State ... of Saorstát Eireann during the year 1922, <http://www.ucc.ie/celt/online/E900003.004.html>.
Sighted May 28, 2000.

3.3 Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland)[15], in operation as from December 29, 1937.

3.3.1 Language: Article 8

1. The Irish language as the national language is the first official language.

2. The English language is recognised as a second official language.

3. Provision may, however, be made by law for the exclusive use of either of the said languages for any one or more official purposes, either throughout the State or in any part thereof.

3.3.2 The Family: Article 41.

1. 1° The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.

2° The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State.

2. 1° In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved.

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[15] Reproduced from *Bunreacht na hÉireann* (Constitution of Ireland), Government Publications Office, Dublin, 1990.

2° The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home.

3. 1° The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect itself against attack.

2° No law shall be enacted providing for the grant of a dissolution of marriage.[16]

3° No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law of any other State but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law for the time being in force within the jurisdiction of the Government and Parliament established by this Constitution shall be capable of contracting a valid marriage within that jurisdiction during the lifetime of the other party to the marriage so dissolved.

3.3.3 Education: Article 42.

1. The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the child is the Family and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their means, for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children.

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[16] Amended as the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989, Family Law Act 1995, and the Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996.

2. Parents shall be free to provide this education in their homes or in private schools or in schools recognised or established by the State.

3. 1° The State shall not oblige parents in violation of their conscience and lawful preference to send their children to send their children to schools established by the State, or to any particular type of school of designated by the State.

3.2° The State shall, however, as guardian of the common good, require in view of actual conditions that the children receive a minimum education, moral, intellectual and social.

4. The State shall provide for free primary education and shall endeavour to supplement and give reasonable aid to private and corporate educational initiative, and, when the public good requires it, provide other educational facilities or institutions with due regard, however, for the rights of parents, especially in the matter of religious and moral formation.

5. In exceptional cases, where the parents for physical or moral reasons fail in their duty towards their children, the State as guardian of the common good, by appropriate means shall endeavour to supply the place of parents, but always with due regard for the natural and imprescriptible rights of the child.

3.4 Fundamental Rights: Article 44.

1. The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour religion.

2. 1° Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen.

2° The State guarantees not to endow any religion.

3° The State shall not impose any disabilities or make any discrimination on the ground of religious profession, belief or status.

4° Legislation providing State aid for schools shall not discriminate between schools under the management of different religious denominations, nor be such as to affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending religious instruction at that school.

5° Every religious denomination shall have the right to manage its own affairs, own, acquire and administer property, movable and immovable, and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes.

6° The property of any religious denomination or any educational institution shall not be diverted save for necessary works of public utility and on payment of compensation.

3.5 Constitution of Ireland, 1937 Article 44 (on Religion)[17]

1. 1° The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour religion.

   2° The State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens.

   3° The State also recognises the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterial Church in Ireland, the Methodist Church in Ireland, the Religious Society of Friends in Ireland, as well as the Jewish Congregations and the other denominations existing in Ireland at the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution.

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[17] There exists some confusion about the 1937 Irish Constitution. Although it is stated that the present Constitution of Ireland (even with amendments) is the constitution 'in operation as from December 29, 1937', Article 44, as formulated by Eamon de Valera, is different from the present Constitution's Article 44. Moreover, as Whyte points out, Article 44, expresses De Valera's ideas on Church-State relations. Cited in Whyte, J., *Church and State in Modern Ireland 1923-1979*, 2nd ed. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan Ltd, 1980), p. 54.

Appendix 4

4. 1 The Maze Prison Hunger Strikes: Suicide or the Politics of Despair ?[1]

Although a reference has been made to the issue of whether terrorists should be treated as criminals, or as a separate political category in Chapter 5, it is appropriate to examine the above in the context of Church-State relations. Cardinal O'Fiaich's efforts on behalf of the prisoners (in H-block) noted in Chapter 4, identified him with the protesting prisoners, and confirmed Protestants in their belief that the Catholic hierarchy supported the prisoners' demands. Moreover, two significant issues arose from the hunger strikes. One was the question of whether their actions were seen as suicide, and therefore immoral, and seconds, the prisoners' demands of being considered as a special category with political status.

On the issue of suicide, it is of note to point out the different positions taken by the Protestant and Catholic Churches. O'Malley presents the Protestant Church's position in the following:

> The Protestant churches had no ambivalence about the question of suicide, no caveats, no place for theological niceties. The hunger strikers were unjustified because they were self-inflicted for demands that they were themselves unjustified, and they were immoral because they had as their ultimate intention the furtherance of murder and destruction of the state.[2]

Moreover, the Irish Council of Churches --- which represents all the mainstream Protestant churches, North and South, maintained that 'there are no people in Northern Ireland prisons who are there for political opinions or for reasons of conscience'.[3]

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[1] The title of this section has been taken from the title of Padraig O'Malley's work, *Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990).
[2] Ibid. p. 180.
[3] Ibid. p. 174.

On the other side of the religious divide, the position of the Catholic Church with regards to the above is ambiguous, for two reasons. On the one hand the Roman Catholic is always preaching about the sanctity of life and how important it is to preserve life at all costs. Committing suicide is a mortal sin because it is destroying life, and that life is not only the life of the person suiciding, but also it is God's life. God had given that life. Thus, the Protestant found it hard to reconcile the Roman Catholics who were viewing the hunger strike 'as a legitimate moral option and at the same time espousing a sort of reverence for life'.[4] To be sure, Father Denis Faul asserted that 'the hunger strikes are not suicide ' but rather 'a responsible protest though of a sacrificial nature'.[5] Another position on this issue is found in Bishop Edward Daly of Derry. According to O'Malley, when the bishop commented on the death of hunger striker Bobby Sands, he [Daly] implicitly invoked 'the principle of double-effect, which distinguishes between the end willed and the end foreseen but not willed'.[6] Thus, as O'Malley points out the Protestant churches:

> .... 'saw the Irish Catholic Church's apparent ambivalence, its propensity to balance criticism of the hunger strikers with criticism of the regime, to equate the violence of Republicans with the violence of the state, to couple the intransigence of the hunger striker with the intransigence of the of the government'... .[7]

In other words it follows, the statements made by Bishop Daly 'that the hunger strikes were not morally justifiable' but that 'the hunger strikers' deaths were not suicide implied to the Protestants that Catholics did not regard the hunger strikes as being wrong'.[8] On the other hand, and to add to the moral confusion, Cardinal Basil Hume the Catholic archbishop of

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[4] Ibid. pp. 175-176.
[5] Ibid. p. 178.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid. pp. 180- 181.

Westminster, called the hunger strikes 'a form of violence, violence to the hunger strikers themselves' that 'could not be condoned by the Church as being in accordance with God's will for men'.[9]

The Protestants, as O'Malley argues, considered Hume's words as authentic and as an exposition of the Catholic Church's teaching.[10] Moreover, the perception of Irish Catholicism 'as wedded to militant Republicanism'[11] was reinforced by Hume's statement, especially when members of the Irish hierarchy (apart from O'Fiaich) maintained their silence.[12]

However, it should be noted that the above position taken by the Irish Catholic Church is not unilateral. Certainly, the position taken by O'Fiaich and some other members of the Catholic clergy during the Maze Prison hunger strikes indicates a political posture. Again, the above illustrates the symbiotic nature of the relationship between Church and State and between religion and politics. Nonetheless, we have noted for instance, the relationship between Irish Catholicism and Irish republicanism is disputed by O'Hagan. O'Hagan's argument is further supported when O'Fiaich instructed priests to read out a statement at Sunday Mass which condemned the violence perpetrated by the IRA at Enniskillen on Remembrance Day in 1987.[13] Republicans walked out of church services at St Paul's off the Falls Rd, St Michael's at Finaghy Rd North, and St Agnes's at Andersonstown.[14]

To sum up, we can again rely on O'Malleys study in which he argues, 'Central to the myth on which the Irish state is built and to the prehistoric gestations of

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[9] Ibid. pp. 176-177.
[10] Ibid. p. 177.
[11] Ibid. p. 176.
[12] Ibid. p. 178.
[13] Cited in *The Australian*, "Warning of new attacks after priest blast IRA", November 17, 1987, p. 5. Author not cited.
[14] Ibid.

the Celtic ethos is the idea of heroic sacrifice'.[15] Finally, the hunger strikes of 1980 must be viewed as a brief phase, a process in the context of the conflict in Northern Ireland. In any event, it must be noted the hunger strikes had political implications. On one level, the events in the Maze noted above, gave an impetus for the nationalist parties such as the SDLP to mobilise, and together with Fine Fáil and Fine Gael established the New Ireland Forum. But the conflicting parties in the North adhered to their respective myths and perceptions. Sinn Féin won two Members of Parliament (Westminster) and two members of the Irish Parliament. Their prisoners were accorded the political status Mrs. Thatcher denied them. For purposes of this study however, the hunger strikes reinforced doctrinal differences. In brief, Protestants were 'left wondering just where the Catholic Church stood' and whether 'our Roman brethren will gain new insights into the Protestant case for primacy of conscience in matters of marriage and family'[16]

4.2 Declaration on Religious Liberty, The Second Vatican Council (Vatican II): Summary of Documents[17]

4. 2.1 *Dignitatis Humanae* December 7, 1965

1. The sacred Council begins by professing that God himself has made known to the human race how men by serving him can be saved and reach happiness in Christ. We believe that this one true religion continues to exist in the Catholic and Apostolic Church... .[18]

2. So while the religious freedom which men demand in fulfilling their obligation to worship God has to do with freedom from coercion in civil society, it leaves intact the traditional Catholic teaching on the moral duty of

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[15] O'Malley, P., *Biting at the Grave,* op. cit. p. 138.

[16] Ibid. p. 186. As O'Malley points out, in a mixed marriage the Catholic partner still has to give the undertaking that he or she will do everything possible to raise the children as Catholics.

[17] Cited in *Vatican Council II: The Concillar and Post Concillar Documents,* Flannery, A., (ed.), © 1975, (Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1981).

[18] Ibid. p. 799.

individuals and societies towards the true religion and the one Church of Christ.[19]

3. This right of the human person to religious freedom must be given such recognition in the constitutional order of society as will make it a civil right.[20]

4. Therefore the civil authority, the purpose of which is the care of the common good in the temporal order, must recognize and look with favour to the religious life of the citizens.[21]

5. Therefore, provided the just requirements of public order are not violated, these groups have a right to immunity so that they may organize themselves according to their own principles.[22]

6. The civil authority must therefore recognize the right of parents to choose with genuine freedom schools or other means of education. Parents should not be subjected directly or indirectly to unjust burdens because of this freedom of choice. Furthermore, the rights of parents are violated if their children are compelled to attend classes which are not in agreement with the religious beliefs of the parents or if there is but a single compulsory system of education from which all religious instruction is excluded.[23]

7. For this reason the protection of the right to religious freedom is the common responsibility of individual citizens, social groups, civil authorities, the Church and other religious communities. Each of these has its own special responsibility in the matter according to its particular duty to promote the common good.[24]

8. The protection and promotion of the inviolable rights of man is an essential duty of every civil authority.[25]

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[19] Ibid. p. 800.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid. p. 802.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid. p. 803.
[24] Ibid. pp.803-804.
[25] Ibid. p. 804.

4.2.2 Decree on Ecumenism, *Unitatis Redintegratio*, November 21, 1964

1. The restoration of unity among all Christians is one of the principal concerns of the Second Vatican Council. Christ the Lord founded one Church and one Church only. However, many Christian communions present themselves to men as the true inheritors of Jesus Christ; all indeed profess to be followers of the Lord but differ in mind and go their different ways, as if Christ Himself were divided. Such division openly contradicts the will of Christ, scandalises the world, and damages the holy cause of preaching the Gospel to every creature.[26]

2. It is the Holy Spirit, dwelling in those who believe and pervading and ruling over the Church as a whole, who brings about that wonderful communion of the faithful. He brings them into intimate union with Christ, so that He is the principle of the Church's unity.[27]

3. Even in the beginnings of this one and only Church of God there arose certain rifts, which the Apostles condemned. But in subsequent centuries much more serious dissension's made their appearance and quite large communities came to be separated from full communion with the Catholic Church for which, often enough, men of both sides were to blame. The ecumenical movement is striving to overcome these obstacles. The differences that exist in varying degrees between them and the Catholic Church -- whether in doctrine and sometimes in discipline, or concerning the structure of the Church -- do indeed create many obstacles, sometimes serious ones, to full ecclesiastical communion. But even in spite of them it remains true that all who have been justified by faith in Baptism are members of Christ's body, and have a right to be called Christian, and so are correctly accepted as brothers by the children of the Catholic Church.[28]

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[26] Ibid.p. 452.
[27] Ibid. p. 454.
[28] Ibid. p. 455.

4. All of these, which come from Christ and lead back to Christ, belong by right to the one Church of Christ. The brethren divided from us also use many liturgical actions of the Christian religion. These most certainly can truly engender a life of grace in ways that vary according to the condition of each Church or Community. These liturgical actions must be regarded as capable of access to the community of salvation. It follows that the separated Churches and Communities as such, though we believe them to be deficient in some respects, have by no means deprived of significance and importance in the mystery of salvation. For the Spirit of Christ has not refrained from using them as means of salvation which derive their efficacy from the very fullness of grace and truth entrusted to the Church.[29]

5. The term " ecumenical movement" indicates the initiatives and activities planned and undertaken, according to the various needs of the Church and as opportunities offer, to promote Christian unity. These are: first, every effort to avoid expressions, judgements and actions which do not represent the condition of our separated brethren with truth and fairness and so make mutual relations with them more difficult; then, "dialogue" between competent experts from different Churches and Communities.... In such dialogue, everyone gains a truer knowledge and more just appreciation of the teaching and religious life of both Communions. In addition, the way is prepared for cooperation between them in the duties for the common good of humanity which are demanded by every Christian conscience; and, wherever this is allowed, there is prayer in common. Finally, all are led to examine their own faithfulness to Christ's will for the Church and accordingly to undertake with vigour the task of renewal and reform.[30]

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[29] Ibid. pp. 455-456.
[30] Ibid. p. 457.

4.2.3 Declaration on the position of the Catholic Church on the Celebration of the Eucharist in Common by Christians of Different Confessions[31]

1. Recently, in various parts of the world, certain initiatives have been taken with regard to common participation in the Eucharist. They have involved, on the one hand, faithful and clergy of the Catholic Church and, on the other, laity and pastors of other Christian Churches and ecclesial communities. At times there is question of the admission of catholic faithful to a Protestant or Anglican eucharistic communion; at other times, participation by Protestants and Anglicans in the eucharistic communion in a Catholic church; or again, there are communion acts of eucharistic worship jointly celebrated by ministers belonging to Churches and ecclesial communities still separated from one another, and these the laity of the communities concerned take part. This is of great theological importance, and we desire to recall the Church's recently formulated norms concerning it.[32]

2. The second Vatican Council addressed itself to this subject in the Decree on Ecumenism, *Unitatis Redintegratio*. After having called to mind that common prayers for unity are an efficacious means for asking for the grace of unity and constitute an authentic expression of the bonds by which Catholics remain united with other Christians, the Decree continues: "As for common worship, however, it may not be regarded as a means to be used indiscriminately for the restoration of unity among Christians. Such worship depends chiefly on two principles: it should signify the unity of the Church; it should provide a sharing in the means of grace. The fact that it should signify unity generally rules out common worship. Yet the gaining of needed grace sometimes recommends it. The practical course to be adopted, after due regard has been given to all the circumstances of time, place, and persons, is left to the prudent decision of the local episcopal authority, unless the

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[31] Ibid. p. 502.
[32] Ibid.

bishop's conference according to its own statutes, or the Holy See, has determined otherwise."[33]

4.2.4 Apostolic Letter on Mixed Marriages, *Matrimonia Mixta*, January 7, 1970[34]

... The Church is indeed aware that mixed marriages, precisely because they admit differences of religion and are a consequence of the division among Christians, do not, except in some cases, help in re-establishing unity among Christians. There are many difficulties inherent in a mixed marriage, since a certain division is introduced into the living cell of the Church, as the Christian family is rightly called, and in the family itself the fulfilment of the gospel teachings is more difficult because of the diversities in matters of religion, especially with regard to those matters which concern Christian worship and the education of the children.

For these reasons the Church, conscious of her duty, discourages the contracting of mixed marriages, for she is most desirous that Catholics be able in matrimony to attain perfect union of mind and full communion of life. However, since man has the natural right to marry and beget children, the Church, by her laws, which clearly show her pastoral concern, makes such arrangements that on one hand the principles of Divine law be scrupulously observed and that on the other the said right to contract marriage be respected.

... Although in the case of baptised persons of different religious confessions, there is less risk of religious indifferentism, it can be more easily avoided if both husband and wife have a sound knowledge of the Christian nature of marital partnership, and if they are properly helped by their respective Church authorities. Even difficulties arising in marriage between a Catholic

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[33] Ibid. pp. 502-503.

[34] Ibid. pp. 508-509. The above text(s) have been reproduced from the Flannery's compilation.

and an unbaptised person can be overcome through pastoral watchfulness and skill.

Neither in doctrine or in law does the Church place on the same level a marriage between a Catholic and a baptised non-Catholic, and one between a Catholic and an unbaptised person; for, as the Second Vatican Council declared, men who, though they are not Catholics "believe in Christ and have been properly baptised are brought into a certain, though imperfect communion with the Catholic Church". Moreover, although Eastern Christians who have been baptised outside the Catholic Church are separated from communion with us, they possess true sacraments, above all the Priesthood and the Eucharist, whereby they are joined to us in a very close relationship.

Comment

It is argued here, that the above citations from the Roman Catholic Church's texts are warranted because they demonstrate doctrinal inflexibility or a monist position. They also add to the recurring ambiguity observed in this study. Concepts such as 'one true religion', found in the 'Apostolic and Catholic Church' and it not recognising a marriage between a Catholic and a baptised non-Catholic, maintain a sense of exclusiveness. Yet, the Catholic Church claims it aspires for church unity, and at the same time professes the freedom of religion.

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- What we do
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- Comments
- Articles
- Publications
- Residential
- Belfast
- Knocklayd
- C'meela Link
- Help Us
- Links
- Feedback
- Order Form

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Belfast - The Belfast Office is the Administrative Centre of the Community

Knocklayd - is a Spiritual Retreat Centre for Corrymeela members, Staff, Volunteers and other groups

Corrymeela Link is a member's organization set up in 1976. It aims to promote the vision of the Corrymeela Community in Britain and beyond.

There are a number of good new conflict resolution sites and other Links which we have added.

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Appendix 5

5.0 Corrymeela Timeline.

1st August 2000

THE WEBSITE OF THE CORRYMEELA COMMUNITY
TimeLine
In 1940 the Reverend Ray Davey volunteers for field work with the YMCA in North Africa. He helps establish a centre in Tobruk to be used by all faiths to care for the social, physical and spiritual needs of those engaged in desert warfare. In 1942 he is taken prisoner of war and held near Dresden, where he witnesses the allied bombing of the city, in which huge numbers of civilians died.

- Returning home Ray is appointed as the first Presbyterian Chaplain to Queens University Belfast. He establishes a Community Centre as the focal point for his work.
- 1963 - 64 Following a series of visits to Christian Communities of Reconciliation in Italy (Agape) and Scotland (The Iona Community), a group is formed to explore the idea of a new Christian Community in Northern Ireland. The group searches for suitable premises.1965 - (February) A holiday guest house called 'Corrymeela' is purchased. Corrymeela, meaning 'The Hill of Harmony', is adopted as the name of the new Community. Volunteer work camps repair and renovate the building.
- * 1965 - (October) The Corrymeela Centre is opened officially by Pastor Tullio Vinay founder of the Agape Community. The Reverend Ray Davey is elected as part time Leader.
- *1966 Corrymeela marks the fiftieth Anniversary of the Republican Easter Rising in Dublin by holding a conference entitled 'Community 1966, a joint Protestant and Roman Search The Bible Catholic Conference'. Such a joint venture is unique at this time. The Prime Minister of Northern Ireland Captain Terence O'Neill uses the opportunity to make a plea for reconciliation between Catholics and Protestants.
- A number of other significant conferences are held at e-mail us Corrymeela which contribute to the development of voluntary Feedback Form movements and organisations such as the Northern Ireland Housing Association, The Northern Ireland Hospice Movement, The Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association and Support Groups Integrated Education. Information and Contacts *
- Members of the Community run Summer Family Weeks at Corrymeela for those who can't afford holidays. Volunteers lead programmes with families, children, and pensioners. Work camps of volunteers continue to renovate and adapt the buildings and the site.
- 1968 - 69 The protest movement for civil rights is overtaken by violence marking the beginning of what is referred to as 'the troubles'.
- 1970 Corrymeela members are involved in Community Projects in Belfast, and run Summer Play Schemes in potentially troubled areas.
- Individual members of Corrymeela involved in the formation of Alliance, a political party whose aim is to attract both Protestants and Catholics.

- 1971 On the 9th August 300 people are interned on suspicion of having paramilitary connections. This is followed by widespread violence in Belfast and Londonderry. Intimidation of families segregates housing into Protestant estates and Catholic estates.
- Corrymeela hosts displaced families at its centre and the nearby town of Ballycastle. The work with families living under stress continues as a central priority for Corrymeela.
- 1971 - (September) The Cross of Nails presented to Corrymeela introducing Corrymeela to an international network of Christian Centres of reconciliation.
- 1973 The first full time director of the Corrymeela Centre is appointed. A long term volunteer programme called 'Serve and Learn' commences. Volunteers give a year's voluntary work in return for learning new skills. This supports the development of more extensive programmes.
- A playground at Corrymeela is opened in memory of a Community Worker who was killed for his work for reconciliation.
- 1973 - 1974 The Corrymeela Singers and Players are formed as a means of promoting the message of reconciliation through music and drama.
- 1974 The Rev. Ray Davey becomes full time leader of Corrymeela. A house is purchased in Belfast as an administrative base and resource.
- 1976 'Coventry House' is built at the Ballycastle Centre to accommodate the international volunteer team. The house is a gift of the Community of the Cross of Nails.
- The Youth Village is built to accommodate the expanding youth work. First full time workers appointed for Community/Family Programmes and Youth Programmes
- Community member Maura Kiely whose son was murdered by paramilitaries, forms the 'Cross Group' as a support for those who have lost members of their family through violence.
- 1977 Political conference at Corrymeela on the theme 'A Critical Look at Direct Rule'.
- 1978 The Cottages are opened as an additional resource for residential work. By this time the Ballycastle Centre has three residential units, The House with 50 beds, The Village with 32, and the Cottages with 32. This means that three separate programmes can take place concurrently.
- 1979 The Croi (Irish for 'the heart') is opened as a building for worship and social meetings. A full time programme worker in Christian Education is appointed.
- 1980 The Rev Ray Davey retires and the Rev John Morrow is appointed Leader of the Community.
- 1981- (March) A major Political Conference 'Models of Political Co-operation' is organised at Queen's University Belfast, in partnership with the Glencree Community of Reconciliation based in Dublin.
- 1981 - (June) The first 'Summerfest', an all age Christian Education festival examining the current issues in the light of faith. The theme for the first Summerfest is "Your Kingdom Come" and Mother Teresa of Calcutta is the keynote speaker. Summerfest is a regular part of Corrymeela's programme. It is held every 2-3 years, and normally attracts 1000 participants.
- 1983 Corrymeela members take a leading role in the newly formed' Inter Church Group on Faith and Politics'. It continues to publish documents emerging from the inter church group's discussions on current issues.
- The Appointment of a Roman Catholic Priest as a member of Staff.

- First Conference for Catholic and Protestant Clergy.
- 1984 Full time Schools Worker is appointed.
- 1985 Understanding Conflict Project commences. This is a joint venture between Corrymeela and the University of Ulster bringing Corrymeela's practical experience of working for reconciliation within an academic framework, providing training for public and other bodies such as the police, trade unions, local government etc.
- 1986 Sanctuary Unit Cedar Haven built for those under threat to meet the increasing demand for this provision.
- Corrymeela receives Templeton Project Award for its YouthWork.
- 1988 Corrymeela receives Peace Pole from Society for World Peace.
- 1989 Norman Richardson and Carmel Heaney, Corrymeela Members, win Kohl International Peace Prize for their peace education work.
- 1992 The Mediation Network for Northern Ireland is formed with Corrymeela members in senior positions. A close association with the Corrymeela Community continues.
- The Village is refurbished.
- 1993 The Rev Trevor Williams, is elected Leader of the Community.
- 1995 Corrymeela 'Treetops' - a childrens bereavement group commences.
- 1996 The Cottages are upgraded.
- 1996 The Community decides to undertake a £1.3 million plan to rebuild the house as a simple structure to replace the worn out wooden building which was bought by the Community in 1965 and gave Corrymeela its name.
- 1997 Corrymeela receives the Niwano Peace Prize.
- 1998 - (March) The newly completed House opens to receive the first group as plans continue for the official opening later in the year.
- 1998 - (April) Community members spend their 'first' weekend in the new House and participate in the re-dedication of the House
- 1998 - (June) Official Dedication of our new House at Ballycastle by Rev. Ray Davey took place on the 2nd June. Among many invited guests, there was a surprise appearance by HRH Prince Charles.
- 1999 - (June) First International Summer School held
- 1999 - (December) First International Winter School held.
- 2000 - (June) - Second International Summer School held
- 2000 - (July) - Corryfest 2000 held at the Centre

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5.1 Profile of the Corrrymeela Community's Membership[1]

A. Roman Catholic:

	Male	Female
Northern Ireland	22	25
Republic of Ireland	2	7
Great Britain	1	2
Other Place	0	1
Total =	25 Males	35 Females

Total Number of Roman Catholics: 60

B. Protestant:

	Male	Female
Northern Ireland	36	45
Republic of Ireland	4	4
Great Britain	9	10
Other Place	4	6
Total =	53 Males	65 Females

Total Number of Protestants: 118

[1] Source: Email correspondence "The Corrymeela Community", <belfast@corrymeela.org.uk> to Ted Cichon subject: Article one from Corrymeela, extract from "The Corrymeela Community and its Programme work", Part 1 Prepared by Colin Fowler July 1995. Sighted April 22, 1999.

5.2 Profile Summary[2]...

- There are 178 Community Members on the current list.
- 34% of the Members are Roman Catholic and 66% are from a Protestant denomination.
- 44% of the Members are male and 56% are female.
- 72% of the Members are originally from Northern Ireland; 10% are from the Republic of Ireland; 12% are from Great Britain; 6% are from another country.
- Of those Members who come from outside Ireland, approximately 88% are Protestant and 12% are Catholic.
- There are more Catholic women from the Republic of Ireland than males.
- Of those who come from another country... 6 are from the U.S.A.; 1 from Australia; 1 from Germany; 1 from Holland; 1 from Sweden; and 1 from Switzerland.[3]

5.3 Electoral Patterns

A theme that recurs in Northern Irish election outcomes, is an inconsistency in the representation of electorates. Another theme, which can be identified, is the suspicion of socialist or Labour contenders in elections. For instance, when proportional representation was abolished in 1922, Bardon notes that twenty-one local authorities had been dissolved and their functions taken over by government-appointed commissioners.[4] Moreover, members of the Government had 'the liveliest fear of socialism and had been concerned at the success of Labour candidates in 1920', who won control of Lurgan, Lisburn and Bangor, and greatly reduced the Unionist majority in Belfast.[5] The evidence here suggests, proportional representation was abolished not only to favour Unionist candidates, but also to exclude Sinn Féin - Nationalists and

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[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[5] Ibid. p. 500.

Labour representation. Another indicator of this assertion is found in Michael Collins's claim that the bill to abolish proportional representation was 'to oust the Catholic and Nationalists people of the Six Counties from their rightful share in local administration.[6]

Moreover, the empirical evidence for the above inconsistency is found in the following electoral results. Bardon makes the comparison between the 1920 and the 1927 local elections. In 1920 opposition parties won control of twenty-four local authorities out of twenty-seven, but by 1927 Unionists had a majority in all but twelve councils.[7] It should be noted that this can be also attributed to local Unionist parties being able to dictate the positioning of the boundaries. As Bardon notes, in the Omagh Rural District Council, for example, Catholics outnumbered Protestants by 8,179 and though nationalists cast 5,381 more votes than unionists, the new electoral boundaries gave Unionists a majority of eighteen representatives there.[8] Catholics made up 56 per cent of Fermanagh's population but their representation on local bodies fell from 52.5 per cent to 36.75 per cent.[9]

5.4 Contemporary Patterns

According to Connolly's definition of pluralism, 'new groupings... can enter into politics and shift the balance of power in the give and take of pluralism'.[10] It is clear new groupings (political parties) *have* entered politics since the beginning of the conflict in Northern Ireland. As Bardon puts it, 'a confusing kaleidoscope of party labels'.[11] It is argued here, that it is only since the formation of a power-sharing Executive in the Assembly in 1999, (but

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[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid. p. 501.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Connolly, W., in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, op. cit. p. 376.
[11] Bardon, J., *A History of Ulster*, op. cit. p. 702.

suspended by the Westminster Parliament on February 11, 2000) a notion of true pluralism has occupied the democratic space in Northern Ireland. In other words, minorities as well as majorities are adequately represented in the legislature. But only for seventy-two days.

A statistical analysis of recent elections is found in the following[12].

Party	1998 Assembly	1997 Local Government	1997 Westminster	1993 Local Government
UUP	21% (28 seats)	28% (188 cllrs)	33% (10 MPs)	29% (197 cllrs)
SDLP	22% (24 seats)	21% (120 cllrs)	24% (3 MPs)	22% (127 cllrs)
DUP 1	8% (20 seats)	16% (91 cllrs)	14% (2 MPs)	17% (103 cllrs)
S. Féin	18% (18 seats)	17% (74 cllrs)	16% (2 MPs)	12% (51 cllrs)
AP	6% (6 seats)	7% (41 cllrs)	8%	---
UKUP	5% (5 seats)	0.5% (4 cllrs)	2 % (1 MP)	---
PUP	3% (2 seats)	2% (7 cllrs)	1%	0.4% (1 cllr)
NIWC	2% (2 seats)	1% (1 cllr)	0.4%	---
UDP	1%	1% (4 cllrs)	---	0.4% (1 cllr)
Con	0.2%	0.4% (2 cllrs)	1%	1% (6 cllrs)
Lab	0.3%	0.4% (3 cllrs)	---	1% (2 cllrs)
Oth Un	3% (3 seats)	1% (11 cllrs)	---	3% (24 cllrs)
Others	0.8%	5% (35 cllrs)	0.3%	4% (23 cllrs)

Abbreviations: Cllrs = councillors, Con = Conservative, Lab = Labour, and Oth Un = Other Unionists.

[12] Whyte, N., "1998 Assembly, Local Government 1993,1997, Westminster 1997 Elections", <http://explores.whyte.com/>.
Sighted December 3, 1999.

5.5 The issues of education, anti-Catholicism and the problems of conflicting evidence

5.5.1 Education

Perhaps one of the unexpected ironies which has resulted in the shortlived power-sharing Executive in the Stormont Assembly, was the appointment of Sinn Féin hardliner, Martin McGuinness as Minister for Education in Northern Ireland. Education, is a transmitter of religious and cultural dimensions. It is a socialising agent as well as an issue under the rubric of social justice. But in brief, Protestant and Catholic children are taught separately. Some would argue, this in itself is divisive 'and not only contributes to the problem but is part of the problem'.[13] There is however, a rather optimistic, or at least a promising view held by Heaney, in which he argues there is a strong Christian ethos, and a caring, stable, environment found in the schools of Northern Ireland.[14] Moreover according to Heaney, they are 'relatively free from conflict' and 'education is seen as the brightest prospect for stability within Northern Ireland.'[15]

The pedagogical discourse has been rehearsed elsewhere. In brief 'the education system... continues to function effectively and succeeds in achieving and maintaining high standards.'[16] But what is also important here is, the above functions in marked contrast to the suspicion and violence which has beleaguered a society for decades. In other words, the point that Heaney makes is that there exists a sense of *moral order* within the schools.[17]

Within Northern Ireland's education system provision has been made for children to learn about other religions.[18] It is a statutory requirement that

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[13] Heaney, L. F., "Northern Ireland-- A Question of Education", in *Contemporary Review*, October 1994 Vol. 265 No. 1545, p. 194.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid. p. 193.
[17] Ibid. p. 195
[18] Ibid. p. 196.

schools integrate Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU) into the curriculum as a cross-curricular theme. As Heaney notes, it success depends on the 'firm and consistent commitment by principals and parents' if this programme 'is to make an impact on Northern Ireland's divided society'.[19]

The themes of human interaction in the EMU projects are not too dissimilar from those found in the Corrymeela Community, especially at Ballycastle. In both instances children are involved in joint trips, meet other children from different religious backgrounds, play, talk and learn together. Heaney's study presents evidence of notable success found in an integrated school system.[20] Since 1982, when there were only two integrated schools in existence and the number of integrated schools has risen to twenty-three by September 1994.[21] In 1994 there were 4,000 children being taught in integrated schools in Northern Ireland, or two per cent of the student population).[22]

In his study, Heaney emphasises that not only such an educational strategy offers some positive prospects for the future of Northern Ireland, but also it appears to be

> the most positive and influentual means whereby children from Catholic and Protestant traditions come to understand each other and to learn together and where different as well as religious identities are recognised and become part and parcel of the learning process.[23]

This again has a resonance with the ethos of the Corrymeela Community. The point is however, the existing situation of integrated schools, although limited, is also the outcome of a policy, administered the state --- a secular entity. Therefore, it can be suggested here, the potential for stability, and

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[19] Ibid. p. 195.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid. p. 196.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.

consequently peace and reconciliation lies in the school system. The potential of the education system outweighs that of Corrymeela. Heaney's assessment places the education system (schools) in Northern Ireland 'to rise above the political turmoil and indecision'.[24] Moreover, another salient feature of the above is that of socialisation. Education can be considered as a transmitter of norms. Thus, for this reason, there is some optimism the education system will continue to produce not only well educated individuals, who will offer their talents to Northern Ireland's industries and institutions, but individuals who possess balanced and informed opinions of the views and beliefs of others.[25]

The above is not to suggest that the education system alone is a panacea for Northern Ireland's problems. Nor is it suggested here, that it be beyond reproach. There is still a resistance to integrated schools within the Catholic faith, in spite of Vatican II encyclicals. For instance, Whyte identifies separate marriage and separate education as the two factors that most divide Protestants as a whole and Catholics as a whole.[26] It is a form of apartheid.

At the same time, the above issues among others in the Roman Catholic tradition, add to simultaneous ignorance and contempt which in turn make up for some Protestants the perception of "Rome Rule". This perception or collective attitude is part of a sociological process. In Northern Ireland, anti-Catholicism is a part of this sociological process that is socially disseminated and transmitted.

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[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Whyte, J., *Interptreting Northern Ireland*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 48.

5.5.2 Anti-Catholicism

The argument for the ideology of anti-Catholicism as a concept being more potent than Corrymeela's message of peace and reconciliation, is strengthened when we examine Brewer and Higgins's sociological features of anti-Catholicism.[27] Anti-Catholicism involves a practical reasoning process in which anti-Catholics 'draw on their stock of socially available common-sense knowledge rather than formal theological knowledge to understand the world'.[28]

Distortion, deletion, distance and denial are the four features of the common-sense reasoning which support and sustain anti-Catholicism.[29] Distortion involves a distorted view of Irish history as a whole. For instance, it has been claimed that the origins of the Orange Order were in response to 'defenderism', which was a part of the 'ethnic cleansing programme to remove Protestant witness from Ireland'.[30] As Brewer and point out, the claim *deletes* the mention of the Peep O'Day Boys terrorising Catholics. Another example of distortion and deletion can be found in the claim that the IRA is Catholic and following an agenda directed by the bishops, involves deleting evidence that the Catholic Church 'has historically been amongst the fiercest critics of terrorism'.[31]

Distance involves the over-looking and avoidance of counter-evidence.[32] For instance, Catholics are stereotyped and individual Catholics are thus treated as types, but the countervailing evidence drawn from personal contact with

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[27] Brewer, J.D., and Higgins, G. I., "Understanding Anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland", in *British Journal of Sociology*, May 1999, Vol.33 No.2, pp. 235-255.
[28] Ibid. p. 246.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid. p. 247.
[32] Ibid.

particular Catholics is overlooked.[33] Denial is a cognitive process which involves falsification in order to deny counter-evidence. Brewer and Higgins cite the work of Taylor where one of his respondents, a member of the Free Presbyterian Church said, 'we let them have their worship and we mixed with them and for all our love, they became our enemies'.[34]

It can be said, the synthesis of the above sociological and cognitive features is termed by Brewer and Higgins as a 'factual reality'.[35] Indeed, this is not to say that the entire Protestant population in Northern Ireland harbours anti-Catholic sentiments. Rather, it must be said that an ecumenical movement has existed at least since 1948 when at Clonard Monastery in West Belfast, the first Sunday of Lent marked the beginning of "Mission to Non-Catholics".[36] and the following illustrates the difficulties found in conflicting evidence.

5.5.3 The problems of conflicting evidence

Conflicting evidence is not necessarily a flaw in the neither research or methodology used in this dissertation's analysis. In specific terms, conflicting evidence does not undermine a historical-comparative approach either. The problems lie in attempts at 'quantification' of concepts such as ecumenism, sectarianism, secularism, as well as other seemingly pedigree, theoretical approaches.

Let us consider for instance, the notion that the Corrymeela Community needs to be more proactive in its lobbying of the government to reach a peaceful resolution. How can we quantify the Community's "proactiveness", or lack of it? There is no definitive, or a quantitative answer. Similarly, the problem exists if we attempt to measure the ecumenical effect of the

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[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid. p. 248.

Corrymeela Community, in relation to the remainder of Northern Irish society. Moreover at the same time, activities such as daily interdenominational prayers at St Anne's Cathedral in Belfast since April 30, 1991, cannot be dismissed or be viewed as insignificant as they are the foundations of empirical data.[37] Another less known fact according to the Church of Ireland Archbishop Walton Empey is, 'many remote Protestant churches would not exist without cash and support from Roman Catholics'.[38] In this instance, a member of the Protestant hierarchy challenges the northern unionists who still believe the Irish Republic is influenced "or even governed" by Rome.[39] Yet, it seems that both the public perception, and perhaps the reality of the situation support the notion that Northern Ireland's society is *more* divided.[40] Continued allegations that the Irish Catholic Church hierarchy is dominated by republicans and adopts anti-British attitudes are in contradiction with the above statement by Archbishop Empey. Thus, the above is a brief account of the difficulty experienced when assessing conceptual constructs (ecumenism, peace dividend) in a physical setting. However, a comparative approach in this analysis enables us to assess the strengths and weaknesses, found in peace oriented NGOs such as the Corrymeela Community.

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38 McAdam, N., and Devine, M., "Church of Ireland Synod: Catholics keep our churches open," *Belfast Telegraph On Line*, May 7, 1996,
<http://belfasttelegraph.co.uk/cgi-bin/ArchiveSearch.cgi>.
Sighted November 15, 1999.

39 Ibid.

40 "Letters", *Belfast Telegraph On Line*, April 22, 1997. Sighted Novermber 15, 1999. In this instance, the writer (not cited in abstract) in " Letters" is referring to anti-Catholicism as 'the theology of hate' which 'for so long, has been gone unchallenged and unquestioned in Northern Ireland'.

Statistics on mixed marriages/relationships 1988/99 --- Page 1. *

Proportion of mixed[1] /relationships 1988 and 1998/99
All married/cohabiting couples *Percentages*

	1988	1998/99
	%	%
Mixed marriage/relationship[2]	2	3
Both same religion[3]	77	64
Unable to calsssify religion of one or both[4]	21	33
Base= 100%	1,983	1,637

Source: Continuous Household Survey

Please note:

The continuous Household Survey and other NI surveys do not provide reliable data on mixed marriages/relationships. This is due to the high proportion falling into the 'unable to classify' category as indicated in point 5 [sic] above. This makes it difficult to accurately measure the true proportion in mixed marriages/relationships. It may be possible to produce more reliable estimates after the 2001 census.

* The above information (document) has been reproduced without alteration. The original document is email correspondence from Michael McNeill of the Central Survey Unit in Northern Ireland, <michael.mcneill.csu@nics.gov.uk>, to Ted Cichon. Sighted June 6, 2000.

[1] Religion is defined as Roman Catholic and non-Catholic.

[2] Mixed religion is defined as one partner Roman Catholic and the other non-Catholic

[3] Same religion is defined as both partners Roman Catholic or both partners non-Catholic.

[4] Unable to classify religion: did not complete an individual interview, had a proxy interview completed on their behalf (which does not ask the religion question) or were unwilling to answer the religion question.

Statistics on mixed marriages/relationships --- Page 2.

Households-Proportion headed by couples in mixed[1] marriages/relationships 1988 and 1998/99

All households *Percentages*

	1988	1998/99
	%	%
Households headed by:		
Couples[2]		
Head and partner mixed religion[3]	1	2
Head and partner same religion[4]	48	37
Unable to classify religion of head and/or partner[5]	13	19
Not headed by a couple	38	42
Base =100%	3, 169	2,809

Source: Continuous Household Survey

Please note:

The Continuous Household Survey and other NI surveys do not provide reliable data on mixed marriages/relationships. This is due to the high proportion falling into the 'unable to classify' category as indicated in point 5 above. This makes it difficult to accurately measure the true proportion in mixed marriages/relationships. It may be possible to produce more reliable estimates after the 2001 census.

Therefore, these figures should be treated as very rough estimates.

[1] Religion is defined as Roman Catholic and non-Catholic.
[2] Married or cohabiting couples.
[3] Mixed religion is defined as one partner Roman Catholic and the other non-Catholic.
[4] Same religion is defined as both partners Roman Catholic or both partners non-Catholic.
[5] Unable to classify religion: did not complete an individual interview, had a proxy interview completed on their behalf(which does not ask the religion question) or were unwilling to answer the religion question.

Statistics on mixed marriages/relationships 1988 and 1998/99 --- Page 3.

Households headed by married/cohabiting couples - Proportion in mixed[1] marriages/relationships 1988 and 1998/99

All households headed by a married/cohabiting couple Percentages

	1988	1998/99
	%	%
Head and partner mixed religion[2]	2	3
Head and partner same religion[3]	77	64
Unable to classify religion of head and/or partner[4]	21	33
Base = 100%	**1,964**	**1,628**

Source: Continuous Household Survey

Please note:

The Continuous Household Survey and other NI surveys do not provide reliable data on mixed marriages/relationships. This is due to the high proportion falling into the 'unable to classify' category as indicated in point 5 [sic] above. This makes it difficult to accurately measure the true proportion in mixed marriages/relationships. It may be possible to produce more reliable estimates after the 2001 census.

Therefore, these figures should be treated as a very rough estimate.

[1] Religion is defined as Roman Catholic and non- Catholic.
[2] Mixed religion is defined as one partner Roman Catholic and the other non- Catholic.
[3] Same religion is defined as both partners Roman Catholic or both partners non-Catholic.
[4] Unable to classify religion: did not complete an individual interview, had a proxy interview completed on their behalf (which does not ask the religion question) or were unwilling to answer the religion question.

Church Attendance by stated religion 1992-93*. Page 1

	TOTAL		Refused don't know religion		More than once a week		At least once a week	
	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct
Total	6108	100%	774	13%	607	10%	2290	37%
Catholic	2120	100%	0	0%	306	14%	1423	67%
Protestant	3132	100%	0	0%	256	8%	849	27%
Other, none	244	100%	162	66%	45	18%	18	7%
Ref, dk	612	100%	612	100%	0	0%	0	0%

Church Attendance by stated religion 1992-93**. Page 2

	At least once a fortnight		At least once a month		At least once every few months		At least once a year	
	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct
Total	690	11%	671	11%	343	6%	569	9%
Catholic	114	5%	106	5%	45	2%	82	4%
Protestant	572	18%	564	18%	294	9%	481	15%
Other, none	4	2%	1	0%	4	2%	6	2%
Ref, dk	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%

Abbreviations
pct = percentage,
Ref= Refused
dk= Don't know religion,[sic]

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< michael.mcneill.csu@nics.gov.uk.> Central Survey Unit, Northern Ireland to Ted Cichon. Sighted June 8, 2000.

** Ibid

Church Attendance by stated religion 1992-93*. Page 3

	Less often		never		Unable attend	
	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct
Total	164	3%	0	0%	0	0%
Catholic	44	2%	0	0%	0	0%
Protestant	116	4%	0	0%	0	0%
Other, none	4	2%	0	0%	0	0%
Ref, dk	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%

Abbreviations
pct = percentage,
Ref= Refused
dk= Don't know religion,[sic]

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Church Attendance by stated religion 1998-99*. Page 1

	TOTAL		Refused don't know religion		More than once a week		At least once a week	
	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct
Total	5504	100%	1088	20%	507	9%	1533	28%
Catholic	1758	100%	0	0%	235	13%	941	54%
Protestant	2631	100%	0	0%	270	10%	589	22%
Other, none	27	100%	0	0%	2	7%	3	11%
Ref, dk	1088	100%	1088	100%	0	0%	0	0%

Church Attendance by stated religion 1998-99**. Page 2

	At least once a fortnight		At least once a month		At least once every few months		At least once a year	
	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct
Total	249	5%	326	6%	439	8%	349	6%
Catholic	64	4%	87	5%	125	7%	100	6%
Protestant	185	7%	239	9%	312	12%	249	9%
Other, none	0	0%	0	0%	2	7%	3	11%
Ref, dk	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%

Abbreviations
pct = percentage,
Ref= Refused
dk= Don't know religion,[sic]

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** Ibid

Church Attendance by stated religion 1998-99*. Page 3

	Less often		never		Unable attend	
	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct	Valid cases	Row pct
Total	207	4%	699	13%	107	2%
Catholic	38	2%	132	8%	36	2%
Protestant	168	6%	552	21%	70	3%
Other, none	1	4%	15	56%	1	4%
Ref, dk	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%

Abbreviations
pct = percentage,
Ref= Refused
dk= Don't know religion, [sic]

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